How the West was Won (well, at least Ramadi)

[Norfolk]

Iraq Warning over Sunni Patrols
BBC News International Version
Published Saturday, 22 December, 2007

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7157581.stm

Iraq warning over Sunni patrols

Gen Jassim wants the patrols to be integrated into mainstream forces
Iraq will not allow US-backed neighbourhood patrols to become a "third force" alongside police and the army, Iraq's defence minister has said.
Gen Abdel Qader Jassim said the Sunni-dominated patrols should be integrated into the regular Iraqi security forces.

The patrols have been credited with the recent drop in violence in Iraq.

But Shia leaders fear the patrols will turn against them after US troops leave Iraq, correspondents say...

"We categorically reject them [the neighbourhood patrols] turning into a third military organisation," said Mr Jassim, himself a Sunni Arab, at a joint press conference with the Iraqi Interior Minister, Jawad al-Bolani.

The neighbourhood patrols consist of some 71,000 men, many of whom were formerly members of the insurgency, fighting against US troops and the Shia-led Iraqi government.

Patrol members are paid about $10 (£5) a day by US authorities, but responsibility for paying them will pass to the Iraqi government next year.

The patrols have been credited with helping to bring down violence

In their press conference, the ministers made clear that payment would only be forthcoming if 20% of the patrols are integrated into the mainstream Iraqi security forces...

Shia leaders fear that unless the patrols can be assimilated into the mainstream Iraqi security forces, the violence could increase once US troops have left Iraq.

This is not going to go down well with Sunni Tribal and Clan leaders or their populations.

[Ron Humphrey]

Iraq Warning over Sunni Patrols
BBC News International Version
Published Saturday, 22 December, 2007

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7157581.stm



This is not going to go down well with Sunni Tribal and Clan leaders or their populations.

Considering that much of the Sunni tribal concern can be found in their ability to have a part in their own governance this really might be a good time frame to look at more local and regional elections within the established framework of the constitution. This would be one step in bringing a sense of incorporation to the current governing environments. There would be alot of important factors to keep in mind and would require involvement of the national government, but it might just work if outside allies agrred to encourage it.

This also might bring some changes which would affect other areas in ways some outside interests might not like so as usual baby steps is best.

[Cavguy]

An article on Ramadi by myself and Colonel Sean MacFarland is out in this month's Military Review.

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/C...ngMarApr08.pdf

The stunning security improvements in Al Anbar province during 2007 fundamentally changed the military and political landscape of Iraq. Many, both in and outside the military (and as late as November 2006), had assessed the situation in Anbar as a lost cause. The “Awakening” of Sunni tribal leaders and their supporters that began in September 2006 near Ramadi seemed to come out of nowhere. But the “Anbar Awakening”—what some have called the “Gettysburg of Iraq”—was not a random event. It was the result of a concerted plan executed by U.S. forces in Ramadi that would eventually develop into an Iraqi led movement that dramatically changed the security situation in all of Anbar and parts of greater Iraq.

The Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who served in or with our brigade combat team (BCT) enabled the Anbar Awakening through a deliberate, often difficult campaign that combined traditional counterinsurgency (COIN) principles with precise, lethal operations. The skilled application of the same principles and exploitation of success by other great units in Anbar and other parts of Iraq spread the success in Ramadi far beyond our area of operations (AO) at a pace no one could have predicted.

The Ready First enabled the Anbar Awakening by—
O Employing carefully focused lethal operations.
O Securing the populace through forward presence.
O Co-opting local leaders.
O Developing competent host-nation security forces.
O Creating a public belief in rising success.
O Developing human and physical infrastructure.

The execution of this approach enabled the brigade to set conditions, recognize opportunity, and exploit success when it came, to create a remarkable turnaround.

And Finally:

Clearly, a combination of factors, some of which we may not yet fully understand, contributed to this pivotal success. As mentioned before, the enemy overplayed its hand and the people were tired of Al-Qaeda. A series of assassinations had elevated younger, more aggressive tribal leaders to positions of influence. A growing concern that the U.S. would leave Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and Iranian-supported militias made these younger leaders open to our overtures. Our willingness to adapt our plans based on the advice of the sheiks, our staunch and timely support for them in times of danger and need, and our ability to deliver on our promises convinced them that they could do business with us. Our forward presence kept them reassured. We operated aggressively across all lines of operation, kinetic and non-kinetic, to bring every weapon and asset at our disposal to bear against the enemy. We conducted detailed intelligence fusion and targeting meetings and operated seamlessly with special operations forces, aviation, close air support, and riverine units. We have now seen this model followed by other BCTs in other parts of Iraq, and it has proved effective.

