General Petraeus: collection

[Granite_State]

http://hughhewitt.townhall.com/Trans...4-9e270a9ef0f2

Some interesting stuff here, but it does make me a bit worried to see General Petraeus interviewed by a completely partisan hack like Hugh Hewitt.

[Abu Buckwheat]

Ok, here is where I say ... excuse me? Seems the fight is over MNF arming Sunni militias ... Krauthammer's 20% doctirine at play?

Iraqi leader tells Bush: Get Gen Petraeus out
By Damien McElroy, Foreign Affairs Correspondent
Last Updated: 2:44am BST 28/07/2007

Stormy relationship: Nouri al-Maliki and Gen David Petraeus


Relations between the top United States general in Iraq and Nouri al-Maliki, the country's prime minister, are so bad that the Iraqi leader made a direct appeal for his removal to President George W Bush.

Although the call was rejected, aides to both men admit that Mr Maliki and Gen David Petraeus engage in frequent stand-up shouting matches, differing particularly over the US general's moves to arm Sunni tribesmen to fight al-Qa'eda.

One Iraqi source said Mr Maliki used a video conference with Mr Bush to call for the general's signature strategy to be scrapped. "He told Bush that if Petraeus continues, he would arm Shia militias," said the official. "Bush told Maliki to calm down."

At another meeting with Gen Petraeus, Mr Maliki said: "I can't deal with you any more. I will ask for someone else to replace you."

advertisementGen Petraeus admitted that the relationship was stormy, saying: "We have not pulled punches with each other."

President Bush's support for Mr Maliki is deeply controversial within the US government because of the Iraqi's ties to Shia militias responsible for some of the worst sectarian violence.

The New York Times claimed yesterday that Saudi Arabia was refusing to work with Mr Maliki and has presented "evidence" that he was an Iranian intelligence agent to US officials. "Bush administration officials are voicing increasing anger at what they say has been Saudi Arabia's counterproductive role in the war," it reported.

Alongside the firm support of Mr Bush, Mr Maliki also enjoys the backing of Ryan Crocker, the US ambassador and his predecessor, Zalmay Khalilzad, now America's representative at the United Nations.

Mr Khalilzad took a swipe at Saudi Arabia in an editorial published earlier this month that was widely seen as an appeal for a larger UN role in stabilising Iraq.

Mr Crocker, who attends Mr Maliki's stormy weekly meetings with Gen Petraeus, said the Iraqi leader was a strong partner of America.

"There is no leader in the world that is under more pressure than Nouri al-Maliki, without question," he said. "Sometimes he reflects that frustration. I don't blame him. I probably would too."

[SWJED]

Telegraph: SWJ Best Fiction Award Winner of the Week

Damien McElroy, foreign affairs correspondent for the U.K.’s Telegraph, “headlines” today: Iraqi leader tells Bush: Get Gen Petraeus out...

One problem - the events as reported in the Telegraph never happened. This from COL Steve Boylan, MNF-I CG Public Affairs Officer, in an e-mail he sent earlier today to McElroy...

[Abu Buckwheat]

Telegraph: SWJ Best Fiction Award Winner of the Week

Well if this is all fiction then the Associated Press's sources are piling on.

Heat Rises Between Iraq PM and Petraeus

STEVEN R. HURST and QASSIM ABDUL-ZAHRA | July 28, 2007 02:05 PM EST

BAGHDAD — A key aide says Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's relations with Gen. David Petraeus are so poor the Iraqi leader may ask Washington to withdraw the overall U.S. commander from his Baghdad post.

Iraq's foreign minister calls the relationship "difficult." Petraeus, who says their ties are "very good," acknowledges expressing his "full range of emotions" at times with al-Maliki. U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who meets with both at least weekly, concedes "sometimes there are sporty exchanges."

It seems less a clash of personality than of policy. The Shiite Muslim prime minister has reacted most sharply to the American general's tactic of enlisting Sunni militants, presumably including past killers of Iraqi Shiites, as allies in the fight against al-Qaida here.

An associate said al-Maliki once, in discussion with President Bush, even threatened to counter this by arming Shiite militias.

