Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
Exactly. I knew you were the guy to ask. It couldn't be done unless the leaders were available and the standing forces, be they regular, NG or Reserve would most likely have to provide those. That might require structuring the force with that in mind, or not. That is effectively what we did in WWII and the Civil War etc. Joshua Chamberlain got his training from self study and Ames, a West Point guy. No matter if you built up your force with volunteer regiments or enlarged regular units, the problem of supplying them with leaders would be the same.
This staffing challenge is not unlike what the US has faced and will face in times of general mobilisation. Where do the officers and NCOs come from?

I suggest one sets some ground rules in this regard that must be complied with.

* It remains undisputed that the NCO structure is the backbone of the infantry battalion.

* You cant instantly produce NCOs (especially not through the same training process as that of the basic troopies - meaning the better and brighter are selected an given a little extra attention with some rank at the end).

* As with officers, NCOs must be trained and exercised at two command levels above their current rank level. Meaning that a section comd/squad leader must be trained tactically at squad, platoon and company levels (platoon sergeant is not a command level).

* If during peacetime the training tempo is maintained along these lines a sudden influx of recruits at the time of mobilisation can be reasonably successfully absorbed. Unfortunately this does not happen as in peacetime all armies can't resist sliding into a routine where their are no military priorities - given that there will be budgetary restrictions.

The benefits to this kind of thing are both societal and military. Societal in that regular people who want to do the job would be going, not regular soldiers. Military in that the units and at least the lower ranks would be there for a particular job and thereby by the unit would be there for a particular job. That might (or not, you guys know better than me) cut down on the career centric coin phenomanom (sic) that so cripples us today. An additional benefit would be sidestepping the military personnel system, which I read over and over is poison to a small war effort.
May I suggest a small change of terminology here. I would suggest that such units be raised for a particular campaign or war (rather than a job).

Its only in times of almost total war that the mindset changes for the better - normally after taking a bloody nose : Kasserine Pass - but sadly it does not take long until things return to the old ways.

Imagine the benefits of a unit that was created to serve in Afghanistan for 3 years straight after being trained up. Then when that time was done, it would be disbanded and if another was needed another could be formed. The guys would be told the terms of service so no complaint coming in fulfilling it. A unit staying in place for 3 years would be great.
I suggest that you get the volunteers to sign up to serve in the unit for three years - this applies also to the leadership cadre. We are not talking about 100s of thousands of people here - you will find them out there. People like me People you sign up to go to war. Once I got into a mostly peacetime environment it was so stifling suffocating to the extent I had to leave. There will be thousands like that in the US you will get a good day's work out of.

Looking into the low incidence of PTSD in the RLI I believe we stumbled upon the secret by chance. Therefore in my experience where I spent a full three years doing a 6week:10days rotation of ops:R&R without any long term ill-effect (any aggressive behaviour I may exhibit from time to time was there from before my service started )

Now to page 251 of Stuart Cloete's book "A Victorian Son" talking about his time in hospital during the Great War, "The feeling that for the next few weeks I need no longer feel afraid or act with courage." That was it. Every two months you had a week when you returned to normality. You could drop your guard, you could wind down. I discussed this some time back somewhere here and suggested how such a rotation would work. That said little wonder - given what I saw in the movie Restrepo - that there is an increasing level of mental and PTSD incidence among those deployed to Afghanistan.

It will take a cost/benefit analysis before the power that be see the benefit of investing in R&R during tours/deployments/campaigns/wars in terms of reduced PTSD and associated costs.

I know this may be impossible but we did it in the past and it worked. Human nature doesn't change so I don't see and fundamental reason, human nature type fundamental, it couldn't work again.
It is absolutely workable ... but not perhaps under your current systems.

Also for something like Afghanistan, you wouldn't have to recreate a brigade combat team. Since it would be a temporary volunteer unit, you could tailor it to the need.
You need the leadership cadre who are in it for the duration. Command continuity and theatre experience are essential. That is your backbone and it extends down to corporal level (squad leader). Ttoopie replacements (as I remember discussing elsewhere here a few years ago) can be trickle fed into the units at a slow rate to never diminish the level of combat experience of units. This I submit needs to be managed and must be maintained down to section/squad level. Once the units have deployed promotions must in the main be from within.

Given your experience, do you think a unit like that would be useful in Afghanistan?
Quite frankly I can't say, but I sometimes wonder if it (and other methods and tactical options) has received any serious consideration.

I would ask the guys who have been there and those who are going there to actively give the use of mounted infantry some thought. You may be greatly surprised at what the troopies come up with.