Taming Pakistan: Modi Effect

[MoorthyM]

There is substantial disagreement over both the nature of American interests and the manner in which they are pursued, and what some see as failure to advance strategic interests may simply be a difference of opinion on what those interests are.

What constitute American interests are subjected to how the US establishment comes to understand the world we all live in. And this is where the problem starts for America (and others).

There are two major questions (among a few) of interest to us that come to define the civilization we are part of:

Do we understand how functional democracies are built and sustained?

Do we understand what causes Muslim radicalism?

Informed observers would concede that we do not know the answers to both.

Of course, if one asks our political scientists, they would tell you that these are complex issues subjected to various causes and influences.

As a physical scientist I would state a fundamental observation that complex causes are unlikely to lead to prolific and repeatable patterns. In other words, there are likely well-defined processes that might shed light on the above two questions.

The bottom line is that poorly understood phenomena of potential strategic significance lead to "difference of opinion" at every level -- from their perceived extent of significance to what to do about them.

[Dayuhan]

What constitute American interests are subjected to how the US establishment comes to understand the world we all live in. And this is where the problem starts for America (and others).

"American interests" are also defined, and continuously redefined, by competition among divergent interests and divergent perceptions of interest. That competition, and its rather ephemeral outcomes, are often baffling to Americans and utterly incomprehensible to non-Amercians, particularly those who are committed to a particular perception of interest and thus less able to see the possibility of competing interests.

There are two major questions (among a few) of interest to us that come to define the civilization we are part of:

Do we understand how functional democracies are built and sustained?

Do we understand what causes Muslim radicalism?

Informed observers would concede that we do not know the answers to both.

I am not convinced that the origin of Muslim radicalism constitutes a civilization-defining issue. I agree that we don't know the answers to those questions, and I suspect that any effort to propose simple, generic, or universally applicable answers to those questions is going to come up.

Of course, if one asks our political scientists, they would tell you that these are complex issues subjected to various causes and influences.

Yes, and they'd be right.

As a physical scientist I would state a fundamental observation that complex causes are unlikely to lead to prolific and repeatable patterns. In other words, there are likely well-defined processes that might shed light on the above two questions.

It's hard to read much history without observing that prolific and repeatable patterns often do have complex causes. An analogous example might be the spread of communist/socialist revolutionary movements in much of the formerly colonized world in the post WW2 decades. That was certainly a prolific and repeatable pattern, but anyone familiar with any of the movements in question knows the causes in any given case were far from simple or consistent. There were of course consistent patterns on the broadest scale, but attempts to extrapolate universal answers or solutions have rarely been of much use. Attempt to define simple, generic, or universal causes for broad geopolitical events are often satisfying but rarely useful.

The bottom line is that poorly understood phenomena of potential strategic significance lead to "difference of opinion" at every level -- from their perceived extent of significance to what to do about them.

Much confusion arises when people, often people with widely divergent views, assume that their own understanding is correct and everyone else's is flawed.

[Dayuhan]

Getting back to Modi...

Much of the suspicion of Modi in the West runs back to the 2002 Gujarat violence, and the widespread perception that Modi either tolerated or was directly complicit in the violence against Muslims.

Would you say that perception is inaccurate, that it is accurate but shouldn't be an issue, or something else?

If tension between India and Pakistan ratchets up and spills over into internal sectarian violence, would a Modi administration defend the rights of all citizens, or would it take sides?

[MoorthyM]

Getting back to Modi...

Much of the suspicion of Modi in the West runs back to the 2002 Gujarat violence, and the widespread perception that Modi either tolerated or was directly complicit in the violence against Muslims.

Would you say that perception is inaccurate, that it is accurate but shouldn't be an issue, or something else?

If tension between India and Pakistan ratchets up and spills over into internal sectarian violence, would a Modi administration defend the rights of all citizens, or would it take sides?

Please permit me to give you a backdrop:

From every Muslim majority region of South Asia most non-Muslims have been forcibly converted, killed or driven away to India. Many non-Muslim Indians are aware of this data and are apprehensive for the following reason: Indian Muslims, who were 10% of the population in 1947, now constitute around 25% of the Indian children under the age of five and they are being rapidly radicalized.

