The Afghanistan National Police (ANP)
Recently published by the OIGs of State & Defense:
Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness
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Key Judgments
• The U.S.-funded program to train and equip the Afghan National Police (ANP) is generally well conceived and well executed. However, long-term U.S. assistance and funding, at least beyond 2010, is required to institutionalize the police force and establish a self-sustaining program.
• The U.S. Ambassador is responsible for policy guidance; the Commander, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) executes the police program through the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). The senior embassy and military leaders have excellent relations and work together well to administer and improve the police program.
• Building the Afghan National Police (ANP) requires a comprehensive, integrated approach that encompasses leadership training, sustaining institutions and organizations, and oversight and internal control mechanisms. As it has rapidly evolved, police readiness requirements have expanded beyond training to include sweeping institutional reform of the ANP through the Ministry of Interior.
• Nevertheless, ANP’s readiness level to carry out its internal security and conventional police responsibilities is far from adequate. The obstacles to establish a fully professional ANP are formidable. Among them are: no effective field training officer (FTO) program, illiterate recruits, a history of low pay and pervasive corruption, and an insecure environment.
• The mentoring program is a key component to effect institutional change and build a capable, self-sustaining national police force. To reach its full potential, the mentoring program should be expanded and better managed to achieve program objectives.
• Management of the police training contract is problematic and requires more effective coordination between State Department contract managers and CSTC-A, which is responsible for executing ANP training programs.
• The procurement pipeline to Afghanistan for ANP equipment is slow, but is improving. There is inadequate accountability for equipment after it is turned over to the ANP, because the ANP logistics system is not yet effective. The ANP needs to establish and implement an effective end-to-end internal controls process.
• Until the Afghan criminal justice system, including law enforcement, judiciary, and corrections, has matured and is synchronized and coordinated from the national to the local level such that laws are standardized and uniformly applied, the ANP will function more as a security force than as a law enforcement organization.
• The U.S. and international effort for standing up the ANP is not limitless; therefore, transitioning full responsibility and authority to the MoI needs greater emphasis.
• Building an effective ANP program will require a long-term commitment from coalition and international partners. Premature withdrawal from this commitment will compromise the progress already accomplished and put at risk the U.S. goal to establish a professional police force embracing the values and practices of community policing and the rule of law.
The full report makes for an interesting read.
Cops or Robbers: The Struggle to Reform the Afghan Police
Cops or Robbers: The Struggle to Reform the Afghan Police (pdf file) - Andrew Wilder, Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit
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...
If police reform is to succeed in Afghanistan, and the big increase in resources to reform the ANP is not to be wasted, the major actors —
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especially the government, the US, and the EUPOL mission — will need to address five key issues.
1. Develop a shared vision and strategy for the ANP
The most fundamental issue that must be resolved
for police reform efforts to succeed in Afghanistan is the need for a shared vision of the role of the ANP, and a shared strategy on
how to achieve that vision. In particular, there is a need to reconcile the “German vision” of the police as a civilian law and order force, and
the “US vision” of the police as a security force with a major counter-insurgency role ...
2. Replace SSR pillars with an integrated and comprehensive rule of law strategy.
The failure of the government and the international community to develop and implement an effective strategy for reforming and strengthening
the judicial sector is a potentially crippling flaw of current police reform efforts. A civilian police force, no matter how well trained and
equipped, will have little ability to uphold and promote the rule of law in the absence of a functioning judicial system ...
3. Make donor assistance conditional on comprehensive MoI reform.
The most consistent theme that emerged in interviews for this paper was that without comprehensive reform of the MoI, police reform efforts will fail and the money spent on reform will be wasted. The MoI is notoriously corrupt, factionalised, and an increasingly important actor in Afghanistan's illegal drug economy ...
4. Prioritise quality of police over quantity.
There has been a damaging tendency to let immediate issues, such as the presidential elections and the growing Taliban insurgency, result in “quick fix” solutions that prioritise the quantity of police over the quality. A recent example was the 2006 decision to create the ANAP to assist
in counter-insurgency operations. Such measures to quickly increase police numbers are undermining the longer-term objective of creating
an effective police force ...
5. Prioritise fiscal sustainability of the security sector.
It is widely recognised that in the foreseeable future Afghanistan will not have the resources to independently sustain the security sector institutions that are currently being developed. Despite this knowledge, few concrete measures are being taken to address the problem, and
few decisions are being made to bring security sector costs more in line with what Afghanistan can afford ...
A massive amount of info about the Afghan police in this document. Very interesting reading, whether you agree with the recommendations or not.
Lemme see if I have this right.
GAO -- who would not have a job if they found nothing wrong -- found things wrong. Okay.
Three DoS, One DoD, one USAID and One DOJ type all commented on the wrongs GAO found -- and added couple to show they were concerned. Okay.
