A Case Against Battle Drill Six

[VMI_Marine]

Here is an older article that addresses the problem as well. This one is from the JRTC perspective. I love the quote at the beginning, which is from the fighting in Aachen in Sept 1944:

"(Streetfighting) is a bad misnomer, because the last place you see any sane man is in a street where every yard is usually covered by a well-sited machine gun. It should be called house-to-house fighting, which it literally is."

--Denis Johnston, BBC Correspondent, On the Front Lines, John Ellis, pg 90

STREETFIGHTING: The Rifle Platoon in MOUT

[Schmedlap]

I no longer have AKO access, so I could not read the article, but I read the comments and agree with most regarding the train how to think versus what to think and the use of BD 6 as a training tool.

The biggest downside that I have seen when some units conduct MOUT training is that they act as though they are doing something completely different from non-MOUT training. I have had to emphasize to numerous junior leaders that the complement to MOUT is MOT. The former is urban and the latter is not. (That rhymes). You're still maneuvering over terrain. It just happens to be urban terrain. They tended to get too focused on the stack and room clearing and start losing sight of the fact that they were maneuvering across terrain, often forgetting everything that they've ever learned about IMT, tactical movement as a member of a fire team, and the basics of suppressive fire and bounding. They don't forget that stuff when clearing a bunker, but seem to forget it when it comes to clearing a room. For me, that was always the red flag that told me that the leaders were not getting it.

I guess my point is that BD 6 is a useful training tool, but that a significant number of leaders do not realize that it is a tool. They see it as some magical collective task that will make their units lethal. For example, one of the last live fire exercises that my unit did prior to OIF III was a "shoothouse" exercise that consisted of nothing more than 4 guys stacking outside of the room, entering, engaging targets while moving to their points of domination, declaring the room clear, then clearing their weapons and walking out. It never progressed to the squad level or beyond. That was partly due to absurd range restrictions, but largely due to a fundamental misunderstanding of the value and purpose of the drill. Clearing the room, while dangerous and crap-your-pants scary, is the easy part.

Fortunately, I saw dramatic improvement after they got some OJT in OIF. And by "improvement" I mean that clearing rooms largely amounted to verifying that the enemy had been killed by the SBF as the assault element entered the building.

[Ken White]

over and over sets up an easily exploited pattern. I always appreciated it when the evil enema displayed patterns in their futile attempts to shorten my days...

[William F. Owen]

For example, one of the last live fire exercises that my unit did prior to OIF III was a "shoothouse" exercise that consisted of nothing more than 4 guys stacking outside of the room, entering, engaging targets while moving to their points of domination, declaring the room clear, then clearing their weapons and walking out. It never progressed to the squad level or beyond. That was partly due to absurd range restrictions, but largely due to a fundamental misunderstanding of the value and purpose of the drill. Clearing the room, while dangerous and crap-your-pants scary, is the easy part.

Fortunately, I saw dramatic improvement after they got some OJT in OIF. And by "improvement" I mean that clearing rooms largely amounted to verifying that the enemy had been killed by the SBF as the assault element entered the building.

I agree on so many levels!

[reed11b]

STREETFIGHTING: The Rifle Platoon in MOUT

The mighty mighty republic of Cortinia!! I fought them often in my days as an airborne paratrooper. Crafty devils they were. Ah the memories

[Cavguy]

I read the BD 6 article too late - and it cost me. When I was a CO CDR I decided to enter and clear a house, which resulted in one of my SSG's KIA. He later received the Silver Star, posthumously.

For the story, read this article from the March issue of ARMY magazine below, compiled by the CompanyCommand.mil Team at West Point.

I'm the B/2-37 AR vignette.

In May 2006, elements of my company and Iraqi police were engaged in a conflict with an unknown number of gunmen located in a house on the outside of town.

.....

I arrived and dismounted on the ground with a squad-sized element of engineers and infantrymen. After receiving heavy small-arms fire, I authorized a section of M1 Abrams and an M2 Bradley to open fire on the house. They fired eight tank rounds and about 100 rounds of 25 mm into the structure, severely damaging it. The small-arms fire ceased, and I decided to lead my two teams to clear the single-story house. My battalion commander offered to let me employ Hellfire air-to-ground missiles from some AH-64s that were now on station to finish the job, but I waived off, trying to contain any collateral damage, and my troops were already inside the SDZ zone] of the weapon. So I continued with the plan to do room-by-room house clearing.

One of my squad leaders, SSG Legaspi, pulled me aside and asked me to let him lead the entry team and for me to follow in the second team. We also had about 10 Iraqi police with us. We advanced on the house and threw some grenades inside to prepare for entry. After they detonated, SSG Legaspi’s team began entering the house and clearing the first rooms. The IPs cowered and refused to enter, so I led the second team in, flanking around the side of the house. As SSG Legaspi led his men into the rear first floor room, shots rang out, and I watched in horror as SSG Legaspi collapsed on the floor about 10 feet in front of my position. The Soldier behind him was pinned by fire behind a pillar and screaming for help. I was stunned—one of my Soldiers just got hit, another was trapped, and the only way to get to either of them was to traverse the same open area that they just got shot in. Not a good set of options.

.....

