The Sole Survivor

[JeffC]

Jeff your comment could be interpreted as you're advocating shooting unarmed civilians. I haven't seen the AAR on this incident and have no inside knowledge, but in general we can run missions pretty much when we want (weather dependent obviously) to nab or a kill a bad guy, which means you generally have the option of aborting the mission if you have been comprised, because you can come back another day. The article stated that these men thought they may have been compromised, yet they agreed to accept the risk and drive on with the mission anyway. I don't think shooting unharmed civilians was an option to begin with, and either did they. They had two options apparently, one was to drive on with the mission, and the other was to abort. As they suspected in (according to the article), the civilians they released reported their location to the Taliban, thus the ensuing fire fight. I don't question their judgment for a minute (I would if they shot unharmed civilians for a target of moderate importance), unfortunately the situation took a turn for the worst, and we lost several brave men that day.

--- If you read the book, you'll see that the circumstances surrounding the mission, which had been attempted multiple times in the past, and which involved tracking a very high profile target, made the decision about what to do with the goat herders a bit more complex then just re-scheduling it for another day. In fact, even if they aborted the mission and headed for an extraction point, they'd still be exposed by the goat herders, and tracked by the Taliban. A fight was inevitable if they let them live.

Further, they were not of one mind regarding killing them. One team member favored it, one abstained, one opposed it, and Luttrell couldn't make up his mind, although eventually he says that he was swayed not by his military training but by his religious upbringing to let them live. Today, he believes that he made the wrong decision, and should have killed them.

Two Taliban sympathizers versus 19 dead SEALs. What would you have done?

[Tom Odom]

Two Taliban sympathizers versus 19 dead SEALs. What would you have done?

The math as you pose it is irrelevant; it is not only hindsight, it presupposes committing a war crime. Bill is absolutely correct.

Tom

[Ironhorse]

Tom, well said, I just went to refill my coffee as I struggle with the same fatally flawed argument.

I have not read the book and have little but passing news info on the events. My comment is on the structure and process of the argument.

It is extraordinarly easy to slip into wargaming actions based on the clarity of hindsight. And as a Monday morning QB who was actually in the game on Sunday, Luttrell will be exposed to many emotions and may feel he has the blood of his compadres on his hands. 2 sympathizers for 19 of "us" - sure, easy math, war is full of tough choices, should'a would'a could'a didn't.

But it doesn't work that way. Time flows in the other direction. If one uses foresight instead of hindsight to QB this thing on the prior Friday afternoon instead of Monday morning, and starts using that calculus against every potential threat who might pose a risk --- that generates atrocities, not good military decisions.

From the thumbnail I've got, sounds like "didn't" was the right call. People still die when the right calls are made. It's war. Can't start doing the wrong thing just because of that. Then war truly would be hell.

[SWJED]

If one uses foresight instead of hindsight to QB this thing on the prior Friday afternoon instead of Monday morning, and starts using that calculus against every potential threat who might pose a risk --- that generates atrocities, not good military decisions.

Could not agree more...

[JeffC]

Tom, well said, I just went to refill my coffee as I struggle with the same fatally flawed argument.

I have not read the book and have little but passing news info on the events. My comment is on the structure and process of the argument.

--- Not a good idea. You don't know all the elements of the argument without reading the book. The point of my post isn't to present an argument; it's to encourage reading the book, and then perhaps you'll be compelled to think about whether the current ROE needs to be re-visited.

[Ironhorse]

Sure, OK, Jeff. I'll clarify that I did not mean YOUR argument. You have nothing in there but balanced posts that present exactly what you say your intent is -- look at this for some chin scratching material on sticky situations that come with the territory and will make you think.

I totally get your point. Do you get mine?

Not at all trying to draw you out on this, but it will be a while before I can crack those 400pp. If you've got more to say (or anyone else?), I'd love to hear the Exec Summary. If not, I'll get to it at some point myself .

