How the West was Won (well, at least Ramadi)

Ok, I was taking a day off from SWJ but RTK made me come and defend my unit's honor ..... :mad:

As said I was there. That also means I was very close to it personally, and it colors my views. That said, I'll try and give as objective as a summary as possible. Forgive the dick and jane writing style, I have to type quickly because I promised to play cars with my 3 year old.....:wry:

This version is entirely my own personal view and from memory without my notes, so forgive me if any inaccuracies in dates or units are involved. My position gave me a first hand view of the complete fight at Brigade level from August 2006-February 2007.

Setting, June 2006. 1/1 AD takes Ramadi over from 2/28 ID. Ramadi is largely under insurgent control, and a Marine BN is hunkered in the government center and a few other sites in central Ramadi. Insurgents have complete freedom of movement in the city, and AQIZ controls most of the town. Daily battles rage between the marines and the fighters around the Gov Center. 2/28 pursues a containment strategy to isolate Ramadi. Residents begin to flee the city in anticipation of a US Fallujah style takedown due to AQIZ (Al Qaeda Iraq) presence. SIGACTs average around 40-60 a day. Attacks against CF are 20+ per day, and tend to be complex. There are less than 300 IP's on the books, and less than 100 report to duty daily in a few decrepit stations on the periphery of the city, and undertake no missions or security duties. The major bases east and west of town are mortared/rocketed multiple times per day from both rural and open areas. COL Devlin, I MEF G2, declares Anbar irretrievably lost. 1/1 AD was charged basically with keeping a lid on things, and preventing an AQIZ sanctuary. COL MacFarland, the commander, was given essentially a free hand to do what he wanted, because things couldn't get much worse.

1/1 AD brings a slightly different experience base to Ramadi. First, they are an in theater transfer from Tal Afar, and followed 3ACR's success. There 1/1 AD learned a lot about local governance development, combat outposts, and tribal cooperation. COL MacFarland determined not to mount a citywide assault and instead begin establishing company bases in key places, starting on the outskirts of the city and moving inward. The bases are designed to reclaim Ramadi one neighborhood at a time.

The campaign begins, and the first few company bases go in. The bases endure daily attacks for several weeks, including ambushes, VBIEDs, mortars, and complex attacks with 40-50 fighters. Over subsequent weeks, the amount, complexity, and frequency of attacks drop. We expand patrols around the base, and leverage CA teams to provide assistance to the population in the neighborhoods surrounding the bases. Although wary, the locals offer some measure of cooperation in many areas. As one area is controlled, another COP is built further in the city, and the process starts over. Two maneuver battalions participate in the initial COP expansion, TF 1-37 AR and TF 1-506 IN.

During this period, we begin to see indications of "Green(Civilian) on Red (AIF)" violence north of Ramadi. Technical intelligence indicates that AQIZ murdered a major tribal sheik in a power dispute, and desecrated his body. His tribe and several nearby tribes begin to fight AQIZ. At this point, our engagement officers, with the support of COL MacFarland, and led by CPT Travis Patriquin, begin engaging the sheiks of the area. It is determined that the sheiks are fed up with AQIZ, but lack the strength, both physical, political, and moral, to take on AQIZ, which is threatening their traditional power in Ramadi. Over time, a deal is struck with a few tribes to the NW of Ramadi, led by Sheik Sittar. We provide training and weapons to members of their tribes, and they join the IP's and cease supporting those attacking us. We cooperatively will work to rid Ramadi of AQIZ. The announcement of the Anbar Salvation Council is made, and greeted with skepticism by outside sources.

We begin police recruitment large scale in August/September. As outlined in CPT Patriquin's "How to win in Al Anbar" PowerPoint, groups of tribal militia are sent to Baghdad and Jordan for police training, while the other half protect the tribe. When one group comes back, another departs. By December over 1000 IP's have been trained and are active in the force. The IP's are deployed into stations protecting tribal areas. AQIZ flees these areas and the surrounding tribes take notice. One by one, the tribes approach the SAA council and us and ask to join. We wholeheartedly accept, and when a tribe joins an IP base is created in their area, supported by CF. The US units in the area provide backup and support to the tribal fighters when attacked by AQIZ. By November, most of the area north and west of Ramadi has been secured by tribal forces backed by US and IA heavy units. The main bases to the west of Ramadi received virtually no indirect fire attacks from October forward. Attacks on CF in these areas drop to Zero, and many caches are revealed. As each tribe comes on line, it adds to the IP recruits, and civil affairs projects are targeted to those areas.

East of Ramadi remained a problem. In late November AQIZ attacked a tribe in an area immediately east of Ramadi that was about to "flip". AQIZ murdered about 20 members and began burning houses. Locals fled across the river in boats and approached an Iraqi Army Outpost north of the river, and described the situation. CPT Patriquin called the local sheiks for a better description. We made contact with the tribal sheik who begged for help. We immediately shifted air and ground resources to the area, and AQIZ began to withdraw. We clearly caught a body being dragged behind a car on UAV as AQIZ withdrew west. TF 1-9 IN emplaced blocks and in cooperation with USMC airpower we targeted and destroyed three AQIZ vehicles fleeing the scene.

The that evening we sent companies of 1-9 IN into the area, who established presence to support the attacked tribe. Other tribes, seeing the forces, requested help. Over the next weeks an area that was previously considered "no go" terrain became supportive as every tribe in the area "flipped". Almost all the major outer Ramadi tribal areas were now friendly to CF. TF 2-37 Armor (TF 1-6 IN began it in that sector until Oct) and TF 1-9 IN developed and maintained the tribal relationships, and ensured AQIZ could not retaliate against the friendly tribes.

While the outer area fight was occurring, the bases in the city were expanding under TF 1-37 AR, TF 1-77 AR, and 1/6 Marines (1-35 AR and 1-506 PIR began the processes but rotated in Oct/Nov 2006). The Marines under 1/6 were able to leave their embattled outposts and established new bases in northern Ramadi where AQIZ had fled as the base footprint expanded. The fighting was heavy but brief, and AQIZ was largely driven from the western and Southern Ramadi Areas. We moved to establish a joint command center for IP/IA/US forces, and the SAA appointed a mayor for Ramadi to establish local governance. In January things had progressed that th IP and IA waged a major fight that expelled AQIZ from west Ramadi during a fight at the "White Apartments". This action, while backed by US, was conducted entirely by IP and IA working together.

