It will fall into chaos as a result of renewed famine and poverty, resulting in military crackdowns.
There will be a military coup that displaces the current leadership, hopefully soon.
It will continue to remain a closed society, technologically dormant and otherwise insignificant.
The leadership will eventually make a misstep, forcing military action from the United States.
That's because we were discussing how big brother could pursue his interests. The discussion hasn't been about North Korean people's interests.Originally Posted by max161
...and South Koreans visiting reunified Germany haven't exactly expressed their enthusiasm for Korean unification.they are prepared to allow South Korea to shoulder the burden of Korean Reunification following war or collapse. They do not want the burden of a collapsed north Korea
Mr. Fuchs,
I would respectfully submit that the considerations of the Korean people (north and South) are pretty important in the equation for analyzing how to achieve one's interests.
I think the Ministry of Reunification in the ROK might have a different view than your sample size of Koreans visiting Germany. Sure the South Korean people are conflicted and even more so because President Lee has been very vocal in discussing the reality of potential costs and even put forth a proposal for a reunification tax to save money for the enormous costs. But I would submit that there will be no long term solution to the Korea problem until reunification can be achieved. And I think German and Korean reunification will be nearly an apples and oranges comparison - there are a lot of lessons to be applied but the conditions that exist on the Peninsula are vastly different between Korea and Germany.
David S. Maxwell
"Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence
I would be surprised if not, bureaucratic self-interest is quite universally strong.
They might build a Ministry of Non-Reunification next to it and the people there would be fierce about their bureaucratic self-interest (and survival) as well.
Mr. Fuchs,
I will ask the Minister of Unification when I attend a meeting with him in two weeks when he is here visiting the states.
David S. Maxwell
"Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence
I received this important comment (and very succinct analysis) in response to the article below from a Korea Hand which should be studied by anyone who wants to understand north Korea. He is one of the most well qualified to make this statement particularly because he is fluent in Korean and has extensive experience communicating face to face with north Koreans as well as reading north Korean primary source documents so when he gives us the north Korean translation and differentiates between policy and politics we should pay attention. I am personally guilty of using military-first policy when it should be military first politics. I will pay more attention to my "kiyosunim" (most learned professor).
September 5, 2012This treatment of outsiders trying to invest is nothing new...it is consistent with past practices for the last 30 years under Kim Jong-il influence. Hatred of foreigners and encouragement and reward for xenophobia has been a very successful tool for Kim Jong-il's rule. Chinese reforms always started with decentralization, giving local administrators a chance to develop as they could as long as they were loyal to the party. Nothing of the kind is possible in the NK political system where centralization is absolute and reward for rejecting all outside influence is one of the keys to leadership. Songun chongchi does not mean "military-first policy." It means "military-first politics" and the Kim Regime has never, ever, used the term military-first policy – songun chongchaek. That is an international media misrepresentation that our government has adopted. However, there has been a defacto military first policy since 1964 with the introduction of the four military lines. And military-first means everything outside NK is the enemy...everything. .. because the regime’s strategy is to project everything is the enemy except the regime. Half of its own people are projected as the enemy.
North Korea Launches Barbed Attack on Chinese Investor
By REUTERS
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2012/...gewanted=print
Last edited by davidbfpo; 09-05-2012 at 05:46 PM. Reason: Fix quote
David S. Maxwell
"Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence
I would also offer this for those who want to understand more about north Korea. Andrei Lankov (truth in lending I have known him for many years) was a Soviet Citizen who studied in Pyongyang, is fluent in Korea and then later defected to Australia and is now a professor in South Korea. He is one of the biggest advocates for getting information into north Korea.
This excerpt is why I am skeptical of north Korean reforms. But if they really do attempt reforms we (the Alliance South Korea in the lead with US in support) absolutely need to be preparing for regime collapse. We need to be aware of the potential fallout from reforms because as much as we want them to reform, open up, and change, those reforms might not lead to the change we want to believe in:
And the real question is whether Kim Jong-un can find a balance among the north Korean "trinity" (fear, economic reforms and propaganda):This is a recipe for discontent and even a revolution, somewhat similar to the recent events in Tunisia or the events of 1989 in Romania and East Germany.