-----------
Edited one hour later to add:
JeffC's post #8 in this thread is what I was responding to with this post. His #9 was not up when I started writing this. And that one starts to do the math in a way that is at least disconcerting.

[JeffC]

Sure, OK, Jeff. I'll clarify that I did not mean YOUR argument. You have nothing in there but balanced posts that present exactly what you say your intent is -- look at this for some chin scratching material on sticky situations that come with the territory and will make you think.

I totally get your point. Do you get mine?

Not at all trying to draw you out on this, but it will be a while before I can crack those 400pp. If you've got more to say (or anyone else?), I'd love to hear the Exec Summary. If not, I'll get to it at some point myself .

I do understand your point. Rules of Engagement are there for a reason, and should be implemented and abided by. On the other hand, changing circumstances may require that ROE by revisited or modified.

As far as the book is concerned, nothing short of reading it does it justice. I read it in 10 hours without a problem. It moves fast, especially the second half, which is where you can pick it up from if you want to skip the INDOC and BUD/S training.

[Steve Blair]

The math as you pose it is irrelevant; it is not only hindsight, it presupposes committing a war crime. Bill is absolutely correct.

Tom

Not only that....

How do you KNOW they were sympathizers? Maybe the Taliban had family members as hostages, or had the capability to grab said family members. We are, after all, dealing with an enemy that has done this sort of thing before and wouldn't hesitate to do it again. If you're that goatherd, are you going to risk your son, daughter, or wife to help some palefaces that you'll never see again and who can't really protect you in any case? Doubtful.

Sometimes pushing on isn't the right answer. If you're blown, you abort and live to track another day. What you don't do is hand the enemy a IO victory by shooting goatherds or by pushing on when you know (or strongly suspect) you're blown and risk the lives of your people without good cause. The balance shifts somewhat if the target is high priority, but that still shouldn't justify handing the bad guys a free press opportunity by killing bystanders.

Americans are indoctrinated by sports and other scenarios to want to avoid anything less than a clear (and hopefully crushing) victory. Sometimes we forget that surviving can be a victory all its own and that restraint and patience are also a component of long term victory.

[JeffC]

The math as you pose it is irrelevant; it is not only hindsight, it presupposes committing a war crime. Bill is absolutely correct.

Tom

The Taliban leader who was their target was actively involved in launching attacks on coalition forces as well as killing other Afghans who weren't part of the Taliban. Every time an operation against him was aborted, more people died. So let's expand the math to include them as well. You're probably now in the hundreds, particularly civilian loss of life. When does the math add up? 2 lives for 100? 2 lives for 1000?

In addition to that issue, do you make a distinction for enemy spies who aren't carrying a rifle? Does the fact that they're spies "arm" them in the eyes of the Geneva Convention?

[Sargent]

The Taliban leader who was their target was actively involved in launching attacks on coalition forces as well as killing other Afghans who weren't part of the Taliban. Every time an operation against him was aborted, more people died. So let's expand the math to include them as well. You're probably now in the hundreds, particularly civilian loss of life. When does the math add up? 2 lives for 100? 2 lives for 1000?

In addition to that issue, do you make a distinction for enemy spies who aren't carrying a rifle? Does the fact that they're spies "arm" them in the eyes of the Geneva Convention?

It doesn't matter. It's a slippery slope, so there's a reason you stay firmly at the top, a good few steps away from the edge.

And take a look at your logic: the Taliban are killing folks who won't join (or who work against them), so we need to start killing folks who work for the Taliban so we can defeat them.

[mmx1]

The Taliban leader who was their target was actively involved in launching attacks on coalition forces as well as killing other Afghans who weren't part of the Taliban. Every time an operation against him was aborted, more people died. So let's expand the math to include them as well. You're probably now in the hundreds, particularly civilian loss of life. When does the math add up? 2 lives for 100? 2 lives for 1000?

In addition to that issue, do you make a distinction for enemy spies who aren't carrying a rifle? Does the fact that they're spies "arm" them in the eyes of the Geneva Convention?