History shows that the strain of war often turns allies into uneasy partners. The reality of how these allies get along may lie somewhere between the worst and best reports about the relationship, one central to the future of Iraq and perhaps to the larger Middle East.

We shouldn't be so quick to judge everything the press reports as wrong. They use sources ... and the PAO demanding to be a counter-source is not really journalism, but dictation. Allowing a chance to spin a story will make war supporters feel good but doesn't explain what is happening.

Every Supreme Commander in war has political problems with the host nationals ... Eisenhower v. DeGaulle for example. I am surprised this hasn't broken out into open media before with other commanders.

However, the blow-back that could occur from the PAO's statements and the Rightwing bloggers calling these reports lies when high level Iraqi officials are going on the record and confirming them is that the Iraqis are now going to get defensive at being called liars.

We may regret it if we cross the Respect-Honor line ... as it stands this is going to get VERY big and help no one except for the Insurgents, who are laughing at us all.

We all want Petraeus to execute his strategy but we should be very concerned about the impact of stoking a "he said-they said" personal integrity war ... the leaks or statements that may come out may not be in the best interest of Iraq or our warfighters.

[SWJED]

... is not a "good thing", I agree. There are times however when a story with "wings" that is indeed fabricated needs to be called-out. I believe now is one of those times. Moreover, I'd hardly categorize the SWJ as a "right-wing" blog. The mere fact you are a blogger there speaks volumes and we don't much toe any "party-line" - kind of call them as we see them.

Not much to fear though - the IO damage was done as soon as the Telegraph's story hit the 'Net. Google it (news and blog searches) - the "left-wing" blogs are in hog-heaven.

Yep, the AP is "piling on"...

On edit: "Calling them like we see them" by definition for the SWJ means each individual blogger and as many here well know, the SWJ regular and guest bloggers are quite a diverse crowd. As for the SWC, you must admit that different points of view, if presented in a professional manner as well as well sourced or based on personal experience, is not only tolerated - but welcomed.

[Abu Buckwheat]

Moreover, I'd hardly categorize the SWJ as a "right-wing" blog.

Litte error here ... I was referring to the other non-professional, personal bloggers (who actually think rational opinions make SWJ a Leftist site) not the SWJ itself.

Heck, this is the only professional scholarly military blog of any merit and thats why I am proud to be a part of it (also because I was given the Hugo Chavez/Raul Castro Comrade's decoder ring when I joined!).

On the other hand I acknowledge that the IO damage was done with the first story and we should whack 'em where we see 'em.

Many of our IO mistakes in theater are so amateur as to be laughable and wiggling about on this one makes the PAO look like an offended school principle's secretary. We should acknowledge that its a superfluous debate, the facts were wrong on that report and move on.

[Granite_State]

Another Vietnam analogy:

http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w070319&s=kaplan032007

[SWJED]

7 September General Petraeus Letter to Troops of MNF-I

HEADQUARTERS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09342-1400

7 September 2007

Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of Multi-National Force-Iraq

We are now over two-and-a-half months into the surge of offensive operations made possible by the surge of forces, and I want to share with you my view of how I think we’re doing. This letter is a bit longer than previous ones, since I feel you deserve a detailed description of what I believe we have – and have not – accomplished, as Ambassador Crocker and I finalize the assessment we will provide shortly to Congress.

Up front, my sense is that we have achieved tactical momentum and wrested the initiative from our enemies in a number of areas of Iraq. The result has been progress in the security arena, although it has, as you know, been uneven. Additionally, as you all appreciate very well, innumerable tasks remain and much hard work lies ahead. We are, in short, a long way from the goal line, but we do have the ball and we are driving down the field.

We face a situation that is exceedingly complex. Al Qaeda, associated insurgent groups, and militia extremists, some supported by Iran, continue to carry out attacks on us, our Iraqi partners, and the Iraqi civilians we seek to secure. We have to contend with the relentless pace of operations, the crushing heat, and the emotions that we all experience during long deployments and tough combat. And we operate against a backdrop of limited Iraqi government capacity, institutions trying to rebuild, and various forms of corruption. All of this takes place in a climate of distrust and fear that stems from the sectarian violence that did so much damage to the fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and into 2007, not to mention the decades of repression under Saddam’s brutal regime. Tragically, sectarian violence continues to cause death and displacement in Baghdad and elsewhere, albeit at considerably reduced levels from 8 months ago, due, in large part, to your hard work and sacrifice together with our Iraqi counterparts.

In spite of these challenges, our operations – particularly the offensive operations we have conducted since mid-June – have helped produce progress in many areas on the ground. In fact, the number of attacks across the country has declined in 8 of the past 11 weeks, reaching during the last week in August a level not seen since June 2006. This trend is not just a result of greater numbers of Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces; it also reflects your determination, courage, and skill in conducting counterinsurgency operations. By taking the fight to the enemy, you have killed or captured dozens of leaders and thousands of members of Al Qaeda-Iraq and extremist militia elements, you have taken many of Al Qaeda’s former sanctuaries away from them, and you have dismantled a number of their car bomb and improvised explosive device networks. By living among the population with our Iraqi partners, you have been holding the areas you have cleared. By helping Iraqis reestablish basic services and local governance, you have helped exploit the security gains. And by partnering closely with Iraqi Security Forces, you have been strengthening Iraqi elements that will one day have sole responsibility for protecting their population. Indeed, while Iraqi forces clearly remain a work in progree, Iraqi soldiers and police are very much in the fight, and they continue to sustain losses that are two to three times our losses.

We are also building momentum in an emerging area of considerable importance – local reconciliation. Local Iraqi leaders are coming forward, opposing extremists, and establishing provisional units of neighborhood security volunteers. With growing Government of Iraq support, these volunteers are being integrated into legitimate institutions to help improve local security. While this concept is playing out differently in various areas across Iraq, it is grounded in a desire shared by increasing numbers of Iraqis – to oppose extremist elements and their ideologies. This is very significant, as many of you know first-hand, extremists cannot survive without the support of the population. The popular rejection of Al Qaeda and its ideology has, for example, helped transform Anbar Province this year from one of the most dangerous areas of Iraq to one of the safest. The popular rejection has helped Coalition and Iraqi Forces take away other areas from Al Qaeda as well, and we are seeing a spread of this sentiment in an ever-increasing number of Sunni areas. Now, in fact, we are also seeing a desire to reject extremists emerge in many Shi’a areas.

The progress has not, to be sure, been uniform across Baghdad or across Iraq. Accomplishments in some areas – for example, in Ramadi and in Anbar Province – have been greater than any of us might have predicted six months ago. The achievements in some other areas – for example, in some particularly challenging Baghdad neighborhoods and in reducing overall civilian casualties, especially those caused by periodic, barbaric Al Qaeda bombings – have not been as dramatic. However, the overall trajectory has been encouraging, especially when compared to the situation at the height of the sectarian violence in late 2006 and early 2007.

Many of us hoped this summer would be a time of tangible political progress at the national level as well. One of the justifications for the surge, after all, was that it would help create the space for Iraqi leaders to tackle the tough questions and agree on key pieces of “national reconciliation” legislation. It has not worked out as we had hoped. All participants, Iraqi and coalition alike, are dissatisfied by the halting progress on major legislative initiatives such as the oil framework law, revenue sharing, and de-ba’athification reform. At the same time, however, our appreciation of what this legislation represents for Iraqi leaders has grown. These laws are truly fundamental in nature and will help determine how Iraqis will share power and resources in the new Iraq. While much work remains to be done before these critical issues are resolved, the seriousness with which Iraqi leaders came together at their summit in late August has given hope that they are up to the task before them, even if it is clearly taking more time than we initially expected.

In the coming months, our coalition’s countries and all Iraqis will continue to depend on each of you and on our Iraqi counterparts to keep the pressure on the extremists, to help security and strengthen the rule of law for all Iraqis, to work with the Government of Iraq to integrate volunteers into local security and national institutions, to assist with the restoration and improvement of basic services, and to continue the development of conditions that foster reconciliation. For our part, Ambassador Crocker and I will continue to do everything in our power to help the Prime Minister and the Government of Iraq achieve the meaningful results that will ensure that your sacrifices and those of your comrades help produce sustainable security for Iraq over the long term. A stable and secure Iraq that denies extremists a safe haven and has a government that is representative of and responsive to all Iraqis helps protect the vital interests of our coalition countries. A stable and secure Iraq will also benefit Iraq’s citizens and Iraq’s neighbors alike, bringing clam to a region full of challenges and employing iraq’s human capital and natural resource blessings for the benefit of all.

