FYI: http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksd...ar-ali.html#tp
http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/mar20...2011/dia.htm#5
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Since a certain event there have been a number of threads and posts that have touched upon the role of the Pakistani Army.
There are now increasing signs that the army is having problems externally with civil society and this WSJ article covers it all:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...orld_LeadStory
Opens with:Quote:
Pakistan's army leadership, under mounting domestic pressure since a U.S. strike team infiltrated its soil to kill Osama bin Laden, issued a rare defensive response to domestic critics Thursday, offering to reduce its reliance on U.S. military aid and training and setting strict limits on American intelligence operations within the country....
The roughly 1,000-word statement—at various points apologetic, belligerent and strident—was the clearest indication to date that in striking a balance between the competing demands, Pakistan's military leaders are looking to first assuage their own people, even if that means scaling back ties to the U.S.
Belfer Center, 27 July 2011: An Introduction to Pakistan's Military
Quote:
The Pakistani military remains an opaque entity, both inside and outside of the country. Few publicly available reports exist for those seeking a basic understanding of its leaders, functions, or allegiances. An Introduction to Pakistan's Military is the first of two Belfer Center reports examining the Pakistani military. To assemble this report, the authors interviewed over two-dozen retired Pakistani military officers, principally in Islamabad and Karachi. The authors also conducted nearly forty additional interviews with Pakistani politicians, civil society actors, journalists, and military experts, as well as with US and European military, diplomatic, and intelligence officers and analysts.
The first report examines Pakistan’s:
- Overall strategic security and threat environment;
- Military history since 1947;
- Conventional military capabilities;
- Nuclear strategy and security posture;and
- Current counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts (briefly).
This report looks rather lame. How does it provide any new insight into the "opaque" side of the army? All it tells you is boilerplate strategic theory and numbers of weapons and so on. Hamid Hussain's occasional articles are far superior if you really want to know something about the Pakistani army.
Hat tip to FP Blog and an article by Christine Fair, which is sub-titled:Quote:
New data suggest it may be even more liberal than Pakistani society as a whole.
Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...think?page=0,0Quote:
I find no systematic evidence that conservative areas are producing more officers than other areas as late as 2002....In the absence of ideal data on officers, I did the next best thing: provide insights into the kind of areas that produce officers.
(Ends with and my emphasis) Admittedly, these conclusions are tentative, and these measures of social liberalism are no doubt imperfect. This study, moreover, cannot be conclusive as it can only speak to the districts that produce officers, not the worldview of officers themselves. Given the high stakes involved, this subject requires more thorough data collection and analysis. Understanding these dynamics is vital for the United States, but it's perhaps even more important for Pakistan and Pakistanis who rely on their military to protect their country.
I guess so. Just like most non western countries (or not) , Pakistan Army recruits it's enlisted troops from the rural regions. Bar the officer corps, they are not exactly well versed in world affairs. Since the education system has long been Islamized, it hardly matters if you study in a madarassa or a private or government school, books are mostly same and they don't really provide a very good picture of non Muslim world. Officers may or not be radicalized but most of the troops are very much influenced by the hardliners.
A Pakistani I know, mentioned that Musharraf tried to reverse the Zia effect but as soon as soldiers reached their villages or towns and attended a sermon by the local Mullah they get back to square one.
The focus on "madressas" and "conservative areas" is useful as an academic exercise but should not "reassure" or "scare" anyone either way. Christine Fair is much more sensible than the previous retarded attempt at connecting lifestyle with political views (he drinks whisky and soda so he must be pro-western), that has a long history in US-Pakistan affairs by now...but this is still misleading.
The problem with GHQ is its tunnel-vision version of "paknationalism"..everything else proceeds from that. Reliance on Islamists is a result of that obsession, not a cause of it. Afghan policy is derived from that obsession, not from Islamic solidarity. And so on...
But, at this point, I think the best thing for NATO would be to throw up its hands and give up. They clearly dont understand what is going on and will continue to throw good money after bad. Let the Indians and the Chinese sort it out, or not sort it out.
The officer corps has become more formally Islamic with time (as have other sections of the middle class) and this newfound "Islam" is not without its problems, but there is a very long journey from being a more orthodox Muslim to supporting the Haqqani network..and many generals can make that journey without passing through Islam on the way.