I have read the Washington Post piece on Luttrell. If you feel I am missing any relevant details please feel free to present them, but I believe the gist of the situation is clear enough.

In this case, the central issue is the ethical status of intentionally killing civilians. I firmly believe that it is wrong, regardless of the calculus of lives in the balance. You attempt to cloud the issue by painting them as spies. but the SEALS didn't know that and even in hindsight you can't say with reasonable certainty if they were willing collaborators with the Taliban.

Would you shoot 3 random passerby's in your neighborhood in the anticipation (since this calculus is based on estimates and predictions, not certainty) that it would save 10 or 100 lives? In what way does moving the venue to Afghanistan change the ethics of such a decision?

[JeffC]

I have read the Washington Post piece on Luttrell. If you feel I am missing any relevant details please feel free to present them, but I believe the gist of the situation is clear enough.

In this case, the central issue is the ethical status of intentionally killing civilians. I firmly believe that it is wrong, regardless of the calculus of lives in the balance. You attempt to cloud the issue by painting them as spies. but the SEALS didn't know that and even in hindsight you can't say with reasonable certainty if they were willing collaborators with the Taliban.

Would you shoot 3 random passerby's in your neighborhood in the anticipation (since this calculus is based on estimates and predictions, not certainty) that it would save 10 or 100 lives? In what way does moving the venue to Afghanistan change the ethics of such a decision?

--- First, an article on what happened doesn't do it justice. Read the book, or don't read the book, but don't imagine that you know what happened without reading the only existing record of what happened (i.e., Luttrell's account).

--- Second, in this particular case, they were clearly Taliban supporters. Revealing the existence and position of this SEAL team makes them the equivalent of spies in that information served as a weapon.

--- Finally, the example you present in your last paragraph isn't remotely equivalent to what happened in those mountains. You're welcome to your opinion of what's right and what's wrong, of course, but without at least taking the trouble to understand Luttrrell's experience and perspective is, in my opinion, the wrong way to go about it.

[Ironhorse]

Concur, Sargent & mmx1. Very well said, mmx1.

There's a difference between
a) the Law of War
b) the ROE for a specific theater, situation, or mission profile
c) the decisions that individuals make within the context of both those -- blindly abiding by them, heinously violating, or just applying them in thier infinitely sticky imperfection.

I'm not sure which one of these we're talking about here. Maybe it will all be clear to me after I read the book. If so, I'll bottle it and be rich.

I would note that there's a path of moderation which might claim a reasonable middle ground, though a bit Buck Rogers-y. Some form of self-limiting detention mechanism, e.g. a timed self-releasing gag & handcuff, or even a good solid dose of anesthesia, might stay within the high ground of the Law of War (a), be feasible within or with reasonable mods to acceptable ROE (b), and could give the operators the flexibility they need to accomplish their important mission while reducing some of the dilemna (c).

But even that won't eliminate the dilemnas, just move them around a bit.

"Shepherd gnawed to death by wolves while sleeping off SEAL's injection, leaves 8 fatherless."

At least that's more reasonable bad luck interpretation of collateral damage (with some military necessity and proportionality), than an "OK to blast 'em, if you think its really important" footnote in the ROE. That's not collateral damage, that's Sargent's slippery slope in full effect.

[William F. Owen]

I am reading this book at the moment, and just read the discussion about killing the goat herders. I was pretty troubled that this even became a discussion, so consulted SWJ and found this thread.

I have no wish to second guess the men on the ground at the time, but I was both horrified and intrigued that they even discussed killing un-armed civilians, in those circumstances.

...but I have no problem with shooting some one with a cell phone who is correcting mortar fire, detonating an IED or using a TV camera as a cover for the same. As fare as I can see, it's all about the nature of the intent.

I have to say this issue vexes me to some great degree, so opinions would be very welcome.

[tequila]

Again, don't want to second-guess the guys on the ground. But I've read the book as well and Luttrell does not at all make clear that the SEALs know for sure the Afghans (including a 14-year-old boy) were Taliban supporters. He only reports that the Afghans were not friendly to the SEALs, to which I would ask you - would you be friendly to a bunch of heavily armed foreigners who appeared on your land pointing weapons at you?

