What is CQB?

[jmm99]

I go along with Steve and Ken, but look at it from another vantage point. The LE-ization, SOF-ization and contradictory (or absent) TTPs and training practices, have gone a long way to replace ROEs based on the Laws of War (Laws of Armed Conflict; International Humanitarian Law) with ROEs (and TTPs) based on civilian legal rules (the "Rule of Law" and International Human Rights Law).

This is again beating the horse that Polarbear1605 and I have been beating for the past 4 years; but that horse (unfortunately) is still alive and kicking.

Its most recent resurrection was last month with release of ATTP 3-37.31, Civilian Casualty Mitigation (July 2012), whose second paragraph sets the test:

1-2. During armed conflict, Army forces protect civilians through civilian casualty (CIVCAS) mitigation. CIVCAS mitigation is all measures to avoid or minimize CIVCASs and reduce the adverse impact of those that occur. In the context of CIVCAS mitigation, a civilian is any person who is not a combatant. In other words, a civilian is a person not engaged in hostilities during an armed conflict, regardless of the groups or organizations to which the person belongs. If there is any doubt, Army forces consider a person to be a civilian. In the context of CIVCAS mitigation, a CIVCAS refers to any civilian wounded or dead as a result of armed conflict.

In how many "CQB" situations involving irregular forces (such as room clearing, stairwell clearing, persons at an IED scene exiting a vehicle, etc.), will there not be at least some doubt as to the status of the shootee ?

This ATTP (3-37.31), BTW, is not a legal or ROE text as such; but rather a GPF operational text (from Preface):

Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-37.31 is the Army’s doctrinal publication for mitigating civilian casualties (CIVCASs). The purpose is to provide doctrinal guidance for minimizing CIVCAS incidents and managing their consequences. The focus is on guiding Army leaders conducting operations involving armed conflict.

civcasmitigationcycle.jpg

Like John Keegan, I've never been in a battle; nor have I been close to a battle. So, to those who have, is this ATTP bullroar - or am I missing something ?

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

'Norms' in quotes because they change like the winds...

Typical because the Armed Forces have to respond to those changes in some fashion lest they imperil their funding. Typical also because in every war, we have modified the rules, the doctrine, to cope with what the bulk of Americans want -- or seem to want, not always the same thing -- the forces to do. The US has most always tried to minimize civilian casualties and in recent wars, that has been at some cost in own casualties. In the most recent, that cost has been relatively small. We have also further modified at the end of or after after the wars to remove what may seem to some an excessively violent approach to operations (That lasts until more violence seems prudent...).

In this case, an odd combination of R2P and current 'COIN' theory sends us to combat (which is barely coordinated chaos) and demands that no one not positively identified as hostile be bothered, much less harmed. Thus the Pam is a fairly logical result of that anomaly. Like most such efforts it truly means well but suffers from excessively idealistic intent coupled with a lack of current appreciation for the harshness of heavy combat in which excessive concern for civilian casualties will cause a more significant increase in own casualties that (as has not been true in the current wars) will go beyond what the public and the politicians will find they are willing to accept. In mid to high intensity combat, it is inevitable that civilian casualties will be incurred and that the rate will rise with the intensity of combat..

The bad news is that such contradictory and untenable doctrine will get combatants killed unnecessarily as they attempt in many combat situations to avoid civilian casualties and find that is not possible without significantly increasing own casualties. The good news is that after a few weeks of heavy combat, reality returns and such idealistic but unrealistic stuff falls by the wayside.

[jcustis]

IIRC, a SWC member penned an Armor Magazine article titled, "Beware Battle Drill Six.". It shares some of your concerns.

The folks who slammed you for asking an entitely reasonable question have their heads up their asses.

The Marine Corps learned the flaws of our TTPs in the urban/residential fights along the Euphrates, and in wholesale amounts during Fallujah 2.0. I cannot remember the title, but a group of infantrymen from 3d Bn 5th Marines wrote an excellent AAR of their fight, and it was eye-opening.

[Cavguy]

IIRC, a SWC member penned an Armor Magazine article titled, "Beware Battle Drill Six.". It shares some of your concerns.

The folks who slammed you for asking an entitely reasonable question have their heads up their asses.

The Marine Corps learned the flaws of our TTPs in the urban/residential fights along the Euphrates, and in wholesale amounts during Fallujah 2.0. I cannot remember the title, but a group of infantrymen from 3d Bn 5th Marines wrote an excellent AAR of their fight, and it was eye-opening.

The Benning link is broken, but there is an open source version of the article here:

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/A+case...x.-a0160714362

Great SWJ thread here:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...4002#post54002

And my comment:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...2&postcount=47

Bottom line - no reason a unit should do it unless all other options are expended. Excessive training focus on it makes it a first, rather than last, tactical choice.

[jcustis]

I'll add that in the Afghan context, there is definitely no need to send a man through a door, knowing that hostiles are confirmed to be inside, unless one is doing DA in-extremis hostage rescue, or hard target takedowns and the intel to be gained has a short shelf-life. The units that need to do it, do it well. Everyone else should just use a rocket or a tank.

[Fuchs]

I'll add that in the Afghan context, there is definitely no need to send a man through a door, knowing that hostiles are confirmed to be inside, unless one is doing DA in-extremis hostage rescue, or hard target takedowns and the intel to be gained has a short shelf-life. The units that need to do it, do it well. Everyone else should just use a rocket or a tank.

I wonder how this works out well if the defenders in the village have connecting tunnels between the houses as they did in Chechnya.

snipe from building
run to tunnel, crouch through it
boom - house gone
rinse, repeat till whole village is down - all for one man with a bolt action rifle?


