The Peter Pandemic Takes Its Toll

Third Way Dispatch - The Peter Pandemic Takes Its Toll: HR McMaster is Passed Over by Matt Bennett.

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... But the fact that a bunch of incompetent imbeciles are running our country is old news. Now we find that the Bush Administration has brought us the corollary to the Peter Principle: genuinely gifted and brilliant public servants who are kept far below the level to which they should ascend.

There are, no doubt, scores of such talents in the federal bureaucracy, held down from their rightful rise by political calculation, petulance or oversight. But one recent and egregious example is the Pentagon’s failure to promote (for a second time) Army Colonel HR McMaster.

Now you may be thinking, wasn’t it H.R. McMaster that led the pacification of Tal Afar, an operation so successful that Bush devoted an entire speech to it just last year? Didn’t I read about McMaster’s brilliant strategy in a long New Yorker piece about him? Wasn’t it McMaster who won a Silver Star in the Gulf War, leading troops so bravely and well that Tom Clancy wrote it up? And surely it was McMaster who’s PhD dissertation became a hugely influential book, Dereliction of Duty, that the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs made required reading for senior military types?

Well brace yourself – the answer to all of your questions is yes. McMaster is a brilliant tactician, a decorated hero, a soldier’s soldier, and a master of the very kind of war we’re fighting in Iraq – the counterinsurgency. In fact, he’s back in Iraq now, helping soon-to-be-fall-guy David Petraeus try to fend off further disaster. But somehow McMaster’s “superiors” – the suits at the Pentagon who helped bring us the Fiasco that McMaster is attempting to clean up – have decided that he isn’t flag officer material...

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It's a damn, damn shame.

Doesn't really inspire continued service does it? :( Things like this always remind me of Sam Damon. There are several other 06s who would serve the cnation well as GOs - but politics (of all flavors) will not permit it.

Typical. And in a few years someone will be moaning about the lack of quality in the officer corps and wonder why all the captains left.

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Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

Doesn't really inspire continued service does it? :( Things like this always remind me of Sam Damon. There are several other 06s who would serve the cnation well as GOs - but politics (of all flavors) will not permit it.

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:mad: Agreed. Makes me wonder bout my chosen profession too. Over time and travels I have heard much of behind the scenes bad talk about him - mostly for no other reason than professional jealousy. I personally have only met him during our TOA in Tal Afar, and I have to say that it remained a lasting success to this day, despite a few hiccups. I was amazed at what 3ACR was able to pull off with the tribes there, and how much was the result of his and LTC Hickey's efforts.

When I hear other O6's and above speak about him they talk about how he was opinionated, pushy, and a media hound. Yes, there was a little over-hype on success in Tal Afar, but there is no disputing the success there, and that it is one of the few cities with a functioning and reasonably fair government and police force.

I really think a lot of serving generals and colonels resent that he succeeded, frankly, and made many others look bad by default. And then he committed the worse sin of getting good press for it from Tom Ricks in "Fiasco". Many of the same criticisms have been leveled inside the army at Petraeus, but he made it out okay.

When I got off the plane back to Germany from Iraq in Feb 07 we were met, as customary, by a GO from USAREUR. The one-star who met us gathered a few company commanders and a few staff together for a pep talk. This general officer, who has since been promoted to a higher position, told us "not to believe the BS about Tal Afar;", [I guess he didn't know we spent 10 of 14 deployed months there] and "That we all know the real way to win the Iraqis is with force", or something to that effect. My fellow former company commanders and I were literally dumbfounded! We had just spent our tour in Tal Afar and had helped turn around Ramadi through tribal engagement, ISF cooperation, and targeted violence, and here a serving GO was telling us not to believe it? I am still maddened by the conversation.

However, just because he didn't get selected first look doesn't mean he won't get it later. Sometimes the army takes awhile to do the right thing.

Maybe Yingling is right about the GO corps. . It's a damn shame. Work hard, succeed in combat (where it counts), and get passed over in favor of people who don't rock the boat ....

Independently of the question of who is ruling in United States now, the extract you posted relates more generally to a subject known as “the circulation of the elite.” There are several models of circulation of the elite’s process, according to each country. But there are some common and recurrent patterns. It’s quite a subject about which, coincidentally, I read extensively and continue reading.
Depending the country and its culture, history, and set of value, it may be either relatively easy to understand why such brilliant person has been held several rungs down the deserved ladder, or tricky to explain in a simple phrase, or even sometimes not all explainable or understandable (at first glance).

