HUMINT, Informants and more (merged thread)

[Michael C]

(Taken from another thread and reduced to developing sources point)

The hardest part is determining whom to kill. The answer is intelligence. Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given. And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.

Michael C. at www.onviolence.com

[Alsultani]

(Taken from another thread and reduced to developing sources point)

The hardest part is determining whom to kill. The answer is intelligence. Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given. And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.

Michael C. at www.onviolence.com

Sir,

Are you specifically addressing LE source operations? I've written a few posts above on what I consider the appropriate application of coercion and paying intelligence sources in counterinsurgency, but locals in the countries in which we are currently "doing" counterinsurgency do not consider the best outcome altruistically. The best outcome is what is the best for them, usually at the expense of someone else. It's also a trick to win the hearts and minds while maintaining their respect and without seeming naive, i.e. weak. I can give numerous examples of coalition forces trying to win the hearts and minds through reconstruction projects and good neighbor policy that got in the way of intelligence collection and our units mission, and that in part financed the local insurgency, that were done by well intentioned but not "tuned in" civil affairs and chaplains. But they got to say at the end that they were able to spend 20 million dollars in an AO, so somebody was happy (Damn those Powerpoint presentations again - they are hindering the war on terror). (Another thread, I know)

Winning the hearts and minds of your neighbors is a concept that does not appear anywhere in their internal sociology, to my knowledge. Societies in which we are doing counterinsurgency have not traditionally organized themselves in ways that best outcomes are arrived at truly consensually and for the "common" good, outside one's kinship or tribal/clan entity. By now, after years of exposure to us, they know to smile and nod their heads when we talk like this while thinking what idiots we are and how they or their cousin can personally profit from it. I would be interested in any counterexamples you might have.

Is it any different in the microcosm of square block LE intelligence ops dealing with chronic criminal organizations?

I'd ask for your continued patience with my posts. Lots of fodder for thought, lots of tough memories of lessons hard learned, and blood of friends shed.

[William F. Owen]

The hardest part is determining whom to kill. The answer is intelligence. Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given.

Well source motivation can and does often alter radically, and what he/she says and does may actually conflict with the facts.

The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given.

Operational experience from Malaya, Aden, Kenya, Colombia, Sri-Lanka, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland would not support those statements. Money and sex are huge motivators. Physical and psychological coercion can and work.

And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.

....and between that ideal and the real world is a whole mess of compromises.

[Tom Odom]

Operational experience from Malaya, Aden, Kenya, Colombia, Sri-Lanka, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland would not support those statements. Money and sex are huge motivators. Physical and psychological coercion can and work.

Chickens were quite effective--even skinny thrice frozen freezer burned EU donor chickens bought on the black market--especially when combined with a bag of rice...

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Chickens were quite effective--even skinny thrice frozen freezer burned EU donor chickens bought on the black market--especially when combined with a bag of rice...

Add to that coloured pens sets and novelty key chains, for your more discerning members of the SLA!!

[davidbfpo]

The other day the BBC reported on the video evidence given by Saajid Badat in a current US terrorism trial:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17821854

It is the first time a convicted UK terrorist has entered into an agreement with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to give evidence in a trial against other alleged terrorists....Prosecutors earlier said Badat's "main motivation" in helping had been to prove he had renounced terrorism with actions as well as words....He saw himself and others like him as victims manipulated and exploited by Bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, they said.

This has now been followed up in this wide ranging article:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...upergrass.html

Which ends with:

...we should not idealise such figures, nor ignore the injustices that reliance on the honesty of criminals and terrorists sometimes entails. But supergrasses do afford a glimpse into the moral squalor of terrorist organisations, while their existence will surely shake the confidence of al-Qaeda cells and their operations. That is something in itself.

[Presley Cannady]

If there's a reference list for this paper, I'd appreciate a look at it.