Civilian Casualties, Religion, and COIN Operations

[rborum]

Just read through Wilf's extensive "more killing" thread from a couple of weeks ago. Very thoughtful discourse..for the most part.

Got some additional insights, I think, on my "civilian casualties" question .. albeit from an angle different from whence the question was posed.

Reading through this and a few other related threads, the discussions seem typically to begin as a polemic: winning population support OR killing militants.

Then those debating on each side clarify that they understand BOTH dimensions are necessary.

The lingering and ensuing debates - which I think are related to the controversy over whether "war is war" - seem to huddle around a couple of themes. They are certainly not epiphanies, but I share them for your consideration:

Roles: There seems to be agreement that militants need to be killed/suppressed AND that infrastructure should be built with an engaged population - but some seem to take the view that the military should only focus on the former and requiring them to do both functions gives us sub-optimal results in both domains.

Sequencing: In the thread, Wilf (I think I am recalling correctly) summarized the options as - and I am paraphrasing here - (A) Kill the militants, and then secure the hearts and minds of the population ; or (B) Engage the hearts and minds of the population, and leverage that to defeat the insurgency. I'm sure I lost some nuance here, particularly in what causes what. Some argue you can't address both tasks at the same time. Others say you must address both tasks both at the same time.

Strategic Interoperability: Regardless of how one draws the arrows between the kinetic and nonkinetic they each transactively affect the other. Most people, I suspect, acknowledge this at some level but the extent to which they are integrated together in strategic thinking (as opposed to being viewed in a more linear way) also seems to vary. Who we kill, and how and when we kill them (including collateral casualties) does seem to affect how the non-militant population responds - both in relation to the counterinsurgent and in how they embrace their own sovereign identity. Conversely, how the counterinsurgent treats the population, the extent of their contact, and how they instrumentally influence their social infrastructure seems to affect not only their degree of cooperation/engagement/ industriousness, but also the extent and quality of the HUMINT acquired from them that improves the counterinsurgent's ability to selectively find and kill the real bad guys.

I might wish to add explicitly, a dimension that is embedded in each of these: Outcome/effects. People often raise the question of what it means to "win" an insurgency. If we assume - and I'm sure this is also debatable - that at least one important outcome is indigenous, stable, sustainable governance based on the rule of law, then both winning population support and killing militants are both just means to an end. Neither are the ultimate objective.

Do any of these make sense? Are there critical contrasting dimensions I missed? Do you wish I would stop writing long posts?

[Ken White]

Very thoughtful discourse..for the most part.

Why, thank you...

some seem to take the view that the military should only focus on the former and requiring them to do both functions gives us sub-optimal results in both domains.

In reverse order, true on the sub-optimal. Most acknowledge that the armed forces must do both early on in a FID environment, the issue is how robust and how quickly should the efforts of other USG agencies be committed -- that is a wild card, situation dependent. Some of us contend that the armed forces will never do that well and that security must be insured before major projects can begin therefor security should be the initial emphasis, transitioning as the situation develops.

Some argue you can't address both tasks at the same time. Others say you must address both tasks both at the same time.

Again an issue of degree, I think. In FID, one has to do both, the difficulty is that many tend to predicate who does what to who on earlier wars and therein lies the fallacy. Every war, every population is different.

Most people, I suspect, acknowledge this at some level but the extent to which they are integrated together in strategic thinking (as opposed to being viewed in a more linear way) also seems to vary.

Therein lie the problem that leads to the quibbles above -- most people want neat, tidy solutions; an 'open the box and break out the strategy' sort of solution. There aren't any. Each war is a separate, non-repeating function and must have differing approaches. A part of our problem is that our ego will not allow us to learn from history and we insist on blundering in, then rapidly researching 'the history' to find solution that worked. What worked then and there may not work here and now. Our penchant for quick fixes is intruded upon by reality -- and different clocks and calendars...

People often raise the question of what it means to "win" an insurgency.

You cannot win against an insurgent, all you can obtain is an acceptable outcome. There is no victory, no defeat (other than at a tactical level). Those words should be avoided in discussion and pronouncements.