A part of the reported problem is failure to adequately equip the ANP. No mention is made of the part played by our ridiculous procurement laws and regulations -- most at the behest of the Congress that is conducting this 'hearing' -- which are almost certainly primarily responsible for that flaw. Okay.
Another part is that the Afghans works on a different timetable and have different mores than we would like. Okay.
Could the excessive bureaucracy herein displayed also play a part in the failure of the ANP to walk on water?
Oh, wait; not too much water there...
We can save money if we store this and release it again a year from now; save the cost of another hearing to discover little real change. Or we could say no such hearing until 2012 and give things a chance to get fixed...
Not to disparage your posting Jedburgh, I appreciate it and your postings. It's just every now and then, my mind really boggles at how utterly ridiculous and overweight we've become. Verily, I have vented... :mad:
Great post and I agree but I do think the
ever pragmatic Dutch have at least a partial solution. Won't work for and in the US but it might work for some nations and for Afghanistan. The Marechaussee LINK and the Gendarmerie LINK concepts are also widely copied in the ME. Iran for example, in the days of the Shahs had two police forces; the totally civilian National Police who performed all standard police functions in the towns and cities and the paramilitary Gendarmerie who policed rural areas AND provdiced the border Guard and a paramilitary force (which coincidentally served as a counterweight and coup deterrent to the Armed Forces).
The Turks also have a Gendarmerie. LINK. Note that in all cases, there's a dual chain, civilian and military and note also that the Turks are using Gendarmes in their counterinsurgency (as did the Dutch and French in their former colonies and as did the Viet Namese use their Field Police).
We have a bad tendency to believe that only US solutions are appropriate and to apply the 'not invented here' syndrome to some good ideas that others have. Of course, one argument certain to be deployed to support that ego centric American concept is that "It's hard enough to stand up one police force, much less two." To which I respond -- when you have an absolute and demonstrated NEED for two different kinds of police forces, that's not an issue, it's simply a minor impediment.
You're pretty much right but that has no effect on the fact
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Originally Posted by
reed11b
I thought I remember reading that the VC effectivly ceased to exist as a substantial threat after the Tet offensive and that the majority of the conflict from that point on out was against the NVA. Am I wrong?
That the Field Police and the PRUs were in existence a number of years before Tet of '68 and operated against the VC AND the NVA before and after even though most of the main force VC were really gone by mid '66. Tet '68 just got almost all the rest but they were never totally extinguished,
Most groups of dissidents and insurgents have several degrees of effort. In VN, the two principal divisions for war fighting -- not political -- purposes were the Main Force, organized military units of professional fighters who were very competent; and the Local Force, mostly local villagers who sniped or planted mines part time, served as guides for the Main Force units and generally laid low and played supporting roles and who were mostly not too competent militarily. The split early on was about 25% Main force and 75% Local Force. By mid '66 it was about 10 or 15 to 85 or 90 and after Tet '68, about 2:98. As Steve Blair said, lot of politics involved in addition to the combat losses which were substantial.
The various Taliban groups -- and there are several -- probably in the larger crews do pretty much the same thing, Semi pro Bands with local auxiliaries.
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P.S. I see that you are also a member of the National Sarcasm Association.
Like Steve said, I'm a plank owner. ;)
Sometimes when it seems appropriate but I don't see anything in this sub thread that I meant to be sarcastic or that seems sarcastic on a relook...???
Keep it simple, then move to hard
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What purpose does / or should a security force of a given type serve, and is there more than one purpose it could serve?
Rob, I suggest you determine what security capabilities and capacities are required, then identify the gap. This isn't easy if you really think about what this entails; however, it is the easiest step.
Next you get with the experts, and those are not the Soldiers and Marines who worked in Afghanistan, they are knowledgeable, but the experts are the Afghanis. You discuss with them the most culturally appropriate and acceptable way to design the security capabilities and capacity required. It may look nothing like our police or military or the local militias in Iraq. What ever we build, it needs to survive the first light of day once we leave for it to be ultimately effective. That means it needs to look Afghani.
Bill
ANP Report by an embed...
From the 12/22/08 Weekly Standard an Article by Ann Marlowe entitled Policing Afghanistan.
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Again, the casualty numbers tell the story. As of mid-November, only 88 U.S. troops had been killed in action in all of Afghanistan this year, but 464 Afghan soldiers had been slain and a whopping 1,215 police. That last is an increase of 47 percent over the 2007 total. Add to that an estimated 2,600 police wounded or missing in action so far this year. Given a total Afghan National Police force of 77,000, that means 1 out of 20 cops was killed or wounded in 2008. By way of comparison, just 181 cops were killed in the line of duty in the United States in 2007, and our population is 10 to 12 times larger than Afghanistan's. If the United States were as dangerous for police as Afghanistan, we would have lost at least
12,000 cops this year.