I am not optimistic that they can find balance other than one weighted most heavily on fear, secondarily on propaganda to reinforce that fear (and control), and only cosmetic economic reforms.Alas, a North Korea in the throes of reform would not become immediately more stable but would become less stable than the ossified state of the Kim Jong Il era. It is possible, though unlikely, that the regime would find a balance of fear, economic incentives and propaganda that would allow it to keep the populace under control.
The risk in reforming North Korea
By Andrei Lankov, Published: September 4
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinio...430_print.html
Last edited by davidbfpo; 09-05-2012 at 05:48 PM. Reason: Fix quotes
David S. Maxwell
"Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence
Posted by max161
Each thread tends to start with a slice of a larger problem and then expands from there. Fuchs opened this thread focusing on the North Korean military and questioned its ability to be a viable threat. Accordingly the the discussion initially focused on how to deal with the potential threat. Reunification is an interesting topic, but first I want to touch upon your cherry picking of experts.The other point is we continue to talk about the Korean Problem with little regard for Korea. Again, many of the comments in this string are seemingly made in the spirit of big brother knowing how to solve all and again with little understanding of Korean culture, politics, tradition, history (and emotions)of the Korean people. I cannot emphasize enough how many of these comments sound just like discussions of Afghanistan by those who knew nothing of the culture, politics, tradition history (and emotions) of the Afghan people. And we see how things have turned out for us in Afghanistan.
Admittedly there is little discussion on the ROK view since like ours it is inconsistent and divided among party lines. Like many you seem to assume reunification is going to happen, but there are others who also claim some expertise in the region that disagree with that assessment. They see no sign whatsoever that the DPRK is going to collapse (as we have been hearing for over the past 20 years) and believe two separate Koreas is in the best interests of most concerned. Maybe it will, maybe it won't, but the larger point is relying on those we label as experts can actually impede gaining understanding of the situation, because those we label experts tend to have strong views on a topic that are hard to sway even when emergent facts call their views into question.
This reliance on cherry picked experts has resulted in bad policies in the past when we later learn that the experts were wrong. I recall one school of experts on Iraq telling us the Iraqi people would embrace democracy and that there was no ethnic tensions in the country, while another school of experts called the shots accurately. Everyone is qualified to evaluate the available evidence and question the experts. Expert views should be sought out, but not blindly accepted. All experts have one key shortcoming which is they're human and have biases that skew their best efforts to be completely intellectually honest.
Obviously many, if not most, Koreans in the North and South want to reunite the Koreas, but of course have different views on what a united Korea should look like. Putting that to the side for a minute, I wonder what nations (I hope the U.S. is) are thinking a reunified Korea will mean to the region and the world? Would two the world's largest militaries united into one under one the world's strongest economies lead to greater regional stability or instability? How would Japan feel about it? Would China or the U.S. have more or equal influence with a united Korea? If the U.S. pulled it troops out of Korea after reunification how would that our ability to deter hostilities in the region? If the Koreas united, would there be a justification for a large ground force in East Asia? Of course most of these questions can't be answered factually until after events unfold, but we can only offer opinions on what we think will happen and what will be in our interests. East Asia with a unified Korea would require a new security paradigm for all concerned.
Bill,
If you read my work you might see that I cite experts from across the spectrum (even Bruce Cumings who claimed for many years that the US started the Korean War) to include north Koreans. I am expressing my opinions based on my years of analysis and I have linked a cross section of the body of work I have produced over the years. I stand by my research and scholarship and I offer it to the forum for discussion. I will be happy to discuss anything but if you think I am cherry picking experts I would recommend you read my work. I thought the forum would benefit from two current open source articles that seem relevant to the discussion with some commentary and analysis but if you think that is cherry picking then my sincere apologies.