I was unhappy with the first attempt at a reply this morning and edited it again and am still unhappy. The point may be moot anyway. Events may be moving in a direction where liberal and "conservative" Pakistani officers will all look equally problematic to American analysts because the pendulum is now swinging from "our army in South Asia" to "our enemy in South Asia", with God knows what results to follow.
And we have an election year coming up.
If I was an academic specializing in research papers about the recruitment patterns of the Pakistani army and the school networks in Chakwal, I would start thinking of grant ideas in a different direction. When the money spigot is finally turned off, it wont be done very rationally. Nobody wants to study a disaster until at least 20 years have passed.
This is a review of Carey Schofield's new book:http://www.spectator.co.uk/books/720...y-within.thtml
A slim bio:http://ccw.modhist.ox.ac.uk/people/bios/schofield.aspQuote:
Like other writers who know the country well, she regards it as the only institution which is able to transcend the religious and tribal divisions that rend the country apart. ‘A Christian or a Parsi or a Sikh can serve in the Pakistan army,’ writes Schofield. ‘Atheists do. But all are bound together by a willing submission to discipline and a battle for self-improvement that is in itself doctrinal in character.’
This is the reason Schofield is optimistic that the army has not been heavily infiltrated by the Taleban...
She paints a convincing picture of the army as an honorable, indeed moral institution, dedicated to the security of the Pakistan nation. But what is this nation to which the army is loyal?
I see that the army is still the great white hope in Pakistan. There is an Urdu verse that fits here:
Meer kya saada hain, beemar huey jin key sabab
Ussi attar key londey sey dawa letey hain..
How naive is Mir, going to get his medication,
from the same physician who made him sick in the first place..
Who knows. Next time around, it may work.
Good review, of all places, in huffpo: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aparna..._b_995933.html
Omarali50,
We must have read a different review! As you said:The reviewer was blunt, for example:Quote:
Good review..
Finally:Quote:
Here again, Ms. Schofield unquestioningly accepts the Pakistan army narrative on Afghanistan, on the Afghan war, and on U.S. policy towards Pakistan. Like the Pakistan army, she repeatedly states that the Pakistan army does not lack intentions, only capabilities, in fighting the militants. There is no attempt to address U.S. concerns about Pakistan's links with the Taliban and the Haqqani network, or Pakistani Jihadi groups. The prescription is simple: Americans need to help build Pakistan's capabilities and resources if they want Pakistan to do more.
Quote:
Otherwise you end up with simply portraying what the propaganda machine asks you to do, taking away any shred of credibility. ... Her latest book is not an academic work on the Pakistani army, but a long press release written by a foreigner.
If its blunt, it cannot be good? :)
I will be the first to admit it, I think the Pakistani army high command (for all sorts of reasons) has adopted a strategic worldview that is fundamentally flawed and leads to repeated disasters and missed opportunities. And I also think that a lot of Western commentators take it for granted that all modern looking armies must have the same fashionable modern notions of strategic necessities and problems, so they tend to take the Pak army view as a reasonable starting point and take it from there. I think that is a mistake.
I also think the Pakistani army is not impossible to reform. They are pragmatic at heart and if more of their "allies"and advisers had told them so and been a bit more upfront, they might have been induced to rethink...."enabling" their pathologies is not helping them.
having said that, I also suspect it may be too late now. Mistrust and accumulated mistakes make it hard to imagine the US or NATO playing too constructive a role any more. Maybe Uncle Chin will have to do what Uncle Sam could not..
for a look at how the strategic geniuses are thinking, go to http://rupeenews.com/
we have a bit of a discussion going about the 1971 war and I wondered if anyone here (especially Ray) can shed some light on Indian operations in East Pakistan. The discussion is at: http://www.brownpundits.com/2011/12/...west-1971-war/
btw, I have seen that military men can be rather suspicious of people who seem disloyal to their own military...but I hope you dont judge too harshly ;)
we mean well.
We have had at least two reviews of Carey Schofield's book 'Inside the Pakistan Army: A Woman’s Experience on the Frontline of the War on Terror', pub.London: Biteback Publishing, 2011; 232 pages.
Here is one by a contributor to SWC, Hamid Hussain, who is a USA-based analyst and this is a slightly edited summaryQuote:
The most valuable part of the book is summary of some of the military operations in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)....This book gives an impression of a favorable narrative about Pakistan army and it is not surprising. Pakistan army was author’s host and it is very difficult to criticize one’s host...Despite its shortcomings, book still has its value for those interested in Pakistan army.
At lengthThe review has appeared in a regional defence journal, but no link could be found without warnings by my IT defences.Quote:
Carey Schofield’s book on Pakistan army is another addition to the work done on Pakistan army. Carey was given unprecedented access by then Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and President General Pervez Mussharraf. She made several trips to Pakistan over five years time period and was given access to several senior generals and visited many formations; a privilege not granted to any Pakistani or foreign writer.
Carey has tried to put a complex story of Pakistan and Pakistan army in two hundred and thirty two pages which is a very difficult task. In chapter three, she starts the story from the time of Prophet Muhammad in seventh century going through various dynasties of the subcontinent, linking it with British Empire and then via Afghanistan all the way down to Baitullah Mahsud of the tribal badlands fame. These events spread over centuries and wide geographic areas are not related to the story of Pakistan army.
Carey is intelligent enough to pick up some of the nuances of inner dynamics of senior officer corps as well as civilian elite. However, her sweeping comments about criticism of army as pastime of ‘chattering classes’ is not correct. In general, army still retains respect and even admiration from general public; however a wide spectrum of the society wants army to stay in its own lane. Large segments of Pakistani society as well as many non-Pakistani well wishers of Pakistan are fully cognizant of the enormous sacrifices made by the soldiers and officers of Pakistan army. Fresh graves continually added to the army graveyard in Rawalpindi are a constant reminder of the sacrifices of Pakistan army. The casualties suffered by senior brass of Pakistan army are unprecedented for any army in recent times. During my recent visit to army graveyard, it was sad to see four graves of senior officer’s right next to each other. Major General Amir Faisal Alvi and Brigadier Moinuddin Ahmad; both assassinated in Islamabad are buried next to each other and immediately below them are buried Lieutenant General Mushtaq Ahmad (assassinated by a suicide bomber in Rawalpindi) and Brigadier Anwarl ul Haq Ramday (killed during attack on army General Head Quarters). In addition to death, countless soldiers have been disabled by the current conflict. Criticism of senior brass is in the context of some seriously flawed decisions regarding national security policy as well as encroachment on areas not related to military affairs.
Carey links some of the preparations made by senior officers in 1999 prior to the coup with potential threat of breakdown of law and order. Evidence does not support this assertion and it is quite clear now that these preparations were made to counter any move by then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during his confrontation with General Mussharraf. The cast in the play, their relationship with Mussharraf and subsequent meteoric rise of almost all of these officers makes it quite clear that by the middle of 1999, army was securing all its bases against Sharif. Then Chief of General Staff (CGS) Lieutenant General Muhammad Aziz Khan summoned a meeting with presumed threat of possibility of attempt of overrunning Prime Minister and President House. Those in attendance included Director General Military Operations (DGMO) Major General Shahid Aziz, Director Military Operations Brigadier Haroon Aslam, Special Services Group (SSG) Commander Brigadier Amir Faisal Alvi, 111 Brigade commander Brigadier Salahuddin Satti, SSG Zarrar Company commander Major Haroon ul Islam and Commanding Officer (CO) of the battalion guarding Prime Minister House Lieutenant Colonel Shahid Ali. It turned out later that the group actually overran the Prime Minister and President House although they were pretending to prevent such an outcome by someone else.
Muhammad Aziz was later given the fourth star and served as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), Shahid Aziz and Satti were promoted to Lieutenant General rank and both served as CGS and Corps Commanders, Haroon Aslam was promoted Major General and appointed General Officer Commanding (GOC) SSG (he is now Lieutenant General and Corps Commander), Faisal promoted to Major General rank (although he later fell out with Mussharraf and unceremoniously removed) and Haroon ul Islam became Lieutenant Colonel and died during Lal Masjid operation. Lieutenant Colonel Shahid did not go further in the army but for different reasons. On the day of the coup, Shahid had restrained newly appointed COAS Lieutenant General Khwaja Ziauddin and his guard and Ziauddin’s escort had pulled guns at each other coming close to a shootout. He also later confronted Lieutenant General Salim Haider and prevented him from entering the Prime Minister House. Shahid followed the orders of his superiors but no army Chief can be comfortable promoting an officer after such encounters. In contrast, Shahid’s counterpart commanding the battalion at President House Lieutenant Colonel Javed Sultan was given choice postings and promoted to Major General rank (he died in a helicopter crash in 2008).
