General Petraeus: collection

[Eden]

Why should he publicly weigh in? Do we really need every 4-star in the chain of command joining the public debate before senior leadership has clearly articulated our strategy?

It seems like it's probably more a unity of command issue. The war is in the capable hands of GEN McChrystal; what is the benefit of CENTCOM publicly contradicting anything coming from either CJCS or theater?

That's sort of my point. McChrystal works for Petraeus - technically - at least when he's not wearing his NATO hat. And Petraeus is the strategic commander, while McChrystal is working at the operational level. If anybody should be articulating the military strategy for Afghanistan, it should be Petraeus. It's as if Omar Bradley was spokesman for our strategy to beat the Nazis in 1944.

I mean, Petraeus was front man for the Surge in Iraq. By most accounts he performed well in that role. Has he been cut out of the picture because the current administration wants McChrystal to be the poster child for Afghan strategy? Or because he is too closely associated in the public mind with Iraq and/or the Bush administration? Or because we've completely lost the bubble on the difference between strategy, operations, and tactics? Or because he doesn't fully agree with the proposed solutions?

Really, I'm just curious, because it seems odd that he has fallen so completely off the radar scope.

[MikeF]

Really, I'm just curious, because it seems odd that he has fallen so completely off the radar scope.

Does Patraeus have a Facebook page yet? If so, we can ask him.

v/r

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

question.
Going back to Iraq, Petraeus "worked for" CENTCOM but really never did. When Fallon tried to impose the chain of command he was asked to retire. Today, Odierno works for Petraeus - probably more so than the latter worked for Fallon - but Petraeus is letting odierno run his show, at least in public.
Afghanistan is more complex. On the one hand CENTCOM is the higher HQ; on the other SACEUR. Managing the Petraeus - Stavridis relationship must be interesting to say the least. I'm not even going into the commander/ambassador relationship - we've done that before Suffice that Petraeus is consistent in his public treatment of his two "subordinates."
My personal view is that the UCP does not serve us well when we set up a 4 star command in a theater. The theater commander is operating above the operational level and is analogous to a GCC with political as well as military responsibilities. We should,I think, treat him as if he were a GCCand make all the GCCs supporting commanders. What we call it is less important than how we do it,

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

My personal view is that the UCP does not serve us well when we set up a 4 star command in a theater. The theater commander is operating above the operational level and is analogous to a GCC with political as well as military responsibilities. We should, I think, treat him as if he were a GCCand make all the GCCs supporting commanders. What we call it is less important than how we do it. (emphasis added / kw)

As you know, I'm not a Goldwater Nichols fan though I do acknowledge it did some things that needed doing. Just think like many US Laws, it overdid what it was trying to do.

That said, I despaired of ever getting it changed but your suggestion placed in bold is mindbogglingy brilliant -- and doable...

We can work out how to deal with the Stormin' Normans...

Hmm. Mayhap some Specified Commands as well...

[Eden]

My personal view is that the UCP does not serve us well when we set up a 4 star command in a theater. The theater commander is operating above the operational level and is analogous to a GCC with political as well as military responsibilities. We should,I think, treat him as if he were a GCCand make all the GCCs supporting commanders. What we call it is less important than how we do it,

Cheers

JohnT

I've seen it happen again and again. When a commander has to deal with two or three levels of war (strategy, operations, and tactics), he becomes less effective. Invariably, his attention and energy is drawn upward, and the lower levels suffer because of it. This is especially true in Afghanistan, a problem exacerbated by the dysfunctional C2 set-up. In the ideal world, McChrystal would be afforded some top-cover by the guy who is actually responsible for strategy within the region - which leads me to my original question posed at the start of the thread.

[Adrienne]

That's sort of my point. McChrystal works for Petraeus - technically - at least when he's not wearing his NATO hat. And Petraeus is the strategic commander, while McChrystal is working at the operational level. If anybody should be articulating the military strategy for Afghanistan, it should be Petraeus. It's as if Omar Bradley was spokesman for our strategy to beat the Nazis in 1944.

I mean, Petraeus was front man for the Surge in Iraq. By most accounts he performed well in that role. Has he been cut out of the picture because the current administration wants McChrystal to be the poster child for Afghan strategy? Or because he is too closely associated in the public mind with Iraq and/or the Bush administration? Or because we've completely lost the bubble on the difference between strategy, operations, and tactics? Or because he doesn't fully agree with the proposed solutions?