V/R
Dave
David S. Maxwell
"Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence
No one is talking about the elephant in the room
David and others,
Your comment:this would fit many other topical threads where the exchange goes in completely unpredictable directions and prefers to take an understandably remote view, invariably from within the USA. Some threads raise issues that are uncomfortable, even if some "top brass" read SWC & SWJ that does not mean posting is protected. Even more so as national elections loom.I am mystified that no one is talking about the elephant in the room which is of course Korean Reunification.
There is one SWC thread for example that has had a significant local "boots on the ground" input, where the USA has little knowledge. I refer to Kingjaja on the Nigeria thread.
Perhaps you can help by getting a Korean aboard to add their views?
davidbfpo
I remain unconvinced that a proactive effort to "fix" the DPRK or induce someone else to do so is in big brother's interest, whoever big brother happens to be. Rocking that boat could go all kinds of unpredictable places, many of them not in anyone's interest.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
That's fine too.
.
Your permission is noted and appreciated.
Have you read any of the material David Maxwell linked to? It provides an excellent starting point for informed discussion. Having watched the peninsula for many years without having actually studied it I found them an excellent way to fill in gaps in my own observations.
As a starting point I'd suggest this one for being quite recent:
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/6891151/FINA...%20Maxwell.pdf
and this one for being more comprehensive:
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/6891151/FINA...gy%20Paper.pdf
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
Posted by max161
Dave,If you read my work you might see that I cite experts from across the spectrum (even Bruce Cumings who claimed for many years that the US started the Korean War) to include north Koreans. I am expressing my opinions based on my years of analysis and I have linked a cross section of the body of work I have produced over the years. I stand by my research and scholarship and I offer it to the forum for discussion. I will be happy to discuss anything but if you think I am cherry picking experts I would recommend you read my work. I thought the forum would benefit from two current open source articles that seem relevant to the discussion with some commentary and analysis but if you think that is cherry picking then my sincere apologies.
I will read each paper over the next couple of days, and I suspect I have read a couple already, but will double check each link. I'm not faulting your work, my point addresses the larger issue of labeling someone an expert and then blindly following them instead of engaging in critical thinking. We have done that for the past 10 years with the current fight we're in.
In this thread I do think you and Dayuhan are to quick to dismiss ideas that don't fit your paradigm. Dismissing them is one thing, saying it isn't possible is another. A lot of potentialties are possible over time and I don't think anyone on this thread is talking about potential changes within the next year or so.
I like Dayuhan's term of "informed opinion" versus expert. To be clear I agree with most of your points, but I'll still challenge them (to drive exposure of the underlying logic). I do it to myself, so no one else gets a buy either. One opinion I'm sitting on the fence is that reunification is destiny. I'm also not convinced it would be a thing for regional security over time. I like the Koreans also, but they're not exactly a peace loving people.
Bill,
I do not think I have suggested blindly following any so-called expert. I think I have suggested throughout my comments that we need to study the situation on the Peninsula and that many of the comments seem to suggest similar thinking that we have done over the last decade in regards to Afghanistan and Iraq in which we have not sought to understand the nature of the problem and the history and culture of the people and countries involved. Most of the discussion as been US and western centric and I have tried to try to provide some views from the Korean and Chinese perspectives.
I think you and I are in violent agreement that critical thinking is required and I have tried to provide some of my critical thinking that I have done over the years. And I have never considered myself an expert on Korea but a student of the Korean problem trying to learn about and understand the nature of the problem and suggest some alternative strategies for dealing with those problems.
Dave
David S. Maxwell
"Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence
No I haven't and not about to now... maybe over the weekend.
It would be interesting to hear from you a little more on this previous statement of yours:
You can - and probably will - play with the definition of "fix" but the fact remains that without the support of China NK would fold in a matter of weeks/months.... even if China was "the key", that would get us nowhere, because the Chinese have no interest whatsoever in trying to "fix" the DPRK, and that's not something any outside influence is going to change.