A few weeks later, a partner commander was in a similar situation. Instead of charging in, he used police tactics and brought in the TPT [tactical psychological-operations team] truck to demand surrender, which the insurgents eventually did. I immediately began kicking myself. Why hadn’t I done that? Or, why hadn’t I dropped a bomb to begin with since my commander was willing? I kept doing my mental AAR, and each time I found myself wanting. Soon after, I read an article in Infantry Magazine arguing against the current training for house entry—that it was getting too many people killed because the extensive training for it makes it a first—rather than a last—option to many commanders.

[Rex Brynen]

I'm the B/2-37 AR vignette.

Thoughtful, striking piece, Niel.

[MikeF]

Neil, thanks for the example. Don't second guess yourself, s*** happens in combat. At least you made a decision.

As Ken said,

over and over sets up an easily exploited pattern. I always appreciated it when the evil enema displayed patterns in their futile attempts to shorten my days

We almost learned the hard way that routine becomes deadly. In early 2007, the threat changed inside the target house. The enemy learned not to fight directly. Instead, they would rig the entire house to blow.

For a time, we mastered the art of battle drill six. We lived by the mantra that "slow is smooth and smooth is fast." My teams could flow through a town seamlessly.

During clearance operations in the DRV, I chose an abandoned home to strong point. To date, we had cleared over 400 homes. Given the location and vantage point, it was key terrain. The location seemed ideal. It was all too inviting. Unfortunately, the enemy identified it as well.

After we secured the house, I had a platoon inside establishing our defense and a platoon outside consolidating. Still something felt odd about the house. In the past 48 hours, we had lost 4 paratroopers to a suicide bomber and discovered an EFP production facility.

An alert NCO continued to search discovering a wire hidden under a rug leading to a hidden basement. Inside the basement, the receiver flashed connected to over 1000lbs of explosives. Thankfully, the det cord was flawed. I would have lost at least 15 soldiers.

Another unit was not so lucky and lost 10 soldiers.

Afterwards, we adopted the crawl approach to clearing.

There is no golden egg with TTPs in sustained COIN. BD6 is not a thing of the past. The key is to be erratic, innovative, and decisive. Sometimes you storm the house; sometimes you call TPTs for surrender; sometimes you blow the house up. As long as you are anything but predictable.

We mastered a similar TTP for driving- always change the tempo. Sometimes we bounded; sometimes we sped; sometimes we crawled.

In any case, the enemy was perplexed and the casualty rate decreased.

v/r

Mike

[Tom Odom]

Neil,

Virtually the same scenario is what prompted the writing of Nightmare on Wazir Street using Duffer's Drift.

Tom

[120mm]

Neil, thanks for the example. Don't second guess yourself, s*** happens in combat. At least you made a decision.

As Ken said,



We almost learned the hard way that routine becomes deadly. In early 2007, the threat changed inside the target house. The enemy learned not to fight directly. Instead, they would rig the entire house to blow.

For a time, we mastered the art of battle drill six. We lived by the mantra that "slow is smooth and smooth is fast." My teams could flow through a town seamlessly.

During clearance operations in the DRV, I chose an abandoned home to strong point. To date, we had cleared over 400 homes. Given the location and vantage point, it was key terrain. The location seemed ideal. It was all too inviting. Unfortunately, the enemy identified it as well.

After we secured the house, I had a platoon inside establishing our defense and a platoon outside consolidating. Still something felt odd about the house. In the past 48 hours, we had lost 4 paratroopers to a suicide bomber and discovered an EFP production facility.

An alert NCO continued to search discovering a wire hidden under a rug leading to a hidden basement. Inside the basement, the receiver flashed connected to over 1000lbs of explosives. Thankfully, the det cord was flawed. I would have lost at least 15 soldiers.

Another unit was not so lucky and lost 10 soldiers.

Afterwards, we adopted the crawl approach to clearing.

There is no golden egg with TTPs in sustained COIN. BD6 is not a thing of the past. The key is to be erratic, innovative, and decisive. Sometimes you storm the house; sometimes you call TPTs for surrender; sometimes you blow the house up. As long as you are anything but predictable.

We mastered a similar TTP for driving- always change the tempo. Sometimes we bounded; sometimes we sped; sometimes we crawled.

In any case, the enemy was perplexed and the casualty rate decreased.

v/r

Mike

I think I'm going to frame that and keep it. Smart. Very smart.

[Tom Odom]

Gents,

I am lookig at updating Handbook 03-04 the Small Unit Leaders Guide to Urban Operations in the next year.

I have asked on of the OC divisions to take it on. But I would love to get direct input from the field. Vignettes are great, especially if tied to TTPs.

If you have something send me a PM and I will send an email address.

Best

Tom

[VMI_Marine]

Lt Ackerman's article Relearning Stormtroop Tactics talks about isolating strong points and reducing them with supporting assets:

After finding the enemy's position, the infantry would make contact, isolate and suppress the objective, and then either bring up a tank or a D-9 bulldozer to reduce the position.

The key point that I learned last year from the Army is that in a non-kinetic environment, the same idea still applies; only now the supporting assets brought up to "reduce" the strongpoint are an interpreter and/or psyops team.

Mike and Neil, thanks for sharing your experiences.