At this time (February) 1/1 AD changed out with 1/3 ID, who enthusiastically adopted our concept of operation and continued with it.

By April, 1/3 ID reported that every tribe in Ramadi was cooperating with SAA, and attacks had dropped to less than 1/day. The campaign rippled outward to the rest of Anbar. 1 MEF and 2 MEF were more than happy to assist.

continued from above .....

So why did it happen? Here are my personal views, and I think it was a combination of these factors, at different strengths among each sheik.

1) The "Taliban" effect. The tribes flipped because it was in their interest to. They saw what life would be like under AQIZ and didn't want any of it.

2) Power. AQIZ became more powerful than the tribes. The tribes decided that this wasn't good, and maybe the Americans aren't so bad.

3) Fatigue. The locals were tired of their families being killed, justified and unjustified. Most just wanted some law and order and a job.

4) Recognition that the US would eventually leave. They watch the news too, and realized that sooner or later the US would be leaving. Extrapolating from that, the real question is what would happen once the US left. They fear the central government and Shia militias. Losing their best fighters to US firepower only weakened their long term position if it comes to a civil war.

5) US Forces learned. US Forces employing COIN doctrine that respected local power structures. We weren't trying to create their society new, we sought to work with rather than against traditional tribal structures. 1 MEF (MajGen Zilmer) and 2 MEF (MajGen Gaskin) were 110% supportive of our efforts and gave us all we needed, especially in non-kinetic resources.

6) The wind was blowing our way. Tribes and Iraqis have a long history of siding with whoever it seems will be the winner, and changing that in an instant. Securing the population from company outposts and ridding the criminal element bought a lot of goodwill, and convinced many that the US would win the tactical battle in the short term.

The risks:

1) Tribes flip back. This would mainly happen if we failed to back them against AQIZ or the central government. Hence Bush's visit to Anbar last week, demonstrating political support.

2) Arming the Sunnis for an upcoming sectarian war.

3) The Sunnis still do not trust the central government in the least.

4) Having empowered the tribes, they act more as mafia type organizations than semi-legitimate governments for the local populace, creating a corrupt and unpopular local government that will channel the population to support AQIZ against the sheiks.

Hon. Schumer has some points. The tribes flipped for their own reasons. But the awakening could not have happened without our support. As Ken stated earlier in the thread, this was attempted but not exploited in 2004, and elsewhere. Bottom line a strategic window opened, and 1/1 AD was smart enough to exploit the window of opportunity. The results are where they are today. We didn't kill those mortar teams hammering our FOB's, they flipped. In essence, that is the goal of both Sun Tzu and COIN theory, defeating your enemy without having to combat him. By co-opting him my FOB is just as safe, except if the guy flipps back. But isn’t that how you win most COIN actions, by convincing the other guy not to fight?

But some pundits are right. While a great tactical and operational success, it only has meaning if the Root Cause of the insurgency is addressed, which requires political reconciliation. All that work is for nothing if the country isn't able to come back together. But that's beyond a BCT's scope.

As a final note, 1/1 AD endured 89 KIA in Ramadi (IIRC +/- a few), and over 500 wounded acheiving the above. It was not easy, and very kinetic at times. A high US price was paid for the Anbar awakening.

Now I have to go and “play cars” :D

As to whether the Awakening would have been possible without the surge ....

As the timeline indicates, all the major muscle movements took place in August-November 2006. Well before the surge. We were augmented by a few companies from a MEU on an Anbar surge from November-January, which enabled us to expand further in 1-9 IN's AO.

In fact, we were extended from 12 to 14 months in theater in Oct 2006 because our replacement BDE was shifted to support the Baghdad surge. This past spring it became policy for all units to have 15 month tours.

1/1 AD remains the only BDE extended during both of its OIF tours - 15 months in OIF 1 to combat the Sadr Rebellion in 2004 and then again this past tour in Ramadi.

Cavguy - Awesome, very informative post. Guys like you who write stuff like this is why SWJ exists.

A few questions:

1) How well understood are tensions and shifts of power within or between tribes? For instance, Sheikh Sittar has often been described as a relatively minor entity at the beginning of the ASC. How have more established leadership figures within the Dulaimi confederation taken the sudden rise of American-backed sheikhs?

2) Are most of AQIZ's Iraqi fighters locally based, i.e. from the tribes themselves, or do they represent a sort of detribalized urban agglomeration, i.e. like many unemployed young men who join the Mahdi Army on the Shia side?

3) To address the main concern of those for whom the tribal strategy represents a short-term solution that works against the long-term strategy --- doesn't empowering the tribes, or at least certain tribal figures, work against the establishment of a legitimate central government, given the transient, violent, and often corrupt nature of tribal power structures?

4) Also, do you know if this was useful at all during 1/1 AD's Ramadi operations?

5) Added late: To what degree has U.S. support come through financing or directly arming the Anbar Salvation Council, as opposed to armed support/combined operations i.e. the tank parked near Sheikh Sittar's home?

May we correspond offline (briefly) about this post? I have a few questions I would like to ask. Thank you.

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Originally Posted by Danny

May we correspond offline (briefly) about this post? I have a few questions I would like to ask. Thank you.

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Sure, Send me a PM.

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Originally Posted by tequila

Cavguy - Awesome, very informative post. Guys like you who write stuff like this is why SWJ exists.

A few questions:

1) How well understood are tensions and shifts of power within or between tribes? For instance, Sheikh Sittar has often been described as a relatively minor entity at the beginning of the ASC. How have more established leadership figures within the Dulaimi confederation taken the sudden rise of American-backed sheikhs?

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Quick answer is that the bigger sheiks came along quickly once they felt their position was declining vis a vis Sittar and his confederation. However, we didn't "sell out" Sittar to the Johnny come latelies. However, tribe positions have changed regularly throughout the ages in Anbar, and they work and adjust to whoever is in favor at the moment.

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2) Are most of AQIZ's Iraqi fighters locally based, i.e. from the tribes themselves, or do they represent a sort of detribalized urban agglomeration, i.e. like many unemployed young men who join the Mahdi Army on the Shia side?

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I would say it's 99/1 local/foreign. The Iraqis will claim it's all foreign fighters, but I think we actually captured one real foreign fighter in our time there.

I would say the comparison to the Mehidi army is close - AQIZ fighters come from the Pepsi Generation, so to speak.

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3) To address the main concern of those for whom the tribal strategy represents a short-term solution that works against the long-term strategy --- doesn't empowering the tribes, or at least certain tribal figures, work against the establishment of a legitimate central government, given the transient, violent, and often corrupt nature of tribal power structures?

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Yes and No. Yes, empowering the tribes makes establishing a central government harder. But that assumes you have a functioning government in the first place, which Anbar had none. The tribes would control who gets elected anyway. I think no central/democratic government is possible as long as you don't have security, which wasn't possible without empowering the tribes or flooding Anbar with tens of thousands of additional US troops.

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4) Also, do you know if this was useful at all during 1/1 AD's Ramadi operations?

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First I've seen it, but that doesn't mean someone in my BDE didn't read it.

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5) Added late: To what degree has U.S. support come through financing or directly arming the Anbar Salvation Council, as opposed to armed support/combined operations i.e. the tank parked near Sheikh Sittar's home?

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Both. Money=Power in Iraq. Also, guns=power. Money+Guns+Influence with US = You da man.

I think most of it is the result of AQIZ overstepping the "line" combined with the tribal power base being threatened by AQIZ. Arabs shift alliances fast, and suddenly the US wasn't so bad - I think Sittar was brilliant to seize the opportunity and make him and his tribe more powerful than ever before .....

Thank you very much for that CavGuy. Sounds like one of those rivers of dominos must have been fantastic to be a part of after so much banging your head on the wall.

P.S. Who won at the cards?

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Originally Posted by JJackson

Thank you very much for that CavGuy. Sounds like one of those rivers of dominos must have been fantastic to be a part of after so much banging your head on the wall.

P.S. Who won at the cards?

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CARS ... not cards. :)

Did give me a humorous mental image of my son smoking a cigar with sunglasses on playing poker ........

I was lucky both my tours in Iraq to serve with exceptional units in exceptional places - Baghdad/Najaf in 2003-2004, and Tal Afar/Ramadi in 2006-2007.

Sheikh Abdul Sittar al-Rishawi killed in car bomb.

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The most prominent figure in a revolt of Sunni sheiks against al-Qaida in Iraq was killed Thursday in an explosion near his home in Anbar province, police said.

Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha was leader of the Anbar Salvation Council, also known as the Anbar Awakening — an alliance of clans backing the Iraqi government and U.S. forces.

He was among a group of tribal leaders who met President Bush earlier this month at al-Asad Air Base in Anbar province.

Abu Risha and two of his bodyguards were killed by a roadside bomb, said Col. Tareq Youssef, supervisor of Anbar police.

No group claimed responsibility for the assassination but suspicion fell on al-Qaida in Iraq, which U.S. officials say has suffered devastating setbacks in Anbar thanks to Abu Risha and his fellow sheiks. It's unclear how his death would affect U.S. efforts to organize Sunnis against the terrorist network.

A senior member of Abu Risha's group, Sheik Jubeir Rashid, said the explosion took place at 3:30 p.m. as Abu Risha was returning to his home in Ramadi, Anbar's provincial capital.

"It is a major blow to the council, but we are determined to strike back and continue our work," Rashid said. "Such an attack was expected, but it will not deter us ..."

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And from the BBC:

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Iraqi insurgents kill key US ally

A key Sunni ally of the US and Iraqi governments has been killed in a bomb attack in the city of Ramadi, Iraqi police and media say.

Abdul Sattar Abu Risha led what was known as the "Anbar Awakening", an alliance of Sunni Arab tribes that rose up against al-Qaeda in Iraq.

The movement helped reduce violence dramatically and was hailed by the US as an example for the rest of Iraq.

President George Bush met and endorsed him during a visit to Iraq last week.

Abu Risha's assassination will be a severe blow to the "Awakening" in Anbar province, says the BBC's Hugh Sykes in Baghdad.
...

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6993211.stm

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BTW, killing the prominent (Sunni) U.S. ally ("poster child" of Iraq volunteer police, force where three-quarters of the volunteer forces were Sunni Muslims) can benefit some other (opposite) players (ea those that do not wish creation of strong Sunni militias).

The WP ran an article about an emgagement outside Ramadi back in mid-August in which US forces discovered and beat back an estimated 70 AQI folks (with maybe 50% casualties to the AQI force) whose ostensible target was this sheik. I think it was called the Battle of Turtle Island but my memory may well be defective as to the island's name. The subsequent death of the sheik may make a point about the tenacity and dedication of the opposition, especially because Abdul Sattar assuredly had pretty significant protection in place. Alternatively, one might instead choose to accept that it was an inside job committed by one of his supposed allies--shades of Mario Puzo's Godfather.

I think it's pretty safe to say that al-Rishawi had many, many enemies, only one of whom was AQI.

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Originally Posted by wm

The WP ran an article about an engagement outside Ramadi back in mid-August in which US forces discovered and beat back an estimated 70 AQI folks (with maybe 50% casualties to the AQI force) whose ostensible target was this sheik. I think it was called the Battle of Turtle Island but my memory may well be defective as to the island's name....

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The article is linked in this earlier discussion thread: Fight on Donkey Island

It isn't known if the sheikh was the specific target of the bad guys rolled back in that engagement, but your memory of the article isn't too bad - his name was mentioned in it more generally as a target:

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....The fighters targeted tribal leaders and police in Ramadi, according to U.S. military intelligence and video footage shot by the insurgents before the planned attack. In one video, an Islamic State of Iraq fighter dives into a lake, waves his fist and threatens Sheik Abdul Sattar Buzaigh al-Rishawi, who founded the main pro-U.S. tribal alliance, known as the Anbar Awakening. Sattar is "a dog of Anbar," the fighter said.

