That's a dangerous and misleading comment
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
23 April 1898 President McKinley called for 125,000 volunteers.
11 May 1898 the Second Oregon Volunteers were on the train from Camp Withycombe outside Portland, Oregon ( a great little military museum there, btw for those who enjoy that kind of thing) to their port of debarkation in San Francisco. As I recall they took up the motto "First to Assemble" as they were the first such volunteer regiment to form and ship out.
25 May they sailed from San Francisco...
That was then, this is now.
You know perfectly well that today we cannot even activate and ship a trained -- even one that's been to Iraq -- ArNG unit in that time for a host of valid reasons. Not least laws passed by the Congress that dictate training times and AC 'Certification' of combat readiness prior to deployment. Carl is correct in ascribing some of those problems to the military personnel bureaucracy (which needs to be totally rebuilt in any case) but it's more complex than that. Not least the concern over poorly to marginally trained and equipped units taking mass casualties, particularly if most such units come from the same small towns. That concern is not or would not be limited to Politicians though that factor prompted those laws I mentioned.
I can sweep the streets and give you a slew of 1900 -- or even 1950 -- level Infantryman in two to four weeks, resource dependent. I could train them shipboard on the 30 day voyage to the Phillipines as I'm sure occured. I cannot do that for today's Infantry. And that's walking Infantry, add in vehicles or aircraft and we're in a different world.
JMA is correct, it would take six months, minimum, IF we had the Cadre. We do not, so that would take a year. It would also take that long or longer to equip them...
We can activate the Guard or Reserve and deploy them in 90 to 180 days. That's about as good as it's gonna get in this era...
It's okay to be proud of ones heritage and experience, it's okay to dream, even to share those dreams with the world but it's not okay to promulgate dangerous illusions.
Take a look at the news and watch You Tube clips...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
carl
What I mean I guess is would a volunteer unit meant specifically for Afghanistan have to match the full range and level of training of a regular unit?
The Regular force there now is not doing all that well. I think that answers your question. If they need more and better training, then throwing together a crew of volunteers with less training -- that's a given; there will be no volunteers for the duration, never have been and training takes time out of their term so it has to be minimized.
Part of the Regular force problem is tours -- we haven't been in Afghanistan 11 years, we've been there eleven one year tours -- but part of it is turnover and level of training. The bottom line is what you suggest we do can be done but it almost certainly would be even less effective and would likely have a higher casualty ratio.
History is good, it is important but it also can breed dangerous illusions because too much of it is slanted to make ideological, political or military points. I mention that only to suggest that any sociological benefits from such Volunteer units may or may not appear. The US of today is quite different than the US in which I was a schoolkid and even more different than it was in the early 20th Century.
Also, I've talked to several who were USV in various units. Typical is the Father of a good friend who served in the 2d Georgia in Mexico looking For P. Villa. He later went to France with the 2d Georgia -- by then the 121st Inf, GA ArNG. When activated to go to Texas and then Mexico, they were initially USV, then they were mustered into Federal service and training began. His contention was that training was a lifesaver both in Mexico and later.
Social and military feasibility are one thing, Political? Well...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
carl
You are right of course about the importance of training. It would not work if the training was inferior. But I am thinking that if a unit was only going to be used for one purpose, small war in Afghanistan, training could be specifically tailored for that and that alone.
Doesn't work that way. Training for combat has to be full spectrum and we currently train folks only for the 'job at hand' and grade held instead of the old fashioned way for world wide service and a grade or two ahead of that currently held. See the result? What do you suppose would occur with even less training?
As wars go, Afghanistan is quite benign -- but that can change in any number of unforeseen ways -- like the sudden entry of the Army of Pakistan because they're upset with the Pakistani Taliban flowing over the Afghan Border. Even a large shipment of mortars and Ammo to the Talib would be a game changer. We could cope with it, could even if there were Volunteers but what if the first few uses of those mortars caught Volunteer units in a big way (the Talib are smart enough to target the elements with political penalties rampant. See the Canadian experience...)?
You may be willing to take a chance on the Volunteer program. I suspect few politicians would agree.
Quote:
The other thing that I think would be critical for this type of unit would be that it would go to one place and stay there for three years. Even if it started off with slightly inferior training by the time it had been there for a year or two it would be extremely good at what it was doing in that particular place. It might be completely lost if called upon to repel a North Korean combined arms attack but that would not be why it was created. And these would not be "for the duration" units. Specific term lengths would apply, say 6 months training then 3 years deployed in the same place with say 30 days leave once a year.
I'm unsure you'd get many volunteers to go to Afghanistan (for just one example) for three years.
It may also be unwise to predicate your efforts on being in one place for three years. For just one example, a slew of people left the Dominican Republic (conflict) and Germany (no conflict) in 1965-66 and went straight to Viet Nam with no replacements in the former nations.
You may start off with the premise that as they gain experience they'll get better but if they take a big hit from a North Korean attack (or anyone else's, large or small...) someone will pay. Particularly if it's soon after they get in theater, where ever it is...
Quote:
Like I said, I know the personnel bureaucracy will never let this come to be. But some way some how has got to be found to break that bureaucracy.
I don't think the personnel bureaucracy would be your biggest problem -- I suspect that would be politicians. Second, I suspect, would be the volunteers themselves...