The book also points out that killing the Afghans would hardly assist that much in avoiding discovery, as the Afghans were accompanied by their flock of livestock who would certainly wander all over the place without herders and be instantly conspicuous, as well as instigate a search by the villagers for their missing men. Strangely the SEALs were not carrying zipties or 550 cord to simply detain the herders, which would have had roughly the same value as killing them as far as concealment was concerned.

IIRC, the SEALs did not attempt to continue w/the mission, since it was blown anyway, but tried to evac and establish comms. The Taliban ran them to ground before they could do so.

[Abu Buckwheat]

In this case, the central issue is the ethical status of intentionally killing civilians. I firmly believe that it is wrong, regardless of the calculus of lives in the balance. You attempt to cloud the issue by painting them as spies. but the SEALS didn't know that and even in hindsight you can't say with reasonable certainty if they were willing collaborators with the Taliban.

This is the heart of the problem we are having at many levels in the military. One time there was a pretty broad ethical line that COULD NOT be crossed. Did it happen outside of the sight of higher headquarters, yes. Did it happen when overzealous officers took orders as authorization from higher headquarters. Yes. However my contention for the last seven years is that there is no authority to commit war crimes because the GWOT is considered (by guys like Douglas Feith) as "A new type of war." Hitler told the German Army before Operation Barbarossa that the German army had to abandon its usual adherence to chivalry and the laws of war. We cannot continue to go there. Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban sympathizers are combatants when on the battlefield. Unarmed civilians who may rat your mission out are part of the game. In the first Gulf War several SOF OPs on key lines of communication were compromised by kids with goats or kids playing. We cannot get into the killing civilians game.

We cannot second guess their moral struggle on the battlefield but the fact that he said military training was not a factor in his reasoning for voting against killing the civilians is indicative that the system has gotten so far off the rails that we need to re-institutionalize our own sense of honor and chivalry.

I think the wild west like "War on Terror" has really badly damaged our image as professionals. Its being run too much like the Indian Wars where the indiginous population are considered non-humans. There have been too many incidents of murder (as many as 100 cases), abuse and random "screw it I'll just shoot them, its a different war and these aren't humans" have been seen and we will hear MANY more reported in the post-conflict period. This is an anathema to COIN. Paticularly in the Pashtunwali-soaked areas of the Lower Hindu Kush. Ask Kipling for examples.

Worst yet, there is also a visceral dis-respect of the enemy G's knowledge of his own game on his own home court. In this case the Gs adhered to Sun Tsu's "If you know the enemy and know yourself ..."

Before the first Gulf War General Schwarzkopf sent a message out to all unit ordering the ban on the use of Death Cards, which I had seen MANY guys carrying, all ready to play Colonel Kilgore. Schwarzkopf said we cannot debase ourselves and act like our enemies.

Should they have let the HVT get away and abort? Only they could make that call. However, I see it this way -we are the greatest goddamn combat power in the world ... we CAN re-sked missions without committing war crimes and we WILL get our target.

Someone in the next DoD needs to be tasked to bring the nation's Honor and adhering to laws and humanity back as a core value (AGAIN) at the troop level. God bless all of those team guys. They are asked to do hard things, but the issue is not about the ROE, its about the ROL, Rule of Law.

We have some major league recalibration to do after this war.

[Rank amateur]

I agree 100%. It'll be much easier for the military to recalibrate if the country does, but I think the country is looking at it as a political/values issues as opposed to what's the most effective way to fight the GWOT.

[marct]

This is the heart of the problem we are having at many levels in the military. One time there was a pretty broad ethical line that COULD NOT be crossed....However my contention for the last seven years is that there is no authority to commit war crimes because the GWOT is considered (by guys like Douglas Feith) as "A new type of war."....We cannot continue to go there. Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban sympathizers are combatants when on the battlefield. Unarmed civilians who may rat your mission out are part of the game.