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http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle2971288.ece

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The Americans had hit a goldmine in Mr al-Obeidi. With his intelligence skills and local gunmen, they suddenly found that they could identify an elusive enemy. The former insurgents knew exactly where to find the Islamists and their weapons. Within a month Mr al-Obeidi’s men had led the Americans on a series of raids that swept the Islamists from Amariyah.

The recent turning of Sunni tribes and insurgents against al-Qaeda in western Iraq and Baghdad has become known as the Sunni Awakening. Here, however, it is more of a national awakening — Mr al-Obeidi’s 600- man force includes disillusioned Shia soldiers as well as Sunni former officers who had worked secretly for the US.

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Good news story, but some good news stories are left better untold. I wish Mr al-Obeidi success and safety.

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Originally Posted by Cavguy

As to whether the Awakening would have been possible without the surge ....

As the timeline indicates, all the major muscle movements took place in August-November 2006. Well before the surge.

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I appreciate you taking the time to write your experiences down. They are important and need to be heard, especially your sequencing of key events.

A couple of questions for you: Was the establishment of Cops necessary? Or was the necessary condition for flipping of the tribes the decision on Colonel McFarland's part to ally with them and in essence stop targeting tribal sunni insurgents and a reciprocation on their part to stop attacking CF? Did any of the tribal sheiks ever tell you that the Cops were necessary?

thanks

gentile

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Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

I appreciate you taking the time to write your experiences down. They are important and need to be heard, especially your sequencing of key events.

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If I ever get my head out of my 4th point of contact, my Mil Review article will be finished on the subject.

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Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

A couple of questions for you: Was the establishment of Cops necessary?

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In my mind, yes. I commanded my company from a COP in Tal Afar (until the b*stards promoted me and I had to leave:(), where we were before Ramadi. I am convinced that COP's are the way to go. You absolutely have to secure the populace 24/7 where they live. Maybe a COP isn't always the right answer, but you have to achieve that effect.

When we inherited Ramadi, no one expected us to do anything but keep the lid on so to speak. It was COL MacFarland's decision to use the same tactics proved in Tal Afar in Ramadi - using clear, hold, build to take back ground, and use that leverage to bring in fence-sitters to our side. You have to understand, in June 2006 AIF OWNED nearly all of Ramadi. Full freedom of movement, multiple IED belts, etc. We went in south Ramadi first with COPs, and basically fought daily there from July-November. The AIF lost control there once the COPs went in. Same in Ta'meem (W Ramadi) and East Ramadi when COPs were established. They interdicted AIF freedom of movement in the vicinity of COPs, which provided the opening to engage with the sheiks. They also bought enormous credibility with the locals who were fence-sitting.

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Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

Or was the necessary condition for flipping of the tribes the decision on Colonel McFarland's part to ally with them and in essence stop targeting tribal Sunni insurgents and a reciprocation on their part to stop attacking CF?

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I wasn't in the discussions, but I know we wouldn't have made such an explicit arrangement. We never stopped targeting any active insurgents. However, certain people associated with certain nationalist insurgents told us they wouldn't fight us anymore, and we accepted that. We didn't declare amnesty, but if reporting stopped on certain individuals who were involved in tribes we wanted to flip, we certainly didn't spoil the movement by arresting them for past sins unless it was someone too dirty to tolerate. You can't have it both ways. The beauty was that these former insurgents led us to huge caches and were ruthless on targeting the AQIZ fanatics once empowered.

I think you get to the idea of it in your article about there bing a lethal/non-lethal balance. We were heavily invested in lethal operations (in Jul-Oct we had almost as many daily sigacts than ALL six BCT's in Baghdad). However, we were equally invested in non-lethal operations to persuade the tribes to take up arms against AQIZ.

If you think about it, 1/1 AD certainly wasn't the first BCT to engage locals, build COPs, invest heavily in ISF, and develop governance. We certainly didn't have a monopoly on good leadership. What was different was our synchronization of the lethal/non-lethal. Also COL MacFarland levied the BN's for some former combat CO's and BN S3's to build his BCT staff in Ramadi - especially reinforcing the S3 shop and ISF cell as decisive multipliers. It makes a big difference having that kind of ground experience in your BCT TOC reacting versus the pre or post-CCC CPT's that are usually there.

The best analogy I can make is to a major conventional battle. Ideally, you array your forces in a tactically sound manner to initiate the battle and develop contact. You develop a collection plan to assess the enemy's decisions and get inside his cycle. When the opportunity presents (i.e. a flank exposed, etc.) you ideally have the flexibility to exploit the opening while it exists with enough combat power to decimate the enemy's formation. That is what happened in Ramadi. We were arrayed correctly in tactics, units, personnel and mindset that when the opening came, we were able to recognize and exploit it to achieve decisive success. Such is the difference that has separated the great commanders from the mediocre throughout history.

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Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

Did any of the tribal sheiks ever tell you that the Cops were necessary?

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In Tal Afar they certainly did. They wanted more COPs (really POPs) than I had platoons. (Grab the Jul-Aug ARMOR Mag and read my article on "Re-taking Sa'ad) We leveraged ISF into the role there. The COPs in Ramadi were for different reasons. We maintained approx 16 COPs manned by US/IA around Ramadi - some were to re-take ground and others to protect friendly tribes. We always sought to transition COPs to ISF as soon as they were capable to establish newer ones in more hostile areas.

I also just finished reading The Tipping Point. Much of what also happened was about getting to the Mavens, Salesmen, and Connectors in the tribes.

