General Petraeus recalled...
I know the implication is tied to COIN as a type of qualifier for the decision to bring GEN Petraeus back to CONUS to guide the board’s deliberations, but I’d like to offer up that while the general media uses COIN much in the way it uses “surge”, I’d offer that this board’s importance is less about picking guys with “exact” knowledge of counter-insurgency, but is more about selecting 06s for GO rank who have proven they possess an agile mind and can recognize changes and possibilities and can adapt quickly to deny the enemy options while exploiting opportunities which will gain and retain the initiative on the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.
I saw where USA MG (Retired) Robert Scales had offered up why this is so important. I have turned to his writing many times because he has thought and written on leadership a great deal, and has so much experience in leadership – and I think he has the crux of it.
Past and current performance offer a window into potential for increased responsibility and authority commensurate to promotion to a higher rank – what GEN Petraeus offers is the perspective of a leader who has proven in every assignment he’s been assigned that he has the qualities required to operate and lead across the full spectrum of operations as defined by FM 3-0 and win.
As a relatively junior field grade what I propose we want from our GOs is agile and adaptive leadership commensurate with the responsibility and authority found in the positions held by GOs under whatever conditions and operational themes the mission commits us to – be they Peacetime Military Engagement, Limited Intervention, Peace Operations, Irregular Warfare, or Major Combat Operations.
The General Officers selected are going to have their hands full – from leading our soldiers in combat today, to anticipating the demands of tomorrow, to educating and informing our political leadership on the best ways to develop, sustain and employ military force where it is required to achieve a political objective – and the risks of doing so. While being grounded in their tactical experiences – they must be thinking on the operational and strategic levels – able to articulate nuances to provide context, while being able to see the inter-relationships and consequences.
I think we must give the board the benefit of understanding that while COIN may be the theme we’ve picked up on, the requirements of ensuring we have the best GOs (and leaders) are deeper and more subjective. The 06s we’ve identified in the original blog and related articles are more then just good COIN officers, they are leaders who have demonstrated that they can identify a problem and think creatively about it, and will resource the means to overcome it. They are full spectrum officers with agile and adaptive minds, and they have sparked creativity in organizations they have been a part of, and inspired the larger community by their ideas and communication skills.
Best Regards, Rob
LOL--we need to have a long talk about General Scales some time.Originally Posted by Rob Thornton
No question, though, that a war rages between the "big" Army and the "irregular" Army. The use of Petraeus on a promotion board shows that Gates is as interested in shaping this as was his predecessor (what was his name?), but is doing it in a more subtle, less in-your-face, fashion.
You know – I’ve never met the retired general – but I have read much of what he’s written over the last few years. I was introduced to his writings by two officers who have influenced me greatly, and who I hold in high esteem. Scales’ writings strike me as being from somebody who has reflected on what they have done, and what they might have done – and also as to how we might do them better. When others were focused on defining “transformation” as being hardware related – the pieces I see from him always seem to put leadership and people first – even when as an advocate for FCS as the Army’s major acquisition, he wrote from the point of enabling agile and adaptive leaders.
This is one reason I think we must select leaders for their potential to visualize and anticipate the problems and possibilities that seem to elude others; and to promote those who have the courage and genius to address and take advantage of things that others less inclined, or less capable might overlook or ignore in favor of something which espouses low personal risk.
This is my opinion is what is significant about bringing GEN Petraeus back – it is not so much what the board will look at, but how they will look at it – how the board will weigh “potential” based on who the candidates are, and how their actions have defined them. This is at least a chance at recasting ourselves to look forward instead of over our shoulder.
Best, Rob
Sorry for digging out this thread, but I have a question regarding how Gen. Petraeus can influence this promotion board's decisions and, ultimately, GO selection process. I've been until now unable to find accurate and up-to-date information about this process and still don't know if, as a Chairman, Gen Petraeus has a real opportunity to change things by promoting great COIN practitioners, or if he can only put names on a list which has to be confirmed by other board members/service/office, willing or not to promote the same kind of officers.
