One can never know when technology will fail you - only that it is sure to fail at some point.
For a time I was in charge of training the new intel people that came to the unit directly from Intel schoolhouse. At first I had them prepare a brief on some topic and in the middle of delivering their brief I would turn off the computer running their powerpoint slides. I had them finish the briefing and, unfortunately, they usually didn't do too well. Next I would have them develop a briefing on a topic without the use of the SIPRnet or JWICs for research which got them acquainted with the pub library.
Technology can be a monkey on your back if you let it.
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
I may have read more into Gen. Mattis quoted comments than was actually present in his speech, but this is my take away from his comments. I remember the level of resources an erstwhile adversary invested in Radio Electronic Combat (REC). If the force is reliant on all the high tech networking and commo, what happens when a dedicated opponent takes them away? Are our leaders fully prepared to effectively prosecute their mission when that happens?
I may also be mistaken (observer bias), but I assumed his term "mission command" meant Auftragstaktik. Which, as Wilf points out, "...is not enabled just by switching off radios."
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
It is not. It is enabled by decent training. However, given even marginal training, a Commander with enough testicular fortitude to turn off the radios forces his subordinate commanders to perform -- whether they want to or not.
You'd be surprised (or maybe not...) by the number of folks who take an entirely too great amount of comfort in being told what to do by a Staff or a Commander miles away instead of making decisions on their own. That forcing effort is beneficial as it pushes the marginal types to become better. Or be pushed off the cart...
Mission command can also be enforced the other way - by subordinates turning off their radios and acting on the last "commander's intent" they liked. This has been done up to Army HQ level, and very often at division and regiment level.
This part of Auftragstaktik - to violate orders when one thinks it's better like that is at the root of the whole system and pretty much ignored in U.S. writings. It was also a critical component of the birth of Blitzkrieg, and the greatest mistake of the Fall Gelb campaign in France 1940 happened when generals obeyed an order even though they knew it was wrong..
Auftragstaktik has its roots in the 18th century, and I can recount an interesting anecdote (albeit not accurately; merely out of the memory):
A major had followed his orders during the seven Years War and done something very stupid because the orders were outdated. A prince arrives and questions the man why he had done something that stupid. The major answered that this had been his order.
The prince replied "His majesty made you a major because he believed you would know when NOT to follow orders!"
Last edited by Fuchs; 05-23-2010 at 10:45 AM.
but I can assure you it is or at least was emphatically not ignored in practice by a great many US commanders and leaders.
That's why the current push for mandatory interconnectivity, BFT, PLRS and all that (not to mention UAVs which offer a way to be the 'Commander in the Sky' without hovering overhead in a Helicopter). Guys who as Captains ignored their Lieutenant Colonels or as LTCs ignored their Generals by "turning off their radios" are now Generals and want to make sure that no one does the same thing to them...
The sad thing is that they really ought to be encouraging initiative instead of inadvertently destroying it.
Not sure I understand the tech aversion by so many here.
Take UAS for example. In OIF 1, there was virtually no V Corps UAS support because Predators were concentrating on trying to find “strategic” SCUD targets. Would having more Army direct support tactical UAS have reduced brigade and below commander initiative or enhanced it? If you no longer had to rely on movement-to-contact or intelligence tasked by some distant operations center and fed to you from the U.S., but instead had access to your own assets and combat information, wouldn’t that help?
If you had the UAS video in your combat vehicle or on a dismounted patrol, accessible to the JTAC and F/A-18, company commander, and providing information to the FS officer in the battalion CP, the Shadow GCS being influenced by the brigade CP, and visible to Apaches supporting you, doesn’t that help?
If the enemy attempts to jam the local UAS digital line-of-sight signal, he is emitting and can be targeted. If instead, he takes out the satellite controlling the "theater-capable" UAS, the temporary loss of information may not be so temporary. And do you prefer to rely on a Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) analyzing UAS video and communicating with you from California, or would analysts operating inside your battalion/brigade CP DCGS-Army be more immune to loss of signal to provide more timely analysis based on the tactical commander’s CCIR?
Would we prefer combat information to come exclusively at the speed and range of the mounted or dismounted Soldier/Marine, whose ground perspective may be limited and events may change minutes after the patrol passes by? Can you see or influence the Taliban shooting at you from 700 meters away? Can you watch that mosque 24/7 with a secure dismounted 2-man OP? Do you trust the lead vehicle keeping an eye out for ground disturbances more than the UAS operator using coherent change detection? Is it possible that just because you don’t understand a technology's value, it still might help you?
When the enemy starts launching long range missiles, rockets, and mortars against your unit (or allies), aren’t you glad we have counter-mortar radars, C-RAM, and Patriot/THAAD/SM3/Aegis…not to mention HESCO and stealth aircraft and satellites with sensors that may detect missile launch? When you cross that minefield or unknown ground near the attack objective, aren’t you glad that tank has a line charge on it? Will that line charge be as effective if every commander mounts his mounted assault based on personal preferences without the benefit of that line charge breech, pre-planned fires, and support-by-fire that one commander may be providing another at specific times and phase lines?
As for commander’s intent, isn’t it fair to say that tactical and strategic actions must mirror that of the national command authority and joint force commander?
In 2003, our probability for success to go all the way to Baghdad was good since we had planned the logistics to support heavy force refuel efforts and had BFT to track unit locations, provide digital comms and graphics, and prevent fratricide.
In contrast, a continued Desert Storm attack well beyond what was logistically supportable and that could have increased fratricide risk and attacks by bypassed threats was not in the cards, despite what a squadron commander may have wanted. And the commander’s intent of the POTUS and General Schwarzkopf were not to go that far. Should those orders have been disregarded?
Just my personal view.
Last edited by Cole; 05-23-2010 at 07:30 PM. Reason: Clarify terms and grammar
Bookmarks