About the case of Army Colonel HR McMaster, now, I would be glad to size this opportunity to enlighten you with likely hypothesizes, but I miss further personal information about him, and even though I would get it, then this wouldn’t guarantee that my suggestion would be the right one. All I can say is that Army Colonel HR McMaster seems to be victim of “injustice,” according to this extract. But the notions of “just” or “unjust” seldom prevail when it comes to the circulation of the elites. In fact, things are much more rational and often justified by ever-changing variables. From the standpoint of the concerned person it seems to be a matter of “luck” and sometimes (or often, still depending the country) it is, indeed.

I would enjoy writing a book since I gathered matter and personal knowledge enough about this subject to make a thick one, but would it be “publishable?” Certainly not, I assume, all things well considered.

I'd still follow him anywhere, despite the selection board's results. I'd be willing to bet we'll hail his promotion less than a year from now.

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However, just because he didn't get selected first look doesn't mean he won't get it later. Sometimes the army takes awhile to do the right thing.

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I've seen some 06s I thought should be GOs make the cut - Robert B Brown is an 06 (P) I think. However there are other guys like J.R. Sanderson and Roy Waggoner that I think should have been promoted some time ago.

The question is how do you give the guys who can lead the Army (or any organization) the authority required to make the right changes in time to make "doing the right thing" something that happens before we have to pay the heaviest prices to figure it out?

I sat in on a VTC today at the AWC where GEN Petraeus spoke from Iraq. He had a great slide about creating "Leaders who get it". I think that only gets us half way though. We have to promote those leaders who get it and assign them to positions where they can affect change rapidly in order to save lives and implement winning practices. While an 06 can change a BCT and can demonstrate good practices, I think it really takes a GO to institutionalize change.

I imagine COL McMasters loves the Army as much as any and more then most. However I think he is too bright and intellectually ambitious (and I mean that in a good way) to allow the Army to keep him in a box. There are too many other fantastic opportunities for leaders of his caliber outside the Army. We often say we want one thing but our choice of spending priorities and our promotion/CMD lists would seem to indicate otherwise. As long as we follow those lines we will move forward slowly and with political risk aversion.

What about “up or out?” I was under the impression that 2 pass-overs for promotion would pretty well finish an officer’s career.

said to me:

"I'm mediocre. All Generals are mediocre. If you're too good, your peers -- competitors, really -- will kill you on the way up."

After he told me that, I started watching and discovered he was right -- and the bad news is that negative comments were occasionally the lesser things done. The good news is that in my observation, the typical water walker had only a very, very few contemporaries who would do that -- unfortunately, sometimes just one is enough.

Sad news that. I sorta suspect that in the course of a career, he told the wrong boss to go pound sand, was proven correct and therefor got away with it at the time and delayed revenge was taken...

This is incompetence and vindictiveness at its worst -neo-conservatism at its finest!

Well I personally would not worry.

In 16 months there will be over 1,000 political appointmements available for the next President in the highest levels of DoD, CIA, DIA and State Department, not to mention the entire politicized counter-terrorism community.

I am pretty sure IN THE NEXT ADMINSITRATION proven records, competence and a realistic outlook on Iraq will equate to a job offer.

Tell him to apply for Deputy Secretary of Defense for SOLIC ... :D

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Originally Posted by T. Jefferson

What about “up or out?” I was under the impression that 2 pass-overs for promotion would pretty well finish an officer’s career.

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This was his first look. He's been BZ on everything else.

A long time ago a great guy told me that everyone gets passed over once. Great officer and leader.

Got this via e-mail:

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HR McMaster is just doing his job. After completing a second tour of duty in Iraq, last summer he returned home--limped really, because of his war wounds--and rediscovered his lovely wife and three daughters. Because he is a serious social scientist, he was rewarded with a secondment to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, where he might in a less politically charged atmosphere unpack the lessons of modern war for the future of the Armed Forces. But this was no typical secondment, and he would have to think and write quickly, because he would be deployed on special assignments.

Thus, he arrived at IISS in September 2006 and was immediately detailed to the Pentagon for the Chairman's assessment on Iraq. He returned before Christmas and spent the first two months of 2007 giving speeches and talks at various think tanks and universities--always impressing and surprising his audience with the intelligence of the US Army.

