The Way Of War

[Steve Blair]

Within a war - this is often shaped by political and social conditions as well as military necessity and/or realities. Violence can taper, as Infanteer mentioned, because both sides need a breather. It can also be because the political leadership of nation X decides to tone down violence to send a signal of some sort. Likewise it can ratchet back up due to domestic pressure on political leaders in response to something that happened (or didn't happen) on the battlefield. The appearance of a "cause" can also cause violence levels to increase (sometimes drastically and quickly).

Between wars I think the same sorts of things apply. Nations exhausted by a major conflict don't seem to have the same stomach for aggression (at least at first), or they may feel that their demands/needs have been met. Political unrest at home can also lead to diminishing violence outside the borders as leaders turn their attention inward. In "ye olden dayes" armies had to be smaller due to logistics limits and obviously couldn't be moved as quickly. This mean that nations or rulers had to "pick their time and place" in a different way than they do now. It's worth considering the impact of social changes on this as well. The rise of communications technology (from printing on) and nation-states and (I think) the dominance of monotheistic religion also play roles.

[Taiko]

Thanks for the imput.



http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=11715

See post #16 for an outline of what I am trying to pitch for.

[Chris jM]

I have read both Infanteer's and Steve's responses, as well as your post on the linked thread. My answer, I think, is complementary to all the above perspectives, perhaps coming from a slightly different angle. It's a good question, and one that has been bouncing around my head for the last few days since reading your thread.

I would suggest that the intensity of warfare refers to political will, in an explicitly Clausewitzian setting. If the political will is for complete and utter annihilation of another population group, then the violence will be total - witness the devastation visited upon Carthage or on the Eastern Front. If the political objectives desire a new balance of power then the need to co-exist post hostilities requires reduced levels of violence.

Political systems may sometimes topple themselves mid-conflict, which is why 'pauses' sometimes exist or the intensity of violence decreases. If the political system is unable to tolerate an ongoing offensive or military campaign due to materiel losses, economic cost, human cost or even parliamentary support, then policy may change, based on the omnipresent centre of gravity, political sustainability.

When the will for total destruction of another population is present as a political goal the violence will be absolute. When that political will decreases in intensity the level of violence, too, reduces. After all, states go to war with the intent of a better peace, so the means exerted will relate to their view and conception of the end-state.

This would explain why states involved in a civil war may often resort to extreme levels of violence as they do not expect to have to rehabilitate or coexist alongside the opposing political order. It would also explain why limitations are placed on even the most high-risk operations, such as the employment of gas in WW2 or nuclear weapons in the Cold War campaigns, as both sides intended to work with and not annihilate the opposing populations.

Perhaps I am rephrasing your question. I don't believe that the intensity of violence differs between time periods, but rather due to the objectives of politics. The trend for political systems to emphasise stability and the maintenance of a balance of power may have moved away from absolutes in conquest and destruction towards less costly and less permanent measures, and it is this phenomenon that is now observed in reduced levels and intensity of violence in warfare.