North Korea: 2012-2016

[Dayuhan]

Everything below is my opinion. Just imagine the IMOs in every paragraph.

You can - and probably will - play with the definition of "fix" but the fact remains that without the support of China NK would fold in a matter of weeks/months.

Fuchs introduced the term "fix" (post #34), and I cannot say with certainty what he meant by it. I would guess that anyone proposing to "fix" the DPRK believes that the the Kim dynasty should either be removed or persuaded/compelled to adopt policies deemed suitable by whoever is doing the fixing. Not saying there can't be another interpretation, but I can't think of one at the moment.

Loss of Chinese support would certainly be a major blow to the Kim dynasty. Whether or not they would fold, and when, is of course uncertain. I suspect they'd hang in longer than you think. That's largely an academic concern, though, because the Chinese policy of not allowing the regime to fall has been a constant for decades. It does not look likely to change any time soon, and it's very doubtful that any outside influence will change it.

It's often supposed by those who haven't been watching the peninsula for long that because China is the DPRK's sole ally and supporter, the DPRK is therefore totally subservient to China and must do whatever the Chinese tell it to do. This has not actually been the case: the Kims have not always followed instructions, and cannot be relied on to do what the Chinese want. They can do this because they know that preserving the dynasty has a central place in Chinese policy and they believe that the policy will continue even if they do not always follow the Chinese playbook.

That could of course change: the Chinese could reassess their policy of keeping the Kim dynasty in power, or the dynasty could push Chinese patience to the point where the policy is abandoned, or some combination of the two could occur. While these things could happen, it's not likely that any outside power can make them happen. So far the Chinese have shown no indication that this policy is likely to change, and the Kims have been fairly astute in their assessment of what they can get away with.

While the Chinese could probably sink or totally cripple the Kim dynasty, they have a clear and long-standing policy of preventing that. They don't want the dynasty to fall. While the Chinese could in theory use the threat of sinking or crippling the regime to compel whatever policy changes the Chinese might think desirable, that threat is largely blunted by that same policy: the DPRK regime does not believe the threat will be carried out. I do not believe the Kims will adopt any policy they see as a serious threat to their absolute dominance even if the Chinese tell them to.

I would be interested to hear why a stable North Korea closely allied to China would not be in the Chinese interest? Want to take a shot at that?

The question is not whether that outcome is desirable, but whether it can be achieved. If the DPRK goes out of control, nobody anywhere will be able to predict the outcome with any certainty, and there's a very good chance that a stable North Korea closely allied to China would not be the outcome. The existing order is not exactly stable, but neither is it completely out of hand. It is not controlled, but neither is it completely beyond influence or allied to China's actual or potential antagonists. If that order is disrupted anything could happen, the outcome would be beyond prediction or control and could easily be much worse for the Chinese.

So far the Chinese seem to feel that sustaining the existing order, whatever its deficiencies and irritants, is preferable to the risk involved in trying to disrupt that order. That may of course change, if the Chinese decide that it should. I do not think any outside power has the capacity to significantly affect that decision.

As to your rather interesting comment that it all hinges on the NK armed forces I would ask you how long do you think they would last - as an effective force - if they were to be deprived of pay, food, winter clothing, fuel, weapons, ammunition?

They're not at war in any active sense, so they could probably last until they could no longer squeeze their needs out of the populace. if pressed too far, they might dispose of the regime and take over themselves... again, the Chinese are unlikely to push to that point, because of the consistent policy previously referred to.

I've been on the receiving end of this sort of "influence" and know that no matter how strong the spirit is - which actually strengthens in the face of such adversity - such deprivation will reduce the armed forces to a mere shell... they will probably stick together only for self preservation but will have no ability for any significant military action other than perhaps a spirited last stand (a la Gen Custer).

Any nation or armed force that allows itself to depend on an outside power for its sustenance is asking for that kind of pressure, but it's not likely that the DPRK armed forces will face it any time soon. Since they are not actively engaged in combat, what need do they have for significant military action? Even if the Chinese were putting the squeeze on to try to compel some policy change, the squeeze would come off if the DPRK were under attack... unless of course you're hypothesizing an attack by the Chinese, a very farfetched scenario.

In short: Chinese policy to date has been based on preventing either war or regime collapse. That policy could change, but it cannot be changed at the instigation of any imaginable "us" and there's no sign that it's likely to change any time soon. While other powers should watch out for and be prepared for potential Chinese policy changes, the most likely eventuality, and the scenario on which primary plans are based, should be that Chinese policy is likely to remain pretty much as is for the near to medium term.