In the long-term, non-Muslim Indians are likely facing extermination in the hands of Islamist forces.

Given this, those who keep on harping Mr. Modi's handling of the 2002 riots in his state, are like those who kept highlighting the acts of some Jews who retaliated against the Nazis, and bypass looking at the methodical Nazi extermination of the Jews.

A competent leader of India must work to liberate India's Muslims from the regressive forces within the community, not to appease or placate them as the previous governments have done.

Do you really think the Indians should worry about others think or say?

[Dayuhan]

Given this, those who keep on harping Mr. Modi's handling of the 2002 riots in his state, are like those who kept highlighting the acts of some Jews who retaliated against the Nazis, and bypass looking at the methodical Nazi extermination of the Jews.

That analogy will be seen by many as strained beyond the breaking point, and would be a tough sell in Western policy circles.

A competent leader of India must work to liberate India's Muslims from the regressive forces within the community, not to appease or placate them as the previous governments have done.

The indiscriminate slaughter of civilians seems a peculiar recipe for liberation, and a less than effective way of fighting radicalism, but that is of course an outsider's view.

Do you really think the Indians should worry about others think or say?

That's up to them. If you want to know why western governments see Modi as a risk and a threat rather than an opportunity, or why they will be less than enthusiastic about joining or supporting a crusade against Pakistan, you have to look at the perceived connection to sectarian violence as a significant factor in shaping that attitude. Whether or not anyone wants to "worry about" it is their own concern. Again, the idea that indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians is a legitimate or effective response to a perceived threat may pass with Modi and it may pass with you, but it's going to be a tough sell in the international public opinion arena. If governments believe that Modi may provoke outright war with Pakistan or that he may deflect anger at Pakistan onto Muslim civilians, they are going to keep his government at arm's length or beyond. Again, whether or not that's something to worry about depends on who's doing the worrying. If India chooses to walk that path, that's their choice. If others choose not to walk that path with them, that's their choice, and it's only to be expected.

Personally, as I said above, I'd suggest waiting and seeing what he actually does before rushing to judgment, but given the past I'd expect that waiting period to be marked by a fair degree of distance.

Also as above, I suspect that Modi's approach to Pakistan and Islam will be less significant in the long run than his response to the challenges of building India's infrastructure, reining in corruption and bureaucratic interference with business, and spreading the benefits of growth outside the urban centers and the urban elite. We'll see what happens.

[MoorthyM]

The indiscriminate slaughter of civilians seems a peculiar recipe for liberation, and a less than effective way of fighting radicalism, but that is of course an outsider's view.

Also as above, I suspect that Modi's approach to Pakistan and Islam will be less significant in the long run than his response to the challenges of building India's infrastructure, reining in corruption and bureaucratic interference with business, and spreading the benefits of growth outside the urban centers and the urban elite. We'll see what happens.

You are putting words in my mouth. I am not even remotely suggesting anything along these lines. No one in their right mind would slaughter civilians when they, too, are victims of radicals.

I can claim to have certain level of bonafides, with a book and a forthcoming academic scholarship in that the radicalization and socioeconomic stagnation of the Muslim communities in many parts of the world (including South Asia) are mostly self-induced. In fact, I believe that we can identify specific processes and entities behind it. Only in this context I used the word liberation. The point is the state has the right to act to secure the rights of Muslim minorities (as with anyone) on the basis of human rights and religious freedom.

That said, I agree with you that Mr. Modi's initial few years of focus is likely to be, and perhaps should be, development. But that alone, obviously, will not make India's growing Muslim radicalism problem go away all by itself.

[Dayuhan]

No one in their right mind would slaughter civilians when they, too, are victims of radicals.

Yes, and that is the problem: the slaughter occurred, and the response of the state government, under Mr Modi's control, was perceived as being either grossly inadequate or actively complicit. That makes people wonder if Modu is, in your words, in his right mind, and it makes governments reluctant to get to close to him.

Sectarian violence can be an opportunity to challenge a radical narrative or reinforce it, depending on how government responds. If government moves in to promptly and effectively restore order, protect the innocent, and punish the guilty regardless of affiliation, the radical narrative is weakened. If government is perceived to be taking sides, the radical narrative is enhanced and given credibility.

