Taming Pakistan: Modi Effect

[Dayuhan]

The sense of grievance against govt./majority community is cultivated by radicals to shift the blame away from themselves for the Muslim communities' shortcomings.

Of course, but it's difficult to cultivate something that didn't exist in the first place. Government needs to starve the cultivators by not fueling or reinforcing the sense of grievance, and by undercutting that sense of grievance where possible. At the very least, minority populations have to know that violence against them will not be tolerated.

Without de-radicalizing Indian Muslims, increasing economic opportunities for them would be suicidal for India (the U.S. State Department folks have so far failed to grasp that).

The point is to compete for those who have not yet been radicalized. Since nobody has yet come up with an effective way of de-radicalizing those already radicalized, it makes some sense to try to prevent radicalization in the first place. It is not a solution in itself (neither is anything else), it's a component of a solution.

My forthcoming scholarship, I believe will help us identify how to neuter Islamic radicalism. Until then, the answer -- from Obama to Putin and from Modi to Jinping -- is the same: who knows what the right policies are!

The "right policies" will inevitably vary according to where, when, and by whom the policies are applied, but I'll certainly be curious to see what you come up with.

When we deal with radicalism (of any description) we often encounter two opposite narratives. One, typically espoused by radicals and their supporters, is that the fault lies entirely with vicious and incompetent governments who have oppressed their people into a radicalized corner. The other, typically espoused by governments and their supporters, is that government is blameless and the whole problem is caused by evil agitators who have corrupted the people. Both, like most polar opinions, are a load of bollocks: there are always elements of both in play. For a government faced by radicalism, objectively assessing its own behavior and getting its own house in order may not be the only part of a de-radicalization strategy, but it's a very important part, especially since the government gets to deal with something it can actually control.

[davidbfpo]

If demography was the key factor whether India's Muslim population became 'radicalised' would be a strategic issue beyond India itself.

In 2001 there were 138,188,240 Muslims, or 13.4% of the population; in comparison Hindus numbered 827,578,868 or 80.5%. From:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_people

India already has a problem with violent radical Muslims who engage in terrorism. Such as in 2006:

More than 160 people have been killed and 460 injured by seven bombs on the train network in the Indian financial capital Mumbai (Bombay), police say.

Certainly when I looked at the issue in 2008 it was clear violent radical Muslims were a tiny minority. For example:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Student...ement_of_India

[MoorthyM]

If demography was the key factor whether India's Muslim population became 'radicalised' would be a strategic issue beyond India itself.

In 2001 there were 138,188,240 Muslims, or 13.4% of the population

Certainly when I looked at the issue in 2008 it was clear violent radical Muslims were a tiny minority. For example:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Student...ement_of_India

David:

In every census since India was born the governments tracked religion, except the last one in 2011. That's for a good reason; the Muslim population percentage is said to be surging forward and the govt. in power didn't want the majority community to start worrying about its existence (it has good reason to do so, as Hindus have basically been wiped out from every Muslim majority region of South Asia)

By various accounts and projections, the Muslim population percentage in India now is around 17-18%.

There is this question of what definition one uses to define a Muslim to be a violent radical. By all accounts (including various polls) such percentages are low even in jihadist infested countries such as Pakistan.

But I think what's more relevant is the ability of violent Islamist groups to form and sustain themselves in a community. I have developed a new way of looking at this (this will be published in a 12,000 word academic journal article, due out in July -- for your information, let me tell you that I refer to a lot of data from the Pakistani Muslim immigrant community in the UK).

As someone with considerable exposure to the ongoing violent radicalization of Indian Muslims (as in my 2009 book), I can tell you that, Indian Muslims are now undergoing second generation process of radicalization. The Indian version of Tahreek-e-Taliban (modeled after the famous militant group in Pakistan) has just been formed in the central Indian city of Aurangabad. Few years ago the security agencies unearthed a massive arms haul there, that included extensive light arms, enough to equip a small militant group.

In 2008, India's National Security Advisor admitted that there are at least 800 terror cells operating, presumably in India's Muslim communities, supported by the likes of Pakistan and assisted by the Saudi funding. Indeed, India is primed to have its own version of Boko-Haram very soon. The underlying process are specific to Muslim communities and are assiduously cultivated by external Islamic governments (of course, the Western governments are busy blaming the local government(s) for what are mostly self-induced Muslim community-specific processes).

What this says is that the Western governments should get their act together and help India led by Mr. Modi, and not undermine him, as I believe they are primed to do (by trying to constantly put him on the defensive). That would be a strategic blunder.

Unless the current trends in Islamization are quickly and permanently reversed, we are looking at an India that's also going in the direction of Nigeria and more.

[davidbfpo]

Cited in small part:

What this says is that the Western governments should get their act together and help India led by Mr. Modi, and not undermine him, as I believe they are primed to do (by trying to constantly put him on the defensive). That would be a strategic blunder.

Unless the current trends in Islamization are quickly and permanently reversed, we are looking at an India that's also going in the direction of Nigeria and more.

