Flexibility eschews book solutions...
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Originally Posted by
kehenry1
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On Steve Metz, that is exactly what I was referring to. The question of whether politics or combat takes over all precedence in a counterinsurgency seems out of place when the entire process is to facilitate flexibility in responses to get a resolution.
True, however recall that the opponent has a voice in everything and he is generally more agile than will be the COIN force.
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It is a balancing of appropriate force to achieve the ends. Even Clausewitz makes reference to that as you point out.
So, I guess my question is: "why is it hard for the military to do both?"
Is this about inflexible meets flexible? And why doesn't the need to be flexible in conventional war and adjust to the circumstances translate to flexibility in application of force and politics in a counterinsurgency?
Because the Armed forces of the US due to many factors tend to tamp down flexibility until it really becomes vital (in the true sense of the word). We are big, heirarchial, bureaucratic and ritualistic. We undertrain people at all levels but particularly at entry, officer or enlisted. We are overly imbued with protecting the institutions and thus almost allergic to any misjudgment that may embarrass the institutions -- all that works to stifle initiative and flexibility.
The fact that a lot of flexibility and initiative are shown is a credit to the people in the units who develop and operate well in spite of the unintentionally oppressive stifling.
The good news is that when initiative and flexibility become imperative and / or the system has rid itself of peace time soldiering oriented folks-- as in the latter stages of WW II -- we can outflex most. We aren't there yet.
From a later post:
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"however, I think the issue here is separating "violence" from other tactics in order to re-enforce the idea among the "combat oriented" forces that the "other tactics", ie "politics" or "non-violent", are available and should be used equally or more often to defeat an insurgency."
That statement, while not totally incorrect, implies action that is very much situation and METT-T dependent. There is no one size fits all and in some insurgencies an over emphasis on "non-violence" will have a negative effect. The current situation in Iraq comes to mind. Anyone who thinks that there is not a considerable degree of violence occurring there just isn't paying attention.
For a large percentage of the insurgents, other tactics can and should be used; for others, they will be seen as a weakness and will merely embolden those opponents.
I think that a part Gian's concern -- and I know a large concern of mine -- is that that Army, as it is prone to do, will swing the "we don't do counter insurgency" gate too far in the opposite direction and forget that it has to be full spectrum. We have a record of doing that -- and in each gate swing, a little more initiative and flexibility get stifled.
That occurs because the senior leadership sets the course and the mavericks and nay sayers are ruthlessly purged. Thus each gate swing gets a few more free thinkers to disappear.
I suggest that the last quote from you I included above is indicative of how this occurs. It is very easy to grab the fad of the day and decide it is the holy grail. It almost never is and the flexibility you properly advocate and cite as apparently missing gives the ability to look at the latest fad, accept the good -- and not throw out that which is proven necessary and to work. Every insurgency, every war is different.
Most of all, that flexibility requires, in COIN or conventional combat, the ability to rapidly assess and act and to do so without relying on dogma.
An idle thought, MarcT...
You said:
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"...stated views are an almost perfect example of someone who believes that certain terms are absolute and unchanging. I really don't think this is a case of someone "getting it" or not - just a great illustration of how the human mind operates."
While that is certainly a correct statement in regard to much argumenation, I'd also suggest that there are those who have very flexible views on those "certain terms" but in certain fora elect to not reveal that flexibility and instead take an exceptionally strong position for a variety of reasons not least to impress upon others the urgency of what they're saying with respect to a particular aspect -- and concomitantly force those in disagreement to take an exceptionally or even excessively contrary position and thus reveal weaknesses.
Been my observation that the truth usually lies in between... :wry:
Clausewitz and Counterinsurgency
marct...
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Probably. I suspect that he looked at it as a change in frequency distribution over time given his use of metaphors and analogs from Newtonian physics.
Clausewitz's writing style was certainly influenced by the overall style of the day. I'm not afraid to admit that the first time I read him, being non-military, non-19th century, I was left scratching my head going "huh?"
Kind of like reading Milton's Paradise Lost in the original language. It has a certain rhythm and language that would do the same unless you've been exposed to shakespearian language.
