Company Level Intelligence Led Operations

[Ken White]

WM said:

We have pushed much of what used to be a division-level function down to the BCTs, Bde-level work has devolved to the Bn TOC, and a company has now become a defacto Bn with regard to certain staff functions/size of its AO. Companies in the AOR seem to operate rather independently and, despite the promise of a "netcentric push" of intel, they need situational awareness (SA) assets to keep their heads (and tails) orientated properly.

To which I'd respond that the 'Division' idea only really worked two places -- in garrison around the world; and in combat ONLY in the desert (North Africa WW II, DS/DS and OIF I); the rest of the time from the revolution forward we have, regardless of the existence of Divisions essentially fought as Regiments, RCTs or Bdes -- so what we really did was not a push down; it was simply an alignment of resources to the proper working level. Long overdue. I'd further suggest the only reason the Division still exists is to justify a slew of MG and BG spaces.

Companies should have been de-facto bns (in the sense I think you mean) many years ago and should be even more independent that they now are.

I think Tom expresses it well.

[wm]

WM said:To which I'd respond that the 'Division' idea only really worked two places -- in garrison around the world; and in combat ONLY in the desert (North Africa WW II, DS/DS and OIF I); the rest of the time from the revolution forward we have, regardless of the existence of Divisions essentially fought as Regiments, RCTs or Bdes -- so what we really did was not a push down; it was simply an alignment of resources to the proper working level. Long overdue. I'd further suggest the only reason the Division still exists is to justify a slew of MG and BG spaces.

Companies should have been de-facto bns (in the sense I think you mean) many years ago and should be even more independent that they now are.

I think Tom expresses it well.

Ken,
I can't disagree with your point about divisions' primary value being related to the total one and two button count out there (if I remember the section on GO strength in the US Code correctly the 3 and 4 button count is also a function of the total number of 1 and 2 buttons). However, the division (more accurately the GS elements of the DISCOM) still does some log stuff that I don't think the Army has figured out how to push down to the BCT without making the tail too big (which it probably already is anyway). And I'm not really sure how we ought to be structuring combat aviation from a C2persective either --But this thread is not about C2 and headquarters functions.

[ODB]

After rereading many of the posts in this thread there sems to be 2 different schools of thought. The analyasis portion at company level I can see. I can see a go to guy in the company that 1. pulls in all intel from patrols, raids, etc...any operation involving elements from the company. 2. receives all intel from higher siphons it for pertainent data. As some have said before a LNO type role.

I cannot agree with conventional units handling assets. There is enough issues with those units who can and the agencies involved. Too many, tapping a shallow pool. The thought of many more people attempting to do this (which many already are)instead of going through the proper channels IMO is part of the problem, not a solution. When they do this and report it as intel, makes second sourcing it very difficult especially when many times it is the same source going to multiple locations to make money. The solution is hand these guys off to the proper entity to handle and all will benefit from it. Honestly I vehemently disagree with conventional forces tasking, training, paying......nothing else needs to be said.

[jcustis]

After rereading many of the posts in this thread there sems to be 2 different schools of thought. The analyasis portion at company level I can see. I can see a go to guy in the company that 1. pulls in all intel from patrols, raids, etc...any operation involving elements from the company. 2. receives all intel from higher siphons it for pertainent data. As some have said before a LNO type role.

I cannot agree with conventional units handling assets.

I'd have to say ixna on running sources too, and we don't train these hard chargers for that. I think the more appropriate term would be "information" collection cell.

What you reference above is exactly how I helped train up a Reserve unit's cell during a pre-deploy work up. The best guys for this work have a penchant for data, like a sports junky who studies and memorizes box scores, for example.

[Ken White]

After rereading many of the posts in this thread there sems to be 2 different schools of thought. The analyasis portion at company level I can see. I can see a go to guy in the company that 1. pulls in all intel from patrols, raids, etc...any operation involving elements from the company. 2. receives all intel from higher siphons it for pertainent data. As some have said before a LNO type role.

Well, more correctly, we can agree on that...

I cannot agree with conventional units handling assets. There is enough issues with those units who can and the agencies involved. Too many, tapping a shallow pool. The thought of many more people attempting to do this (which many already are)instead of going through the proper channels IMO is part of the problem, not a solution. When they do this and report it as intel, makes second sourcing it very difficult especially when many times it is the same source going to multiple locations to make money. The solution is hand these guys off to the proper entity to handle and all will benefit from it. Honestly I vehemently disagree with conventional forces tasking, training, paying......nothing else needs to be said.

While disagreeing on this. In a perfect world, I'd agree with you but having worked both sides of the SF/Conventional fence, the problem is that just as all Battalions and Companies are not great, All A (and B) Teams are not great. I've always had a suspicion that too many Intel folks, when they were in Kindergarten, got a report card that said "Doesn't share well with others." The Intel side is spread too thin, in a war never has enough really well trained people and has a bad tendency to withhold info from users -- or tailor it.

