General Petraeus: collection

[carl]

More likely a Marine will be named, and he will continue the same focus, but with more emphasis in killing that element of the populace that feels greater afinity with the Taliban than with their own government;

Don't they try to limit the killing of elements of the population with great affinity for Taliban & company to those who shoot at us, plant bombs and send night letters-or have they loosened the rules of engagement lately?

[Bob's World]

Don't they try to limit the killing of elements of the population with great affinity for Taliban & company to those who shoot at us, plant bombs and send night letters-or have they loosened the rules of engagement lately?

They do try, but they are all afghan civilians. How much of one's populace must one kill, or have some foreign military kill on one's behalf in order to gain their support?

No nuance of ROE changes the nature of the combatants. All are civilians, and only a portion take up arms. Those with arms are the surface of the iceberg of those who share the same perspective but that take less agressive roles, or choose to wait and see. The problem with an ROE that focuses on blowing the top off of the iceberg is that it merely enables more of the iceberg to emerge, while adding ice to the water, making the base larger.

[carl]

How much of one's populace must one kill, or have some foreign military kill on one's behalf in order to gain their support?

Couldn't this question be turned around to apply to Taliban & company in that they often resort to savage terror to gain and maintain control of areas, there are a number of Pakistanis in their ranks and they are supported heavily by a foreign military (the Pak Army/ISI)?

[Bob's World]

Couldn't this question be turned around to apply to Taliban & company in that they often resort to savage terror to gain and maintain control of areas, there are a number of Pakistanis in their ranks and they are supported heavily by a foreign military (the Pak Army/ISI)?

Sounds like we are in the middle of a big messy family squabble, aren't we?

The Taliban do not have "clean hands" and no one here argues that they do. Nor does anyone argue that a border was drawn by white men that breaks the Pashtun populace into those who are "Afghan" and those who are "Pakistani" (much as if someone came and painted a line through the middle of your home and divided your family.) Neither of those lines mean much to the divided party.

Does Pakistan support the Taliban cause? Of course they do, it is in their interest to do so. Does the U.S. support the (formerly pro-Russian) Northern Alliance cause? Of course we do, it is in our interest to do so; or at least was in those heady days post 9/11.

But if this is about the interests of the people of Afghanistan perhaps we should take a more neutral role and promote solutions that serve the entire populace, not just the half we jumped in bed with (against the half we were in bed with when the Soviets were the occupiers).

US interests are best served by stability; and stability is best served by finding common ground and shared governance that represents the entire populace equitably. Sure in the past we have jumped on various sides of the problem to swing results to favor specific results we desired. Once to oust the Soviets, and against to oust AQ. Time to shift our efforts to become more centrist and equitable if it is truly stability that we seek.

Reasonable minds can differ of course, but this is how I see it.

[wm]

Reasonable minds can differ of course, but this is how I see it.

Not sure that my mind counts as reasonable, but I do differ, to some degree, with the following

US interests are best served by stability.

I think a more accurate assertion would be that nation states' interests in general, and those of the US in particular, are best served by predictability. Stability may well be one category of predictability, but I'm not so sure it is the only one. Some forms of instability are also predictable (like radioactive decay). A quiesant populace may appear to be stable, but that could be quite a distortion, as I think recent events in Egypt have pointed out. One would prefer to know,I think, whether a current level of stability (or instability) is likely to persist, and if so, for how long.

The US political process is predictable but it is rather far from stable, what with the potential turnover of significant portions of the governing elite at all levels every 2-6 years.

One optimizes one's interests by minimizing one's risks. The best way to minimize risk is to have a high level of certainty (that is, predictability) regarding future outcomes and consequences deriving from current actions.

[carl]

Sounds like we are in the middle of a big messy family squabble, aren't we?

No, it sounds more like we are in a violent civil war with lots of innocent people being killed, sometimes because they don't to do what some pathological teenager wants them to do fast enough or because a village mullah has decided he knows God's will better.

The Taliban do not have "clean hands" and no one here argues that they do. Nor does anyone argue that a border was drawn by white men that breaks the Pashtun populace into those who are "Afghan" and those who are "Pakistani" (much as if someone came and painted a line through the middle of your home and divided your family.) Neither of those lines mean much to the divided party.