Carey has highlighted some of the differences among senior brass regarding ongoing operations. No army is monolithic and Pakistan army is no exception. In war, there are differences between various branches of the armed forces as well as senior officers. There was and probably still a clear divide between intelligence agencies and fighting formations as far as conduct of operations is concerned. It is also very difficult for an outsider to navigate the minefield of personal and professional rivalries and jealousies among the senior officers.
Carey has given a detailed account of the controversy surrounding the unceremonious removal and death of the former GOC of SSG Major General Amir Faisal Alvi. Carey knew him well and he shared many details with her therefore the account is quite credible. Carey was criticized by many army officers when she published Alvi’s letter after his death. Many charged that the letter was fabrication to discredit Pakistan army. However, there is no reason to believe that the letter was a fabrication. It was Alvi’s own view in the context of his deep anger towards some senior officers. Carey provides her take on the issue and gives the readers all sides of the story and they can reach their own conclusions.
Alvi was forcibly retired and he suspected that then Director General Military Intelligence (DGMI) Major General Mian Nadeem Ijaz and then CGS Lieutenant General Tariq Majeed conspired to remove him. It is quite clear now that Alvi was removed for passing some remarks against General Mussharraf that were recorded by MI and played to Mussharraf. Alvi’s affair with a woman got entangled with his removal as remarks were passed during telephone conversation with this lady. Alvi was furious as many other officers also had affairs and he didn’t hesitate to announce this to many. However, later Alvi tried to put disagreement regarding policy matters (peace deals with militants) as cause of his dismissal and accused some officers including Tariq Majeed in this regard. This gives the impression that somehow these officers were not committed to the fight against militants or worse they were running their own show; both assumptions not correct. Negotiations and payouts to militants were part of the general policy that proved to be disastrous as later events showed. However, officers (formation commanders and intelligence operatives) involved in these efforts were following a policy decision and not acting independently. Tariq’s own son-in-law has been abducted by the militants and in their custody for the last eighteen months. They have demanded release of some high value detainees and huge ransom and it is to Tariq’s credit that he has held his ground.
The most valuable part of the book is summary of some of the military operations in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) although author could have provided more details in view of her access to several senior officers involved in the operations. There are few minor typo errors in the book. On page 100, Hizb-ul-Tahrir; a London based Islamist group championing Caliphate is named incorrectly Hezb-e-Islaam and on page 137, tribal police khassadars is written Hasildars.
This book gives impression of a favorable narrative about Pakistan army and it is not surprising. Pakistan army was author’s host and it is very difficult to criticize one’s host. Such relationship invariably affects the perspectives and if one is using titles such as ‘unimpeachable’, ‘glamorous’, ‘outgoing’, ‘scrupulous’, ‘clever and kind’, ‘darkly brilliant’, ‘neat’, ‘honorable’, ‘guileless’, ‘principled’, ‘gutsy’and ‘gentle and thoughtful’ for senior officers, it is very hard to criticize the same individuals. Despite its shortcomings, book still has its value for those interested in Pakistan army.
we, in the chattering classes, have a name for this condition. Its called Lieven Syndrome, in honor of respected author Anatol Lieven. Extreme cases may also be labelled "Cloughley syndrome", for obvious reasons.
I love the Pakistanis 'intelligentsia'!
In their frustration of not being able to prove that as a Muslim majority nation as they claimed would give them the power to be free and independent and powerful they have failed so badly and so miserably.
India have 'overhauled' Pakistan many times over and has no regret that those who felt that they would be better off with a new country based on religion left.
Therefore, only dreams and hallucination is all that they can cling to!
But this is wonderful and humorous:
Check who is begging! :eek: ;) :DQuote:
To emerge as an international economic power India will one day beg Pakistan for reach into Iran, Central Asia , and beyond to Russia and Europe. India will beg Bangladesh for reach into South East and East Asia.