Other problem; assault on village. First line of houses is unoccupied save for some spotters, textbook-style. Assault on village. How to blow up 2nd line of houses without closing in with tanks within suicidal 50 m (think: capable opponents, European two-floor houses with inverted vee roof)?


I'm no friend of maxims.

[jcustis]

By Afghan context, referring to the use of a rocket or tank was hyperbole. We shouldn't actually level a house for a guy with a bolt action rifle. You just encircle the structure and wait him out.

If, over time as you operate in the battlespace, you realize there are tunnels involved, you change to address that element.

Now, if there are defenders (emphasis on plural), then tactics adjust as well, but I get where you're going with what you're saying.

[carl]

The Marine Corps learned the flaws of our TTPs in the urban/residential fights along the Euphrates, and in wholesale amounts during Fallujah 2.0. I cannot remember the title, but a group of infantrymen from 3d Bn 5th Marines wrote an excellent AAR of their fight, and it was eye-opening.

The title is:Lessons Learned: Infantry Squad Tactics in Military Operations in Urban Terrain During Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah, Iraq.

I have it in PDF if you want me to send it to you.

One of their conclusions is you if you know somebody bad is actually in the building, you bring it down around their ears with tanks or artillery as you said. The Russians learned the same thing long ago. Each of their city fighting battle groups preferably had a great big direct fire weapon attached.

American cops basically do the same thing. If you know there will be a fight if you go in, you don't. You gas 'em out or wait them out, active shooters excepted. Same thing with cell extractions in prisons. You don't. You gas 'em out.

[JMA]

Like John Keegan, I've never been in a battle; nor have I been close to a battle. So, to those who have, is this ATTP bullroar - or am I missing something ?

Mike, at least you are asking the question... many powerful people - for that read congressmen and senators - have not either yet that does not stop them making far reaching decisions which have a major implication for soldiers on the battle field.

First thing that comes to mind is the 1978 US decision to unilaterally take flamethrowers out of their weapons arsenal. I can see the fire risk in areas where building are built with wood but in caves, bunkers and buildings they may well be just the trick. (Not at all concerned about the "horrific" death they deliver as I would be more concerned about reducing own force casualties and noted that under demolitions three improvised incendiary devices are listed in the document.)

The comment that soldiers adapt is correct but one needs to bear in mind that this experience is purchased through the blood of soldiers.

[max velocity]

So, the So What?

Re: "CQB" "black art tactics" (sarcasm), neither the police nor the military do, would, or should, use them when there are actual armed and ready bad guys inside a structure.

So: I am getting a consensus that CQB room entry and clearing drills are best utilized simply to confirm that a room(s) is/are clear, with the potential for bad guys in there but not really considered high threat. Unless as pointed out you are Tier 1 DA and have no choice, but are super high speed anyway.

So: infantry need to be trained for high intensity MOUT/OBUA "just in case" or indeed as we always say, in order to train for the worst case: "train hard fight easy". But in reality we will seek alternative means within the rules of engagement to destroy or neutralize enemy combatants prior to "clearing" those structures. We want to avoid dynamic building and room entry in high intensity conflict where the bad guys are alive and tip top inside there, if we can. And if we do go in, and we dont have a tank gun or thermobaric weapon in direct support, we would rather go in through the roof or a mousehole or some such alternative to the front door.

Interestingly, when buildings are damaged and we include tunnels, rat runs etc, then we can't really do the urban specific "CQB" SME room entry drills, because rooms/buildings have been rearranged by fire. So, then it becomes close combat or "non-SME taught" CQB which comes full circle back to my original point: if urban room clearing type CQB is the totality of all CQB, or whether other close combat is CQB also, with urban CQB being simply a specific sub-set.

We also need to think seriously about getting back to a point where we train infantry to do the real high intensity breach and room/building clearance drills, rather than the current norm "SWAT type", as laid out in publications such as the small unit tactics smart book (US). I recall that BritMil had a battalion in Berlin during the cold war the exclusively trained in FIBUA high intensity tactics.

[Fuchs]

Since it was mentioned; let me point out that fighting in houses does not always equal "urban" operations, combat or anything else "urban".

urban
  Example Sentences Origin
ur·ban
   [ur-buhn]
adjective
1.
of, pertaining to, or designating a city or town.
2.
living in a city.
3.
characteristic of or accustomed to cities; citified: He is an urban type.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/urban?s=t

rural
  Example Sentences Origin
ru·ral
   [roor-uhl]
adjective
1.
of, pertaining to, or characteristic of the country, country life, or country people; rustic: rural tranquillity.
2.
living in the country: the rural population.
3.
of or pertaining to agriculture: rural economy.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/rural


A couple houses close to each other is not an urban environment, it's usually a rural one. Hence no "urban" operation, and hence all MOUT training centres should be known as rural village training centres.


I wrote this because I am convinced that there are numerous important tactical differences between combat in/at a village and combat in a town or city.

[JMA]

Since it was mentioned; let me point out that fighting in houses does not always equal "urban" operations, combat or anything else "urban".

A couple houses close to each other is not an urban environment, it's usually a rural one. Hence no "urban" operation, and hence all MOUT training centres should be known as rural village training centres.

I wrote this because I am convinced that there are numerous important tactical differences between combat in/at a village and combat in a town or city.

Well yes... but CQB is not defined by terrain but rather by the word "close" meaning on the other side of a six inch brick wall or on the other side of a bush both by day or night. CQB is not a purely urban phenomenon.