This has been a concern of mine for quite a while now in more than just a purely military setting. I must admit that one of the reasons why I dislike Feith so much is because, IMO, he embodies the ideology of the ends justify the means without regard to what those means do to the people and their social system. As with many theologians, both "secular" and "sacred", he appears to live in an illusory world which, because it is "true", requires that everyone must accept it and, if they do not, be made to accept it "for their own good". In this way, he is similar to UBL and other brands of fanatics.

Abu, you mentioned "honour" and "chivalry" and they are important in this respect - they are lodged inside individuals. This is something that fanatic ideologues cannot accept - for them, "truth" must be given from a central system - it cannot be contained within individuals and serve as a source of opposition to that central system. This is all about a fight between types of power: "power within" and "power over" as Miriam Seimos would say.

We cannot second guess their moral struggle on the battlefield but the fact that he said military training was not a factor in his reasoning for voting against killing the civilians is indicative that the system has gotten so far off the rails that we need to re-institutionalize our own sense of honor and chivalry.

I think the wild west like "War on Terror" has really badly damaged our image as professionals....There have been too many incidents of murder (as many as 100 cases), abuse and random "screw it I'll just shoot them, its a different war and these aren't humans" have been seen and we will hear MANY more reported in the post-conflict period. This is an anathema to COIN. Paticularly in the Pashtunwali-soaked areas of the Lower Hindu Kush. Ask Kipling for examples.

Leaving aside the actual efficacy of it, and I agree it is about as useful as sending a package of Twinkies to a famine zone, there are other, more important issues. The "War on Terror" has done more than "damage" the US military's "image as professionals" - it appears to have damaged, at least in some cases, your self-image; in theological terms, your souls. It has done so by putting you in what Bateson called a "double bind"; a situation where you are squeezed between two conflicting and contradictory positions. Pulled apart a bit further, think of the "debate" over waterboarding with some ideologues saying that it is not torture while knowing that it is. The "solution" being offered to this double bind by certain ideologues - "it's not torture, just a necessary tool in the War on Terror" - is not a solution that can be accepted while retaining honour.

Someone in the next DoD needs to be tasked to bring the nation's Honor and adhering to laws and humanity back as a core value (AGAIN) at the troop level. God bless all of those team guys. They are asked to do hard things, but the issue is not about the ROE, its about the ROL, Rule of Law.

We have some major league recalibration to do after this war.

While I agree, I would go further that saying it is about ROL - I would say I is about basic philosophy in the original meaning of that word; it is about "knowing yourself". Institutional "recalibration" is a good start to that; even St. Paul managed to realize that one when he noted that "I had not known sin but by the law" (Romans 7:7), but that is only the start - it is still basing individual ethics, "honour" as it were, on some system external to the individual which is amenable to manipulation by ideologues. Honour (and ethics) must be internal even if they are shaped by external (actually inter-personal) systems. If they don't live within you, then you are "just following orders" - a "defense" that I doubt will be accepted by any sane court or deity.

Marc

ps. Yes, Wayne, I am a radical immanentalist

[IntelTrooper]

Someone in the next DoD needs to be tasked to bring the nation's Honor and adhering to laws and humanity back as a core value (AGAIN) at the troop level. God bless all of those team guys. They are asked to do hard things, but the issue is not about the ROE, its about the ROL, Rule of Law.

We have some major league recalibration to do after this war.

Uh, what?

Edited to Add: Nevermind, that was an extremely old post.

[goesh]

This is a hell of a thing to have to think about. The senior man should have made the decision. The last thing to go before the collapse of an entrprise be it a combat patrol or a hot dog stand is discipline. Adrenaline, instincts and psychological stress makes a bad admixture that even good discipline can hold together for only so long. We all chose this path and we are haunted at times by making the right decisions and the wrong decisions and IMO only discipline keeps the score even. These men did no right or wrong, they died and 1 walked away from it. Let it be knowing we could have done no better or worse had we been there ourselves.