If we assume...that at least one important outcome is indigenous, stable, sustainable governance based on the rule of law...

True as stated. I'd only suggest that the outcome you suggest (and with which many agree) is in some cases not probable enough to merit its acceptance as a goal (e.g. Afghanistan); that the 'rule of law' must be appreciative of the locale (i.e. neither Iraq nor Afghanistan will ever meet western norms even at a low level) and that "sustainable governance" is very much beholder -- and local calendar -- dependent.

Expecting ideal solutions in any FID (or COIN) efforts is unwise.

[rborum]

Thank you Ken.

[Brandon Friedman]

[1] In my experience, anyone who fired at me is in what we can call Category 1.

[2] Anyone who did not but seemed likely to fire given a chance is in Category 2A. Anyone who did not and might not was suspect until proven not a potential threat (Category 2B). Anyone who offers cooperation is accepted conditionally and cautiously until some proof of their intent is shown (Category 2C). Anyone who does cooperate, seems unlikely to shoot at me is in Category 2D.

[3] Anyone who fights with me is in category 3A. Anyone who has fought with me on multiple occasions and thus has proven some loyalty or appreciation of the benefits of a mutually rewarding relationship is in category 3B.

[4] Fellow members of my own or closely allied units are in category 4.

As I'm sure you already know Category 1 persons are easily identified on the battlefield and should be killed.

Categories 2-4 persons should not be killed if possible. However, they bear considerable watching and due to necessary action ([1] above), Category 2 persons may be accidentally killed on a sliding scale of A to D with A being of small consequence and B being avoided if at all possible, C being avoided in most cases while killing D is to be avoided even at some cost *.

Category 3 persons should not be killed but 3A persons must be closely watched unless and until they move to Category 3B. Those in 3B must still be loosely watched...

Category 4 persons should not be killed unless they are engaged in wrongdoing. Unfortunately, even some of them bear watching...

IOW who to kill is obvious, who not to kill is far less obvious and avoiding killing them while it increases your risk is necessary -- and please remember this:

That is true not only in an FID or COIN operation but in all combat to include major combat operations against a peer force in a war of movement.

If that equates to a platitude, my regrets -- it's reality.

Ken, I might be misunderstanding you, because in your later comments, I tend to agree with you. But with all due respect, I think your categorizations above badly underestimate the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan and fail to reflect the reality on the ground. Dealing with Afghans (or even Iraqis, for that matter), cannot be broken down into eight simple categories. Relationships in these places are more fluid than you're suggesting. So, assuming I haven’t just misread you (which I might be doing), I have some questions for you:

Do you kill civilians who actively assist the Taliban by offering shelter to their fighters? How do you know whether or not they were coerced into it? What about those who provide the Taliban with weapons? What about civilians who actively assist one Taliban group, but offer you information about another Taliban group? What about farmers who eagerly sell opium to warlords known for attacking Americans? How do you distinguish between those who support the warlords and those who are coerced into supporting the warlords?

What if U.S. forces offend the honor of a local tribe one day, and the next time U.S. forces come around, the locals fire at them? Leaving immediate self-defense aside, are they to be killed? Are they considered the "enemy?" What if they start planting land mines on the approaches to their village to keep U.S. forces out? And what about the ever-present problem of receiving seemingly-good-but consistently-bad information from locals who are motivated by tribal rivalries and/or profit—and not by America’s desire to win the “Global War on Terror?”

There are an infinite number of categories that inhibit the process of knowing who to kill. I’ve never once fired my personal weapon or ordered anyone else to fire theirs without (at least) first being drawn upon by the enemy. That’s because we had no idea who to kill otherwise.

This is why the U.S. military is moving toward a population-centric approach. Sure, it’s not the way I was brought up in the infantry. But when you don’t have adequate intelligence or language skills within American units--and you haven't grown up in the "neighborhood"--being focused primarily on killing the right people is a recipe for disaster in places like Afghanistan--as Michael C rightly notes. We’re just not equipped. If you want to kill the right people, you must first secure the population, give them confidence, and then let the intelligence come to you. Only then should you start looking for fights.