The discussion in this thread and the feedback (positive and negative) helped me get this article out the door, and improved its quality immensely. I hope it adds to the discussion and understanding of what happened in Anbar.

Also, I'm outed!

Niel

[Tom Odom]

Congrats!

And of course good work!

[SWJED]

How the West Was Won by Cavguy

This is news the world doesn’t hear: Ramadi, long a hotbed of unrest, a city that once formed the southwestern tip of the notorious “Sunni Triangle,” is now telling a different story, a story of Americans who came here as liberators, became hated occupiers and are now the protectors of Iraqi reconstruction.

- - Ullrich Fichtner, “Hope and Despair in Divided Iraq,” Der Spiegel, 10 August 2007.

Colonel Sean MacFarland and I teamed up to provide a firsthand account of the “Anbar Awakening” in this month’s issue of Military Review. The article details the efforts of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Ramadi, Iraq from June 2006 to February 2007. Transferring from Tal Afar into the most violent city in Iraq at the time, the Ready First designed a campaign plan that sought to set the conditions for a tribal alliance, and rapidly exploit success through developing local governance and security forces. Supported by the 1st and 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force leadership, the plan was successfully executed and achieved results beyond anyone’s expectations. This success in execution was carried forward to greater success by the actions of our follow-on unit, 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division.

The article describes the key facets of the plan – population security through combat outposts, combat operations against Al Qaeda insurgents, tense negotiations with tribal sheiks, and a few key individuals and decisive combat actions that shifted the tide of conflict and began the transformation of the nation...

[Boot]

I know quite a few Marines who were in Ramadi during this time, and spent time at Blue Diamond and Hurricane point, nice to see a different view, I have seen plenty of AAR's from Marines through professional journals, reports themselves, or the actual people involved. I know Col Devlin only in passing and I am a little surprised that he would say something like that especially working for a guy like Gen. Gaskin. One of the Army Captains who was in my team out of FOB Loyalty had an IP checkpoint outside of Ramadi. I have also been to Tal Afar, and I was pretty impressed with how quiet it was.
Lastly your not implying that the Army BCT is solely responsible for the success out west...are you?

[Cavguy]

Lastly your not implying that the Army BCT is solely responsible for the success out west...are you?

I hope not ... 1/6 and 3/8 Marines was part of 1/1 AD, and the article clearly credits the Army and Marine members of the BCT, and notice I talk of the USMC Air Support. 4 of 5 maneuver BN's in AO Topeka were Army - but it was a joint fight. It would be no different if it had happened in RCT's to the East and west, both of which have army units working in them but I rarely see them mentioned either, not out of omission, but because most of the forces in those areas are Marines.

The article also credits 1 and 2 MEF. However, it is undeniable that the (most recent) Awakening began in AO Topeka, and it was under control of a US Army BCT operating under 1 and later 2 MEF, utilizing lessons and mindset largely developed elsewhere.

If you notice, the article is about the Awakening, and only really mentions (in action) one of the five BCT's under our control 1-9 IN, because they were at the decisive action.

[Eden]

I'm curious about the role of higher headquarters in helping or hindering operations. The impression I get is that your brigade commander was left to his own devices and allowed to get on with it. I wonder whether he had to gain approval for his plans, how closely operations were monitored, and how difficult (or easy) it was to get resources from higher. I ask because a very fine brigade commander in Afghanistan was consistently micro-managed and forced to jump through several briefing hoops each time he wanted to mount an operation.

I suspect partly this was a matter of scale; there was only one combat brigade with a two-star and several deputy CGs to help him in Afghanistan. I just wonder if the same thing went on in Iraq.

[Ken White]

My son reported the same problem you note in his two trips to the 'Stan but noted the absence of GO micro management in his trip to Iraq. All those were with the same Bde but with different Flag Officers each time.

To state the obvious, the uppermost elephant sets the tone for the herd and scale can affect the personality -- or at least modulate the display thereof.

[Cavguy]

I'm curious about the role of higher headquarters in helping or hindering operations. The impression I get is that your brigade commander was left to his own devices and allowed to get on with it. I wonder whether he had to gain approval for his plans, how closely operations were monitored, and how difficult (or easy) it was to get resources from higher. I ask because a very fine brigade commander in Afghanistan was consistently micro-managed and forced to jump through several briefing hoops each time he wanted to mount an operation.