In late March it was back to Iraq for another important strategic assignment. He did his job again and returned home to write and give more speeches. His last talk at IISS last week packed the house at 10 am on a Monday morning in summer--something that senior officials would not have done. Former foreign ministers and Members of Parliament were lined up to ask HR questions, and they all left in admiration for the man. They saw, as those of us who know him do, a brilliant soldier as able in the field of analytic thinking and research as on the battlefield.

That celebrity finds HR is not a mystery to those who know his talents, but HR has to cringe every time an article appears highlighting this point. He is not a Colonel in search of celebrity, but a professional doing his job. HR has a great future ahead of him.

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In the comments section of the blog entry I put up - Contrary Peter Principle - Claymore posted a comment that points to this Col John Boyd quote - To Be Or To Do?.

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Of all the things Boyd wrote or said, we probably get the most requests for his "To be or to do?" invitation. Although Boyd associated with many junior officers during his Air Force career, there were a few, perhaps half a dozen, that he had such respect for that he invited them to join him on his quest for change. Each one would be offered the choice: Be someone – be recognized by the system and promoted – or do something that would last for the Air Force and the country. It was unfortunate, and says something about the state of American's armed forces, that it was rarely possible to do both.

Boyd's biographer, Robert Coram, collected the invitation from an officer who got it and selected the "to do" option, and he confirmed its essence from several others.

"Tiger, one day you will come to a fork in the road,” he said. “And you’re going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go.” He raised his hand and pointed. “If you go that way you can be somebody. You will have to make compromises and you will have to turn your back on your friends. But you will be a member of the club and you will get promoted and you will get good assignments.” Then Boyd raised his other hand and pointed another direction.

“Or you can go that way and you can do something – something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. If you decide you want to do something, you may not get promoted and you may not get the good assignments and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors. But you won’t have to compromise yourself. You will be true to your friends and to yourself. And your work might make a difference.” He paused and stared into the officer’s eyes and heart. “To be somebody or to do something. In life there is often a roll call. That’swhen you will have to make a decision. To be or to do. Which way will you go?

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Gentlemen,

I rarely post here as this small wars neophyte typically views a visit to SWJ as akin to the Vatican or Temple Mount.

Still, I feel compelled to share my pain at this disservice to H.R. McMaster. It's inexplicable. I haven't sat on a promotion board, but I've seen no indication that McMaster didn't fully deserve a BZ selection to BG.

The article (Peter Principle)indicated that this is his second pass-over. IIRC, three strikes and he's out. Y'all have the best contacts in the biz. I'd sure appreciate if one of you could really shed some light on what's actually going down here.

In the meantime, I've e-mailed the Prez, DoD, and D.A., as well as calling my Senator (Gordon Smith) at his D.C. offices. Just now I'm damned ticked at this abysmal coterie of perfumed princes barring the door. :mad:

I have never met H.R McMasters but I feel like I know him. I first saw the name when I was working for then BG Bob Scales helping write Cetrain Victory for the Army. CPT H. R. McMasters and his troop's fight at '73 Easting was the lead combat vignette. That was in 1992.

Time goes by and 2005 rolls around. I am by then retired for nearly 10 years and as a military analyst at a training center intensely interested in events in theater. And gradually stories and reports about McMasters and his 3rd ACR at Tal Afar start to emerge as a success story.

But it is a politically explosive success story because McMasters is not following the prevalent wisdom. His unit is operating differently. He is staying put when other units are bouncing all over the map. Later his unit is singled out by the President of the United States for its successes in Tal Afar. Still those successes underlined much of what was not right in our strategy and operations elsewhere.

Hopefully this too will pass...

Tom

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Originally Posted by Abu Buckwheat

This is incompetence and vindictiveness at its worst -neo-conservatism at its finest!

Well I personally would not worry.

In 16 months there will be over 1,000 political appointmements available for the next President in the highest levels of DoD, CIA, DIA and State Department, not to mention the entire politicized counter-terrorism community.

I am pretty sure IN THE NEXT ADMINSITRATION proven records, competence and a realistic outlook on Iraq will equate to a job offer.

Tell him to apply for Deputy Secretary of Defense for SOLIC ... :D

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I can't tell if this comment is sarcastic or not, so I will assume it is not.

I think it likely Col. McMaster displeased Big Army most of all and that is why he wasn't promoted. A change in administrations, regardless of the party elected won't change Big Army.

Secondly, changing the political party in power inside the beltway, won't change the big problem, which is the culture inside the beltway. That marches on strong regardless.

Third, what does SOLIC mean?

Last, as Rob mentioned, this is a strong sign that not only does Big Army not "get it"; they don't want to get it.

