Army wants to get rid of M113s
I know that General Gavin's name and the M113 have no connection, but I saw Mike Sparks' name, along with his standard MO, in this thread and thought that he might like read the story link below.
I sincerely hope that Mike uses this news (http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/0...icles_072108w/) to reinvent himself and do something a little more productive. The potential is there...
This thread should die - but when it comes to mikey - it is a slow and painful death. If only he had passed his swim test as a Marine 2nd Lt we might have been spared all the pain and agony of his Internet rants and raves.
Hell hath no fury like a Marine scorned...
“…I know it when I see it.”
“…I know it when I see it.”
What Sparks' doesn't get - from our about page:
“Small Wars” is an imperfect term used to describe a broad spectrum of spirited continuation of politics by other means, falling somewhere in the middle bit of the continuum between feisty diplomatic words and global thermonuclear war. The Small Wars Journal embraces that imperfection.
Just as friendly fire isn’t, there isn’t necessarily anything small about a Small War.
The term “Small War” either encompasses or overlaps with a number of familiar terms such as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, support and stability operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and many flavors of intervention. Operations such as noncombatant evacuation, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance will often either be a part of a Small War, or have a Small Wars feel to them. Small Wars involve a wide spectrum of specialized tactical, technical, social, and cultural skills and expertise, requiring great ingenuity from their practitioners. The Small Wars Manual (a wonderful resource, unfortunately more often referred to than read) notes that:
Small Wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small Wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.
The “three block war” construct employed by General Krulak is exceptionally useful in describing the tactical and operational challenges of a Small War and of many urban operations. Its only shortcoming is that is so useful that it is often mistaken as a definition or as a type of operation.
We’d like to deploy a primer on Small Wars that provides more depth than this brief section. Your suggestions and contributions of content are welcome.
Originally Posted by SWJED
Dave, then start with Gavin without Sparks. Gavin called them Brush fire wars...and he also said that the USMC would be in an excellant position to fight them because of their forward deployment as a Sea based force. I met Gavin 3 times before his death(at his second home in Winter Park,Fl.) and he always spoke highly of the USMC in person and in his writings. I guess my point is don't throw the baby out with the bathwater.
If I may venture an opening line:
"Small Wars are neither small or wars in terms of relative and conventional understanding. Despite the fact that both the words are inaccurate and misleading, but they are useful...."
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I am certainly no defender of Mike Sparks, (who ever and how ever many people he may be) and he/they is/are his/their own worst enemy/ies, but the issues he/they raises are sometimes deserving of careful study. (and some are moon screamer out there!)
The M113 fiasco is his best known effort. Some of issues Mike raises (usually in error and usually over stated) ask some very serious questions about issues that reside at the very heart of military thought, and its relationships with technology and industry - and even though he comes off as some ranting extremist, a lot of his ideas, stripped of their emotional and abusive content, are more main stream than is comfortable for many.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Having to give credit where credit is due, Mike Sparks is at least due that as well as a few other things. As to the Moon Screamers, it goes without saying that if such flubs didn't occurr with depressing and unsettling regularity, then Sparks et al. wouldn't have much credibility. Extremes beget their opposites.
Giving credit where credit is due: Sparks' proposal to mechanize the combat support companies in parachute battalions doesn't seem outlandish to me. Some airborne forces have light tracked armor but the US makes do with up-armored Hummers.
I believe Sparks' idea was that the company's vehicles could continue to be used as platforms for crew served weapons (like the Hummers are now), transport one of the rifle companies, or serve as something like a cav troop of sorts for the battalion commander. I may not be understanding that exactly right, but I think that's more or less what he envisioned.
So, assuming that the M113 isn't the best option for that role, what light tracked armor would be suitable that can be airdropped? The German Weisel? Something else?
There are some cav types on this board who should have some good ideas. I never experienced anything heavier than leather personel carriers or the old 1/4 ton jeeps, so I have no idea what can or can't be airdropped and what the logistical problems are.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
On Airborne Cavalry
I've served in heavy and light (airborne) units in combat.
With tongue partially in cheek, here's my voice- platform is irrelevant.
For an airfield seizure, scouts should jump in (dismounted) prior to main body (old LRSD mission). Scouts survey subsequent drop zones for enemy activity providing brigade commander accurate picture of DZ.
After infantry seizes airfields, planes land and reconnaissance vehicles exit the aircraft...no air drop...just a landing. Then, scouts mount and expand the BCT's terrain.
I know this is short, but it's valid. Too many old NCO's traded stories of failed efforts to drop an LRAS and scout HMMWV. The initial shock of an airborne seizure provides the needed time to land recon vehicles....
Oh BTW, the M113 is not a recon vehicle. I'd prefer a Harley or a gater with a .240 mounted over an M113.
I think we had it right with the XVIIth Airborne concept: 82nd BCT seizes airfield followed by a mechanize IRC from 3ID (tank platoon/bradley platoon with HQ) concept.
It works.
v/r
Mike
Last edited by MikeF; 08-03-2008 at 09:34 PM.
Concept in the 70s was to LAPES (low altitude parachute extraction system) an M551 Sheridan battalion in for the "heavy element" rather than heavy drop, which was tried and did work but not as reliably as LAPSE. That is if the C130 crews got LAPES approach --speed, altitude, and attitude of AC correct. This concept goes back into the 50s and 60s. According to global security LAPES is no longer an active TTP
Of course we were no where near as well equipped for this as the Soviets with the BMD and BMP. They had a larger tolerance for drop associated losses.
Best
Tom
Scouts without...
Can't talk to either of them but my steed in the early 60s was an M151 that survived ten heavy drops -- and I can put a 151 most places you can put a track and a lot of places you won't put either a no ground clearance Gator or a heavy Harley...That said, the 113, particularly with a Soucy track, is a good scout vehicle, it's small, fast, reliable and fairly quiet. The 114 was even better in it's recommended upgrade -- the problem is that the US Army does not want a Scout vehicle. Every attempt to buy one has foundered.Oh BTW, the M113 is not a recon vehicle. I'd prefer a Harley or a gater with a .240 mounted over an M113.
The Armor community is too wedded to the northern Europe end of WW II version of reconnaissance -- "We're too impatient to do recon by stealth, we just got out looking for trouble and to do that, you have to have Armor." There's some merit to that idea in some situations but it doesn't have to be that way and it's rarely the best way.True -- for some situations; METT-TC again rears its pretty little head...I think we had it right with the XVIIth Airborne concept: 82nd BCT seizes airfield followed by a mechanize IRC from 3ID (tank platoon/bradley platoon with HQ) concept...It works.
I was somewhat involved in the original Mike Sparks group discussion on this, and I am certainly not claiming credit for anything, but what it came down to was that it simply made no sense to try and drop an M-113 equipped infantry battalion. What did seem to have merit was adding a small number of M-113s to provide whatever basic capability they brought to the party.
What is an M113?? There is vast difference between the original A1 and the some of the stuff that has recently been prototyped by RAFAEL and others. Some iterations are incredibly capable, but they tip the scales at >18,000kgSo, assuming that the M113 isn't the best option for that role, what light tracked armor would be suitable that can be airdropped? The German Weisel? Something else?
There are some cav types on this board who should have some good ideas. I never experienced anything heavier than leather personel carriers or the old 1/4 ton jeeps, so I have no idea what can or can't be airdropped and what the logistical problems are.
Personally, for modern operations, I think it is generally waste of time to airdrop an AFV. Yes, everyone can come up with a mission where it may have to be done, but I submit they are/will become incredibly rare and the effort does not match the reward.
That being said, there is massive and obvious merit in creating a reasonably armoured vehicle that is as light as possible, with a reduce signature and small logistic foot print. For various reasons the M113 is not an ideal starting point. Personally I favour the UK CVR-T as the basis for future thinking in relation to tracked vehicles.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I would question airborne operations above an LRS/SOF team level at all.
If you boil away all the hype, the best reason I can think of to retain airborne cabilities, is that it preserves the only light infantry the US Army is apparently capable of keeping. If you take away the airborne-specific requirements, our "light" infantry goes to war in 10 foot tall, 140 ton vehicles that cannot travel off-road. WITH reflective belts on, of course.
(I am being partially sarcastic, of course.)
IMO, we can project power properly, or we cannot. The US will never actually put a large unit at risk, doing Airborne ops properly, so they serve no practical purpose, except to preserve the "Airborne Spirit", IMO.
Now that I've ticked off my Airborne friends, it's time to go after my fellow Cavalrymen: Frankly, it's been about the vehicle for too long. Recon needs to become a mission.
I would recommend that CAV be divorced, permanently, from the Armor community, and become it's own deal. I'd tear MI completely down, and restructure collection, analysis and dissemination into a new branch.
I've found more than once, that there is a bit of "Sparky" in me, as well....
Last edited by 120mm; 08-06-2008 at 05:16 AM.
You're entitled to your opinion
even if you are wrong...I've discovered that use of the word never with respect to the US is not a good idea. We have surprised a number of people over the years by doing things we were not supposed to do. As I just told Reed on another thread, Omar Bradley in 1949 said there'd never be another major amphibious operation -- and a year so later, there I was at Inchon...IMO, we can project power properly, or we cannot. The US will never actually put a large unit at risk, doing Airborne ops properly, so they serve no practical purpose, except to preserve the "Airborne Spirit", IMO.
Never's not a good word.
Be that as it may, a lot of folks question parachute units just as you do. I've been listening to 'em for about fifty or more years -- and the units are still here because, as expensive as they are, they offer a capability that cannot at this time be matched in any other way. As to the "Airborne Spirit" there's some truth in that; not least in that the kids know three things; they stand an excellent chance in a combat jump of never getting to the ground alive (and they'll still go); they are probably going to fight outnumbered and surrounded and the other guy better watch out (Hey, long as they believe, who am I to argue...); and like Privates in every Army in the world, they get covered up with manure daily; like Privates in every Army in the world, they dig out and smile -- they just know they do it faster and smile bigger than most.As an old Cav Guy (whose last TCPC run was in an M41A1C...), I totally and wholeheartedly agree with that.Now that I've ticked off my Airborne friends, it's time to go after my fellow Cavalrymen: Frankly, it's been about the vehicle for too long. Recon needs to become a mission.
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks