General Petraeus: collection

[Rob Thornton]

Things I think you might see:

- a comprehensive approach that considers the linkages between the various wars and tensions within the CENTCOM AOR, and effort spent to coordinate with the adjacent GCCs and the Inter-Agency where boundaries matter.

- a great deal of energy spent on persuading Iraq's and Afghanistan's neighbors that they have clear and enduring interests in assisting those two states to succeed, and that the United States succeeds as well - and as such they should be more involved and proactive in ensuring they do.

- a staff that is more focused on a CDR's articulated guidance to support the Iraq and Afghanistan commands.

-guidance passed to those two commands that is not constraining, but empowers and creates unity of effort from a regional perspective

-more energy directed back toward informing and leveraging the whole of government, and on keeping civilian leadership focused on future risks - again with a regional perspective

-regional actions that match a regional and broader U.S. narrative

- a command that lets the commands in Iraq and Afghanistan focus on their campaigns and not on fighting higher

Things I think you will not see:

- micro-management of either Iraq or Afghanistan

- the sacrifice of U.S. regional interests to ensure a legacy associated with Iraq

- a command that does not play well with others - be they GCCs, or the Inter-Agency

- a command that does not consider the strains placed on the force providers and institutions, and as such absolves itself from all risk to the services, or to FP goals outside the CENTCOM AOR.

- a staff that does not enable subordinate commands

It has been my observation that the commanders who excel at any level are those who identify what are the things that only they can do by virtue of position and in some cases by personality – and focus their efforts as such. The broader the responsibilities, the more things that compete for your attention – as such, the art is knowing what is important, and why. They are also ones who consider the broader picture, and can empathize with those below, adjacent and above them. I think at that level you really need some strategic vision as the moves we make today will be with us for some time to come.
Best, Rob

[Eden]

I have read that LTG Odierno, in his first go-round in Iraq, was one of those senior leaders who performed poorly and did much to spark the continuing troubles through a misapplication of force. Recent appraisals indicate that he now 'gets it' and should be an effective MNF-I commander.

Is this a fair assessment? If so, what caused the scales to fall from his eyes? Was it his own experience and reflection, or did he become a disciple of someone else?

If the assessment is fair, it would make Odierno a symbol of the growth and development of the Army as a whole, and would make for a fascinating study.

[SWJED]

... roundup on the new appointments at SWJ.

[Ron Humphrey]

... roundup on the new appointments at SWJ.

I simply say this:

Canis timidus vehementius latrat quam mordet (not a response to you in particular but the way I would respond to some who threatens to hurl stones at my head)

Carpe Dium

AND for the others in the group

Cave ne ante ullas catapultas ambules

[John T. Fishel]

I thought you were describing GEN Jack Galvin! but then I remembered (as if I ever forgot) that GEN Petraeus was mentored by Galvin!

Of all the CINCs I saw in SOUTHCOM, Jack Galvin was the most successful. That was because he practiced the art of the possible as well as it could be done. Seems that Dave Petraeus learned well at the feet of a master - and may well (I hope) have surpassed him.

Cheers

JohnT

[Hacksaw]

Hmmm.... I've thought about this one all day. I think you got it about right, whether encouraged or not, the 4ID has been self-described by some as acting like thugs in OIF I. I also think it fair to say that for any number of reasons, 4ID was not successful.

Just came off a visit to FT Hood, and the damn near unanimous opinion is that LTG O walks on water, is thoughtful, inclusive, and "just gets it man"

Pretty high praise, and tough to argue with results.

As for the appearant shift... whose to say, it'd be a great book. I think you can surmise, however, that the first experience caused him to reflect - consider how he might improve... The man and his family have sacrificed greatly in this war -- makes a smart man think.

I probably was still a skeptic until I talked with the folks who worked for the man. This is a damn good choice, because for all the hulking physical intimidation... He's a known commodity in Iraq with all important personal connections... and the commodity he's best known for is being tough in pinch... a good guy to have in the foxhole when the sh!t hits the fan.

Live well and row

[Cavguy]

Just came off a visit to FT Hood, and the damn near unanimous opinion is that LTG O walks on water, is thoughtful, inclusive, and "just gets it man"

Pretty high praise, and tough to argue with results.


I probably was still a skeptic until I talked with the folks who worked for the man. This is a damn good choice, because for all the hulking physical intimidation... He's a known commodity in Iraq with all important personal connections... and the commodity he's best known for is being tough in pinch... a good guy to have in the foxhole when the sh!t hits the fan.

I was with Hacksaw on this trip to Hood - have to echo. After reading Ricks' books and conversations with a few 4ID OIF 1 friends, I was prepared to find a kinetically minded HQ kept in check by Petraeus, and had to slap myself for preconcieved notions that people other than myself can't learn. I don't know why it suprised me, I learned/changed alot between my two tours. I don't know what the "Road to Damascus" moment was for LTG O, but whatever Kool-Aid he drank between 2004 and 2006, it was good.

His staff was organized properly for COIN and had the right mindset for action to support/enable the transformation of ops, and it was accomplished through no small amount of force of personality from the commander. My hat's off to him.