The border is a reality that is recognized by both sides, grudgingly maybe on the Afghan side but it isn't seriously contested. I would guess the Pakistanis are rather more concerned about maintaining it as it is more than anybody.

The point of your Pashtun comment is to suggest that the Pakistanis aren't foreigners coming over to Afghanistan to kill locals on behalf of Taliban & company. From what I read, the Afghans know full well who is a Pakistani coming over to mess around in somebody else's neighborhood, not to mention various volunteers from over the ocean who show up from time to time.

You might want to change your "white men" reference to "europeans". My auntie was a missionary for decades in Pakistan. She was as fair skinned as the daughter of an Irishman could be. The Pakistanis always used to ask her if she was a Pathan.

Does Pakistan support the Taliban cause? Of course they do, it is in their interest to do so. Does the U.S. support the (formerly pro-Russian) Northern Alliance cause? Of course we do, it is in our interest to do so; or at least was in those heady days post 9/11.

But if this is about the interests of the people of Afghanistan perhaps we should take a more neutral role and promote solutions that serve the entire populace, not just the half we jumped in bed with (against the half we were in bed with when the Soviets were the occupiers).

You suggest "this" is about the interests of the Afghans. And you mention the Taliban & company's cause. That cause is from what I read an Islamist Afghanistan ruled by Kandaharis, not much evidence that it will be much different from what it was pre-2001. Most of the Afghans disliked that intensely and don't want it to come back.

You also say the Pak Army/ISI supports the cause of Taliban & company. Now, the Pak Army/ISI supports a cause which most Afghans view as inimical to their interests, and since you say we should promote solutions that serve the entire populace, shouldn't we therefore oppose the Pak Army/ISI's support for Taliban & company? This might possibly dovetail with our interests, since the Taliban was in charge of most of Afghanistan they hosted a group that killed 3,000 of our people and have never renounced that group.

In your parenthetical I think you are slanting things a bit. We, by deferring to the ISI, backed with most of the money the most religious muj groups. Gulbuddin and the boys comes to mind. And I believe Ismail Khan over there in Herat killed a lot of Russ. The Taliban doesn't like him at all. Also I might add that Massoud was the key leader in the Northern Alliance. He was not pro-Russian either judging by the number of their bodies he left on various battlefields. Not simple these things.

[Bob's World]

The "predictability" we carefully crafted over the past few generations in the Middle East arguably is the principal motivation for young men from a wide range of Muslim countries to act out violently against the US, but that on 9/11 or to travel to Iraq to fight us there, etc. A forced predictability sounds nice, but it comes with consequences.

As to stability, actually, as I think about it, I will clarify my position. It is not stability in Afghanistan that is important to the US, it is stability between Pakistan and India that is important to the US. That is arguably the biggest problem with our approach to Afghanistan, is that it has created a tremendous disruption of the uneasy stability that existed prior to our mucking around chasing terrorists.

Reconciliation that incorporates all Afghans equitably in the governance and opportunity of their country is best, but otherwise a homegrown solution that excludes either side is preferable to a US forced solution that excludes the Taliban side. A homegrown solution will achieve a stability that is maintained by that side; a US forced solution will require the US to keep it stable. Frankly, we have bigger fish to fry.

AQ is everywhere and nowhere, they can plan, organize and launch attacks from virtually anywhere. Events such as are occurring in Tunisia and Egypt, and rumbling in several other countries promises to rob AQ of much of the rationale that they have been able to leverage to motivate attacks on the US. Even if the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan and are willing to openly (which is highly unlikely) support AQ it will be a simple matter to launch strategic raids against such targets as they develop.

Bottom line is that there are people out there working to whip up a lot of very irrational fears; and as Churchill reminded a London populace being submitted to German terror attacks, "we have nothing to fear, but fear itself."

Our fears have launched us on some fools errands. Time to stop taking counsel of our fears and to start focusing on what is really important. Pak-India stability is important. An improved US-Iranian relationship is important. Getting our military re-postured so as to be a more effective deterrent of state activity that is counter to our interests is important. Defeating the Taliban or denying any particular piece of dirt to AQ? Not so much.

Others think similarly. George Friedman's "the Next Decade" takes a very similar stance for slightly different reasons. He does a good job of laying out the history of the geopolitics as well.