The occasional SWC contributor, Hamid Hussain, a USA-based analyst has written an article for a regional defence journal and provided a copy (slightly edited by me).
This coup brought General Musharraf to power and the paper details what happened. What I found interesting was the inter-action within the army leadership and the future careers of those involved - with several suicides.
Omar,
I am responding since you asked me to.
Usual reasons given for not succeeding.Quote:
On the contrary Pakistan army’s war plan centered on launching a counter-offensive with one armored and two infantry divisions on the Western front in case of Indian attack on East Pakistan. At what point in time would the attack be launched, however, remained undecided. On December 3, 1971 Pakistan’s 12 Div attacked Poonch but lack of surprise, poor quality of generalship by GOC Akbar Khan (a candidate for COAS in 1976), insufficient logistics and a determined Indian resistance led to the failure of the offensive and Pakistani troops had to withdraw.
In his piece Defeat in the West, Waseem Altaf appears to indicate that practically all the Pakistani military were staffed by incompetent brass and that is why Pakistan made no headway.
If that is true, which I am sure it is not, then there is some real systemic problem in the Pakistani military.
I am sure this article denuded the Arabian Sea of sea salt since much of it was consumed while reading this piece.
The Growth of Islamism in the Pakistan Army
Entry Excerpt:
--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.
Once again it is time for a Pakistani decision on who will Army Chief of Staff, so the occasional SWC contributor, Hamid Hussain, a USA-based analyst has written an article on the choices and more. Attachment no longer works - my fault.
Last week the Army Chief of Staff for six years, General Kiyani announced his retirement; effective on the 29th November 2013, link to his official statement:http://ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=...date=2013/10/6
FP.com has an optimistic article on the implications, although from this faraway vantage point his successor has quite a lot to do:Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...stan?page=fullQuote:
The next army chief will have his work cut out for him. In addition to convincing the reluctant civilian government to continue the fight against the Pakistani Taliban, he will have to help manage the Afghanistan endgame as U.S. troops withdraw and a presidential election take place next year.
The civilian government have not announced their choice of Kiyani's successor; FP.com does comment on their contenders.
Announced today, the next Chief of Army Staff (COAS) will be Lt Gen Raheel Sharif and the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee (CJCSC) will be Lt Gen Rashad Mahmood. Taken from:http://dawn.com/news/1058927/pm-meet...cjcsc-expected
FP in the last post thought:Quote:
Raheel Sharif....is possibly the safest choice politically for Nawaz Sharif, as Raheel Sharif enjoys a close relationship with one of the prime minister's confidants.
He appears to have picked the two least aggressive generals for the two jobs. May not be the best decision for an army at war...
Omarali,
The BBC's slim profile suggests COAS LTG Raheel has been preparing the army for an internal war:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25122054
The Daily Telegraph's comment uses that fatal adjective 'moderate':http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...commander.html
Hamid Hussain's profiles are a good guide: http://www.brownpundits.com/2013/09/...f-in-pakistan/
General Tariq Khan stood out among the candidates but Sharif was probably scared of promoting someone known to be aggressive and headstrong. Good for Sharif, but maybe not so much for the army.Quote:
Raheel is a gentleman but almost all agree that for a peacetime army, it would make no difference but he is probably not suited to lead an army engaged in a war. I think Raheel himself knows it, but Lieutenant General ® Abdul Qadir may whisper some good words about him in Sharif’s ears.
Per army scuttlebutt, he is a good man, but not an aggressive leader. Will do fine if politicians above him take tough decisions and people on the frontlines (corps commander Peshawar, IGFC, SSG chief, etc) are up to the job..but hard to believe that he will make tough decisions on his own.
Attached after light editing are Hamid Hussain's comments on the appointment and the next year.
I have altered my method of saving Hamid's contributions so they will remain available.
Stephen Tankel has a slightly optimistic comment on the new COAS, part of a forthcoming series on 'War on the Rocks' assessing General Kayani's legacy:http://warontherocks.com/2013/12/gen...ouse-in-order/
He'll have his hands full:Quote:
The anti-state insurgency has made the security establishment even less likely to part with its pro-state proxies for the time being, not least because they do not attack Pakistan and in some cases provide utility against those militants who do. At the same time, the existence of a militant infrastructure and ongoing support for proxies creates myriad operational and ideational challenges for those seeking to counter the jihadist insurgency.