Hope this answers your inquiry - my challenge in writing an article has been that there is no single factor I can point to - it was multiple factors that cascaded into radical success - leadership, organization, COPs, plans, local engagement, tactics, tribes, ISF, and some just plain stupid moves by AQIZ all influenced the result. Explaining exactly why we succeeded where others failed is my great challenge - I can't even point to blind luck because it also worked in Tal Afar. :confused:

One note is also pertinent - I discussed this at the COIN seminar today with an attendee - We "owned" a very large battlespace in both cases. Impact of our flank units was absolutely minimal. Therefore, we were able to synchronize effects in our AO much easier than a large city like Baghdad where multiple BCTs have to work in harmony. There was absolutely no functioning government in Ramadi, and the one in Tal Afar was completely under our influence. That may have been a significant factor as well.

Also, check out this thread on SWJ, dealing with the amazing contributions of a talented young Captain in our BDE to winning the war. Sometimes, individual actions make a difference.

In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict
By ALISSA J. RUBIN and DAMIEN CAVE
New York Times
Published: December 23, 2007

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The Awakening movement, a predominantly Sunni Arab force recruited to fight Sunni Islamic extremists like Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, has become a great success story after its spread from Sunni tribes in Anbar Province to become an ad-hoc armed force of 65,000 to 80,000 across the country in less than a year. A linchpin of the American strategy to pacify Iraq, the movement has been widely credited with turning around the violence-scarred areas where the Sunni insurgency has been based.

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Despite the successes of the movement, including the members’ ability to provide valuable intelligence and give rebuilding efforts a new chance in war-shattered communities, the American military acknowledges that it is also a high-risk proposition. It is an experiment in counterinsurgency warfare that could contain the seeds of a civil war — in which, if the worst fears come true, the United States would have helped organize some of the Sunni forces arrayed against the central government on which so many American lives and dollars have been spent.

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Iraq Warning over Sunni Patrols
BBC News International Version
Published Saturday, 22 December, 2007

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7157581.stm

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Iraq warning over Sunni patrols

Gen Jassim wants the patrols to be integrated into mainstream forces
Iraq will not allow US-backed neighbourhood patrols to become a "third force" alongside police and the army, Iraq's defence minister has said.
Gen Abdel Qader Jassim said the Sunni-dominated patrols should be integrated into the regular Iraqi security forces.

The patrols have been credited with the recent drop in violence in Iraq.

But Shia leaders fear the patrols will turn against them after US troops leave Iraq, correspondents say...

"We categorically reject them [the neighbourhood patrols] turning into a third military organisation," said Mr Jassim, himself a Sunni Arab, at a joint press conference with the Iraqi Interior Minister, Jawad al-Bolani.

The neighbourhood patrols consist of some 71,000 men, many of whom were formerly members of the insurgency, fighting against US troops and the Shia-led Iraqi government.

Patrol members are paid about $10 (£5) a day by US authorities, but responsibility for paying them will pass to the Iraqi government next year.

The patrols have been credited with helping to bring down violence

In their press conference, the ministers made clear that payment would only be forthcoming if 20% of the patrols are integrated into the mainstream Iraqi security forces...

Shia leaders fear that unless the patrols can be assimilated into the mainstream Iraqi security forces, the violence could increase once US troops have left Iraq.

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This is not going to go down well with Sunni Tribal and Clan leaders or their populations.

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Originally Posted by Norfolk

Iraq Warning over Sunni Patrols
BBC News International Version
Published Saturday, 22 December, 2007

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7157581.stm



This is not going to go down well with Sunni Tribal and Clan leaders or their populations.

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Considering that much of the Sunni tribal concern can be found in their ability to have a part in their own governance this really might be a good time frame to look at more local and regional elections within the established framework of the constitution. This would be one step in bringing a sense of incorporation to the current governing environments. There would be alot of important factors to keep in mind and would require involvement of the national government, but it might just work if outside allies agrred to encourage it.

This also might bring some changes which would affect other areas in ways some outside interests might not like so as usual baby steps is best.

An article on Ramadi by myself and Colonel Sean MacFarland is out in this month's Military Review.

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/C...ngMarApr08.pdf

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The stunning security improvements in Al Anbar province during 2007 fundamentally changed the military and political landscape of Iraq. Many, both in and outside the military (and as late as November 2006), had assessed the situation in Anbar as a lost cause. The “Awakening” of Sunni tribal leaders and their supporters that began in September 2006 near Ramadi seemed to come out of nowhere. But the “Anbar Awakening”—what some have called the “Gettysburg of Iraq”—was not a random event. It was the result of a concerted plan executed by U.S. forces in Ramadi that would eventually develop into an Iraqi led movement that dramatically changed the security situation in all of Anbar and parts of greater Iraq.

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The Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who served in or with our brigade combat team (BCT) enabled the Anbar Awakening through a deliberate, often difficult campaign that combined traditional counterinsurgency (COIN) principles with precise, lethal operations. The skilled application of the same principles and exploitation of success by other great units in Anbar and other parts of Iraq spread the success in Ramadi far beyond our area of operations (AO) at a pace no one could have predicted.

The Ready First enabled the Anbar Awakening by—
O Employing carefully focused lethal operations.
O Securing the populace through forward presence.
O Co-opting local leaders.
O Developing competent host-nation security forces.
O Creating a public belief in rising success.
O Developing human and physical infrastructure.

The execution of this approach enabled the brigade to set conditions, recognize opportunity, and exploit success when it came, to create a remarkable turnaround.

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And Finally:

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Clearly, a combination of factors, some of which we may not yet fully understand, contributed to this pivotal success. As mentioned before, the enemy overplayed its hand and the people were tired of Al-Qaeda. A series of assassinations had elevated younger, more aggressive tribal leaders to positions of influence. A growing concern that the U.S. would leave Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and Iranian-supported militias made these younger leaders open to our overtures. Our willingness to adapt our plans based on the advice of the sheiks, our staunch and timely support for them in times of danger and need, and our ability to deliver on our promises convinced them that they could do business with us. Our forward presence kept them reassured. We operated aggressively across all lines of operation, kinetic and non-kinetic, to bring every weapon and asset at our disposal to bear against the enemy. We conducted detailed intelligence fusion and targeting meetings and operated seamlessly with special operations forces, aviation, close air support, and riverine units. We have now seen this model followed by other BCTs in other parts of Iraq, and it has proved effective.