So while I agree with you in principle, in practice a unit that wants to know what's going on its AO (particularly in an urban environment) has little choice; I've done it --as have thousands of others -- and it works. It works without disrupting the 'real' intel types, too.

Edited to add:

On re reading this after a good dinner, it seems more brusque than intended; few more thoughts:

Remember an informant and an agent aren't the same thing. I'd also note that nature hates a vacuum and something will rush to fill it. If units believe they're getting stiffed on Intel -- and many do (see below) -- they'll do something to fix that shortfall -- and I suggest three things about that. First, they should, it's a Commanders responsibility. Second, better to do it on an organized basis and exercise some control rather them have them do it under the table and possibly cause the problems you cite.

The third factor involves the Intel community (and to an extent the SO/SF community) and its operating methods. As a team Intel sergeant, I was several times ordered not to share Intel with neighboring units on the grounds that the guy who gave the order (An FA MAJ on an SF tour) determined they did not have the need to know -- even though usually they had specifically asked for certain info. I did what I was told but I did argue about it and I did not then and do not now, many years later, believe he made the right call. I have seen that syndrome many time both before and since that period. I have no problem with protecting sources and methods but I have too often seen those things used as a reason to deny needed intel to units. Knowledge is power and all that. I have also seen time and again reports by troops on the ground (Inf, LRS and SF) get ignored by Intel types at higher echelons even if multiple troop reports corroborated the item and they ignored it on the basis their technical means couldn't verify it. Numerous variations on those themes over the years. The point is that if the Intel guys want to do it all, they need to convince their customers -- the Troops -- that they're a part of the solution and not a part of the problem.

I have also responded on intel (local, theater and national) driven ops and have found that errors exceeded accuracy by a factor of about 2:1.

I understand all that's better now. I'll accept that it may be better but I suggest, as I said above, there are not enough intel folks to do what needs to be done. If it needs to be done, better to do it with some control than ignore the problem. Intel driven ops need to share ALL the info they have with the guys doing the work; withholding and dissembling get people killed needlessly.

[Ron Humphrey]

it very common for those who know not to know who needs to know until after they really needed to know it

[ODB]

Orginally posted by Ken White:

Remember an informant and an agent aren't the same thing.

How easily terminology can make a difference, especially in dealing with this subject. Wonder if that has been the difference in some of the meanings and due to the terms used has misconstrued the point being made?

The third factor involves the Intel community (and to an extent the SO/SF community) and its operating methods. As a team Intel sergeant, I was several times ordered not to share Intel with neighboring units on the grounds that the guy who gave the order (An FA MAJ on an SF tour) determined they did not have the need to know -- even though usually they had specifically asked for certain info. I did what I was told but I did argue about it and I did not then and do not now, many years later, believe he made the right call. I have seen that syndrome many time both before and since that period. I have no problem with protecting sources and methods but I have too often seen those things used as a reason to deny needed intel to units. Knowledge is power and all that. I have also seen time and again reports by troops on the ground (Inf, LRS and SF) get ignored by Intel types at higher echelons even if multiple troop reports corroborated the item and they ignored it on the basis their technical means couldn't verify it. Numerous variations on those themes over the years. The point is that if the Intel guys want to do it all, they need to convince their customers -- the Troops -- that they're a part of the solution and not a part of the problem.

I believe this truely gets to the heart of the problem. An old S3 of mine always told S2 "You look like you got a secret in your pocket and your not sharing." This happens all too much. Understandable at some levels but also avoidable. Experienced this in Afghanistan between conventional forces on an op and OGA on an op in the same area at the same time with neither knowing prior. This should have been handle at the G level staff prior, we were OPCON to the division. One of my biggest frustrations is simply no one is more special than someone else and if done correctly everyone looks good. Just don't understand the mentality of these folks.

Completely agree there is a huge intel problem and unfortunately those who have the ability to change it are not here reading this. A lot of it comes down to personal relationships and the ability to interact at levels beyond email.

Great posts and love drawing from others experience. Thanks

[Ken White]

...Completely agree there is a huge intel problem and unfortunately those who have the ability to change it are not here reading this. A lot of it comes down to personal relationships and the ability to interact at levels beyond email...

that trend will continue. Right now, the personal relationships do make a difference.

Oh, FWIW, the incidents I mentioned; I was a very young SSG. Less than a couple-three years later, I'd have ignored him and slipped it to them anyway; gotta do what's right -- which may not always be what your boss wants...

[Ken White]

...However, the division (more accurately the GS elements of the DISCOM) still does some log stuff that I don't think the Army has figured out how to push down to the BCT without making the tail too big (which it probably already is anyway). And I'm not really sure how we ought to be structuring combat aviation from a C2persective either -- But this thread is not about C2 and headquarters functions.

I understand both issues and a few others are being worked -- and that there is some resistance to doing so. Plus ca change...

Be interesting to see how it works out over the next few years.