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If we take a sliding scale, from "Politics" (defined as non-kinetic human interaction) to "War" (defined as kinetic human interaction), that would make sense.
Exactly.
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I really don't think this is a case of someone "getting it" or not - just a great illustration of how the human mind operates.
I believe that's why I stated in an earlier post that the question of which takes precedence is sometimes related to the person's experience. Combat oriented may focus on the combat while "state" oriented may focus on the non-kinetic, political aspects. Thus, someone has to be able to balance them and figure out when the right time to apply either/or/both is.
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You may be right about the separation of violent from non-violent tactics, although I would argue that this is now into the realm of communicating the concept of appropriate tactics for the given environment.
may be true and may also be trying to communicate in the simplest, most recognizable terms. A US infantry man with his "political" experience in the states, probably doesn't associate "politics" with physical violence. Thus, it is meant to translate based on his experiences.
Ken..
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That statement, while not totally incorrect, implies action that is very much situation and METT-T dependent. There is no one size fits all and in some insurgencies an over emphasis on "non-violence" will have a negative effect. The current situation in Iraq comes to mind. Anyone who thinks that there is not a considerable degree of violence occurring there just isn't paying attention.
First, the "used more often" was not to imply "more often than combat". But, as in "more often" than it is. Secondly, I had a long post on the very subject of the "enemy's vote" and Clausewitz's point that the enemy deciding to do violence forcibly changes our actions.
The only way to determine which is appropriate is the facts on the ground and evaluated with "probabilities and conjectures". Which, I always though Clausewitz meant "gut instinct" to an extent. You have all the information, now you have to conjure a likely scenario and act on it. there are no "absolutes".
Not carping, kehenry1, merely suggesting...
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Originally Posted by
kehenry1
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Ken.
First, the "used more often" was not to imply "more often than combat". But, as in "more often" than it is...
Realized that and am simply unsure you're correct. My sensing is that the first 18 months were overly violent on our part, the next 18 were, effectively a learning phase where a balance was sought and the last 18 have seen a pretty good amalgam. IOW, I do not think that last "more often" is now true.
It should be noted there were examples of units that did the balance bit very well early on and others that do not do it well today. All units have never and will never perform the same way in a given situation. Both the Army and the Marines are far from monolithic or standard in their tactical methodology. That's okay. It better be because it's highly unlikely to change. :o
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...Secondly, I had a long post on the very subject of the "enemy's vote" and Clausewitz's point that the enemy deciding to do violence forcibly changes our actions.
Read and generally agreed with that.
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The only way to determine which is appropriate is the facts on the ground and evaluated with "probabilities and conjectures". Which, I always though Clausewitz meant "gut instinct" to an extent. You have all the information, now you have to conjure a likely scenario and act on it. there are no "absolutes".
The "gut instinct" is, practically, the action of an intuitive commander. Fortunately, there are some of them about. The unfortunate counterpoint is that Steve Metz hit a nail with his comment about interchangeable Colonels (substitute any rank); it is anathema to the personnel 'managers' to say that any one of a given grade and specialty cannot do any job requiring that specialty. It is a fact of life that perhaps anyone may be able to do the job but the most capable should probably be employed to do a specific job. Unfortunately, that is not the American way...
True, there never are any absolutes. In war, any variety, there are not even too many probables... :D
Invictus0972. Who knew that was a code name
for "opener of cans of worms" ??? :D
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"In college, I had a seminar on Vietnam, and I came away agreeing with my professor who said that it was an "unwinnable" war. His assertion was that the only path to victory was full mobilization of the military; and, because of our Cold War commitments in Eastern Europe, this was an absolute impossibility. Do you agree?"
How many pages did Karnow have to do this stuff??? :confused:
My opinions...
With my aforementioned there is no 'win,' well, yeah it was 'unwinnable.' I do think it could have been brought to a more satisfactory conclusion but I have to caveat that by saying had it been, the 30% probability is that we'd have had a North and South Korea like situation and an altered relationship with both China and Russia today. The greater probability, the 50% solution, is that we and they would be about where we are now due to our inability to stem the North's -- and many in the South's -- strong sense of nationalism and dedication. Not to mention the fact that there was really no overarching national interest at stake in Viet Nam and people here were more aware of that than they were at the time of Korea and thus there would have been little support for a continued troop presence -- and the North would have known that. (The other 20% is all over the place,dozens of possibilities)
I disagree with him that full mobilization would have been required; there were adequate forces in country, they just weren't properly employed for a too lengthy period. Once they were, the combat was reduced to very minor efforts on the part of the North and the South effectively countered most of them.