This is to a large extent what happened in Mindanao in the early 70s: violence initially broke out between rival militias from the indigenous Muslim and settler Christian populations, with plenty of blame on both sides. Government had a brief opportunity to stay neutral. They failed to take it: instead they took the side of the settler population, kicking of a war that's been running sporadically ever since. It was a bad move.

I can claim to have certain level of bonafides, with a book and a forthcoming academic scholarship in that the radicalization and socioeconomic stagnation of the Muslim communities in many parts of the world (including South Asia) are mostly self-induced. In fact, I believe that we can identify specific processes and entities behind it. Only in this context I used the word liberation. The point is the state has the right to act to secure the rights of Muslim minorities (as with anyone) on the basis of human rights and religious freedom.

That said, I agree with you that Mr. Modi's initial few years of focus is likely to be, and perhaps should be, development. But that alone, obviously, will not make India's growing Muslim radicalism problem go away all by itself.

No, it won't but economic opportunity, especially for the critical young male demographic bracket, is always a useful element of any challenge to radicalism. So is a very clear effort to provide equal services and equal access to justice for minorities that consider themselves aggrieved.

What specific policies to you believe Modi will adopt to challenge domestic Islamic radicalism, and what policies would you suggest that he adopt? I'm also curious to see how he'll approach the Naxalite/Maoist insurgencies, but that of course is another topic!

[JMA]

Do you really think the Indians should worry about others think or say?

Of course not... They should act in their own best interests regardless (much like Americans do).

Advice from the US is best ignored - probably doing the exact opposite would be the best course of action.

If India has a problem it is that it lacks the necessary aggression to really establish itself as a real Power in the region.

[MoorthyM]

If India has a problem it is that it lacks the necessary aggression to really establish itself as a real Power in the region.

You are so correct about the past. I wrote an article about 10 years ago titled "Slaves, Servants and Rulers." The Indian society now has a ruling class that can and will assert itself. Mr. Modi, I believe, represents them.

[JMA]

"American interests" are also defined, and continuously redefined, by competition among divergent interests and divergent perceptions of interest. That competition, and its rather ephemeral outcomes, are often baffling to Americans and utterly incomprehensible to non-Amercians, particularly those who are committed to a particular perception of interest and thus less able to see the possibility of competing interests.

Interesting way of explaining what observers across the world see as wild swings in policy and perceived "interests" with every change of President.

You totaly miss the point that it is the near total lack of policy continuity that serves neither the "national interests" of America nor the interests of the countries and regions on the receiving end of this lunacy.

[Dayuhan]

Interesting way of explaining what observers across the world see as wild swings in policy and perceived "interests" with every change of President.

You totaly miss the point that it is the near total lack of policy continuity that serves neither the "national interests" of America nor the interests of the countries and regions on the receiving end of this lunacy.

Policy continuity has both positive and negative sides. Leaders often become personally invested in policies and find it difficult to accept that they aren't working. A new administration can be an opportunity to change direction and discard ineffective policies. Of course it doesn't always work that way, but policy continuity is not a universal good, especially if an existing policy involves beating one's head against walls, trying to "install" democracies in foreign countries, or other episodic lunacies.

In recent years at least the policy shifts are often less radical than they are sometimes cracked up to be: politicians of both parties have to play from the same book of options, and that book is often pretty limited, in the real world at least. Certainly the American left expressed vast disappointment with what they perceived as Obama's policy continuities with the previous administration.

In any event, policy discontinuity is a liability inherent in democracy, so we've little choice but to live with it. Whether or not that serves American interests depends on how you define American interests, and those who are deeply attached to their own preferred definitions sometimes find it difficult to accept that competing definitions are equally legitimate, or that the populace the US government is tasked to represent does not share their definitions.

PS: Issue probably best pursued on another thread before David comes along and reminds us (correctly) that it's straying off topic.

[JMA]

This is a classic response (and a keeper).

As you live outside the US one would think that you would be able to establish how the world sees American foreign policy actions (or interference).

There is a simple reason why the US 'empire' will last a short 75 years and that is because the US are both unable and unwilling to understand the realities of the world they live and see everything through myopic and parochial eyes.