As I noted at the outset of this letter, over the next few days, Ambassador Crocker and I will share with the U.S. Congress and the American people our assessment of the situation in Iraq. I will also describe the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command. I will go before Congress conscious of the strain on our forces, the sacrifices that you and your families are making, the gains we have made in Iraq, the challenges that remain, and the importance of building on what we and our Iraqi counterparts have fought so hard to achieve.

Thanks once again for what each of you continue to do. Our Nations have asked much of you and your families. It remains the greatest of honors to serve with you.

Sincerely,

s/

David H. Petraeus
General, United States Army
Commanding

[MattC86]

I am very nervous about starting this thread and asking this, one because I know many of you are active military (and some have GEN Petraeus in their chain of command), and two because it's pretty politically sensitive, but all the political hoopla surrounding Congress, the White House, the American people, and GEN Petraeus/Ambassador Crocker the last few weeks has made me too curious not to ask. All that jazz about curiousity and the cat. . .

Anyway, is anyone else uneasy about GEN Petraeus and what he is doing in the United States? I personally feel that the administration has ceded it's Constitutional responsibilities as top policy-makers/policy strategists and has, in effect, "hid" behind GEN Petraeus and made the COIN/surge "strategy" (really a tactical reorientation in my mind) Petraeus' strategy rather than what it is, Bush's policy.

By ceding that responsibility, they have also passed GEN Petraeus the buck on "selling" the war. Now this is tricky, because I understand the importance of IO in any COIN situation (and the usual difficulties of fickle popular support for wars in the United States - or any liberal democracy), and I know some responsibility for IO falls to GEN Petraeus anyway. And most of what little I saw from his testimony was excellent - I particularly liked how he did not say whether MNF operations in Iraq are making America safer - but his appearances on Fox or on Katie Couric were cheerleader-esque appearances in some ways, and make me think that he's doing a lot of salesman work while he's here.

What especially bothers me is his op-ed from just before the 2004 election about the Iraqi Security Forces, which, as shown by events of the next years, was (to my admittedly non-expert perspective) debatable at best and patently false at worst. That editorial from a serving military officer smacked of political salesmanship, and I am worried that he is doing much of the same currently. I wonder what anyone else thinks of this blurring of political and military responsibilites.

I hope this was not too out of line, and if it was, I apologize.

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

Matt,
I don't think most will say you are out of line - you phrased your question as a question and not as an attack or an indictment.

There certainly is a convergence point for policy and strategy, and the higher in the rank structure regarding a policy and the strategy for realizing it, the closer you are affiliated with it.

The very broad and general policy goal is to see Iraq to a point of stability where it can govern its own affairs, provide for its citizens and participate as a responsible state on the regional and international scene. By doing this we also help to prevent further instability in the region (such as Iran expanding a destabilizing influence & Non-state actors such as AQ or other terrorist organizations expanding into ungoverned spaces) and protect access to the strategic energy resources which are so vital across the world.

Certainly the MNF-I CDR bears some responsibility in meeting those "ends" by helping determine the "means" he'll use to do so. He also bears great responsibility for planning and implementing the "ways". The policy makers - really the administration - must approve the strategy as the tool used to realize the ends. The law makers must approve the appropriation and allocation of the "means" or funding and resources needed to pursue the ways. Congress and the President are of course elected officials - so enter in the people to go with the government and the military - the people get their window through the media.

This was all kind of what Clausewitz theorized in his secondary trinity (the people - the military and its leadership - the government) with regard to considering the nature of war. War makes no sense without its political context else why would you go to war if not for some political reason (usually involving fear, interests or honor).

At the level of war in which GEN Petraeus' operates - policy is part of it. Remember there was a political confirmation process for assigning him to lead MNF-I - politics entered early on. Every General Officer is charged with providing the elected officials their best and most honest military advice to inform policy questions, and although the President is in our Chain of Command - our oath is to preserve the constitution.

