The Afghanistan National Police (ANP)

[reed11b]

I don't think that's possible. Suppress, control to an extent? Yes. Defeat? No -- they'll just go to ground and wait out the west.

I would have to have better then my current knowledge of the Taliban to continue that line of discourse. If you have any suggestions on sources for that feel free to PM me with them, I am always willing to learn.

As an aside, I'd suggest that given what I know of Afghanistan, they'd be better off with one National Gendarmerie and having the normal police functions at Province and city level -- but that's in the too hard box at this time.

Sometimes it takes somebody to actually say the obvious. I agree and I am embarrassed I did not think of that right of the bat.
Reed

[Ken White]

I would have to have better then my current knowledge of the Taliban to continue that line of discourse. If you have any suggestions on sources for that feel free to PM me with them, I am always willing to learn.

that's just my very strong conviction from watching a couple of dozen dissident movements over the years and reading some history. In almost all cases, if the heat gets to be too much, the broadswords and battle axes go under the roof thatch, the guns and RPGs get buried, and everyone looks peaceful for a bit -- then zap; they-y-y-r-r-e ba-a-a-a-c-c-kk.

With respect to the Taliban in particular, they're effectively doing that right now; just like the VC of old (and hundreds of other groups) they're just plain old villagers by day then at night they either group together or assist groups. Same game, different time and place.

For example, check this LINK for a Reuter's photograph of a Shura in Sangin attended by some British Army folks earlier this year. While the Black headgear is not a guarantee of Taliban membership or sympathy it is generally indicative. Notice the number of them and notice also the numerous looks of love and affection or just plain old 'we're happy to be here'...

[reed11b]

that's just my very strong conviction from watching a couple of dozen dissident movements over the years and reading some history. In almost all cases, if the heat gets to be too much, the broadswords and battle axes go under the roof thatch, the guns and RPGs get buried, and everyone looks peaceful for a bit -- then zap; they-y-y-r-r-e ba-a-a-a-c-c-kk.

With respect to the Taliban in particular, they're effectively doing that right now; just like the VC of old (and hundreds of other groups) they're just plain old villagers by day then at night they either group together or assist groups. Same game, different time and place.

I thought I remember reading that the VC effectivly ceased to exist as a substantial threat after the Tet offensive and that the majority of the conflict from that point on out was against the NVA. Am I wrong?
Reed
P.S. I see that you are also a member of the National Sarcasm Association.

[Steve Blair]

I thought I remember reading that the VC effectivly ceased to exist as a substantial threat after the Tet offensive and that the majority of the conflict from that point on out was against the NVA. Am I wrong?
Reed
P.S. I see that you are also a member of the National Sarcasm Association.

Ken's old enough he's a charter member of the NSA.....

The VC's main strength was indeed broken by the Tet Offensive, and there is a fair amount of speculation that this was done intentionally on the part of the NVN government to remove them as a policy threat after the fall of the south. Local Force elements were still fairly active, but Tet had the Main Force elements dig up their buried guns and charge US and SVN gunlines. Not a productive activity if you plan to survive....

[Ken White]

I thought I remember reading that the VC effectivly ceased to exist as a substantial threat after the Tet offensive and that the majority of the conflict from that point on out was against the NVA. Am I wrong?

That the Field Police and the PRUs were in existence a number of years before Tet of '68 and operated against the VC AND the NVA before and after even though most of the main force VC were really gone by mid '66. Tet '68 just got almost all the rest but they were never totally extinguished,

Most groups of dissidents and insurgents have several degrees of effort. In VN, the two principal divisions for war fighting -- not political -- purposes were the Main Force, organized military units of professional fighters who were very competent; and the Local Force, mostly local villagers who sniped or planted mines part time, served as guides for the Main Force units and generally laid low and played supporting roles and who were mostly not too competent militarily. The split early on was about 25% Main force and 75% Local Force. By mid '66 it was about 10 or 15 to 85 or 90 and after Tet '68, about 2:98. As Steve Blair said, lot of politics involved in addition to the combat losses which were substantial.

The various Taliban groups -- and there are several -- probably in the larger crews do pretty much the same thing, Semi pro Bands with local auxiliaries.

P.S. I see that you are also a member of the National Sarcasm Association.

Like Steve said, I'm a plank owner.

Sometimes when it seems appropriate but I don't see anything in this sub thread that I meant to be sarcastic or that seems sarcastic on a relook...???