You really expect the world which has been subjected to the ravages resulting from the incompetent foreign policy adventures of the US to be understanding of the US's domestic challenges (which you list)?

These comments are Germaine to this discussion as unfortunately the US still the power to interfere and really screw things up in the subcontinent.

Policy continuity has both positive and negative sides. Leaders often become personally invested in policies and find it difficult to accept that they aren't working. A new administration can be an opportunity to change direction and discard ineffective policies. Of course it doesn't always work that way, but policy continuity is not a universal good, especially if an existing policy involves beating one's head against walls, trying to "install" democracies in foreign countries, or other episodic lunacies.

In recent years at least the policy shifts are often less radical than they are sometimes cracked up to be: politicians of both parties have to play from the same book of options, and that book is often pretty limited, in the real world at least. Certainly the American left expressed vast disappointment with what they perceived as Obama's policy continuities with the previous administration.

In any event, policy discontinuity is a liability inherent in democracy, so we've little choice but to live with it. Whether or not that serves American interests depends on how you define American interests, and those who are deeply attached to their own preferred definitions sometimes find it difficult to accept that competing definitions are equally legitimate, or that the populace the US government is tasked to represent does not share their definitions.

PS: Issue probably best pursued on another thread before David comes along and reminds us (correctly) that it's straying off topic.

[Dayuhan]

As you live outside the US one would think that you would be able to establish how the world sees American foreign policy actions (or interference).

What I've been able to establish is that practically everyone in the world "knows" what's best for the US and "knows" what the US ought to do, and that practically everyone in the world is upset that the Americans don't do what they think the Americans ought to do. Of course all of these opinions are different, often widely divergent, and generally completely incompatible. You can hardly walk into a bar or an internet forum on this planet without hearing some blowhard discoursing at length on what the Americans ought to do and how the Americans are such fools for not following the prescription offered by the blowhard. Of course all of the blowhards have different prescriptions and most of them are grossly inconsistent with reality, but one gets used to that. I've occasionally introduced myself as Canadian just to escape the invariable lecture.

There is a simple reason why the US 'empire' will last a short 75 years and that is because the US are both unable and unwilling to understand the realities of the world they live and see everything through myopic and parochial eyes.

Non-Americans also see the world, and America, through their own parochial and often myopic eyes.

I don't think there ever was an "American Empire" in any literal or meaningful sense, and I don't think that American primacy was necessarily a good thing for America or the world. In any event the US no longer enjoys economic primacy (a good thing; a unipolar global economy is a very unstable thing) and a power that does not have economic primacy cannot reasonably aspire to military primacy, so there will have to be adaptation. Those who fail to adapt don't survive.

You really expect the world which has been subjected to the ravages resulting from the incompetent foreign policy adventures of the US to be understanding of the US's domestic challenges (which you list)?

The world can understand the domestic realities of the US or not, as it pleases. Just as it would be silly for India to submit it's policies to American review (or to expect automatic American support for its policies and leaders), it would be equally silly for the US to submit its own policies for foreign review and approval. Those outside the US (and most of those inside it) need to accept that the US government will not always do what they want. That would of course be impossible even if the US tried to do what they want, because they all have different ideas about what the US ought to do... and of course they all "know" that their particular slice of myopia and parochialism is the true and right one.

These comments are Germaine to this discussion as unfortunately the US still the power to interfere and really screw things up in the subcontinent.

The subcontinent also retains the power to screw things up on its own, although when they do somebody somewhere will invariably find a way to blame it on the US. Some things are inevitable...

[Ray]

BJP to invite Nawaz Sharif and other leaders for oath taking ceremony

http://www.google.com/gwt/x?source=s...ct=np&whp=3252

[Ray]

On taking the Muslim along, I think more than words by Modi, his actions should speak for itself.

Even as a Chief Minister, he did not make any policy religion specific. It was for all.

It maybe interesting to note that there are more Muslim policemen in Gujarat than any State in India!

It is time for Indians to think as being Indians, than live in the old Vote Bank formula that sustained the political parties on issue that divided each other on the basis of religion, caste, community, language etc.