Also, I don't think the President has hung him out to dry. Tune in tonight for the President's speech and I think you'll see him take responsibility for the decision to continue the policy.

I hope that helps answer your question. Also for a good read on this pick up any book by Colin Gray.

Best regards, Rob

[skiguy]

Matt, you're not out of line, but I may be because I'm going to attack and indict..so I'll apologize in advance if I offend anyone. (or even get banned) And, yeah, I'm going to draw partisan lines in the sand here, because I'm that disgusted by what I've seen and heard.
By the way, I'm not in the military and I'm not one who blindly thinks the Bush administration has handled the war in Iraq well.

Petraeus and Crocker were attacked by EVERY f-ing democrat with every question they were asked. Yes, it's Bush's policy, but it's the General's and Ambassador's plan that is in effect, so it's perfectly understandable that they will both get a little defensive and try to "sell" it. I thnk it's disgusting how they're being treated. But that may just be me...because I think they are geniuses and nothing less. If anything is "bad" from this, it's the fact that the president handed them a mess. But I can't think of two (actually more, add Nagl, Kilcullen, and many more to the list) better people to fix things.

The democrats called them liars or worse. Those 2 demand respect and it's not given to them..not by the jackasses in Congress, Chris Matthews, Anderson Copper, the NY Times, et al. I'll watch Bush, but I'm not stayin up to watch my Senator Reed's rebuttal. I know it will just be a bunch of garbage because his thick head is already made up and no facts (like those he was given Monday and Tuesday) will change his mind.

What's wrong with this country is there is a certain, and unfortunately, large group that wish nothing more than failure because they hate their own president that much. And it's not just the war. They blame America for terrorists. They say the economy's bad when it's clearly not. I could go on, but I'll stop now before I get myself into more trouble than I probably already have.

[Watcher In The Middle]

Anyway, is anyone else uneasy about GEN Petraeus and what he is doing in the United States? I personally feel that the administration has ceded it's Constitutional responsibilities as top policy-makers/policy strategists and has, in effect, "hid" behind GEN Petraeus and made the COIN/surge "strategy" (really a tactical reorientation in my mind) Petraeus' strategy rather than what it is, Bush's policy.

Uneasy about General Petraeus / AMB Crocker and their actions/testimony?

Not in the least. Look, these guys are the "on the scene" experts. Who Better? Actually, this type of thing happens all the time, just not on such a contentious issue.

Just as a single example, we (the federal government) has an upcoming auction of the 700 Mhz. spectrum (think extreme high speed wireless internet access). There's been tons (and I do means TONS) of testimony over the last few years, and probably more to come. And I can guarantee you that all of that "testimony" provided by all the different experts has all been carefully crafted around different sales pitches. In fact, that's one topic where the issue really should be more contentious, but isn't because the political leadership in both parties doesn't want it to be a contentious issue. That's not the case with Iraq - the leadership on both sides need it to be a contentious issue.

What they are really doing (and actually it's smart politically), is that they want both GEN Petraeus / AMB Crocker out there on the record FIRST, not later. Because if the Congress Critters went first and then the real experts came later, well you'd have a whole lot of evidence laid out there for God & Everyone to see exactly how bright/dumb their elected pol's really are. And we're talking a "Whole Lot of Ugly" here......

Think of it as an avoidance of a congressional replay of "RatherGate". Only this time, it would be all about Iraq if you didn't have both GEN Petraeus / AMB Crocker out there on the record FIRST. Can you imagine the havoc (and the fun) the blogs and the new media would have with a target as big as Congress showing their collective ignorance?

If the WH didn't have both of them report first, Congress (if they were thinking) would have insisted upon it.

So no, it's really unlikely there's a problem here.

[Rob Thornton]

Matt,

Click here for the text of the President's Speech

I think the President did a good job of distinguishing the lanes, taking responsibility, articulating the rationale at the different levels.

His speech was more informed I believe as a result of the AMB Crocker/GEN Petraeus report, and the report issued by Gen (R) Jones' commission. This is a responsibility of those who serve to inform policy with their best advice. I think this week's events show how things can work (and work well) when the pieces are linked.