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The discussion in this thread and the feedback (positive and negative) helped me get this article out the door, and improved its quality immensely. I hope it adds to the discussion and understanding of what happened in Anbar.

Also, I'm outed!

Niel

Congrats!

And of course good work!

How the West Was Won by Cavguy

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This is news the world doesn’t hear: Ramadi, long a hotbed of unrest, a city that once formed the southwestern tip of the notorious “Sunni Triangle,” is now telling a different story, a story of Americans who came here as liberators, became hated occupiers and are now the protectors of Iraqi reconstruction.

- - Ullrich Fichtner, “Hope and Despair in Divided Iraq,” Der Spiegel, 10 August 2007.

Colonel Sean MacFarland and I teamed up to provide a firsthand account of the “Anbar Awakening” in this month’s issue of Military Review. The article details the efforts of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Ramadi, Iraq from June 2006 to February 2007. Transferring from Tal Afar into the most violent city in Iraq at the time, the Ready First designed a campaign plan that sought to set the conditions for a tribal alliance, and rapidly exploit success through developing local governance and security forces. Supported by the 1st and 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force leadership, the plan was successfully executed and achieved results beyond anyone’s expectations. This success in execution was carried forward to greater success by the actions of our follow-on unit, 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division.

The article describes the key facets of the plan – population security through combat outposts, combat operations against Al Qaeda insurgents, tense negotiations with tribal sheiks, and a few key individuals and decisive combat actions that shifted the tide of conflict and began the transformation of the nation...

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I know quite a few Marines who were in Ramadi during this time, and spent time at Blue Diamond and Hurricane point, nice to see a different view, I have seen plenty of AAR's from Marines through professional journals, reports themselves, or the actual people involved. I know Col Devlin only in passing and I am a little surprised that he would say something like that especially working for a guy like Gen. Gaskin. One of the Army Captains who was in my team out of FOB Loyalty had an IP checkpoint outside of Ramadi. I have also been to Tal Afar, and I was pretty impressed with how quiet it was.
Lastly your not implying that the Army BCT is solely responsible for the success out west...are you?:)

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Originally Posted by Boot

Lastly your not implying that the Army BCT is solely responsible for the success out west...are you?:)

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I hope not ... 1/6 and 3/8 Marines was part of 1/1 AD, and the article clearly credits the Army and Marine members of the BCT, and notice I talk of the USMC Air Support. 4 of 5 maneuver BN's in AO Topeka were Army - but it was a joint fight. It would be no different if it had happened in RCT's to the East and west, both of which have army units working in them but I rarely see them mentioned either, not out of omission, but because most of the forces in those areas are Marines.

The article also credits 1 and 2 MEF. However, it is undeniable that the (most recent) Awakening began in AO Topeka, and it was under control of a US Army BCT operating under 1 and later 2 MEF, utilizing lessons and mindset largely developed elsewhere.

If you notice, the article is about the Awakening, and only really mentions (in action) one of the five BCT's under our control 1-9 IN, because they were at the decisive action.

I'm curious about the role of higher headquarters in helping or hindering operations. The impression I get is that your brigade commander was left to his own devices and allowed to get on with it. I wonder whether he had to gain approval for his plans, how closely operations were monitored, and how difficult (or easy) it was to get resources from higher. I ask because a very fine brigade commander in Afghanistan was consistently micro-managed and forced to jump through several briefing hoops each time he wanted to mount an operation.

I suspect partly this was a matter of scale; there was only one combat brigade with a two-star and several deputy CGs to help him in Afghanistan. I just wonder if the same thing went on in Iraq.

My son reported the same problem you note in his two trips to the 'Stan but noted the absence of GO micro management in his trip to Iraq. All those were with the same Bde but with different Flag Officers each time.

To state the obvious, the uppermost elephant sets the tone for the herd and scale can affect the personality -- or at least modulate the display thereof. :wry:

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Originally Posted by Eden

I'm curious about the role of higher headquarters in helping or hindering operations. The impression I get is that your brigade commander was left to his own devices and allowed to get on with it. I wonder whether he had to gain approval for his plans, how closely operations were monitored, and how difficult (or easy) it was to get resources from higher. I ask because a very fine brigade commander in Afghanistan was consistently micro-managed and forced to jump through several briefing hoops each time he wanted to mount an operation.

I suspect partly this was a matter of scale; there was only one combat brigade with a two-star and several deputy CGs to help him in Afghanistan. I just wonder if the same thing went on in Iraq.

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I'd really have to have COL MacFarland answer that. I believe in one of his media interviews he half-jokingly says he was given the AO and basically told to keep the lid on it, because no one expected anything out of it. I'm not sure how much/little interaction with MG Zilmer on day to day ops he had, but I never felt 1MEF or 2MEF meddling much in our operational plans. Outside of Baghdad, the size/scope of the MND AO's pretty much limits how much a division commander can actively control, the BCT commanders are kind of like kings of their kingdoms. That is a good and bad thing - allows initative, but also accounts for the "mood swings" that sometimes occur after RIP/TOA's, where a BCT commander with an opposite tactical philosophy takes over. I know that was 3d ACR's fear with us in Tal Afar, and our fear about 1/3 ID. 1/3 ID performed superbly in our place, and I know (despite Ricks' out of context quote in FIASCO) we did well in Tal Afar, violence by October 2006 there was 60% less than the 60% reduction during 3ACR's tour.

From personal experience, as the BDE Battle Major, I never had tactical interference from the MEF, in fact, I would say they went out of their way to be supportive to our tactical efforts. The CG and ADC were regularly in our AO, so I am sure they were quite familiar with our plans and course of action. How much they gave Ready 6 specific guidance I am unaware.

I actually enjoyed working for a MEF HQ much better than an Army DIV HQ, micromanagement wise.

All,

COL MacFarland wrote an addendum to last month's Military Review article on Ramadi. He wanted to address the mistaken perception of some that it was an Army-centric effort. In reality, it was highly joint - from the squad on up.

You can read the addendum here, and the original article here.