I suspect partly this was a matter of scale; there was only one combat brigade with a two-star and several deputy CGs to help him in Afghanistan. I just wonder if the same thing went on in Iraq.

I'd really have to have COL MacFarland answer that. I believe in one of his media interviews he half-jokingly says he was given the AO and basically told to keep the lid on it, because no one expected anything out of it. I'm not sure how much/little interaction with MG Zilmer on day to day ops he had, but I never felt 1MEF or 2MEF meddling much in our operational plans. Outside of Baghdad, the size/scope of the MND AO's pretty much limits how much a division commander can actively control, the BCT commanders are kind of like kings of their kingdoms. That is a good and bad thing - allows initative, but also accounts for the "mood swings" that sometimes occur after RIP/TOA's, where a BCT commander with an opposite tactical philosophy takes over. I know that was 3d ACR's fear with us in Tal Afar, and our fear about 1/3 ID. 1/3 ID performed superbly in our place, and I know (despite Ricks' out of context quote in FIASCO) we did well in Tal Afar, violence by October 2006 there was 60% less than the 60% reduction during 3ACR's tour.

From personal experience, as the BDE Battle Major, I never had tactical interference from the MEF, in fact, I would say they went out of their way to be supportive to our tactical efforts. The CG and ADC were regularly in our AO, so I am sure they were quite familiar with our plans and course of action. How much they gave Ready 6 specific guidance I am unaware.

I actually enjoyed working for a MEF HQ much better than an Army DIV HQ, micromanagement wise.

[Boot]

I hope not ... 1/6 and 3/8 Marines was part of 1/1 AD, and the article clearly credits the Army and Marine members of the BCT, and notice I talk of the USMC Air Support. 4 of 5 maneuver BN's in AO Topeka were Army - but it was a joint fight. It would be no different if it had happened in RCT's to the East and west, both of which have army units working in them but I rarely see them mentioned either, not out of omission, but because most of the forces in those areas are Marines.

The article also credits 1 and 2 MEF. However, it is undeniable that the (most recent) Awakening began in AO Topeka, and it was under control of a US Army BCT operating under 1 and later 2 MEF, utilizing lessons and mindset largely developed elsewhere.

If you notice, the article is about the Awakening, and only really mentions (in action) one of the five BCT's under our control 1-9 IN, because they were at the decisive action.

Cavguy,
I sent you a PM and no I didn't think you were implying that, my question was totally tounge in cheek. I have great respect for Col McFarland and what was accomplished in Ramadi, and what is being accomplished in Al Anbar. Sorry if I came across that way.
I worked for Gen Pittard and Gen Yarbrough at the IAG and have great respect for both and the rest of the Soldiers I worked with there.
I worked with 4-1 BCT in MND-N and was extremelly impressed with the support they gave TT's and the team I was on when we rolled through there. It was overall better than what my Marine brothers were giving Marine TT's.
Now if the 3/69th Armor would give back the radio gear they stole from one of the MiTT's!...


Boot

[Ken White]

When 1st Recon Co moved from the east coast of Korea to the west, they started with the two 1/4 tons, two 2 1/2 tons and one 100 cubic foot reefer they were authorized; when they arrived on the west coast two weeks later they had about 20 1/4 tons, five new GMC 2 1/2 tons and three reefers -- all painted Marine green with yellow reg and unit numbers. Consider your lost radios payback

[Cavguy]

Cavguy,
I sent you a PM and no I didn't think you were implying that, my question was totally tounge in cheek. I have great respect for Col McFarland and what was accomplished in Ramadi, and what is being accomplished in Al Anbar. Sorry if I came across that way.
I worked for Gen Pittard and Gen Yarbrough at the IAG and have great respect for both and the rest of the Soldiers I worked with there.
I worked with 4-1 BCT in MND-N and was extremelly impressed with the support they gave TT's and the team I was on when we rolled through there. It was overall better than what my Marine brothers were giving Marine TT's.
Now if the 3/69th Armor would give back the radio gear they stole from one of the MiTT's!...


Boot

No worries, I just was suprised that COL Mac and I did take some shots from a few Marines over the article - they inferred that it was somehow an attempt of the Army to claim all the credit and ignored their contributions. It wasn't just your (jesting) comment. I thought we tried in the original to highlight the joint nature, but it wasn't strong enough obviously.

I have run into a number of Marines (incl you) who were in Ramadi and enjoyed the article. I've often said to peers there's about 10 articles needing to be written about what happened there in each BN AO. 1/6 Marines taking back the "racetrack" would be fascinating.