Best regards, Rob

[SWJED]

...to preside over BG promotion board.

[Rob Thornton]

I know the implication is tied to COIN as a type of qualifier for the decision to bring GEN Petraeus back to CONUS to guide the board’s deliberations, but I’d like to offer up that while the general media uses COIN much in the way it uses “surge”, I’d offer that this board’s importance is less about picking guys with “exact” knowledge of counter-insurgency, but is more about selecting 06s for GO rank who have proven they possess an agile mind and can recognize changes and possibilities and can adapt quickly to deny the enemy options while exploiting opportunities which will gain and retain the initiative on the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.

I saw where USA MG (Retired) Robert Scales had offered up why this is so important. I have turned to his writing many times because he has thought and written on leadership a great deal, and has so much experience in leadership – and I think he has the crux of it.

Past and current performance offer a window into potential for increased responsibility and authority commensurate to promotion to a higher rank – what GEN Petraeus offers is the perspective of a leader who has proven in every assignment he’s been assigned that he has the qualities required to operate and lead across the full spectrum of operations as defined by FM 3-0 and win.

As a relatively junior field grade what I propose we want from our GOs is agile and adaptive leadership commensurate with the responsibility and authority found in the positions held by GOs under whatever conditions and operational themes the mission commits us to – be they Peacetime Military Engagement, Limited Intervention, Peace Operations, Irregular Warfare, or Major Combat Operations.

The General Officers selected are going to have their hands full – from leading our soldiers in combat today, to anticipating the demands of tomorrow, to educating and informing our political leadership on the best ways to develop, sustain and employ military force where it is required to achieve a political objective – and the risks of doing so. While being grounded in their tactical experiences – they must be thinking on the operational and strategic levels – able to articulate nuances to provide context, while being able to see the inter-relationships and consequences.

I think we must give the board the benefit of understanding that while COIN may be the theme we’ve picked up on, the requirements of ensuring we have the best GOs (and leaders) are deeper and more subjective. The 06s we’ve identified in the original blog and related articles are more then just good COIN officers, they are leaders who have demonstrated that they can identify a problem and think creatively about it, and will resource the means to overcome it. They are full spectrum officers with agile and adaptive minds, and they have sparked creativity in organizations they have been a part of, and inspired the larger community by their ideas and communication skills.

Best Regards, Rob

[SteveMetz]

I know the implication is tied to COIN as a type of qualifier for the decision to bring GEN Petraeus back to CONUS to guide the board’s deliberations, but I’d like to offer up that while the general media uses COIN much in the way it uses “surge”, I’d offer that this board’s importance is less about picking guys with “exact” knowledge of counter-insurgency, but is more about selecting 06s for GO rank who have proven they possess an agile mind and can recognize changes and possibilities and can adapt quickly to deny the enemy options while exploiting opportunities which will gain and retain the initiative on the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.

I saw where USA MG (Retired) Robert Scales had offered up why this is so important. I have turned to his writing many times because he has thought and written on leadership a great deal, and has so much experience in leadership – and I think he has the crux of it.

Past and current performance offer a window into potential for increased responsibility and authority commensurate to promotion to a higher rank – what GEN Petraeus offers is the perspective of a leader who has proven in every assignment he’s been assigned that he has the qualities required to operate and lead across the full spectrum of operations as defined by FM 3-0 and win.

As a relatively junior field grade what I propose we want from our GOs is agile and adaptive leadership commensurate with the responsibility and authority found in the positions held by GOs under whatever conditions and operational themes the mission commits us to – be they Peacetime Military Engagement, Limited Intervention, Peace Operations, Irregular Warfare, or Major Combat Operations.

The General Officers selected are going to have their hands full – from leading our soldiers in combat today, to anticipating the demands of tomorrow, to educating and informing our political leadership on the best ways to develop, sustain and employ military force where it is required to achieve a political objective – and the risks of doing so. While being grounded in their tactical experiences – they must be thinking on the operational and strategic levels – able to articulate nuances to provide context, while being able to see the inter-relationships and consequences.