Money Quote:

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"You old guys need to get over that s—t."
- Young Marine to Marine Sergeant Major when asked how he felt about fighting alongside an Army unit in Al Anbar, Iraq.

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and

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One of the great legacies of the fight for Al Anbar province will be the enduring, mutual respect earned by the various service-members who fought side by side. This respect was nowhere more evident than in Ramadi, where our Army brigade combat team, the 1st BCT, 1st Armored Division (Ready First Combat Team), fought under the command of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). The Ready First was not a pure Army BCT. It contained U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) elements, including a reinforced rifle battalion (initially 3/8 Marines and later 1/6 Marines), two rifle companies from a Marine Expeditionary Unit (2/4 Marines), a riverine patrol unit, an air and naval gunfire liaison platoon, and a civil affairs detachment. The Air Force supported the Ready First with an air liaison team embedded in the BCT. The brigade staff itself was a de facto joint organization—it had Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine officers and NCOs throughout. The electronic warfare officer, a Catholic chaplain, and the head surgeon were all Navy commanders. The civil affairs and public affairs officers were Marines. Outside the brigade, support came from a Marine logistics group and I MEF’s air combat element. Numerous other external USMC units, including a platoon from a radio battalion, a postal unit, explosive ordnance disposal teams, fire-fighting teams, air traffic controllers, and military transition teams, also provided support. So did the Navy, in the form of surgical teams and corpsmen, SeaBee battalions, electronic warfare experts, and SEAL platoons from SEAL Teams 3 and 5.

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Originally Posted by Cavguy

I hope not ... 1/6 and 3/8 Marines was part of 1/1 AD, and the article clearly credits the Army and Marine members of the BCT, and notice I talk of the USMC Air Support. 4 of 5 maneuver BN's in AO Topeka were Army - but it was a joint fight. It would be no different if it had happened in RCT's to the East and west, both of which have army units working in them but I rarely see them mentioned either, not out of omission, but because most of the forces in those areas are Marines.

The article also credits 1 and 2 MEF. However, it is undeniable that the (most recent) Awakening began in AO Topeka, and it was under control of a US Army BCT operating under 1 and later 2 MEF, utilizing lessons and mindset largely developed elsewhere.

If you notice, the article is about the Awakening, and only really mentions (in action) one of the five BCT's under our control 1-9 IN, because they were at the decisive action.

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Cavguy,
I sent you a PM and no I didn't think you were implying that, my question was totally tounge in cheek. I have great respect for Col McFarland and what was accomplished in Ramadi, and what is being accomplished in Al Anbar. Sorry if I came across that way.
I worked for Gen Pittard and Gen Yarbrough at the IAG and have great respect for both and the rest of the Soldiers I worked with there.
I worked with 4-1 BCT in MND-N and was extremelly impressed with the support they gave TT's and the team I was on when we rolled through there. It was overall better than what my Marine brothers were giving Marine TT's.
Now if the 3/69th Armor would give back the radio gear they stole from one of the MiTT's!...


Boot

When 1st Recon Co moved from the east coast of Korea to the west, they started with the two 1/4 tons, two 2 1/2 tons and one 100 cubic foot reefer they were authorized; when they arrived on the west coast two weeks later they had about 20 1/4 tons, five new GMC 2 1/2 tons and three reefers -- all painted Marine green with yellow reg and unit numbers. Consider your lost radios payback :D

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Originally Posted by Ken White

When 1st Recon Co moved from the east coast of Korea to the west, they started with the two 1/4 tons, two 2 1/2 tons and one 100 cubic foot reefer they were authorized; when they arrived on the west coast two weeks later they had about 20 1/4 tons, five new GMC 2 1/2 tons and three reefers -- all painted Marine green with yellow reg and unit numbers. Consider your lost radios payback :D

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HEY! I was in 3rd Recon EVERYONE knows 1st Recon are liars and cheats!:p

As for us Angels in 3rd Herd...:wry:

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Originally Posted by Boot

Cavguy,
I sent you a PM and no I didn't think you were implying that, my question was totally tounge in cheek. I have great respect for Col McFarland and what was accomplished in Ramadi, and what is being accomplished in Al Anbar. Sorry if I came across that way.
I worked for Gen Pittard and Gen Yarbrough at the IAG and have great respect for both and the rest of the Soldiers I worked with there.
I worked with 4-1 BCT in MND-N and was extremelly impressed with the support they gave TT's and the team I was on when we rolled through there. It was overall better than what my Marine brothers were giving Marine TT's.
Now if the 3/69th Armor would give back the radio gear they stole from one of the MiTT's!...


Boot

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No worries, I just was suprised that COL Mac and I did take some shots from a few Marines over the article - they inferred that it was somehow an attempt of the Army to claim all the credit and ignored their contributions. It wasn't just your (jesting) comment. I thought we tried in the original to highlight the joint nature, but it wasn't strong enough obviously.

I have run into a number of Marines (incl you) who were in Ramadi and enjoyed the article. I've often said to peers there's about 10 articles needing to be written about what happened there in each BN AO. 1/6 Marines taking back the "racetrack" would be fascinating.

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Originally Posted by Boot

HEY! I was in 3rd Recon EVERYONE knows 1st Recon are liars and cheats!:p

As for us Angels in 3rd Herd...:wry:

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Only for war stories. Thieve? Constantly. Only due to military necessity, of course... :D

Reporter Jim Michaels has a forthcoming book on 1/1 AD in Ramadi.

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A Chance in Hell

Posted by SWJ Editors on June 8, 2010 4:22 AM | Permalink| Print

How one brigade turned Ramadi, Iraq’s most violent city, into a model of stability. The riveting book by USA TODAY’s Jim Michaels is scheduled for release June 22, 2010. A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq’s Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War is available for pre-order on Amazon.com.

Colonel Sean MacFarland’s brigade arrived in Iraq’s deadliest city with simple instructions: pacify Ramadi without destroying it. The odds were against him from the start. In fact, few thought he would succeed.

Ramadi had been going steadily downhill. By 2006, insurgents roamed freely in many parts of the city in open defiance of Iraq’s U.S.-backed government. Al-Qaeda had boldly declared Ramadi its capital. Even the U.S. military acknowledged the province would be the last to be pacified.

