Quote Originally Posted by selil View Post
Steve you have something there

The discussions of COIN or NO-COIN aren't an issue in the Marines nor is the concept of doctrinal documents. I think the difference in this case between the Marines and the Army is that in the Marines they think/train (any Marine, any mission, any location), whereas the Army specializes in silos of missions or skills. I know that there are contrary examples but I think it is part of the Army culture.

Look at how people identify themselves here on SWC. They are Armor, they are Intel, they are logistics, and they may have been other things but their current occupation is denoted by their skill set.

It is a fundamental part of the Marine psyche that every Marine is a rifleman, and every other job after that is dessert. The only place I've ever seen strife bent around mission was with an Air Wing (El Toro to be exact), and my Battalion Commander reminded a pilot flying CAS that when he lands he's a rifleman too (it was really a joke more than a censure).

Perhaps that is why Gian Gentile sees the conflict with COIN encumbering his Army rather than expanding his role (no disrespect meant Col. Gentile). I'd defer to people much more aware of the roles and culture, but institutionalized silos of concern would create the inter disciplinary strife we see exhibited. MarcT could discuss the organizational issues much better than I.
One reason I find it so interesting, Sam, is that it's been such a constant in the Army as an institution. Even going back to the period before the Civil War we find the Army training (when it could...considering that almost 3/4ths of the authorized strength was scattered at small posts throughout the expanding Frontier) for line-against-line Napoleonic conflict. The majority of the skills the troops needed for Indian warfare were learned in the field, while training still focused on European-style warfare. There was no formal effort to retain lessons learned (the majority of what we might now consider doctrinal information came out either in journal articles or privately-published books), and even some moaning about how the constant small-scale warfare detracted from the real business of training men to be soldiers.

It's an interesting situation...and one that doesn't seem to be going away any time soon. That's why I see many more similarities between Vietnam and Iraq on the institutional response side than I do in the field.