Really, I'm just curious, because it seems odd that he has fallen so completely off the radar scope.

The way I understand it, GEN McChrystal was directly tasked by the Pentagon/White House to prepare his report on the situation in Afghanistan. It went through CENTCOM then to the Pentagon, where his resource requests will be reviewed. I would imagine if there are any significant disagreements between Petraeus/McChrystal they're being worked out before anything is submitted.

I'm sure GEN Petraeus knows there is nothing to be gained by standing in the way of communications between the administration and its theater commander. It's been that way since at least 2007, when Bush stopped trusting what he was hearing from the Pentagon/Tampa and wanted to speak directly to the CG in Iraq. The theater commanders were essentially functioning as GCCs, with direct communications between Baghdad and the Pentagon/White House. When Admiral Fallon got involved it only complicated things, pissed everyone off and made it harder for Petraeus to do his job.

Add to that reports/rumors of tension with the Obama administration during its early days over Odierno and Petraeus's attempt to talk Obama out of the 16-month withdrawal plan for Iraq, and he's probably smart to keep his head down right now.

It's consistent with the way he's treating Iraq, as well. When is the last time you have seen him say anything about Iraq since the aforementioned discussions on withdrawal timelines? Exactly. He trusts his generals and recognizes there's nothing to be gained by taking a public role in these discusisons.

[Pol-Mil FSO]

From a bureaucratic perspective, I think one of GEN Petraeus' roles would be to provide support for GEN McChrystal when the latter has a policy difference with his civilian counterpart (Ambassador Eikenberry) that has to be kicked up to the next level. The CENTCOM Commander is the logical counterpart to SRAP Holbrooke although I sometimes think that it might even require CJCS or SecDef involvement if preparing for bureaucratic combat with Ambassador Holbrooke.

[John T. Fishel]

Got a couple of questions for you:
What authority was given to super ambassadors like Holbrooke and how was it given?
Do you know if the President has given clear authority to either Eikenberry or McChrystal in Afghanistan? (I doubt he has...)

Cheers

JohnT

[Pol-Mil FSO]

Dr. Fishel:

Ambassador Holbrooke is the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP). If asked the Special Representative of whom? I assume (although am not 100 percent sure) that the answer is the President of the United States. Regardless, it is clear to everyone that I have talked to at the State Department (and the NSC) that Ambassador Holbrooke is in charge of civilian decisionmaking regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan. As far as I know, the only persons that Ambassador Holbrooke answers to are Secretary Clinton and President Obama.

In the case of Afghanistan, I think there is an explicit line of authority from POTUS to Ambassador Eikenberry and to GEN McChrystal. As Chief of Mission, Ambassador Eikenberry has a direct line to the President (at least theoretically) as the President's representative to the Government of Afghanistan and has authority over all USG executive branch civilians in Afghanistan (except those directly assigned to CENTCOM). And when wearing his Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan hat GEN McChrystal's chain of command goes up through GEN Petraeus and Secretary Gates to POTUS.

What I find interesting is the new "Integrated Civilian-Military Decisionmaking Structure" in Afghanistan. This structure has five levels and at the top is the "Principals Group" which consists of two persons, Ambassador Eikenberry and GEN McChrystal. (This group seems to me to be an effort to institutionalize the relationship enjoyed by GEN Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker in Iraq.) In addition, the middle level of this structure is the "Regional Integrated Team" (IT-R). This IT-R now exists in RC-East and RC-South and consists of the ISAF Commander and the Senior Civilian Representative. I do not think that it has registered with a lot of people that the RC-East and RC-South Commanders now have civilian U.S. counterparts.

[John T. Fishel]

That is more or less what I expected at the top. But I find the Holbrooke - Eichenberry "relationship" confusing in theory because, in theory, it doesn't exist. In fact, personalities will drive it.

The institutionalization of the Petraeus/Crocker relationship by replicating the Washington interagency process strikes me as better than what we have had before but much less than it could be. (Back to that in a moment.) I'm glad to see that we have tried to develop coordination mechanisms below the level of Kabul. It should help providing the personalities don't get in the way. What I would really liketo see is a single chain of command in country - I really don't care much if the Ambassador or military commander is in charge but one of them should be. won't solve all problems - pesky personalities again - but if things got too bad the one in charge could send the other one home which might help.

Thanks again.

Cheers

JohnT