A lanky officer with a boyish face, MacFarland was no Patton. But his soft voice masked an iron will and a willingness to take risks. While most of the American military was focused on taming Baghdad, MacFarland laid out a bold plan for Ramadi. His soldiers would take on the insurgents in their own backyard. He set up combat outposts in the city’s most dangerous neighborhoods. Snipers roamed the dark streets, killing al-Qaeda leaders and terrorist cells. U.S. tanks rumbled down the streets, firing point blank into buildings occupied by insurgents. MacFarland’s brigade engaged in some of the bloodiest street fighting of the war. Casualties on both sides mounted. Al-Qaeda wasn’t going to give up easily. Ramadi was too important. MacFarland wasn’t going to back down either. The two sides had fought to a stalemate.

At least until Sheik Abdul Sattar Bezia al-Rishawi emerged. A minor tribal leader, Sheik Sattar had earned his reputation as a smuggler. He carried a large six-shooter on his hip and had a taste for whiskey. But he hated al-Qaeda and was watching MacFarland’s brigade as they battled militants toe-to-toe. This was a different group of Americans, Sattar thought. Sattar approached MacFarland and said he was ready to join with the Americans and fight al-Qaeda. Other officers might have kept their distance. MacFarland didn’t hesitate. He promised Sattar his support.

What followed was one of history’s unlikeliest - and most successful - partnerships. Together, the Americans and Sattar’s growing band of fighters drove al-Qaeda from Ramadi. A Chance in Hell is compelling tale of combat leadership and how a handful of men turned the tide of war at a time when it looked most hopeless.

Jim Michaels is a military writer for USA Today and an experienced war correspondent. He is also a former U.S. Marine infantry officer. Again, A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq’s Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War is available for pre-order on Amazon.com.

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I read a draft copy, and it's very well written. He covers in detail many of the debates going on at higher levels about our approach, as well as selected stories of units involved in the fighting. Good read, well told, and I learned some things from reading it.

You just have to love Big Army revisionist history.

Yeah, one Army Colonel and his men were responsible for starting the entire Awakening.

Talk about ignoring the actual evolution of the "awakenings" - starting out near the Syrian border. And ignoring or giving token credit to the multitude of units, both U.S. military and U.S. civilian agency, involved with nurturing these things along.

Those on this website, and those who may have never stepped foot in Iraq, will certainly eat this stuff up as fact. Those in the know are just going to chuckle at this slanted view of history. Because those in the know and who were actually involved heavily in the program are not going to open up their pieholes and be posting it all over the internet for internet wasta points.

Carry on.

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Originally Posted by Agrippa

You just have to love Big Army revisionist history.

Yeah, one Army Colonel and his men were responsible for starting the entire Awakening.

Talk about ignoring the actual evolution of the "awakenings" - starting out near the Syrian border. And ignoring or giving token credit to the multitude of units, both U.S. military and U.S. civilian agency, involved with nurturing these things along.

Those on this website, and those who may have never stepped foot in Iraq, will certainly eat this stuff up as fact. Those in the know are just going to chuckle at this slanted view of history. Because those in the know and who were actually involved heavily in the program are not going to open up their pieholes and be posting it all over the internet for internet wasta points.

Carry on.

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No one has ever denied what happened out in Al Qaim w/LtCol Alford in 2005. In fact, Jim's book above details a lot of it.

More than a few of us have spent more than a few months in Iraq, and outside the wire. Your attack is silly, childish, and inane. Counter the points with facts or your own version, but leave the childish namecalling out of it.

This discussion between myself and a commenter may illuminate further.

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Makatak:
This sounds a little bit overblown. The "Anbar Revolution" (where tribal leaders started moving to the coalition side) began in 2005 in the western part of the province and moved east towards Ramadi. The MEF strategy all along was to separate Al Qaeda from the tribal leaders. In that sense, the brigade was a beneficiary of fortunate timing. In addition, they were an active-duty brigade (two rotations earlier, in 2004, a USAR brigade had the fight in Ramadi). Of course, if the author tells a good story and sells lots of books, then good for him. I hope he captures the larger context of actions throughout Anbar province and how the Brigade's actions both fit into that larger context and were enabled by external factors (and actors).

Posted by Makatak | June 8, 2010 4:24 PM

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Niel Smith:
Makatak,

You have a few facts/timelines wrong in your critique.

The "USAR BCT" you mention was 2/28 ID, PAARNG, not USAR. They were the previous rotation to 1/1 AD (the unit owning AO Topeka in the book) in 2005-2006, not 2004. 2/2 ID, an active BCT from Korea, owned Ramadi 2004-2005. They did have a rough rotation due to a number of factors.

The western fight was under LtCol Alford in Al Qaim, yes his superb efforts to enlist the tribes in that area preceded 1/1's efforts and achieved some great local results. However, his actions had little influence in what transpired Ramadi 2006.

Jim Michaels, the author, covers all this in his book. (I read an early draft) While not an exhaustive academic history, he reveals a lot of the debates and discussions between MNF/MNC-I, I and II MEF, and the various BCTs about how to best do what you describe. Jim describes the overall effort to win the tribes in the Ramadi AO and gain the alliance with Sheik Sittar, who became the most important figure in the Awakening movement until his assassination.

As far as causation, the US's role in it, and other factors, that ground has been covered and re-covered here on SWJ. Reasonable people may disagree on how much one factor weighed vs. others, and we need a lot more interviews with Iraqis and perspective from time to make an accurate judgment. Timing was certainly a factor, and the situation in early 2006 provided opportunities not available in 2004-2005. However, I am firm in my opinion that our change of tactics played a significant role in starting, facilitating, and accelerating the awakening.

Jim's book, told largely from the perspectives of the major players of the US side in Ramadi, details how that was done. Jim's book does a great job capturing that story, and the essence of what the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen of the Ready First Combat Team paid for in blood in 2006-2007.

You may also want to read and join the discussion here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3864), which has a lot of debate along these lines.

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