He makes some good points about over reliance on technology.
Mattis: Military should rely less on technology
He makes some good points about over reliance on technology.
Mattis: Military should rely less on technology
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
OK but.....
I like General Mattis. He's on my tick list, but I'm not sure about this. "Turn the radios off" is a tad simplistic, and so-called "mission command" is not enabled just by switching off radios. - also there are very many differing types of "mission command."
Sure, use the radios less. Practice pro-longed radio silence, but that did not mean switching them off - and as the entire command system of the US Army is essentially digital, I'm more than curious to know how this gets put into practice.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
There were a number of interesting replies when this was posted on the SWJ blog here: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...hould-rely-le/
But simple works! I don't think that Gen Mattis expects a radio switch to go to 'off' and de-centralised mission command to suddenly be turned on. However, taking away some of the props that support micro-management and enable massive reach-down can be a great thing in training. If people are suddenly forced to employ verbal orders, use their own initiative in-keeping with their commander's intent and trust their subordinates once in a while it can only be of benefit, even when technology is allowed again.
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
WHY Oh WHY... cannot we have the Blog discussion here!! No wonder this board goes a bit quiet. Why is the blog comment different form the Forum!! We are missing a trick!! IMO - possible IMHO.... but unlikely....
Wallah!! Mate, I am as simple as it gets. I am the Mr Simple of simple things. It's my schtick. Clausewitz the Hedgehog!!! I may well be an opinoated arrogant little twat, but I am very simple opinionated.... you get it!But simple works! I don't think that Gen Mattis expects a radio switch to go to 'off' and de-centralised mission command to suddenly be turned on.
Yes, its about leaders leading regardless. Ensuring leaders lead, under all likely conditions is leadership. Back in the day I've seen Section Commanders making sketch maps, because there were not enough maps. If I was king, I would be teaching platoons to use whistles. PRR is gradually eroding hand signals. All good. - IF that was what Matis is talking about, then all for it.If people are suddenly forced to employ verbal orders, use their own initiative in-keeping with their commander's intent and trust their subordinates once in a while it can only be of benefit, even when technology is allowed again.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Maybe Mattis wants to make the entire chain think...to teach superiors to occasionally trust their subordinates, or at least allow them to learn on their own. So yes, Wilf, sometimes it DOES mean switching them off. As Chris points out, it's good for learning and testing.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I don't know if it was good leadership... but I turned off the BN CMD net in the field more often than I should admit... Not sure I need to call in hourly slant reports when I'm supposed to be in the middle of Battery TNG
Only got caught once, and when the BN CDR came and found me observing some outstanding PLT TNG lanes designed, organized and led by my junior leaders... I was forgiven my sin... maybe that's why he made 3-star
Hacksaw
Say hello to my 2 x 4
Wilf, you may not like this and I could be wrong but I think he means to use the Prime Tenets of Maneuver Warfare. The Mission....The Main Effort....Surfaces and Gaps. Per the OODA loop. Turn the radio off.... Observe(visually see) Surfaces and Gaps. Orient on the Main effort. Decide how you can support the Mission (commanders Intent) then Act on your decision. Adjust as necessary based upon what you see ....not the chatter over the radio. Just my interpretation anyway.
Slap, have you considered going to a Warden recovery clinic?
I think you're at least partway right, although I'd slim it down to seeing what the commanders at all levels can do when they don't have someone looking over their collective shoulders. At the very least it would be a start toward weeding out the sitters from the doers, and might even allow something like (gasp) actual learning, training, and safe (as in non-combat) tactical mistakes to be made and learned from.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
One can never know when technology will fail you - only that it is sure to fail at some point.
For a time I was in charge of training the new intel people that came to the unit directly from Intel schoolhouse. At first I had them prepare a brief on some topic and in the middle of delivering their brief I would turn off the computer running their powerpoint slides. I had them finish the briefing and, unfortunately, they usually didn't do too well. Next I would have them develop a briefing on a topic without the use of the SIPRnet or JWICs for research which got them acquainted with the pub library.
Technology can be a monkey on your back if you let it.
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
I may have read more into Gen. Mattis quoted comments than was actually present in his speech, but this is my take away from his comments. I remember the level of resources an erstwhile adversary invested in Radio Electronic Combat (REC). If the force is reliant on all the high tech networking and commo, what happens when a dedicated opponent takes them away? Are our leaders fully prepared to effectively prosecute their mission when that happens?
I may also be mistaken (observer bias), but I assumed his term "mission command" meant Auftragstaktik. Which, as Wilf points out, "...is not enabled just by switching off radios."
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
Well you're right about not liking it!!
So called "Mission Command" is not a tennet of so called MW. Foch writes very clearly about the "ability to understand your commander" in 1911. Moltke even earlier, but I am less familiar with his work.
I strongly believe in:
a.) "doing your utmost to fulfil your commanders intent."
b.) especially when the situation changes significantly from the one he issues the orders to cover.
..... but you cannot do a Formation crossing of the Suez Canal, using "mission command" and with no radios. It is very context specific.
Surfaces and Gaps? OK, as long as you know that the gaps are the entrances to ambushes, - especially if you've run into North Korean, Chinese, Japanese, or Soviet Fortified region, or prepared defensive position. ... but I digress.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Guderian crossed the Meuse at Sedan using the normal German leadership methods.
He had trained the troops very well for that particular action before the campaign, though.
It is as much about the commander clearly explaining his intent and plan as it is for the subordinate to carry it out with minimal further direction. But as it is said even the best plan rarely survives contact.
I agree that “turning off the radios” is a bit much plus our over reliance on technology is not so much radios as it is those things that replace solid field craft, like GPS. While GPS is a great thing the art of map reading and navigation using the compass are falling by the wayside. That is an over-reliance on technology. Comms are comms and short of wig wag and heliograph there's not much else you can do to replicate them.
"What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."
wearing a war suit...
I really do post date the Smoke Signals and even the Telegraph and Heliograph.
...Barely...
However, I'm old enough that radio was the primary comm means and we did back then turn 'em off for training and for real when our emissions might have been a problem.
There was no replicate to it, the idea was not to find alternatives or substitutes, it was to do the job without using them at all. Hard as it is to believe with all the modern gee whiz stuff, GPS, BFT, etc. (those are just aids -- and that's all they are, aids, they are not imperatives) and amazing as it may seem that units were trusted to the extent that they were released from view and 'positive control' to perform actual combat missions in a fairly active war or two, it was done. You can really do that...
One would be remiss to not understand that even if non use of comm and the other aids was not intentional it did, does and can happen due to both technological and logistic problems -- and even more frequently as a result enemy or combat action. Combat is hard on equipment...
The problem is that we are not using our aids as aids-- they are too often being used as substitutes for a lack of training. They have ceased being a cane and have become a Walker (or even a Wheelchair in some cases...) That's what Mattis is warning against...
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