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Third, what does SOLIC mean?

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Office of the Secretary of Defense-Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

It was at one stage OSD-SOLIC/HA as in humanitarian affairs. I worked hand in glove with them in Zaire and Rwanda.

best

Tom

Carl - glad to see you blogging again! SOLIC is Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict. We call the later Small Wars around these parts:rolleyes:.

That said, the Army is in store for some soul-searching, rebuilding, reeducating, retraining and reequipping after OIF because the threat we face ain't going away. IMHO COL McMaster may do more good by staying the course and hopefully the next board will rectify what the last two blew. He is the type of operator / leader / scholar that the Army, and the entire DoD for that matter, can ill afford to lose - in uniform - not out.

Stay safe and best regards!

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Originally Posted by SWJED

SOLIC is Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict. We call the later Small Wars around these parts:rolleyes:.d

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If there happened to be a somebody in that area and can point me to some resources I'd really be happy.. SOLIC with the emphasis on LIC is something I'm intensely interested in.

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Originally Posted by selil

If there happened to be a somebody in that area and can point me to some resources I'd really be happy.. SOLIC with the emphasis on LIC is something I'm intensely interested in.

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Welcome to Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Web Site

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC))

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Pursuant to Section 138(b)(4) of reference (a) and the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by Section 113 of reference (a), this Directive establishes the position of the ASD(SO/LIC) with the responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities, as prescribed herein, and replaces references (b) and (c)......

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The above is the '95 directive revising the position; it superseded the original from '88, so its no longer available on the DoD Directives page.

Was not this the major thrust of Col Yinglings article?
The very delema Mcmaster finds himself in.

Though I do not think congressional oversite is the best answer because they can only approve or disapprove of what they are shown.

Mason

Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral Failures'.

Figures . . . generals (like many people) tend to promote people like themselves. Generally speaking it takes an exceptional leader to promote someone who challenges their view of the world. This of course has the affect of stifling innovation and ensuring that if your army doesn’t know how to fight an enemy it won’t learn quickly.

General Patton was found alive and left this message for the Generals and the Citizens of the United States about Iraq and Terrorism. The part where it says to promote Col. MacMaster was left off for some reason.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xyUX6wV1lBQ

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Originally Posted by slapout9

General Patton was found alive and left this message for the Generals and the Citizens of the United States about Iraq and Terrorism. The part where it says to promote Col. MacMaster was left off for some reason.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xyUX6wV1lBQ

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Slap,

Way too much time on

Youtube, Dude

Tom :cool:

Gee Tom, I got the idea after seeing your Green Beret attack Squirrel with silver chips in his chest:)

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Originally Posted by Tom Odom

Slap,

Way too much time on

Youtube, Dude

Tom :cool:

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I think Slapout was actually submitting his Youtube question for the next Presidential debate...

Hey if the Dems got a talking snowman to talk about global warming- Slap could have a talking "attack squirell" that asked: how as president would you shape the armed forces and inter-agency process to meet the threats of the 21st century?

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Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

Hey if the Dems got a talking snowman to talk about global warming- Slap could have a talking "attack squirell" that asked: how as president would you shape the armed forces and inter-agency process to meet the threats of the 21st century?

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And the response from pretty much any candidate would be..."Gee, mister squirrel, that's a really good question. I've given this particular issue a great deal of thought and consideration during my time in public office. It's great that we have citizens such as yourself who are willing to ask the tough questions of those you would elect to lead this great nation in this time of stress. Thanks so much for sharing it with us and giving me the opportunity to answer. I know that you support our brave men and women in uniform just as much as I do and that your prayers are with them. Next question, please."

Which translates to: "Holy @%($...a talking squirrel! What's his voter demographic? Did Planter's contribute to my campaign? How can I spin this? What the crap is the 'armed forces'? We have forces without arms? Wait...there's a base in my district...ok...support the troops...yeah...next question."

Big Belly Laugh

Rob - saw your comment on the SWJ blog entry and since not all Council members peruse there and comment (hint / hint) I'm reposting here:

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Rob,

I've gotten e-mails and read comments that - oh well - all colonels are A++ and it is kind of like luck of the draw on who makes it and who does not. Seems to me that this is peacetime promotion board (like there should even be such an animal) talk. Eventually we will know who made the cut and who did not and hopefully that will shed some light on this BS non-selection.

I've also been told that because SWJ and others have made this an issue we are potentially pissing off the brass and may be hurting COL McMasters' future chances. Many are the same people who say with a straight face "you don't understand the selection process and what the board members were presented". Yea right.