Here is an interesting story about an American gun maker that is pulling out of a contract competition because they are concerned that any guns sold to the Pak Army may be used to slay Americans.
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/01/05...with-pakistan/
Every body gets it but the genii inside the beltway. The Pak Army/ISI is the enemy.
A timely IISS Strategic Comment as Afghanistan is in a flux, there are no talks with the Pakistani Taliban and the Pakistani Army are "prepping" for ground action in Waziristan. To name just three factors.
Link:http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/...y-balance-1d21
Here is a comment that appeared today on the Onviolence blog. It has to do with their series dealing with Lone Survivor, book and movie.
You can all judge for yourselves whether you believe the man who made the comment or not. I do. It all fits with everything that has been happening for more than a decade.Quote:
The Taliban actually videotaped the fight with Seal Team 10 that day. I saw it in 2007 when I was there. It was obviously a controlled item and required a clearance to view. The main reason for viewing it was that after the fight, when the fighters are going through discarded equipment, they find the Panasonic Toughbook laptop the team was carrying. One of the fighters came up with some equipment and was able to actually “map” the hard drive. This demonstrated the presence of those trained or employed by Pakistan’s intelligence service(ISI). But with regard to the fight, from the first shot to the last was less than two minutes. How long did it appear to last in the book and film?
We have videotaped evidence that the Pak Army/ISI kills our people and we do nothing, except lie, about that and everything about this particular fight.
http://www.onviolence.com/?e=762
(The comment is the very last one.)
Professor Christine Fair's new book "Fighting to the End; the Pakistan Army's Way of War" is out.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00..._prd_ttl_sol_0
I am only on chapter two, but hope to have a review when done and when I get some time to write one. I look forward to enlightening comments from professional/academic people on this blog.
I think the introduction pretty much nails it. I am sure I will disagree with some details as I go along, but the overall thesis seems accurate to me.
What do others think?
Interestingly the current rating on Amazon is 2 stars because there is only one review and that person appears to be unhappy that she was not harsh enough or went easy on Islam. You can't win em all..
SitRep book report:Quote:
Christine Fair's book on the Pakistan military is out. From Amazon: Simply put, acquiescence means defeat. Fighting to the End convincingly shows that because the army is unlikely to abandon these preferences, Pakistan will remain a destabilizing force in world politics for the foreseeable future." Oxford University Press
Nice discussion at the Hudson institute on that other 10 years too late book:
http://www.hudson.org/events/1146-th...otta-gall42014
(Carlotta Gall: The Wrong Enemy)
Well, I am the one who wrote the review and gave the rating. Here's my review: http://www.amazon.com/review/R1EQTVWSDJJN38
The explained reason why this book failed in its primary purpose is essentially this: the author failed to properly understand what drives Pakistan or why it continues to be revisionist.
Surely, Christine Fair has published extensively on Pakistan in peer-reviewed journals – in fact, far more than perhaps any other scholar. However, just about all of them address small issues with nothing putting together to identify what Pakistan is really all about. Her prolific publishing on small issues is less optimal in developing a long view, and it shows. I can say that because I have read most of her publications in intimate detail, and have referred to her work in my forthcoming scholarship.
Through my exchanges with her over the years, I have realized that she is a sectarian by nature, who tends to somewhat blindly identify with people who call themselves victims (perhaps owing to her financially-deprived family origins). I have noticed that, in the context of South Asia, she never properly understood that the claims of Muslim victimization was mostly a self-induced effect, and that it was tactic used to undermine and victimize non-Muslims (I have covered this in great detail in my book, Defeating Political Islam). For example, her constant theme with regard to India’s Muslim minorities is her emphasis of their “discrimination” in India, without understanding the situation in a wholesome manner.
With such a strong outlook and background, it is hard to see how she can be objective or produce a wholesome analysis. It showed finally, in the form of a flawed book.
On this subject, I also recommend Haider Mullick's Pakistan's Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies, published by the Joint Special Operations University in 2009.
Is there any book that deals with the American end of this disaster? What is the dominant theory? Were all the American policy makers just foolish? or did they have nefarious motives of their own?