I would be interested to hear why a stable North Korea closely allied to China would not be in the Chinese interest? Want to take a shot at that?
As to your rather interesting comment that it all hinges on the NK armed forces I would ask you how long do you think they would last - as an effective force - if they were to be deprived of pay, food, winter clothing, fuel, weapons, ammunition?
I've been on the receiving end of this sort of "influence" and know that no matter how strong the spirit is - which actually strengthens in the face of such adversity - such deprivation will reduce the armed forces to a mere shell... they will probably stick together only for self preservation but will have no ability for any significant military action other than perhaps a spirited last stand (a la Gen Custer).
Please try to answer this yourself and not refer me to what Maxwell has written.
Dave,
I read all your articles except for “Beyond the Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy for the Korean Peninsula, April 2004” which I intend to get to. You were correct to be defensive towards my previous comments because you did a great job of including contrarian expert opinions in your informative articles. However, unless you’re misreading my comments, or I’m misreading yours, it seems we agree on more than we disagree on in regards to the Korea problem.
One assumption I question is that North Korea will execute the final option if faced with regime threatening internal instability. Granted I have no idea what North Korean leaders are actually thinking, but it seems to be a bit of a reach that they believe their military would be successful in uniting the peninsula. There is always a danger in applying western logic to an eastern problem, but it seems more probable that they would focus internally and ask China for a bailout package, which I believe would be in their interest to do so (cheaper than containing a failed state on their border.
It seems unlikely that there will be a citizen revolt if the KFR can retain control of its military, and the military is willing to use force against its citizens. The military would have to lead the rebellion, and do so they would need assurances of external support or believe that other military leaders would join in. That is hard to conceive how they would organize such a revolt in a hyper paranoid society where everyone is a state spy.
I found your proposed strategy to convince the KFR that it will survive as a means of deterring attack brilliant. That would provide needed time for longer term strategies involving information operations and economic engagement to erode KFR’s control to work. You pointed out that North Koreans are interfering with South Korean elections (seems to be a norm for other nations to interfere in elections, we have a long history of doing so in the past), and they want the party that supports the Sunshine policy to win. Obviously nK supports it, and while it may help nK achieve their objectives in the short term I suspect it would be more effective at undermining the regime over time than a harder stance.
In addition to these soft power approaches I agree with your suggestion that we should also take active measures such as sinking a couple of their submarines and then not taking credit for it in response to their sinking of the ROK frigate. It would send a clear message and if the attack wasn’t claimed it would give nK the option of not responding to maintain their legitimacy.
I still think we (the global community) should put more pressure on the KFR for their massive human rights violations. Currently outside of a relatively few nK watchers these atrocities get little fanfare compared to say Sudan, so the North Koreans are given a lot of freedom from world opinion to continue these abuses unabated. Instead of us coming across as a power for the betterment of the human race, we instead focus on telling nK they can’t have nukes, which paints us as a hegemonic power telling other states what they can and can’t do. World opinion may or may not mitigate their behavior, but we won’t find out unless we try. World opinion won’t change KFR’s ethics, but I suspect it will cause them to question the value of continuing to conduct such activities if they feel other nations are being pressured by their populations to take some sort of action against North Korea. Of course the situation in Syria and elsewhere calls that assumption into question.
While not making the WMD issue, we should do everything possible using all element of DIME to curtail their WMD programs, but focusing solely on WMD is like declaring war on terror, war on drugs, and war on IEDs. Many greats successes have been made in all these efforts at the tactical level, yet drug trade remains very profitable, IED attacks are proliferating at an ever greater rate, and of course terrorism will persist. We need a strategy that addresses the problem not a symptom of the problem, and that is what you’re advocating.
Everything below is my opinion. Just imagine the IMOs in every paragraph.
