Also two other factors. SOF-ization and a deeply flawed training system
Not only is the US Army (and the Marine Corps to a lesser extent) guilty of "law enforcementization," the Army in particular dumbed down training to such an extent in the 80s that, given 2001 and some fighting to do, they adopted not only the flawed LE stuff but also much in the way of SOF Direct Action TTP. A combination of those two adoptions using the terribly flawed Task, Condition and Standard training process in an attempt to rectify shortfalls induced by that very process has been very harmful.
Task: Clear a building. Condition: Whoops! Empire State Building? Pentagon? Crystal City Marriot? Typical American Office building? Strip Shopping Center? European urban house? Afghan Rural house? Viet Namese rural house? Thatched Hut? :eek:
Standard: Clear and live... :wry:
Both the LE and the SOF DA TTP have a place but in general, infantry combat is not such a place. Some one needs to go dig out the pre-1975 doctrine, get the Army on an outcome based training regimen and let the LE and SOF stuff stay where it belongs. Slap and Infanteer are both correct as are Steve and Max -- and we, the Army, have got a problem that must be addressed... :mad:
Take doors as an example. For good reasons, LE and SOF DA types use doors. Why would Joe Tentpeg, Gruntus Typicalus, in an urban combat situation EVER use a door if it could be avoided? He's not remotely concerned with doing little damage to property, * he is very concerned with not ever doing the same thing twice (contrary to what we 'taught' and practiced for too long...) and doing the unexpected while letting the other SOB die for his country (hat tip to George C. Scott...).
Mouseholes, battered holes, through the ceiling, even windows are better than doors. Been my observation that a Frag grenade is best first in if doors must be used (NOTE: That will work on most Afghan dwellings. Do not try it in much of the rest of Asia; the walls are far thinner... :D)
* For those who cite good COIN etc. practices as a reason to avoid property damage, I agree -- what I do not agree with is using General Purpose Forces in that role; they will never do it well -- nor should they.
1 Attachment(s)
The Pet Peeve and LE-ization of ROEs
I go along with Steve and Ken, but look at it from another vantage point. The LE-ization, SOF-ization and contradictory (or absent) TTPs and training practices, have gone a long way to replace ROEs based on the Laws of War (Laws of Armed Conflict; International Humanitarian Law) with ROEs (and TTPs) based on civilian legal rules (the "Rule of Law" and International Human Rights Law).
This is again beating the horse that Polarbear1605 and I have been beating for the past 4 years; but that horse (unfortunately) is still alive and kicking.
Its most recent resurrection was last month with release of ATTP 3-37.31, Civilian Casualty Mitigation (July 2012), whose second paragraph sets the test:
Quote:
1-2. During armed conflict, Army forces protect civilians through civilian casualty (CIVCAS) mitigation. CIVCAS mitigation is all measures to avoid or minimize CIVCASs and reduce the adverse impact of those that occur. In the context of CIVCAS mitigation, a civilian is any person who is not a combatant. In other words, a civilian is a person not engaged in hostilities during an armed conflict, regardless of the groups or organizations to which the person belongs. If there is any doubt, Army forces consider a person to be a civilian. In the context of CIVCAS mitigation, a CIVCAS refers to any civilian wounded or dead as a result of armed conflict.
In how many "CQB" situations involving irregular forces (such as room clearing, stairwell clearing, persons at an IED scene exiting a vehicle, etc.), will there not be at least some doubt as to the status of the shootee ?
This ATTP (3-37.31), BTW, is not a legal or ROE text as such; but rather a GPF operational text (from Preface):
Quote:
Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-37.31 is the Army’s doctrinal publication for mitigating civilian casualties (CIVCASs). The purpose is to provide doctrinal guidance for minimizing CIVCAS incidents and managing their consequences. The focus is on guiding Army leaders conducting operations involving armed conflict.
Attachment 1622
Like John Keegan, I've never been in a battle; nor have I been close to a battle. So, to those who have, is this ATTP bullroar - or am I missing something ?
Regards
Mike
It's typical military response to civilian 'norms.'
'Norms' in quotes because they change like the winds...
Typical because the Armed Forces have to respond to those changes in some fashion lest they imperil their funding. Typical also because in every war, we have modified the rules, the doctrine, to cope with what the bulk of Americans want -- or seem to want, not always the same thing -- the forces to do. The US has most always tried to minimize civilian casualties and in recent wars, that has been at some cost in own casualties. In the most recent, that cost has been relatively small. We have also further modified at the end of or after after the wars to remove what may seem to some an excessively violent approach to operations (That lasts until more violence seems prudent...).
In this case, an odd combination of R2P and current 'COIN' theory sends us to combat (which is barely coordinated chaos) and demands that no one not positively identified as hostile be bothered, much less harmed. Thus the Pam is a fairly logical result of that anomaly. Like most such efforts it truly means well but suffers from excessively idealistic intent coupled with a lack of current appreciation for the harshness of heavy combat in which excessive concern for civilian casualties will cause a more significant increase in own casualties that (as has not been true in the current wars) will go beyond what the public and the politicians will find they are willing to accept. In mid to high intensity combat, it is inevitable that civilian casualties will be incurred and that the rate will rise with the intensity of combat..
The bad news is that such contradictory and untenable doctrine will get combatants killed unnecessarily as they attempt in many combat situations to avoid civilian casualties and find that is not possible without significantly increasing own casualties. The good news is that after a few weeks of heavy combat, reality returns and such idealistic but unrealistic stuff falls by the wayside.