The terms 'only' and 'just' are inappropriately associated with casualty numbers, however the article provides some insights into FID/ANP training that I do not see reported in the MSM.
What is the strategy again?
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081227/...LkrP_pf7qs0NUE
As Taliban nears Kabul, shadow gov't takes hold
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AP – This June 26, 2008 file frame grab from television footage reportedly shows Afghan militants holding … WARDAK PROVINCE, Afghanistan – Two months ago, Mohammad Anwar recalls, the Taliban paraded accused thieves through his village, tarred their faces with oil and threw them in jail.
The public punishment was a clear sign to villagers that the Taliban are now in charge. And the province they took over lies just 30 miles from the Afghan capital of Kabul, right on the main highway.
The Taliban has long operated its own shadow government in the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan, but its power is now spreading north to the doorstep of Kabul, according to Associated Press interviews with a dozen government officials, analysts, Taliban commanders and Afghan villagers. More than seven years after the U.S.-led invasion, the Islamic militia is attempting — at least in name — to reconstitute the government by which it ruled Afghanistan in the late 1990s.
Whoever controls the populace is winning, we can continue to conduct raids, chase HVTs, use UAVs with hellfire missiles to conduct deep attacks, but if we can't control the populace it is all for naught. This principle of COIN seems to have simply been ignored in OEF-A.
In a Western society the police would be the primary force for controlling the populace, and it appears we're trying to force that model on the Afghanis based on the number of police killed in Surferbettles' post. That should be an indicator that the Taliban sees the Afghani police as their greatest threat, thus they are aggressively targeted.
I'm sure our response will be more Afghani Commandos and a bigger ANA. It is the American way, if a little stupid doesn't work, try "more" stupid, because we're obviously not applying enough stupid to the problem. I wonder what metrics our EBO bubbas are using to paint a rosey picture?
Pardon my frustration. Must be a post Christmas hangover. If you haven't had chilled lemonchillo, then I highly recommend it, but in moderation.
My Saturday Nights are not the same as when I was younger...
If we do not follow the proposed police-model for Afghanistan what other models are available which will meet the need/desire to reduce the disruptive components of Taliban influence in Afghanistan? I am going to look to Latin America for answers, conduct a DIME based analysis for a couple of hours, and share what I find with the group.
Paramilitary Groups (1) have been used by various actors in Latin America in the countries of Colombia (2), El Salvador (3), Guatemala (4), Nicaragua (5), and Mexico (6). Paramilitary groups have been used for such varying needs as Land Reform (7) and what is termed Corporate Counterinsurgency (8). The effectiveness or appropriateness of Paramilitary Groups in supporting legal governments has been questioned by a variety of sources. (9) It is noteworthy, however, that Paramilitary Groups have been/are widespread in Latin America.
The D in DIME stands for Diplomacy. The US has had diplomatic relations with Colombia for over one hundred years (10). El Salvador sought admission to the US after the break up of the United Provinces of Central America in 1838 and later declared independence in 1841. (11) (12). The US-DOS describes US relations with Guatemala as close though on occasion strained. (13) Rafael Carrera was the Guatemala’s first dictator in 1838. (14) Mexico’s relationship with the US has characterized as a ‘love-hate’ one since it’s independence in 1810. (15) US-Nicaragua relations since it’s independence in 1821 have been turbulent. (16) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs for Paramilitary Groups appear to have a deeper history in Africa than they do in Latin America. (17) (18) (19) (20). Our diplomatic efforts in the region have been characterized as uneven and this may in part be due to Latin America accounting for less than 6 percent of US trade. (21)
The I in DIME stands for Information/Intelligence. As can be seen from my list of references there seems to be no shortage of information on Paramilitary Groups in Latin America and so I will leave it at that.
The M in DIME stands for Military and I will limit my analysis to a partial catalog of Paramilitary Groups in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Mexico. Colombia is home to the FARC, ELN, and AUC. (22) (23) El Salvador was home to the FMLN, FDR, ERP, RN and PRTC during the 1970’s and the FMLN participates in the Government today. (24) (25) Guatemala was home to the ESA (Secret Anti-communist Army), La Mano Blanco, URNG (comprised of the EGP, ORPA, FAR, and PGT). (26) Nicaragua was home to the Contras (a group which included the FDN) and the FSLN both of which participate(d) in the countries government. (27) (28) (29) Mexico is home to the EZLN and it can be argued that the countries Paramilitary Drug Cartels desire some level of political control of the country. (30) (31) (32)
The E in DIME stands for Economics. Since I am running out of steam on this two-hour sprint tonight I will limit my analysis to the statement that Paramilitary Groups require money to function. Consider that the CRS reports “In the United States, wholesale illicit drug sale earnings estimates range from $13.6 to $48.4 billion annually.” This same report goes on to state that Mexico “…is the main foreign supplier of marijuana and a major supplier of methamphetamine to the United States.” (33)
Paramilitary Groups have an extensive and checkered history in Latin America. Perhaps Paramilitary Groups are an answer to the problems in Afghanistan(34), but their use will certainly result in a bumpy ride. It is my hope that Agricultural Development and Security Development (in particular that of the ANP and their derivatives), will be the main effort in Afghanistan. Time will tell.
(1) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitary
(2) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitarism_in_Colombia
(3) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(4) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan_Civil_War
(5) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicarag...nd_the_Contras
(6) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zapatis...nal_Liberation
(7) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(8) http://www.rand.org/publications/ran...horizon08.html
(9) Chomsky, N. (2000). Rogue States, The Rule of Force in World Affairs Cambridge MA: South End Press
(10) http://countrystudies.us/colombia/97.htm
(11) http://countrystudies.us/el-salvador/5.htm
(12) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(13) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htm
(14) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(15) http://countrystudies.us/mexico/93.htm
(16) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(17) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disarma..._Reintegration
(18) http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php
(19) http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_l...=17&search.y=3
(20) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3582160.stm
(21) http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl895.cfm
(22) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4528631.stm
(23) http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/st...bia/links.html
(24) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(25) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farabun...beration_Front
(26) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan_Civil_War
(27) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FSLN
(28) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicarag...nd_the_Contras
(29) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicarag...mocratic_Force
(30) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zapatis...nal_Liberation
(31) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_Drug_War
(32) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf
(33) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf
(34) http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/st...fghanistan604/
And now for the hunt for the scotch...
ANP and more - an Afghan interview
Not sure of the interviewee's background and this is supplied in the opening:
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Lieutenant General Abdul Hadi Khalid was the Afghan first deputy minister of the interior for security from May 2006 to late June 2008. Specializing in counter-narcotics, border policing and internal security, he announced the largest drug seizure in history.
He lost his post after a dispute with President Hamid Karzai's administration last year, but remains one of Afghanistan's leading thinkers on regional ethno-political dynamics and transnational criminal networks.
Interview covers more than the ANP and is most interesting on relatiosn with Afghanistan's neighbours: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI23Df02.html . Note this appeared first two weeks ago on the Jamestown website.
davidbfpo
Cross posting for reference
Posted on another OEF thread: A variety of links and some will be cross-posted on other threads i.e. ANA & ANP. Not in order of priority.
1) Britain calls for mini-surge in Afghanistan to help train army. Of note is the claim the UK can deploy only 3k of the 9k troops in Helmand and that the ANA now have 8k deployed in Helmand (which I simply find incredible) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6851607.ece
2) http://www.captainsjournal.com/ has some amazing reports on the ANA and ANP. This is the longest, citing many sources (many on SWC I'm sure) and covers both the ANA and ANP: http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/...national-army/
3) A Canadian OMLT veteran (from Kandahar Province) on the ANA, including literacy, training and more: http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/
davidbfpo
The price of working with the ANP
The BBC News reports:
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Five British soldiers have been shot dead in Helmand Province, in an attack the UK military blamed on a "rogue" Afghan policeman.
And a comment from an ex-UK commander:
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It will undermine trust, certainly in the short term, until we establish exactly what happened. And it wouldn't at all surprise me now if there aren't a lot of soldiers, British soldiers in Afghanistan, with their fingers very firmly on the trigger when they're around Afghan police and military.
See:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8341659.stm and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8341825.stm
Not good news for Afghanisation and training the Afghans.
davidbfpo
ANP police officer kills five UK soldier
A few more details in follow-up reporting, notably the attack was within a compound: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-strategy.html
Commentary and links on:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...11/murder.html
davidbfpo
A scathing indictment ....
is this article in the Independent, 'Most of them were corrupt and stoned on opium':
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'Most of them were corrupt and stoned on opium'
A senior serving soldier reveals how the Afghan policemen in Helmand are often a danger to the British forces they work with
Thursday, 5 November 2009
When I heard the news this morning, I thought "Christ, five in one go..." I was shocked and saddened – but I was not surprised that it had happened. I'm surprised it took this long.
We went out to Helmand to mentor the Afghan National Police without understanding the level they were at. We thought we would be arresting people, helping them to police efficiently. Instead we were literally training them how to point a gun on the ranges, and telling them why you should not stop cars and demand "taxes".
Most of them were corrupt and took drugs, particularly opium. The lads would go into police stations at night and they would be stoned; sometimes they would fire indiscriminately at nothing.
I particularly interested in this comment:
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The Afghan army are a lot more switched on. They have started to stand up for themselves. But the police have not had the same investment. There is no point in pushing the army through to clear ground if you leave a void behind with the police.
The primary problem in Astan is not military, but that of civil administration (part of the political effort, which is near FUBAR).
Uncheerful
Mike