[Rob Thornton]

While having an interesting discussion here at work about security requirements, in terms of what capabilities are required and how they might shape organization at various levels, some questions came up – there a bit random so I apologize up front:

What purpose does / or should a security force of a given type serve, and is there more than one purpose it could serve? Police in cities that have no other mechanisms to preserve order and protect the public make sense – particularly where the demographics lend themselves to the requirement – but what about elsewhere – in the fringes where there is not much variance in the demographics and outside presence in solving disputes is not taken kindly?

Does Afghanistan need a national police, or does it need some of the capabilities we normally associate with a national police, perhaps resident in the ANA? Kind of like a frontier army?

Is there other (political) value in building what might be a competing power structure?

Could some of the functions that might be desired from a national police be fulfilled from tribal constabularies? If so, could a combination of tribal constabularies and the ANA organized, trained and equipped to perform along the lines of a frontier army/constabulary meet the requirement? Could it do so with less risk?

If a national police or gendarme was the preferred COA – which model (Guardia Civil, Canadian Mounties, Australian National Police, German Border Guards, the Frontier Corps, even something along the lines of other forms of LE with national authorities such as some of the big national park rangers in places where poaching is big money and brings in well armed criminals)? What would be most suitable given the environment and conditions?

How might a national police be perceived in a place like Afghanistan? What might the enforcement of national laws in accordance with national standards mean to tribal authorities?

I’m not pointing to a yes or no, just trying to work through the consequences on a number of levels. If the solution was an organizational one, it seems there would have to be some serious work done in other areas – tribal and/or provincial buy in would seem to be critical, as well as some serious legislative pieces on the Afghan part.

While we have good reasons for our separation and distribution of authorities (and systems we’ve grown to support them), we have in the past had what we might consider a dual use military ( such as in in the 1800s where there was a lack of other types of authority).

Over time we have developed a very complex system with overlapping agencies from local to state to federal, and with discreet capabilities emerging to fill gaps. Its difficult to know if had we known exactly where we were going and had the resources that we would have been better served to put them into place all at once – there may have been a requirement to adjust in other areas to make what we have suitable to our environment. Awkward, but I heard an analogy the other day about putting 9 pregnant women in the same room does not necessarily get you a baby in one month.

It is hard to live with the idea that some things may take more time than we are comfortable with, particularly when their problem is our problem. Somehow we’ve got to reconcile expectations – not an easy task by any measure.


Best, Rob

[reed11b]

Steve said, I'm a plank owner.

Sometimes when it seems appropriate but I don't see anything in this sub thread that I meant to be sarcastic or that seems sarcastic on a relook...???

I was refering to the lack of happy faces in the picture link.
Reed
P.S. Rob, I have a response for you, making sure my info is correct.

[Ron Humphrey]

For example, check this LINK for a Reuter's photograph of a Shura in Sangin attended by some British Army folks earlier this year. While the Black headgear is not a guarantee of Taliban membership or sympathy it is generally indicative. Notice the number of them and notice also the numerous looks of love and affection or just plain old 'we're happy to be here'...

How come it seems like the yunguns are the only ones who didn't bother taking off their shoes?

It is hard to live with the idea that some things may take more time than we are comfortable with, particularly when their problem is our problem. Somehow we’ve got to reconcile expectations – not an easy task by any measure.

A lesson that some of us keep having to learn over and over and over, the hard way

[Ken White]

What purpose does / or should a security force of a given type serve, and is there more than one purpose it could serve?

Seems to me that's a determination the Nation concerned has to make and what we think is low quality secondary.

...but what about elsewhere – in the fringes where there is not much variance in the demographics and outside presence in solving disputes is not taken kindly?

Seems that could range from no police requirement through tribal or council police to elements of a national force that responds to local control.

Does Afghanistan need a national police, or does it need some of the capabilities we normally associate with a national police, perhaps resident in the ANA? Kind of like a frontier army?

As I said above, IMO, a National Gendarmerie and a local Province / District element. However, that should really be up to the Afghans even if I / we disagree...

Is there other (political) value in building what might be a competing power structure?

Always! Keep each other honest. That's why I do not agree with a DoD, War and Navy worked fine...

Could some of the functions that might be desired from a national police be fulfilled from tribal constabularies? If so, could a combination of tribal constabularies and the ANA organized, trained and equipped to perform along the lines of a frontier army/constabulary meet the requirement? Could it do so with less risk?