I am not sure what would come from the West acting together to help the incoming, new Indian government - assuming they could act together. Yes there are some simple steps that can be done, although I am unconvinced they actually could undermine him. See this for a US viewpoint:http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed...519-story.html

From my faraway "armchair" the reported growth of Islamization seems tame alongside India's own 'small wars', none of which to my knowledge are realted to Islamization - if one excludes Kashmir. See:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2248

[MoorthyM]

Cited in small part:

I am not sure what would come from the West acting together to help the incoming, new Indian government - assuming they could act together. Yes there are some simple steps that can be done, although I am unconvinced they actually could undermine him. See this for a US viewpoint:http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed...519-story.html

From my faraway "armchair" the reported growth of Islamization seems tame alongside India's own 'small wars', none of which to my knowledge are realted to Islamization - if one excludes Kashmir. See:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2248

Public statements by Western high officials about the need to focus away from Mr. Modi's purported acts or in acts in 2002 Gujarat riots and directives to the State Dept. etc to do the same are among the things that should help.

The current metrics that are being used to characterize the onset of the so-called Islamization process are hardly robust IMO. And hence, what conventional wisdom says in this context needs to be taken with a pinch of salt.

As I have shown in my forthcoming work, sharia's popularity is probably by far the most appropriate metric. By this measure growth of radicalism in India is not tame at all. It is a juggernaut trending toward formation and sustaining of Islamist militant group all over India.

[carl]

Moorthy:

When you say Mr. Modi's gov will actively work to defang Pakistan, how do you think they will go about doing that?

It is something that must be done, probably the sooner the better, but it will be tricky.

[Dayuhan]

Public statements by Western high officials about the need to focus away from Mr. Modi's purported acts or in acts in 2002 Gujarat riots and directives to the State Dept. etc to do the same are among the things that should help.

That should help what?

Mr Modi himself could make that process easier by making clear, unequivocal statements to the effect that his government is committed to providing equal protection to all citizens, and that violence against minorities or majorities would absolutely not be tolerated. Of course such statements would have to be backed up with action to mean anything, but statements would be a start.

Expecting other countries to "focus away from Mr. Modi's purported acts or in acts in 2002 Gujarat riots" in the absence of any such effort from Mr Modi would be to effectively ask them to condone mass murder. The world should not pretend that Gujarat didn't happen, any more than they should pretend that Mumbai didn't happen.

As I have shown in my forthcoming work

Bit of confusion in the tenses there. "Have shown" is past, "forthcoming" is future. It's one or the other, not both.

...sharia's popularity is probably by far the most appropriate metric. By this measure growth of radicalism in India is not tame at all. It is a juggernaut trending toward formation and sustaining of Islamist militant group all over India.

Impossible to comment without seeing the work. Would you care to summarize the evidence, arguments, and recommendations?

Just to be clear: I do not think Indians should care what the US thinks, or submit policies for US review. I also do not think the Indians should expect automatic support for their policies or leaders from the US or any Western power.

[MoorthyM]

That should help what?

Mr Modi himself could make that process easier by making clear, unequivocal statements to the effect that his government is committed to providing equal protection to all citizens, and that violence against minorities or majorities would absolutely not be tolerated. Of course such statements would have to be backed up with action to mean anything, but statements would be a start.

Expecting other countries to "focus away from Mr. Modi's purported acts or in acts in 2002 Gujarat riots" in the absence of any such effort from Mr Modi would be to effectively ask them to condone mass murder. The world should not pretend that Gujarat didn't happen, any more than they should pretend that Mumbai didn't happen.

Bit of confusion in the tenses there. "Have shown" is past, "forthcoming" is future. It's one or the other, not both.

Impossible to comment without seeing the work. Would you care to summarize the evidence, arguments, and recommendations?

Just to be clear: I do not think Indians should care what the US thinks, or submit policies for US review. I also do not think the Indians should expect automatic support for their policies or leaders from the US or any Western power.

I couldn't agree more with just about everything you said.

If I were Mr. Modi, I would put it along these lines: Any form of ideological indoctrination that discourages citizens from embracing modern education and incites them into taking law into their won hands and trying to unlawfully enforce/impose rules on an ideological basis will not be tolerated, as are violence acts against all citizens.

I will just list the abstract of my upcoming scholarship:

Many militant groups around the world are purportedly fighting to institute sharia as the governing law of Muslims. However, very few scholars have studied the relationship between sharia and violence, presumably because the former is largely viewed as dealing with internal governance issues. This perspective has likely led to the West’s policy of accommodating political and community groups that seek to promote sharia. In this paper, I argue that public surveys in Muslim communities are ill-prepared to identify the potential links between sharia and violence, especially when the majority of poll respondents identify themselves as peace-loving Muslims who perceive sharia as divine law. Moreover, I identify a radicalized subpopulation of jihadist clerics that benefit from sharia’s popularity. Empirical data is presented regarding the growth of clerical power in Pakistan and elsewhere, aided in part by this popularity, which the clerics themselves have helped to nurture. In particular, the analysis suggests that jihadist clerics and militant groups leverage sharia’s esteem in order to advance a violent agenda.