[Dayuhan]

The "predictability" we carefully crafted over the past few generations in the Middle East arguably is the principal motivation for young men from a wide range of Muslim countries to act out violently against the US, but that on 9/11 or to travel to Iraq to fight us there, etc.

The extent to which despotism is predictable is debatable: many despots (Saddam Hussein for one) have been less than predictable, and the time and manner of their inevitable fall is often less than predictable.

The extend to which "we crafted" the pattern of despotism in the Middle East is also highly debatable. Most of these governments were not installed by us and their form is dictated less by us than by local habit and tradition. We've been quite willing to deal with it (not that we could do anything about it in most cases) but "crafted by us" is a huge overstatement. I realize that some may perceive it that way, but managing a perception is very different from managing a reality. If we believe that the stats quo was "crafted by us" when in fact it was not, we are tempted to try to re-craft it to suit our current beliefs. That's a recipe for trouble.

The extent to which foreign fighters are trying to "act out" against US control in the homeland is highly debatable and not fully consistent with evidence. Foreign fighters are regularly recruited from countries such as Libya and Syria, where no US control or even influence exist. Foreign fighters are not limited to fights against the US: they have been very successfully recruited for fights against other powers that have no influence in home countries (the Soviet Union in Afghanistan). Evidence and Occam's razor suggest that the driver for foreign fighter recruitment is the simple "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" narrative, and that this is not US-specific or a reaction to US action in source countries.

This study of foreign foghter recruitment and motivations:

http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/...2/ISEC_a_00023

does not cite desire to diminish US influence in the homeland as a significant motivator.

It's dangerous and inappropriate to assume that the US is simply an innocent victim of terrorism and that evebts have nothing to do with our past. It is equally dangerous and inappropriate to assume that it's all about us, and that everything that happens is a reaction to something we did or are doing. Even where our history is a causative factor, we can't always correct it with assertive action: the antidote to dumb intervention isn't smart intervention, it's less intervention.

It's all to easy to assume that now we understand all the mistakes we made before, and now we can correct them because now we know what everybody wants and needs. Worth remembering that our conviction was every bit as strong back when we were making all those messes. hen you think you know what's best for others it's a good time to be think again and be very careful. When you know you know what's best for others it's a good time to lock yourself up until sanity returns.

Reconciliation that incorporates all Afghans equitably in the governance and opportunity of their country is best

Best for us, no doubt. Burt can we dictate - and impose - what we think is "best" for Afghanistan? What if the various Afghan factions don't trust each other, don't think joint governance sufficiently protects them, and don't trust the US to determine what's "best"?

but otherwise a homegrown solution that excludes either side is preferable to a US forced solution that excludes the Taliban side. A homegrown solution will achieve a stability that is maintained by that side

The last "homegrown solution" didn't work out all that well, certainly not for us. Why should we think the next will do better? Just because we aren't there doesn't mean a solution is "homegrown", either: the Pakistani Army and ISI will still be backing their chosen side.

Even if the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan and are willing to openly (which is highly unlikely) support AQ it will be a simple matter to launch strategic raids against such targets as they develop.

Didn't we try that before, with all that cruise missile drive-by shooting stuff? Did it accomplish the purpose? Will it if we do it again?

Our fears have launched us on some fools errands. Time to stop taking counsel of our fears and to start focusing on what is really important. Pak-India stability is important. An improved US-Iranian relationship is important. Getting our military re-postured so as to be a more effective deterrent of state activity that is counter to our interests is important. Defeating the Taliban or denying any particular piece of dirt to AQ? Not so much.

I agree. It wasn't just our fears, though, it was also our domestic need to translate punitive action into something benevolent, hence the efforts to "install" democracies in places where we have no business meddling in governance at all.

Unfortunately we have largely committed ourselves to a course we never should have taken. If you fire off an effective punitive raid and leave while you're on top and everyone fears you, you've accomplished a purpose and delivered a message: people will remember and be deterred. If you stay around until your vulnerabilities are clear and the other side is ascendant, leaving becomes defeat, and that delivers a message too. Unfortunately we selected goals that we haven't the capacity to achieve, and that makes failure, with all the perception-related baggage that goes with it, a very likely possibility. As far as I'm concerned we should never have tried to govern Afghanistan or to dictate how it will be governed, because these are things we haven't the capacity to do.