I think there are two questions there, not a follow on. First is merit of Tribal Constabularies (and how funded?); second is whither the ANA. I don't think you can answer your complex question until those two simple questions are answered. By the Afghans...

If a national police or gendarme was the preferred COA – which model ... What would be most suitable given the environment and conditions?

the last question answers the first; there's a reason all those forces you cite are differently organized, equipped and focused. What does Afghanistan need; not what we think but what do they think.

How might a national police be perceived in a place like Afghanistan?

I think the answer to that is known today. One reason to look at a reorganization and redirection. Many years ago the Kentucky Highway Patrol had a terrible reputation for graft, corruption and incompetence. Rather then reform it, it was disbanded in 1948 and the Kentucky State Police were activated with some quite high standards (and broader enforcement powers); today, they're one of the best in the country.

What might the enforcement of national laws in accordance with national standards mean to tribal authorities?

My suspicion is they won't like it...

It is hard to live with the idea that some things may take more time than we are comfortable with, particularly when their problem is our problem. Somehow we’ve got to reconcile expectations – not an easy task by any measure.

Not sure it's our problem but I get your drift, we volunteered to help -- and we should. I think we just need to remember it doesn't have to be our way to work...

That doesn't mean carte blanche and our agreement to everything; gotta sort through the local politics and capabilities but it does need to be a local, not a US arrangement.

[Bill Moore]

What purpose does / or should a security force of a given type serve, and is there more than one purpose it could serve?

Rob, I suggest you determine what security capabilities and capacities are required, then identify the gap. This isn't easy if you really think about what this entails; however, it is the easiest step.

Next you get with the experts, and those are not the Soldiers and Marines who worked in Afghanistan, they are knowledgeable, but the experts are the Afghanis. You discuss with them the most culturally appropriate and acceptable way to design the security capabilities and capacity required. It may look nothing like our police or military or the local militias in Iraq. What ever we build, it needs to survive the first light of day once we leave for it to be ultimately effective. That means it needs to look Afghani.

Bill

[Surferbeetle]

From the 12/22/08 Weekly Standard an Article by Ann Marlowe entitled Policing Afghanistan.

Again, the casualty numbers tell the story. As of mid-November, only 88 U.S. troops had been killed in action in all of Afghanistan this year, but 464 Afghan soldiers had been slain and a whopping 1,215 police. That last is an increase of 47 percent over the 2007 total. Add to that an estimated 2,600 police wounded or missing in action so far this year. Given a total Afghan National Police force of 77,000, that means 1 out of 20 cops was killed or wounded in 2008. By way of comparison, just 181 cops were killed in the line of duty in the United States in 2007, and our population is 10 to 12 times larger than Afghanistan's. If the United States were as dangerous for police as Afghanistan, we would have lost at least
12,000 cops this year.

The terms 'only' and 'just' are inappropriately associated with casualty numbers, however the article provides some insights into FID/ANP training that I do not see reported in the MSM.

[Bill Moore]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081227/...LkrP_pf7qs0NUE

As Taliban nears Kabul, shadow gov't takes hold

AP – This June 26, 2008 file frame grab from television footage reportedly shows Afghan militants holding … WARDAK PROVINCE, Afghanistan – Two months ago, Mohammad Anwar recalls, the Taliban paraded accused thieves through his village, tarred their faces with oil and threw them in jail.

The public punishment was a clear sign to villagers that the Taliban are now in charge. And the province they took over lies just 30 miles from the Afghan capital of Kabul, right on the main highway.

The Taliban has long operated its own shadow government in the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan, but its power is now spreading north to the doorstep of Kabul, according to Associated Press interviews with a dozen government officials, analysts, Taliban commanders and Afghan villagers. More than seven years after the U.S.-led invasion, the Islamic militia is attempting — at least in name — to reconstitute the government by which it ruled Afghanistan in the late 1990s.

Whoever controls the populace is winning, we can continue to conduct raids, chase HVTs, use UAVs with hellfire missiles to conduct deep attacks, but if we can't control the populace it is all for naught. This principle of COIN seems to have simply been ignored in OEF-A.

In a Western society the police would be the primary force for controlling the populace, and it appears we're trying to force that model on the Afghanis based on the number of police killed in Surferbettles' post. That should be an indicator that the Taliban sees the Afghani police as their greatest threat, thus they are aggressively targeted.