I think we must give the board the benefit of understanding that while COIN may be the theme we’ve picked up on, the requirements of ensuring we have the best GOs (and leaders) are deeper and more subjective. The 06s we’ve identified in the original blog and related articles are more then just good COIN officers, they are leaders who have demonstrated that they can identify a problem and think creatively about it, and will resource the means to overcome it. They are full spectrum officers with agile and adaptive minds, and they have sparked creativity in organizations they have been a part of, and inspired the larger community by their ideas and communication skills.

Best Regards, Rob

LOL--we need to have a long talk about General Scales some time.

No question, though, that a war rages between the "big" Army and the "irregular" Army. The use of Petraeus on a promotion board shows that Gates is as interested in shaping this as was his predecessor (what was his name?), but is doing it in a more subtle, less in-your-face, fashion.

[Rob Thornton]

You know – I’ve never met the retired general – but I have read much of what he’s written over the last few years. I was introduced to his writings by two officers who have influenced me greatly, and who I hold in high esteem. Scales’ writings strike me as being from somebody who has reflected on what they have done, and what they might have done – and also as to how we might do them better. When others were focused on defining “transformation” as being hardware related – the pieces I see from him always seem to put leadership and people first – even when as an advocate for FCS as the Army’s major acquisition, he wrote from the point of enabling agile and adaptive leaders.

This is one reason I think we must select leaders for their potential to visualize and anticipate the problems and possibilities that seem to elude others; and to promote those who have the courage and genius to address and take advantage of things that others less inclined, or less capable might overlook or ignore in favor of something which espouses low personal risk.

This is my opinion is what is significant about bringing GEN Petraeus back – it is not so much what the board will look at, but how they will look at it – how the board will weigh “potential” based on who the candidates are, and how their actions have defined them. This is at least a chance at recasting ourselves to look forward instead of over our shoulder.

Best, Rob

[CB]

Sorry for digging out this thread, but I have a question regarding how Gen. Petraeus can influence this promotion board's decisions and, ultimately, GO selection process. I've been until now unable to find accurate and up-to-date information about this process and still don't know if, as a Chairman, Gen Petraeus has a real opportunity to change things by promoting great COIN practitioners, or if he can only put names on a list which has to be confirmed by other board members/service/office, willing or not to promote the same kind of officers.

Please, any information would be extremely welcome. Thanks a lot in advance for any help you could provide.

Best,

CB

[tequila]

... with LTGEN Odierno to be MNF-I commander.

Interesting to see what impact if any this will have on Afghanistan and Iran policy.

[Rob Thornton]

Things I think you might see:

- a comprehensive approach that considers the linkages between the various wars and tensions within the CENTCOM AOR, and effort spent to coordinate with the adjacent GCCs and the Inter-Agency where boundaries matter.

- a great deal of energy spent on persuading Iraq's and Afghanistan's neighbors that they have clear and enduring interests in assisting those two states to succeed, and that the United States succeeds as well - and as such they should be more involved and proactive in ensuring they do.

- a staff that is more focused on a CDR's articulated guidance to support the Iraq and Afghanistan commands.

-guidance passed to those two commands that is not constraining, but empowers and creates unity of effort from a regional perspective

-more energy directed back toward informing and leveraging the whole of government, and on keeping civilian leadership focused on future risks - again with a regional perspective

-regional actions that match a regional and broader U.S. narrative

- a command that lets the commands in Iraq and Afghanistan focus on their campaigns and not on fighting higher

Things I think you will not see:

- micro-management of either Iraq or Afghanistan

- the sacrifice of U.S. regional interests to ensure a legacy associated with Iraq

- a command that does not play well with others - be they GCCs, or the Inter-Agency

- a command that does not consider the strains placed on the force providers and institutions, and as such absolves itself from all risk to the services, or to FP goals outside the CENTCOM AOR.

- a staff that does not enable subordinate commands

It has been my observation that the commanders who excel at any level are those who identify what are the things that only they can do by virtue of position and in some cases by personality – and focus their efforts as such. The broader the responsibilities, the more things that compete for your attention – as such, the art is knowing what is important, and why. They are also ones who consider the broader picture, and can empathize with those below, adjacent and above them. I think at that level you really need some strategic vision as the moves we make today will be with us for some time to come.
Best, Rob