I have no doubt you’ll pick this apart--and maybe I'm misunderstanding you--but if there’s one thing on which we could probably agree, it’s the idea that these situations are best dealt with by avoiding them like the plague in the first place. We certainly agree this:

What I and some others have also said is that most such conflicts should be avoided by better diplomacy, aid and low key SF involvement to stop burgeoning problems before they require GPF deployment because those will always be messy and difficult. Your comments prove that that they are that. It will be no consolation but a lot of us discovered that 40 years ago and our forebears in the Army on the Plains in the late 19th Century probably had precisely the same complaints. As did a bunch of Alexanders folks in what is now Afghanistan 2,340 years ago. The tools may change, warfare may change but war does not.

[Ken White]

is going to be inaccurate, out of date and will fail to do justice to the nuances.

Any characterization of people in groupings or categories is going to be inaccurate, able to be taken out of context and will fail to do justice to the nuances.

Combine those two thoughts. then go forth...

Ken, I might be misunderstanding you, because in your later comments, I tend to agree with you. But with all due respect, I think your categorizations above badly underestimate the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan and fail to reflect the reality on the ground.

I don't underestimate the situation in Afghanistan, the categorizations above may state grossly simplified categories to make a point in a semi light hearted vein they are incapable of underestimating or overestimating or even estimating anything. Aside from having a long ago but still educational peacetime tour in the area, recall I even went out of my way earlier to point out my son had two tours there, a Grandson in law also has two and I know folks there now as well as others who've been. I'm not pulling this stuff out of my back pocket. I have more respect for everyone on this board than that.

Dealing with Afghans (or even Iraqis, for that matter), cannot be broken down into eight simple categories. Relationships in these places are more fluid than you're suggesting. So, assuming I haven’t just misread you (which I might be doing),

You didn't misread but you seemingly took a simplistic set of points for a scholarly dissertation on population centric operations. Aside from people in general being infinitely more complex than that -- you cannot categorize them other than in generalities. With a tour in the ME and pretty broad travel there, I'm aware of the nuances and the fact that nothing in the ME -- or South Asia -- is as it seems. The national sport in that area is haggling, they're masters at it and no westerner will ever match them -- foolish to try.

I have some questions for you:

Do you kill civilians who actively assist the Taliban by offering shelter to their fighters? How do you know whether or not they were coerced into it? What about those who provide the Taliban with weapons? What about civilians who actively assist one Taliban group, but offer you information about another Taliban group? What about farmers who eagerly sell opium to warlords known for attacking Americans? How do you distinguish between those who support the warlords and those who are coerced into supporting the warlords?

Assuming 'you' is GPF acting on intel provided in all cases, in order: No; That's one reason why you don't; No (willingly provided, sold or were coerced or just taken? No way to ever be sure even with a brilliant 'Terp and half an MI Det along); Take the info with a grain of salt and check it out while compensating them in some way thus keeping a possible information source; No; You can't.

Once more, as I said way above: "IOW who to kill is obvious, who not to kill is far less obvious and avoiding killing them while it increases your risk is necessary."

What if U.S. forces offend the honor of a local tribe one day, and the next time U.S. forces come around, the locals fire at them? Leaving immediate self-defense aside, are they to be killed?

Did you punish or report the offending US elements and make sure the local tribe knew of the punishment? You must hav known about it if you know that's why they're shooting at you. If not you were wrong and are therefor responsible for your unit being fired upon and you have to make a judgment call. Enjoy.

Are they considered the "enemy?"

First thing you need to do is purge the word enemy from your COIN lexicon, that's an MCO construct and is woefully un-population centric; in FID, there is no enemy, there are good guys and bad guys, a few of each. There are a great many in between who will go with the flow. The trick is to kill the bad guys, not kill the good guys and kill as few of the floaters as possible. Bad guys shoot at you; good guys and floaters do not, thus they're easy to tell apart.

What if they start planting land mines on the approaches to their village to keep U.S. forces out?

