Originally Posted by
OUTLAW 09
This article was recently posted to a blog site that I tend to really follow for it's open source analysis work which started with MH17.
IF we take the concept of the Russian arguments of NATO expansion, "humiliation", the US caused everything by their unipolar approach, the West wants to keep Russia down for what they really are-- a smoke screen of disinformation---we are left with two core Russian reasons for the annexation of Crimea and the current attempted annexation of eastern Ukraine;
1. an internal political reason---the Maidan civil society efforts to overthrow massive corruption demanding transparent rule of law and good governance AND
2. the argument below which actually is far more enlightening ie pure MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX reasons.
While 5 pages long it is easy to cut and paste-well worth the read.
Russia depends on Ukraine to be able to fulfill it's military aspirations
Introduction
The top-level analysis of Russia's motivations to intervene in Ukrainian affairs is provided in [1]. Currently there is almost a consensus on the matter by now, namely pointing at:
1.the imperial aspirations of the Russian federation and Vladimir Putin,
2.the need to protect Russian-speaking compatriots,
3.fear of NATO expansion into Ukraine, which will give Russia an extra 2.000 kms of border with NATO.
Imperial aspirations
The imperial inspirations of Vladimir Putin are driven by the internal Russian forces, which are worth a separate analysis (but not given here).
Protecting Russian-speakers
As of the Russian-speaking compatriots, the realities are somewhat different. The real divide in Ukraine is between people who associate themselves with Ukrainian historic and cultural tradition, and the ones who associate with Russian or Soviet one, regardless of the spoken language [2].
NATO expansion
Concerns about NATO expansion also has a different background. Russia already has a common border with NATO, in the Baltic states, where NATO is 200-300 kilometers away from vital Russian centers, and at the far north. We believe that the real source of the Russia's concern is that while it has sufficient resources to effectively counter the military threat from the border with the Baltic states and Norway, it has no economic and military resources to adequately address such a threat if it will be coming from an additional 2.000 kms long common border with Ukraine.
Consider that Russia has 60.900 kms of border to protect, a 144 million population and $2,6 trillion GDP. Maintaining the armed forces which can guarantee national security in such situation is beyond Russia's demographic and economic capabilities, unless it surrounds itself with buffer states like Belarus or Kazakhstan.
Some myths busted
Myth 1: Russian army is sufficient to serve it's imperial ambitions
Russian conventional armed forces are also insufficient to serve the needs of its expansion using military force. At the height of the confrontation in Ukraine Russia had to pull troops from the places as remote as Norwegian border of Novosibirsk to form the strike force, and still could not expect for “blitzkrieg” against Ukraine. This military aspect of the balance of power is almost completely overlooked by the expert community, which tends to believe that Russia cannot be defeated on the ground.
Myth 2: Ukraine is dependent on the Russian market
Another myth which needs to be addressed is the story of critical dependence of Ukraine on the Russian market. Russia accounts for 29,6% of Ukraine's external trade, including 27,9% of export, and 31,1% of import by Ukraine. From the standpoint of the trade balance (according to Russian Ministry of Economic Development), 65% of Russian export to Ukraine are mineral resources, predominantly natural gas; 11,3% are machinery, tools, and transportation vehicles, 8% are chemicals, and 6,9% are products of metallurgy. Ukrainian export to Russia includes: machinery – 39,2%, products of metallurgy 21,3%, food products – 11,4%, chemicals 10,8%, and mineral products 7,6%.
Ukraine has negative trade balance with Russia because of the import of natural gas, but still remains the principal “tool shop” for Russian industry, including its military sector. Russia still remains supplier of raw materials and fossil fuels for Ukraine, as it was during the Soviet era.
If the gas imports is eliminated from the trade balance between two countries, Ukraine becomes big net exporter to Russia.
Myth 3: Ukraine cannot survive without gas from Russia
Meanwhile a successful experiment of operation of the Ukrainian trunk and distribution gas pipelines, which Ukraine was forced to do during the 2009 winter demonstrated that it is possible in principle for the Ukrainian economy to survive without importing natural gas from Russia. After 2009 Europe developed a series of gas pipeline interconnectors, which allow to maneuver natural gas supply inside EU, and gradually switch from Russian gas supply to receiving the necessary amounts of natural gas from Qatar, US, Norway, and UK. This system is connected to Ukrainian pipelines. As the conflict in the Eastern Ukraine unfolded Russia terminated gas supply to Ukraine (July 2014). Ukraine managed to negotiate replacement of 60% of Russian natural gas imports by the gas supply from the western direction already, without putting Russian gas supply to Europe at any risk.
This certainly could be done earlier, but gas trade between two countries was the most corrupt area of trade relations between Russia and Ukraine, with corruption revenues allegedly traveling to the very top of political establishment in Kyiv and in Moscow. In this regard the gas trade between Russia and Ukraine is a showcase of the devastating impact of corruption on the economy, with machinery (including military) products being the lead exported item.
Myth 4: Russia is independent from Ukraine
Another factor which is overlooked as well is Russia's dependence on Ukraine in the fields of industry and selected mineral resources. If these dependencies would not be resolved, the Russian Empire Project becomes unrealistic.
How Russia tried to resolve its dependency on Ukraine
Russia tried to replace all Ukrainian components by Russian ones
After the disappearance of the USSR, the interdependence between Ukraine and Russia was very deep. In November 1993 the Russian Federation decided to break its dependence on Ukraine, first of all in the military-industrial complex. A correspondent Classified Decree was issued by Russian President Borys Yeltsyn, and echoed by the special government program of the Russian Federation. Following these decisions Russia gradually replaced all Ukrainian components which it could replace with Russian-made parts.
Then there were ups and downs in this program, but now, 21 years later, it is safe to say that, particularly in the military field, Russia buys from Ukraine only the components which it cannot manufacture in Russia. Nevertheless Ukrainian machinery still is the leading article of Ukrainian export to Russia, which amounts for over $300 mln per year; banning the machinery import from Ukraine will inflict heavy damage on Russia, so Russian threats to do so are mostly a bluff.
From another hand, if Ukrainian companies will find buyers for their production outside Russia, and severe ties with (which is usually difficult) the Russian market, this will be a major blow for Russian defense industry. At this time Russian defense industry reached the point when it cannot replace Ukrainian partners at affordable cost and in a reasonable time.
Russia tried to buy critical Ukrainian enterprises in 2013
Under such conditions during the 1st half of 2013 Russia came to conclusion that the optimal strategy would be to buy the Ukrainian enterprises which it cannot replace. On December 2-3, 2013, at the starting days of Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity, Russian Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin embarked on a “shopping tour”, visiting several enterprises of Ukrainian East and South. The Rogozin's tour did not yield any result for two reasons: Russia wanted to get control of the enterprises which are banned from privatization by Ukrainian law, and also because of the change of the regime which followed in three months.
'Novorossiya' consists of the regions Russia depends upon most
After the Yanukovych regime collapsed, Russia came up with the concept of Novorossiya, wrapped up in artificial ideological justifications of 'common language' and 'historical tradition'. In reality Novorossiya (Crimea, Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhya, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Odessa regions) is the collection of the regions that house the most advanced Ukrainian industry assets, on which Russia depends.
For Russia the most effective way to address these problems now, is to establish its control over entire Ukraine, or at least over its most critical parts.
The following sections will provide the necessary details of Russia's dependence.
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