Both are smoke-screens to stifle any debate on WARTIME leadership and the type of commanders this country deserves.

Moreover, I stand by my opinion that this issue seriously affects perceptions - especially those of the junior and mid-level officers dedicated to winning the long war and are at the tipping point on whether to stay or bolt. Many of them looked to McMaster as a glimmer of hope in these most difficult times.

Dave

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Fascinating discussion, and one I heard earlier today at work. Personally, i think COL McMaster will make a great G.O. Notice I used "will" not "would". McMaster didn't get picked up BZ for O-7, that does not mean that he "won't" get picked up fo O-7. Regrettably, I believe that McMaster didn't get picked this go round for some of the reasons that were enumerated in earlier posts. That being said, I think that the next promotion board will select him. I think the lesson from this isn't as cut and dry as many view it. It is easy to contend that McMaster as a iconoclastic visionary who has spoken out and been "wronged" by those who continue to subscribe to the vision he has tried to shatter/upset, and perhaps it is that simple, and it would make many of us comfortable in that we "know" the enemy we would face if /when we were to pursue similar arguments. Regrettably, I think McMaster got passed over for something as simple an petty as professional jealousy. Here is a guy who has gotten it right in the last two major conflicts that we have fought, Desert Storm and Iraq. He has shown himself able to understand, adapt, and succeed in two very diverese military situations on top of being a best selling author. McMaster was probably passed over by people on a board who feel more threatened by the actions he has taken over his career, than the speaking of his opinion that he has done. Yeah, "they" might justify their decision based on some of his staements, but they are probably as threatened by his success as anything else. My $.02.

1. All BZ promotions are "select-in". Therefore nobody gets "passed over" BZ.

2. ALL GO promotions are "select-in", so once again, nobody gets "passed over".

3. All GO promotions are subject to political push and pull. As long as you're in the zone, there's hope.

I've seen several "tombstone" promotions to BG turn into amazing GO careers. It ain't over til it's over.

Hey Dave,

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Moreover, I stand by my opinion that this issue seriously affects perceptions - especially those of the junior and mid-level officers dedicated to winning the long war and are at the tipping point on whether to stay or bolt. Many of them looked to McMaster as a glimmer of hope in these most difficult times

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I don't have a problem with the GOs - most I've met have been pretty amazing people. Most have been people who I've admired for shouldering a great deal of responsibility and carrying it far better then I could hope.

It is the system that I think needs to be brought in line. I've said before that we are both bureaucratic and conservative and that makes change very difficult. I guess that could be seen by some as a good thing if you believe that by sacrificing getting it too far right, you can avoid getting it too far wrong. However I think that taking a planning maxim and applying it too leadership selection is a poor choice.

We've spent an awful lot of money talking about building leaders that reflect the attributes of $20 words, but when it comes down to it I personally don't see much happening that reflects investment in human capital. Sure we see ACS talk, and some others, but most of it comes with a pretty heavy price tag. I've not seen much in the way of "new". When I read that COL McMasters had been passed over ( and I think this was not his BZ, but his first look - RTK could say for sure) it sort of hit me. The first time I got that feeling was when I looked at a BN CMD slate and saw some guys I would not want to follow slated in MTO&E CMD slots and some I'd follow anywhere in TDA alternates (& yes TDAs need good folks too) - it hit me then that there is no real HR strategy that identifies the very best people to do the most important things - which is when I made some decisions about what was most important to me - after all if these incredible leaders had sacrificed so much only to be put at the bottom of the pile I was not going to ask my family to sacrifice the ways theirs had. I'd always believed that the only place such a large organization can really look after its people is at the lower tactical levels (BDE & below), at the higher levels it more akin to see a hole fill a hole, but then I knew it as gospel. Sometimes we put round pegs in round holes on purpose, but mostly when that happens it seems to be luck.

I'm not sure we can really excel by perpetuating this system. We struggle to come up with good ideas such as revamping the OER system, or rearranging the money, but in the end there are "must do's" that trump the "need to do's" that we just can't get past. This leaves the good ideas with no real staying power, and after awhile they just come across as another hollow slogan. I know people can be petty, but I think COL McMaster's case is more representative of a system that cannot consistently identify and promote excellence.

What I have not figured out is if it can be fixed. It may not be a problem, it might be a condition. The only way I can see us fixing this problem is to make recruiting and retaining the most talented people and their families the priority. This means everything from the list of incentives that DAGGER 6 had listed to questioning our system of promotion at all levels. In another post somebody had mentioned the issues with LTs, CPTs and MAJs. If its a condition, then its a whole nother ball game, and will take some real external efforts to change - like LTC Yingling's thoughts.

I'm sort of past wondering about how this sort of thing applies to me as I've already made up my mind, but I do worry about allot of kids I've led, and I'm even wondering about what kind of Army my own kids will inherit. We had an interesting conversation the other night about who in America is willing to serve. We better be thinking about that one real hard, or one day we're going to wake up and "the next greatest generation" is going to say "hey why don't you take a turn on the wall for awile."

Rob raises some excellent issues, as usual. We need to be concerned and do all we can to ensure that the system (and we ALL hate HRC/PERSCOM/MILPERCEN/OPO) is responsive to the needs of the Army and to the wonderful soldiers/officers who make it up.

Nonetheless, I was struck with a feeling of Deja Vu when I read Rob's last post.

In 1987 (OK some of you weren't born yet), YG 1966 had just finished the War College and one of thier members asked rhetorically if there was enough talent left to see the Army through the difficult years to come. The thesis was that YG 66 had been decimated in Viet Nam (it hadn't), had suffered a huge exodus in response to an unpopular war, and had experienced a larger than normal exit on it's 20th anniversary (i.e. first opportunity to retire). Rick Atkinson would later study that portion of the YG coming from USMA, but some brilliant GO asked a coupla us to look and see if the Army had lost all its senior talent, using YG 66 as a case study.

On the one hand, we were stifled in our attempts because we couldn't get access to personal/personnel records necessary. Once an officer retires, his/her records are off limits unless you have the moral equivalent of a warrant. While the anecdotal evidence, in deed, pointed toward a hollow leadership structure on its way to the top, the numbers we were able to get did not support the supposed crisis. Within the active duty crowd, there was unbelievable talent available -- dedicated folks willing and able to take the reins of the Army. The Gulf War sort of bore out that the YG that got repreatedly "screwed" after VN were more than capable of leading the Army they had helped re-create in the aftermath.

I just don't know how to systemitize that.

Then there's what I call the Sports Illustrated effect.

As others have alluded above, the Army doesn't like to reward officers it considers "special". Ditto, there's a certain pride in being un-educated. (Not the same as being stupid). I was commanding my third company while yo-yo was off getting his masters. The last good book I read was 100-5 (3-0). You all know the syndrome.

Quite apart from that is the SI effect. I never wanted my favorite athlete to be on the cover of Sports Illustrated in the Pre=season. Same for my team getting ranked number one. The SI effect is that anyone singled out as outstanding incurs some sort of debillitating malady that keeps them from presaged glory. Can't explain why.

Go Twins.

I'm brand new to this forum and agree with most of the posts, especially Old Eagle's post of selected versus passed-over. To add to the discussion COL McMaster's predesssor at 3 ACR was COL Dave Teeples who was on the FY07 BG ACC list. Additionally, some food for thought, is that there are individuals that remember who "rocks the boat." McMaster while in Iraq tried to relieve his aviation squadron commander, but he was reinstated. Who chaired the BG board? Plus, there is the legacy of McMaster working for Macgregor. My $0.02. Glad to be aboard and look forward to future dialogues.

Here is the latest from the DoD.

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New Joint Qualification System Enhances Officer Management


The Department of Defense announced today the details of a new joint qualification system (JQS), which will help to identify military personnel who possess the abilities needed to achieve success in the joint/interagency environment. This new program will allow DoD to better incorporate an officer's joint experiences and qualifications into assignment, promotion and development decisions.

Inherent in this new system is the ability to recognize the skills that aid U.S. military efforts to respond to national security threats, as well as interagency, combat operations and humanitarian crises at home and abroad. A four-level system serves to enhance the tenets of jointness set forth in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986 and will be implemented for all services on Oct. 1, 2007.

While officers may still earn designation as a Joint Qualified Officer, formerly known as a Joint Specialty Officer, by completing the requisite joint professional military education and a standard-joint duty assignment, officers may also earn qualifications by accumulating equivalent levels of joint experience, education, and training. The experience-based system awards points in tracking the progression through successive qualification levels, while accounting for the intensity, environment, and duration/frequency of each joint activity.

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Originally Posted by Kreker

McMaster while in Iraq tried to relieve his aviation squadron commander, but he was reinstated. .

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He didn't try. He did releive him. I was there. And it was justified.