Do not step on or drive over them. Tell the point Squad to start probing, the second and the guns to overwatch and the third to standby to go anywhere and do anything, if you have a 'Terp, tell him to ask them to come out and guide you in to save work, call it in -- wait a minute,why are you asking me this; you should know all that stuff...

And what about the ever-present problem of receiving seemingly-good-but consistently-bad information from locals who are motivated by tribal rivalries and/or profit—and not by America’s desire to win the “Global War on Terror?”

Take it with a grain -- no, a truckload -- of salt, write it down, make sure your Company intel guru gets it (you do have one, right?) and logs it, report it, keep it in mind and don't act on it unless you get corroboration unless it poses immediate danger to US troops, then act -- but sensibly and with good judgment.

There are an infinite number of categories that inhibit the process of knowing who to kill. I’ve never once fired my personal weapon or ordered anyone else to fire theirs without (at least) first being drawn upon by the enemy. That’s because we had no idea who to kill otherwise.

That may be why I said try to kill anyone who shoots at you and try to avoid killing all the others. Are we not saying the same thing in a different way? The 'at least' BTW is a good touch, inaccurate harassing fire need not be answered -- should not be, really (showing disdain is good); probing fire at night must be answered cautiously if at all and absolutely not with an automatic weapon. As an aside on that count, re: the local who fired on you and may not have lacking an insult by us -- shoot back. In that part of the world to not do so is to appear weak and that's more dangerous than being weak. You should also never relax -- most irregular forces will avoid contact with an obviously tough and ready element and wait for easier pickings if they can.

This is why the U.S. military is moving toward a population-centric approach. Sure, it’s not the way I was brought up in the infantry.

That's because all the things learned the hard way before you were born were purged from the system. Speak to several Chiefs of staff Army about that -- I sure tried to tell a bunch of their senior minions and two of them it was a dumb idea. The US Army was doing population centric operations all over the world for a good many years; some us got to be pretty good at it -- good enough to realize we learned something new every day and that no one had all the answers.

But when you don’t have adequate intelligence or language skills within American units--and you haven't grown up in the "neighborhood"--being focused primarily on killing the right people is a recipe for disaster in places like Afghanistan--as Michael C rightly notes. We’re just not equipped. If you want to kill the right people, you must first secure the population, give them confidence, and then let the intelligence come to you. Only then should you start looking for fights.

We can disagree on that. You cannot provide security unless you look for fights in the right places and the intel is good enough to tell you that -- and I'll bet big buck few if any GPF units have set up ambushes on the known infiltration / exfiltration trails due to risk aversion. The population will have no confidence in you as long as they get night visitors and you are not the visitor.

Killing people who are trying to kill you is never wrong; killing anyone not actively trying to do that is almost never right. If you re-read my post, you'll note that's what I said. I also pointed out that was true in ANY war, population centric or not, something you also seem to have missed.

We have tons of intel, perhaps too much, the problem is in the distribution and utility; the bottom line is that at Bn level and below, you'll almost never have what you can consider adequate Intel. Fact of life. Nor will there ever be enough good interpreters -- that also is a fact of life. I hear your complaints, heard others voice them in 1950, 52, 61, 65, 66, 68, 70 in more than five countries all while doing the Grunt population centric shtick. I even picked up a first edition Galula from the SWC Bookstore in '64. not a great book IMO. Truly sorry to hear things haven't gotten better -- but sadly not at all surprised. Goes with the territory, I'm afraid.

I have no doubt you’ll pick this apart--and maybe I'm misunderstanding you--

Found out the hard way on these boards it's better to read a comment and if it raises red flag, leave it and come back and read it again later. Then go answer it point by point to insure you didn't miss or elide an important item. All of us react to adverse stimuli and then tend to miss the thrust for a tree or two.

but if there’s one thing on which we could probably agree, it’s the idea that these situations are best dealt with by avoiding them like the plague in the first place. We certainly agree this:

Yes, we can, we can probably agree on a number of other things as well. We're all products of our experiences and we're all better for sharing an learning. Closer to 80 than I'd like and I'm still learning new stuff every day...