It would be lovely if we could bring all the competing factions into a functioning inclusive government with balanced powers and constitutional protections respected by all... but it's a pipe dream. Afghanistan is not the 51st state and we cannot impose an American solution to an Afghan problem.

[carl]

As to stability, actually, as I think about it, I will clarify my position. It is not stability in Afghanistan that is important to the US, it is stability between Pakistan and India that is important to the US. That is arguably the biggest problem with our approach to Afghanistan, is that it has created a tremendous disruption of the uneasy stability that existed prior to our mucking around chasing terrorists.

Why, apart from a humanitarian standpoint, is stability between the two countries so important to us? There is not likely to be a war to the death between the two since they both have nukes. Neither country is likely to let us influence the status of their nukes so we have no power to affect that equation either way.

What do you mean by stability anyway? I don't understand. Their existence is already insured by the nukes.

The continued tensions between the two is caused by three things (among others), Kashmir, the Pak Army/ISI support for violent young men who periodically go to India and slaughter Indian civilians and the disagreement between the two countries over who will have the greater say in Afghanistan. We can influence two of those things, maybe. Kashmir they will have to work out between themselves but we have some influence on the other two. What I can never understand is why your position normally seems to favor the Pak Army/ISI. It seems to be fair to tell them stop supporting LeT killers and you guys can share Afghanistan in that neither will control the place.

I will anticipate you answer. You normally respond by saying we must be sensitive to the Pak Army/ISI desire for strategic depth because anything that threatens that depth will set the Pak Army/ISI off on a march down the road to nuclear Armageddon, or it is implied. Why? I don't think they are insects programmed to react to stimuli in only one way. They may find it advantageous to make us think that, it pays; but they dealt with an Afghanistan they didn't control in the past and they will in the future.

The whole thing about strategic depth is a sham anyway. For strategic depth to be useful, there must be some sort of resource base to fall back upon. There is nothing in Afghanistan the Pak army can use to rebuild itself. Yet they insist that it is of value. It seems mindless adherence to something that isn't. That is only of value if it is part of a grift. They sort of remind me of the sheriff in Blazing Saddles threatening to shoot himself if the lynch mob didn't back off.

Your last sentence mentions how we disrupted an "uneasy stability" by going after some people who killed 3,000 Americans. That period of stability included lots of fighting in Kashmir by people dispatched, trained and sponsored by the Pak Army/ISI. It also included the Kargil conflict. That doesn't seem so stable to me.

Reconciliation that incorporates all Afghans equitably in the governance and opportunity of their country is best, but otherwise a homegrown solution that excludes either side is preferable to a US forced solution that excludes the Taliban side. A homegrown solution will achieve a stability that is maintained by that side; a US forced solution will require the US to keep it stable. Frankly, we have bigger fish to fry.

What you are saying here is the Taliban & company's interests trumps those of the other Afghans and ultimately, it may be easier to just let them have the place and that wouldn't be so bad. Please correct me if I am wrong.

I would point out that any stability the Taliban could maintain would be that of a repressive police state. Isn't that something akin to a "forced predictability"?

AQ is everywhere and nowhere, they can plan, organize and launch attacks from virtually anywhere.

I've heard that very often and it always sounds good in theory, connectivity, virtual training, the miracle of the internet and all that. What I observe is they seem to hang out in Pakistan, near the mountains and most of the attacks on us seem to go through there. From this I conclude there is an advantage to being there that surmounts the discomforts. If they could do what they want to do from a seaside resort in Belgium, why don't they? The roads are better and the cheese is good.

Even if the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan and are willing to openly (which is highly unlikely) support AQ it will be a simple matter to launch strategic raids against such targets as they develop.

If it is so simple, how come we haven't been able to find AQ 1 & 2 and MO in a decade, 10 years, of trying? Strategic raids sounds really cool but I can't think of one that paid off since maybe Pizarro.

Bottom line is that there are people out there working to whip up a lot of very irrational fears; and as Churchill reminded a London populace being submitted to German terror attacks, "we have nothing to fear, but fear itself."

FDR said that in 1932 or 1933 and I believe he was referring to the domestic economy. If Churchill had said that in 1940 or 41 people would have thought him odd since bombs were falling on their heads at the time.