The commitments in Europe were actually hollowed out significantly to support the war in Viet Nam; Seventh Army was a veritable shell and the USSR knew that so I disagree on using Europe as an excuse. Full mobilization was not called for due to US domestic political constraints and for no other reason. Most were not convinced that Viet Nam was a necessary war.
I think it was marginally necessary but very poorly planned and fought initially. One can argue about the rationale for Eisenhower signing and the Senate ratifying the mutual support treaty but both actions were taken. We did have a Treaty obligation . One can also argue about the wisdom of the Kennedy Admin in convincing the South to invoke that treaty and then argue more about the Admin's actions early on -- not to mention Johnson's stupidity. Then there was Nixon's campaign promise to get us out. All in all, domestic politics intruded into that war in a major way to the extent that a more satisfactory outcome was denied.
Long way of saying that we probably agreed to a treaty that we should not have, went in as obligated by that treaty which was the right thing to do; went in wrong and stayed wrong for too long, finally got it half right and then left. We would not have 'won' but the capability for a much better end result was squandered. Europe and Cold War considerations there were not an impediment, US domestic politics were the arbiter.
FWIW, to me the military lessons are: (1) Our egos are way too big. (2) Our politicians are way too dumb.
(1a) We knew how to fight insurgencies, we'd done it a number of places but our ego centric leadership refuses to learn from the past and want to do it their way, we are masters at reinventing wheels. The Troops early on had trained for COIN, the Generals had not (1b) We are cultural illiterates, we consistently ignore the rest of the world, partly due to incompetent media but again egos strike -- we have FAOs and ignore what they say. Thus we wander into other nations like clueless boobs. (1c) We refuse to be Bismarkian and learn from the mistakes of others; bad as a bunch of teenagers. (1d) We're too arrogant, a military fallibility that causes continuing underestimation of opponents.
(2) That's obvious and needs no explanation. :mad:
This Administration is the worst
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Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
Thanks. I've watched all the Kilcullen links posted here carefully. His "talking points" have shifted. (But remember, I'm an ad guy/spin doctor. ) It's probably both going on at once: more aggressive tactics and trying to communicate in a way that elicits more "oo-rahs"/ prepares the public to expect more explosions on their TV.) Paetreus et al. are providing much better spin than anything coming out of our politicians. Kudos to them. Shame on the civilian leadership.
in my overlong life at getting their message out... :rolleyes:
I don't pay much attention to any of the spokes types; the tendency to spin is too great. I just cull a dozen or so sites a day and try to keep up with what's actually happening; not easy but one can get a fair idea. If you know what to look for it's out there.
Of course, it helps to not have a day job... :D
And, if I may:
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My main objection to their current strategy - assuming that there is one, and that I more or less understand it - is that there isn't enough strategic differentiation. We need to fight the global insurgents...
We are. We just don't talk about it and thus all eyes are on I-rak and that's good.
Great Post, Rob. Some thoughtful stuff there.
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"I don't think we can operate on a business model that espouses efficiency over effectiveness and operate in the type of high risk environments we do in the spectrum of war while maintaining the potential for success that we like to go to war with."
That seems to me to summarize a great many synergistic things that put us where we are. I'm going to work on a post on that after Turkey Day, pretty crammed up between now and then -- be outa town from Fri until the Tue after the day.
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"This is where investing in leaders (even more then we have so far) from team leader to GO may be the only mitigation strategy we can pull off. We have to have guys and gals who can take a concept out of doctrine (science) and implement it within the context of the operational conditions (art) to accomplish the mission - whatever it may be. Its a tall order, and why we require the best people be placed where they can be best used."
That, too is a critical point. Very critical.
Rank amatuer is right, you oughta start a thread on that five items idea...;)