Fuchs introduced the term "fix" (post #34), and I cannot say with certainty what he meant by it. I would guess that anyone proposing to "fix" the DPRK believes that the the Kim dynasty should either be removed or persuaded/compelled to adopt policies deemed suitable by whoever is doing the fixing. Not saying there can't be another interpretation, but I can't think of one at the moment.
Loss of Chinese support would certainly be a major blow to the Kim dynasty. Whether or not they would fold, and when, is of course uncertain. I suspect they'd hang in longer than you think. That's largely an academic concern, though, because the Chinese policy of not allowing the regime to fall has been a constant for decades. It does not look likely to change any time soon, and it's very doubtful that any outside influence will change it.
It's often supposed by those who haven't been watching the peninsula for long that because China is the DPRK's sole ally and supporter, the DPRK is therefore totally subservient to China and must do whatever the Chinese tell it to do. This has not actually been the case: the Kims have not always followed instructions, and cannot be relied on to do what the Chinese want. They can do this because they know that preserving the dynasty has a central place in Chinese policy and they believe that the policy will continue even if they do not always follow the Chinese playbook.
That could of course change: the Chinese could reassess their policy of keeping the Kim dynasty in power, or the dynasty could push Chinese patience to the point where the policy is abandoned, or some combination of the two could occur. While these things could happen, it's not likely that any outside power can make them happen. So far the Chinese have shown no indication that this policy is likely to change, and the Kims have been fairly astute in their assessment of what they can get away with.
While the Chinese could probably sink or totally cripple the Kim dynasty, they have a clear and long-standing policy of preventing that. They don't want the dynasty to fall. While the Chinese could in theory use the threat of sinking or crippling the regime to compel whatever policy changes the Chinese might think desirable, that threat is largely blunted by that same policy: the DPRK regime does not believe the threat will be carried out. I do not believe the Kims will adopt any policy they see as a serious threat to their absolute dominance even if the Chinese tell them to.
The question is not whether that outcome is desirable, but whether it can be achieved. If the DPRK goes out of control, nobody anywhere will be able to predict the outcome with any certainty, and there's a very good chance that a stable North Korea closely allied to China would not be the outcome. The existing order is not exactly stable, but neither is it completely out of hand. It is not controlled, but neither is it completely beyond influence or allied to China's actual or potential antagonists. If that order is disrupted anything could happen, the outcome would be beyond prediction or control and could easily be much worse for the Chinese.
So far the Chinese seem to feel that sustaining the existing order, whatever its deficiencies and irritants, is preferable to the risk involved in trying to disrupt that order. That may of course change, if the Chinese decide that it should. I do not think any outside power has the capacity to significantly affect that decision.
They're not at war in any active sense, so they could probably last until they could no longer squeeze their needs out of the populace. if pressed too far, they might dispose of the regime and take over themselves... again, the Chinese are unlikely to push to that point, because of the consistent policy previously referred to.
Any nation or armed force that allows itself to depend on an outside power for its sustenance is asking for that kind of pressure, but it's not likely that the DPRK armed forces will face it any time soon. Since they are not actively engaged in combat, what need do they have for significant military action? Even if the Chinese were putting the squeeze on to try to compel some policy change, the squeeze would come off if the DPRK were under attack... unless of course you're hypothesizing an attack by the Chinese, a very farfetched scenario.
In short: Chinese policy to date has been based on preventing either war or regime collapse. That policy could change, but it cannot be changed at the instigation of any imaginable "us" and there's no sign that it's likely to change any time soon. While other powers should watch out for and be prepared for potential Chinese policy changes, the most likely eventuality, and the scenario on which primary plans are based, should be that Chinese policy is likely to remain pretty much as is for the near to medium term.
Last edited by Dayuhan; 09-06-2012 at 12:55 PM.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
Yes, the whole idea of "fixing" North Korea is very vague. I would like to understand what this actually means in terms of an end state. Only then can we really examine whether China possesses the capability to bring about that end state and, if so, whether the US and Western Powers possess the capability to compel China to act.
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks