HUMINT, Informants and more (merged thread)

[Uboat509]

Michael C said:

Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given.

This has certainly become the conventional wisdom but it doesn't square with my experience. Police make extensive use of paid informants and coercion is routinely used successfully in both law enforcement and military circles. My experience in Iraq further lead me to become automatically suspicious of anyone who provided me with "free" information. They usually had an agenda. People like to speak in absolutes like these but, in my experience, they rarely hold up to close scrutiny.

SFC W

[davidbfpo]

Michael C said:

This has certainly become the conventional wisdom but it doesn't square with my experience. Police make extensive use of paid informants and coercion is routinely used successfully in both law enforcement and military circles. My experience in Iraq further lead me to become automatically suspicious of anyone who provided me with "free" information. They usually had an agenda. People like to speak in absolutes like these but, in my experience, they rarely hold up to close scrutiny.

SFC W

The police can make extensive use of informants, but in the UK use appears to have reduced. Partly as there is no extensive legislation and procedures to follow. Secondly informant handling is now for specialists only. At one point experienced handlers were referring old informants to use Crimestoppers, as it was far more secure and paid just as well. In Northern Ireland, many of the police handlers have left and it is a moot point if the coverage Wilf refers to now exists.

An important point - for all law enforcement - is that everyone understands what to do when someone offers to help; usually referred to as "walk-in's". Many in the informant handling field refer to these being the best sources, usually as their motivation is easier to identify and develop.

It can also work in an opposite way. In Northern Ireland a UK Customs officer accompanied a friend to an Army base to complain about his friend being roughed up. The officer he spoke to was offensive and rude (understandably as his regiment had lost men in the days before). The Customs officer became the local PIRA intelligence officer, with an ideal cover to be in the South Armagh area and legally carried a gun.

davidbfpo

[Uboat509]

This thread demonstrates the problem that LE in this country runs into all too frequently. Sure it's great when a walk-in comes in and provides useful information. The success of police tip lines and shows like America's Most Wanted certainly demonstrate that valuable information can gained from "walk-in sources." But there are limits to that. The type of people who report information because it is the right thing to do aren't typically the type of people to be directly involved in the activities they are reporting on. They can only report what they see from the outside. That means that in order to get "inside" information LE still has to get people who are directly involved to give that information up, either by the carrot (money, shortened prison terms etc.) or the stick (lengthened prison terms, higher charges etc.)

It can also work in an opposite way. In Northern Ireland a UK Customs officer accompanied a friend to an Army base to complain about his friend being roughed up. The officer he spoke to was offensive and rude (understandably as his regiment had lost men in the days before). The Customs officer became the local PIRA intelligence officer, with an ideal cover to be in the South Armagh area and legally carried a gun.

Wasn't it James Connelly or perhaps Michael Collins who bemoaned the fact that Irish Republican movement was shot through with informants? In fact, if memory serves, part of the reason that the Easter Uprising of 1916 was such a debacle was that British Intelligence used their network of informants to spread some disinformation.

SFC W

[jmm99]

The intelligence war between the British and Irish Intelligence Services, CIA Studies in Intelligence, V13:1-69-78 (Winter 1969)

[Alsultani]

Michael C said:


This has certainly become the conventional wisdom but it doesn't square with my experience. Police make extensive use of paid informants and coercion is routinely used successfully in both law enforcement and military circles. My experience in Iraq further lead me to become automatically suspicious of anyone who provided me with "free" information. They usually had an agenda. People like to speak in absolutes like these but, in my experience, they rarely hold up to close scrutiny.

SFC W

Hello. I did outside the wire HUMINT in Iraq for 16 months, attached in direct support to a combat arms BN. For us it was a matter of finding people whose interests (self, family, tribe) coincided with ours at enough points to carefully time a pitch to cooperate. Sometimes this required the application of subtle but effective pressure. Arabs in general, but especially in Iraq, are experts in looking at angles for self preservation and are quick to detect bull####, while smiling to your face and telling you what they think you want to hear. Authentic self interest is the best motivator. Information in our AO was never given for altruistic reasons, or because it was the right thing to do. Ever. This is the hardest cultural lesson for beginning HUMINT folks to learn. In addition, less people over time will come forward to give accurate information to a unit whose actions derive from "movement to contact" command philosophy rather than "think to contact." Surgical and accurate kinetic operations, snatch and grabbing the right people with as small a footprint as possible, which begets more intelligence, which leads to more surgical ops....etc.. That's part of what gets people off the fence. I know S3's like to plan these large cordon and search operations, because they make great powerpoint presentations and have cool sounding code names, but shouldn't be done if smaller targeted ops are available. Again, just my experience: operations planned for the sake of operations. I've seen it. People won't risk coming forward if they don't think the unit can effectively act. 95% of our BN's kinetic operations were based on intel from my team, and were very targeted. The use of money: no problem. I don't mind paying thousands of dollars (MNCI Rewards program) to a source who is delivering HVT's. I have enough checks and balances in my AO to know when or if that is a bad idea and how to deal with it accordingly if it becomes a negative. I knew where my sources lived and who their enemies were. I wouldn't call it coercion, but we did eventually reach that point in our relationship where the source realized it might not be a good idea to screw us over. Like I said, mutual points of interest. It didn't have to be said, it was understood.

Knowing where to put pressure in a family/tribally oriented society can reap rewards, including getting members of the insurgency giving you information. Schoolhouses tends to teach in terms of black and white, which is a natural CYA motivated behavior. Counterinsurgency and, I would imagine, LE street intelligence operations should be seeing shades of gray. It was surreal at times meeting covertly with people on our HVT list, and we always made sure we had the right leverage, but the bigger payoffs are what we were looking for and what we got. I would imagine that much of what works best isn't talked about or formally taught. One tends to look at things a little differently when soldiers are dying around you.

I don't say my experience is normative for every HUMINT experience. I operated in a unique, isolated tribal area for 16 straight months, which gave me the opportunity to really master my AO and who was who. After we had proven ourselves, we had 100% support from our supported BN Commander. I'm talking in the context of actionable intelligence developed over months, which is a luxury I know many units do not have. I also had two very squared away CAT II American citizen interpreters who spoke native Iraqi Arabic - again, something that might not be normative.

By the way, sorry for jumping in here. You guys all seem to know what you're talking about and I know some of you have a lot more experience and historical perspective than I do.

[davidbfpo]

Alsultani,

By the way, sorry for jumping in here. You guys all seem to know what you're talking about and I know you have a lot more experience than I do.

We are all still trying to learn and some of our experience is rather dated, 10-20yrs plus. Yours is fresher, even if old "lessons" appear - as indicated - and few here until recently worked so hard in an Arab culture.

davidbfpo

[Dayuhan]

Arabs in general, but especially in Iraq, are experts in looking at angles for self preservation and are quick to detect bull####, while smiling to your face and telling you what they think you want to hear. Authentic self interest is the best motivator.

Interesting comments overall.

I think you might find that the above description does not apply only to Iraqi Arabs. I suspect you'd find similar phenomena wherever people have experienced extended periods of anarchy, or rule by violent and capricious dictatorships, or by sequential invaders or warlords, or other conditions of long term instability and violence. Under these circumstances there is little loyalty beyond the immediate: self, family, clan or tribe. Survival becomes the first interest and self-interest the second, and abilities like detecting bull#### and turning a situation to your own advantage become key survival skills.

Not saying this is a good or bad thing, only that it's something you can expect to find in places where insurgencies flourish.

[Alsultani]

Interesting comments overall.

I think you might find that the above description does not apply only to Iraqi Arabs. I suspect you'd find similar phenomena wherever people have experienced extended periods of anarchy, or rule by violent and capricious dictatorships, or by sequential invaders or warlords, or other conditions of long term instability and violence. Under these circumstances there is little loyalty beyond the immediate: self, family, clan or tribe. Survival becomes the first interest and self-interest the second, and abilities like detecting bull#### and turning a situation to your own advantage become key survival skills.

Not saying this is a good or bad thing, only that it's something you can expect to find in places where insurgencies flourish.

Exacerbated no doubt by the fact that I was operating in a primarly Shia environment in a country that had been run by Saddam. I would be very interested in any book or paper recommendations from council members on these sorts of sociological considerations. As a current DOD HUMINT training contractor I've requested access to the BCKS MI net system to read the paper listed at the top of this thread. Hopefully there is a lot out there.