Omar:
There is no book like that that I'm aware of. There probably won't be for years. To write one people in power right now would have to talk truthfully about their flaws or allow access to source material that demonstrated their flaws. That isn't going to happen easy.
Until then guesses are all we may have. And your guess about the 'romance of the raj' being used as the fulcrum of a grift is one of the best.
No, not to my knowledge. Hopefully the long running thread 'The US & others working with Pakistan' may have an answer; it does have 685 posts so may take a while for you to check:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2313
Have a look elsewhere for Myra MacDonald's writing.
She has just reviewed in RUSI Journal a book by a former Pakistani Ambassador to Washington DC 'Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States and an Epic History of Misunderstanding' by Husain Haqqani.
Hamid Karzai: Last will and testament...well, not exactly. But an important interview as he is on the way out:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=We-5RdJxgf0
Omar, without first understanding why Pakistan behaves the way it does, your question may not be answered.
The policy-makers have to rely on political scientists such as the likes of Christine Fair. Not to be so hard on Fair, quite frankly, no one has yet to figure out the conundrum called Pakistan. Hence, circumstances and our belief that our Pakistani specialists are credible forced us into foolish policies initially.
Now, at least the policy-makers know that they can't trust our Pakistan experts, as a result the U.S. has no Pakistan policy :o
Pakistan is not a state with an army but an army with a state. Any analysis of Pakistan should begin there IMO. Pakistan ends wherever the army's ability to exert influence ends regardless of the internationally recognised border. Add to that the parralel state of the ISI and its own overlapping, competing and in some cases greater/longer reach and the, if that weren't complicated enough, civilian state apparatus which compete for authoity with the others then you have what can only charitably described as a headache (SNAFU to the locals). Ontop of that thes ovelpping netoks of power intersect at key points. Anyone who thinks "normal" diplomatic relations is possible with that setup is welcome to try. Even figuring out what "Pakistani" national interest depends upon figuring out which "power ministry" (to borrow a phrase from post-soviet analysts) is exerting internal and external pressure. Figuring out the correlation of frorces at any given time may actually be the easy part (:rolleyes:), the next step requires a degree of patience and mirror imaged machiavellianism that would confound the most seasoned wheeler-dealer.hardly something western european or even the US democracies with their short attention spans and black and white public diplomacy narrative (good guys/bad guys) can handle. Good luck to anyone who tries.:eek:
I have my first thoughts about both the Fair book and the Carlotta Gall book:
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/...om_search=true
An excellent quick summary of the Afghan war and where and how America went wrong. She presents a very strong case against Pakistan (from the American and Afghan perspective). She does mention some of America's own cruelties and absurdities and does not fail to mention the terrible and tragic "shoot first and ask questions later" aspect of actual military operations (the scene where a translator witnesses his troops pointlessly shoot innocent Afghan civilians is devastating), but she does not provide any insight into WHY the top US decision-makers were so thoroughly fooled. Still, thanks to her book, this question must now be front and center; that the US was taken for a ride is documented in devastating detail.. WHY they allowed themselves to be taken for a ride (or did they really WANT to be taken for a ride because their aims were never the stabilization of Afghanistan?) is left unclear.
I dont know enough about particular Afghan personages to know if her somewhat uncritically positive views of various police chiefs are really accurate, but even if some details are wrong, this is a must read book. And it is hard to see how this will fail to influence future American attitudes to Pakistan...
About Christine Fair's book:
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/...om_search=true
A thorough and very well documented exposition of the Pakistan army's dominant strategic culture. I think she may slightly exaggerate the unanimity of this consensus. In actual fact the majority of officers are probably thinking far more about their plots and post-army jobs than about the strategic needs of Pakistan, but those who think they are thinking are indeed thinking exactly this.
Her conclusions seem unimpeachable: the army will not reform in return for X or Y amount of money or even minor territorial concessions. Nothing less than the fall of India will be enough. Since that seems less likely than GHQ believes, it is therefore going to be Pakistan that will fight to the end....sad, but most likely true
Omar is right. Ms. Gall's is a must read book.
Some of her viewpoints dovetail into things I've read in other books. Her point about the displacement of local strong men leaving a vacuum to be filled by Taliban & Co. matches things I've read in War Comes to Garmser and Little America. She is very emphatic about how badly the errant air strikes and shootings have hurt the fight and hurt Afghans. (The account of the translator Omar mentions is an account of straight up premeditated mass murder in my view. But they were spec ops so it's ok. That's my sarcasm not Ms. Gall's.)
One of the things that she writes I hadn't read before. I had always read that Mullah Omar was a self made man. He saw lawlessness and started the fight against it on his own and things went from there. Ms. Gall writes that what actually happened is that a group of former mujahideen commanders, local strong men, got tired of the chaos down around Kandahar and created an organization to fight it. MO was the equivalent of a squad leader in the employ of one of those strong men, a good reliable fighter and a good man but not too bright . Within a very few months what the commanders created had turned into the Taliban with MO at its head eclipsing everybody else. Ms. Gall didn't actually say it but I think she very strongly suggested MO's rise was the result of ISI machination and he is their creature completely.
The other thing that surprised me is she ends the book on an optimistic note. She seems to say that Afghans dislike Taliban & Co intensely and if given support they will reject them, as in kill them reject them. But they need support to counter the support Taliban & Co receive from Pakistan.
So it is a great book. But like Omar says, even Ms. Gall doesn't have an idea about how we got so thoroughly fooled by the Pak Army/ISI.
Citing Carl in part:Prompted me to recall an exchange with a retired USG decision-maker, who was closely involved in monitoring Pakistan's nuclear developments and in particular the leading scientist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the ' the father of Pakistan's nuclear programme'. See:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul_Qadeer_KhanQuote:
...how we got so thoroughly fooled by the Pak Army/ISI.
Several times Dr. Khan was outside Pakistan on his missions, with "hands on" access to incriminating evidence and each time those further up the command chain declined to authorise action.
The USG decision-maker IIRC referred to an overwhelming US national interest in the maintenance of at least a friendly Pakistani state, that was not totally opposed to the interests of the USA and allies.
This seems a rather high price to pay given what happened over the conflict in Afghanistan, but as I have posted before Pakistan is far more important than Afghanistan.
Yes an element of being 'fooled' existed, I suspect more of the explanation and blame rests closer to home than the murky corridors of the Pakistani Army/ISI.
David, I suspect that the history is repeating itself.
At this time Pakistan is embarking on a massive buildup of Plutonium based nukes. These compact nukes are versatile and dangerous. To my knowledge, the U.S. has no game plan on what to do about Pakistan becoming a Sunni Islamist nuke factory.
If Pakistan played a role in facilitating the conditions that led to the 9/11 attacks on America, it is now setting the stage for a nuclear 9/11.
http://www.frontpagemag.com/2010/moo...i-third-reich/
David:
Everything about our official attitude toward Pakistan cries out "How on earth can we think that and do that!?". The Pak Army/iSI and the feudal elites haven't well hidden much of anything. What the have done is too big and brazen for that. All they really bother to do is say "We did not!" one second and "It's your fault! Can you blame us?" the next. And we go right on cooing to them as you would a favored but petulant child.
What on earth is with us? The Pak Army/ISI is the most dangerous organization in the world and will have to be brought low or tens of millions will die, if that is even possible anymore. And yet we still think we can deal with the devil's spawn.
A WoTR review of Carlotta Gill's book 'The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001-2014:http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/fin...-and-al-qaeda/
The review author, David Isby has visited Afghanistan for thirty years.
One passage:Quote:
Unsurprisingly, Gall does not provide a comprehensive account of the strategy, organizations, or background behind Afghan or Pakistani actions (and U.S. reactions to them), which is unfortunate. She reports largely what she saw. Similarly, Gall does not attempt to provide a prescription of how U.S. policy might focus away from the “wrong” enemy without compounding the damage already done. She does not look at the larger story of U.S. relations with Pakistan, nor does she aim to identify and examine the alternatives to the perceived policy of appeasement bitterly opposed by her Afghan sources such as Amrullah Saleh, the former intelligence chief, one of the most thoughtful and effective Afghan officials (hated by the ISI, not least for his sympathy towards India). But without Pakistan providing access through its territory, both coalition military forces and Afghanistan’s economy would be at risk of being cut off. Despite Pakistan’s dysfunctional democracy, the ISI remained hands-off as an elected government served its full term for the first time in the country’s history, to be replaced by an elected successor of a different party.