Please, any information would be extremely welcome. Thanks a lot in advance for any help you could provide.
Best,
CB
Last edited by CB; 12-11-2007 at 12:09 PM. Reason: misspelling
Is this what we really want? Is this good for the Army?
A Coin Cabal? There certainly are some indicators that that is what our Army has become. Consider the elevation of relatively lower ranking officers who are members of this Cabal to rock-star status.
We think with these latest moves that Yingling's recommendations are being adopted. However, I see these moves as reinforcing what Yingling railed against in his important piece: a crony dominated system of officer promotions. That may be an extreme view but we should at least look at these latest developments with trepadation and caution before we start falling all over ourselves with high-fives and self-congratulations.
gentile
What alternative would you propose? A renewed emphasis on conventional maneuver warfare?
And, I'm just asking--this is not a leading question. I'm not an advocate of "all COIN, all the time." I think we're preparing to fight the last war. I'm not sure what the appropriate future course is.
Well, it wasn't really my point but yes, I believe creating career paths for successful COIN experts is a good thing for the Army. That doesn't mean promoting only COIN experts, of course, but creating a diversified officer corps able to handle both stabilization & COIN ops and waging conventional war. Just look at the kind of conflicts in which the US Army has been involved in the past; couldn't such a change in officer promotion policy have helped the US Army to be better prepared to the kind of missions it would have to face, either in Lebanon, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. ?
And this is different from the airborne mafia, armor community, etc., in what real way? It's always cronyism when it's a group that someone happens to disagree with, but forward thinking if it's a group that happens to meet someone's agenda objectives. Just an observation that we've seen this before and seem stunningly incapable of learning from previous bureaucratic mistakes.
Steve, I agree that the Army's looking to fight the last war again, but it seems that they're always either doing that or fixating on the war that they WANT to fight (here I refer to doctrinal development after the Civil War and, to a degree, the post-Vietnam period). I'm honestly not sure that the institution is capable of preparing for a variety of threats or even meaningfully thinking about those multiple threats. It's all "either/or."
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Here's the distinction I would draw...
I don't think there is any value in promoting any officer who believes that COIN is the Holy Grail -- same would apply to the unquestioning belief in any doctrine of warfare. However, I do think that there is something particularly challenging about the Iraqi and Afghani battlefields. For an armed force steeped in a firepower intensive model of conventional warfare, the ability of an officer to adapt to the more nuanced situation in which the question is not how to kill the guy, but instead whether to kill or befriend the guy, suggests qualities that might be useful for executive leadership. And these are the very officers who are going to have more than one trick in their repertoire, who can both fight and nurture as necessary, and who will best serve the institution in any form war will take while they're at the helm.
However, I don't think that you need Gen. Petraeus to participate in order to find those people.
Cheers,
Jill
Promotion Boards
CB: Depsite all the hype that GEN Petraeus was sent back to choose the next BG's in his (COIN) image it just does not work like that. Promotion boards are run by strict adherence to the regulations. For example none of the board members can discuss anything among themselves. There is no debate. Files are read and each board member makes his vote. Voting discrepancies that are too large among voting members require a revote. Questions as to specific officer qualifications in terms of professional development are addressed to the board recorders who find the answers through the DA Secretariat which administers the board. The bottom line is that all promotion board members make blind votes and are sworn to follow the rules of the board (which includes no discussion of officers considered for selection nor revealing results of the board). The bottom line is that there is way that the president of the board can influence the outcome during the board proceedings. That does not mean that prior politicking does not take place but the promotion boards are not a smoke filled room where the members debate who should be promoted (or blackballed). The Army (and all the services) have gone to great lengths to ensure that promotion boards are as fair as possible in a system that is based on human subjectivity.
Dave
David S. Maxwell
"Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence
Sounds like tenure.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
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All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
A few years ago someone did a quantative analysis of promotions to try and figure out what qualification was the best predictor of whether a given officer would be promoted or not. Wanna know which one was the most accurate in predicting? Having a square jaw in the official photo. Hence we sometimes get CAT 4 generals.
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