I'm sure our response will be more Afghani Commandos and a bigger ANA. It is the American way, if a little stupid doesn't work, try "more" stupid, because we're obviously not applying enough stupid to the problem. I wonder what metrics our EBO bubbas are using to paint a rosey picture?

Pardon my frustration. Must be a post Christmas hangover. If you haven't had chilled lemonchillo, then I highly recommend it, but in moderation.

[Surferbeetle]

If we do not follow the proposed police-model for Afghanistan what other models are available which will meet the need/desire to reduce the disruptive components of Taliban influence in Afghanistan? I am going to look to Latin America for answers, conduct a DIME based analysis for a couple of hours, and share what I find with the group.

Paramilitary Groups (1) have been used by various actors in Latin America in the countries of Colombia (2), El Salvador (3), Guatemala (4), Nicaragua (5), and Mexico (6). Paramilitary groups have been used for such varying needs as Land Reform (7) and what is termed Corporate Counterinsurgency (8). The effectiveness or appropriateness of Paramilitary Groups in supporting legal governments has been questioned by a variety of sources. (9) It is noteworthy, however, that Paramilitary Groups have been/are widespread in Latin America.

The D in DIME stands for Diplomacy. The US has had diplomatic relations with Colombia for over one hundred years (10). El Salvador sought admission to the US after the break up of the United Provinces of Central America in 1838 and later declared independence in 1841. (11) (12). The US-DOS describes US relations with Guatemala as close though on occasion strained. (13) Rafael Carrera was the Guatemala’s first dictator in 1838. (14) Mexico’s relationship with the US has characterized as a ‘love-hate’ one since it’s independence in 1810. (15) US-Nicaragua relations since it’s independence in 1821 have been turbulent. (16) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs for Paramilitary Groups appear to have a deeper history in Africa than they do in Latin America. (17) (18) (19) (20). Our diplomatic efforts in the region have been characterized as uneven and this may in part be due to Latin America accounting for less than 6 percent of US trade. (21)

The I in DIME stands for Information/Intelligence. As can be seen from my list of references there seems to be no shortage of information on Paramilitary Groups in Latin America and so I will leave it at that.

The M in DIME stands for Military and I will limit my analysis to a partial catalog of Paramilitary Groups in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Mexico. Colombia is home to the FARC, ELN, and AUC. (22) (23) El Salvador was home to the FMLN, FDR, ERP, RN and PRTC during the 1970’s and the FMLN participates in the Government today. (24) (25) Guatemala was home to the ESA (Secret Anti-communist Army), La Mano Blanco, URNG (comprised of the EGP, ORPA, FAR, and PGT). (26) Nicaragua was home to the Contras (a group which included the FDN) and the FSLN both of which participate(d) in the countries government. (27) (28) (29) Mexico is home to the EZLN and it can be argued that the countries Paramilitary Drug Cartels desire some level of political control of the country. (30) (31) (32)

The E in DIME stands for Economics. Since I am running out of steam on this two-hour sprint tonight I will limit my analysis to the statement that Paramilitary Groups require money to function. Consider that the CRS reports “In the United States, wholesale illicit drug sale earnings estimates range from $13.6 to $48.4 billion annually.” This same report goes on to state that Mexico “…is the main foreign supplier of marijuana and a major supplier of methamphetamine to the United States.” (33)

Paramilitary Groups have an extensive and checkered history in Latin America. Perhaps Paramilitary Groups are an answer to the problems in Afghanistan(34), but their use will certainly result in a bumpy ride. It is my hope that Agricultural Development and Security Development (in particular that of the ANP and their derivatives), will be the main effort in Afghanistan. Time will tell.

(1) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitary
(2) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitarism_in_Colombia
(3) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(4) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan_Civil_War
(5) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicarag...nd_the_Contras
(6) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zapatis...nal_Liberation
(7) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(8) http://www.rand.org/publications/ran...horizon08.html
(9) Chomsky, N. (2000). Rogue States, The Rule of Force in World Affairs Cambridge MA: South End Press
(10) http://countrystudies.us/colombia/97.htm
(11) http://countrystudies.us/el-salvador/5.htm
(12) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(13) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htm
(14) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(15) http://countrystudies.us/mexico/93.htm
(16) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(17) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disarma..._Reintegration
(18) http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php
(19) http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_l...=17&search.y=3
(20) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3582160.stm
(21) http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl895.cfm
(22) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4528631.stm
(23) http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/st...bia/links.html
(24) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(25) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farabun...beration_Front
(26) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan_Civil_War
(27) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FSLN
(28) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicarag...nd_the_Contras
(29) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicarag...mocratic_Force
(30) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zapatis...nal_Liberation
(31) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_Drug_War
(32) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf
(33) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf
(34) http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/st...fghanistan604/


And now for the hunt for the scotch...

[Surferbeetle]

From the SWJ Reference Library-Afghanistan website

The Sarandoy served as a national police force, but their armaments surpassed the traditional police arms of pistol, baton and shotgun. The Sarandoy constituted a third ground force within the DRA. They had heavy armaments, armored personnel carriers and a separate command and control system. The DRA Army, KHAD and Sarandoy often worked together out of necessity, but they were separate, rival systems designed to counterbalance one another and prevent regime ouster. It was not an efficient, or particularly effective design, but the DRA was designed for regime survival, not efficiency or effectiveness. Furthermore, the DRA leadership saw their chief threat as internal subversion within the communist party instead of the rural Mujahideen.

From the Illinois Institute of Technology website

The general ineffectiveness and unreliability of the Afghan army led the Kabul regime to organize a number of paramilitary internal security forces. Probably the most important of these in the mid-1980s was the Sarandoy (Defenders of the Revolution), an armed body under the control of the Khalqidominated Ministry of Interior. It was an outgrowth of the Daoud-era Gendarmerie that before 1978 had comprised about 20,000 men. The November 1985 issue of Jane's Defence Weekly gave approximately the same figure for the size of the Sarandoy in 1985. It was organized into six brigades or regiments, numbering around 6,000 men and based in Qandahar, Badakhshan, Baghlan, and Parvan provinces and in Kabul, which had two Sarandoy units; there were also 20 operational and mountain battalions, with an additional 6,000 men; personnel attached to the national and 28 provincial headquarters of the Sarandoy, numbering around 3,000 men; and other personnel attached to the Sarandoy Academy and to administrative, construction, and maintenance units. These totaled a further 4,000 men. Established in early 1981, the force played an active role in offensives against the mujahidiin, though its effectiveness was hampered by the rivalry between Parchamis and Khalqis. Sarandoy relations with Parcham-dominated KHAD were tense.

From wikipedia

There was a bitter rivalry between Najibullah and Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi. Gulabzoi, a Khalq sympathizer, was Minister of the Interior and commander of Sarandoy ("Defenders of the Revolution"), the national gendarmerie. Gulabzoi was one of the few prominent Khalqis remaining in office in a Parcham-dominated regime.

[Jedburgh]

JFQ, 1st Qtr 09: Irregular Warfare Lessons Learned: Reforming the Afghan National Police

.....While most Afghan governing institutions had long been viewed with suspicion by the people, the Afghan police were especially distrusted as a result of their lengthy history of corruption, cronyism, and incompetence. Furthermore, these same police officers served as the real face of the Afghan government for average citizens, as they were the representatives of the government most likely to interact with the local people on a routine basis. So in keeping with the basic tenets of our counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and the irregular warfare (IW) joint operating concept, we would have to fix the Afghan police—and the government agencies administering them—as a critical step toward convincing the people to support the popularly elected government instead of the Taliban alternative. This article describes the scope and challenges of these major stability operations missions, while highlighting relevant elements of our new COIN doctrine—central to the IW concept—as they relate to operationalization, or using the COIN doctrine as the basis for specific action plans.....

[Bill Moore]

thanks Jedburgh, this is a very relevant post.

Force Structure Mismatches with Mission Requirements. Stability and reconstruction operations usually require a variety of skills and resources that do not routinely reside within the U.S. military.

I hope all those working on the irregular warfare Joint Integrating Concepts and Security Force Assistance read this article. There is a wealth of informaton here that inform the process and help clarify what are capability and capacity gaps are.

At the same time, the civilian police mentors hired by the State Department to provide civilian law enforcement expertise to the developing Afghan police forces do not have the flexibility to deploy into the areas where they are needed the most, for reasons of force protection and nonpermissive threat conditions. Nor do they typically bring a Soldier’s mindset to the tasks at hand. As a result, there is a real mismatch between the force structure needed to carry out the Afghan police development mission and the resources available on the ground.

I have commented negatively before on my impressions of State Department funded police training in a combat zone. These police advisors definitely have a role to play, as the expertise they bring is essential for the bread and butter law enforcement skills, but they are not capable of teaching the counterinsurgency/constabulary skills needed.

As the author stated they are not allowed to conduct combat advising/ mentoring due to outdated Department of State rules, which indicates that for these programs to be effective they will probably require a DoD lead, but with whole of government participation. Doing more of the same that has led to failure to this point is not the right answer. We really do need a sea change in our whole of government approach to building partner capacity, which is why we must get the security force assistance concept right, it is absolutely critical.

Upon taking responsibility for police development, the United States initially replaced this focus on quality with an emphasis on quantity. That approach, while fielding individual police at a far higher rate, did nothing to address the ineffectiveness of the police leadership at the district level, or in the administration of the police forces at the national or provincial levels. Instead, leaders must take a holistic approach—or systems perspective on the operational environment approach—if there is to be any chance of
overcoming the wholesale political, organizational, and societal challenges of creating a functioning and professional institution. The scope of the problem includes economics, cultural norms, family issues, pay, basic means of
identification, illiteracy, and a range of other major challenges.

This is a case where the turtle beats the hare in the race. We must be prepared to fill the security role until we can implement an effective security force assistance program. There will be an uncomfortable gap where we need an interim capability, which may be able to be filled with local militias working for the coalition and other unconventional options. Locals must play a role as soon as possible, but at the same time we can't afford to stand up a "police" force too quickly, which could undermine its credability for a long time to come.

[Surferbeetle]

The article linked by Jedburgh is well written, interesting, captures the 'ground reality' found upon COIN battlefields and I agree with much of what is stated. I would, however, like to focus upon this quote:

At the same time, the civilian police mentors hired by the State Department to provide civilian law enforcement expertise to the developing Afghan police forces do not have the flexibility to deploy into the areas where they are needed the most, for reasons of force protection and nonpermissive threat conditions. Nor do they typically bring a Soldier’s mindset to the tasks at hand.

Further examination of the 'why' behind the above quote may have some interesting lessons for those of us who focus upon the 'soldiers approach'. It's my opinion, based upon the close observation of policemen who have been on my teams, that there is a valuable distinction between a 'policeman's approach' and a 'soldier's approach' to certain recurring situations in the COIN environment. Soldiers are trained to rapidly and decisively escalate a situation in order to overwhelm and destroy/subdue opposition. Policemen are also able to take a different tack in that in appropriate situations they are able to consistently deescalate and bring conflict to an 'acceptable' resolution. This observation does not discount the 'fighting' abilities of Police. Instead I often use the Mixed Martial Arts analogy for COIN because I believe that the use of more than just one method is vital to success, and ANP training needs to take this into account.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Entropy; a summary of where the ANP are today and at a national level: http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_s...hard-sale.html

Yes, it is depressing and IMHO suggests our strategy is built on 'shifting sands".

davidbfpo

[Entropy]

Thanks David!

Here's another decent article on the subject:

The strategy of the major U.S. and British military offensive in Afghanistan's Helmand province aimed at wresting it from the Taliban is based on bringing back Afghan army and police to maintain permanent control of the population, so the foreign forces can move on to another insurgent stronghold.

But that strategy poses an acute problem: The police in the province, who are linked to the local warlord, have committed systematic abuses against the population, including the abduction and rape of pre-teen boys, according to village elders who met with British officers.

Anger over those police abuses runs so high that the elders in Babaji just north of Laskgar Gah warned the British that they would support the Taliban to get rid of them if the national police were allowed to return to the area, according to a Jul. 12 report by Reuters correspondent Peter Graff.

Associated Press reporters Jason Straziuso and David Guttenfelder, who accompanied U.S. troops in Northern Helmand, reported Jul. 13 that villagers in Aynak were equally angry about police depredations. Within hours of the arrival of U.S. troops in the village, they wrote, bands of villagers began complaining the local police force was "a bigger problem than the Taliban".

[IntelTrooper]

Thanks David!

Here's another decent article on the subject:

Dumb, dumb, dumb. Time to rotate these guys to some mandatory Blackwater, I mean, "Xe" training time and replace them with the ANCOP (Afghan National Civil Order Police) for a few months.