Retooling the Artilleryman

[Ron Humphrey]

But can someone tell me what the likelihood of Full out and out Ground Arty component being a mainstay in the future. If the USAF gets the 22's and others then when comparing ground arty in relation to Air or Naval Arty which are the more likely to be used in largess. Isn't it a little harder for an enemy to take out supporting assets that are in the air or the ocean than on the ground.

Pound for pound what is the tradeoff between these and is it even something to be considered or can our forces not accomplish the missions without 155's on the ground.

[Cavguy]

But can someone tell me what the likelihood of Full out and out Ground Arty component being a mainstay in the future. If the USAF gets the 22's and others then when comparing ground arty in relation to Air or Naval Arty which are the more likely to be used in largess. Isn't it a little harder for an enemy to take out supporting assets that are in the air or the ocean than on the ground.

Pound for pound what is the tradeoff between these and is it even something to be considered or can our forces not accomplish the missions without 155's on the ground.

Except in bad weather. Or for some reason our Aircraft can't/won't be overhead.

Also, response time for Arty is damn near immediate, aircraft take time to come overhead. Arty is usually Direct Support to the unit, meaning it can be grabbed immediately. Aircraft are subject to the ATO and CAOC priority of allocation. If the battle is over a wide front, you may not get aircraft support.

Arty can provide continuous fire to suppress an enemy, for hours if needed. Aircraft have limited bombs and can't stay on station.

We're not to the point that JDAMs can replicate indirect fire support.

[Tom Odom]

Except in bad weather. Or for some reason our Aircraft can't/won't be overhead.

Also, response time for Arty is damn near immediate, aircraft take time to come overhead. Arty is usually Direct Support to the unit, meaning it can be grabbed immediately. Aircraft are subject to the ATO and CAOC priority of allocation. If the battle is over a wide front, you may not get aircraft support.

Arty can provide continuous fire to suppress an enemy, for hours if needed. Aircraft have limited bombs and can't stay on station.

We're not to the point that JDAMs can replicate indirect fire support.

All good points

Let me add that you can field a hell of a lot of artillery for the price of an F22

And as for immediacy and the continuing need for arty look at earlier rotations on OEF and how soon units began taking arty with them.

Don't forget either the pricesion revolution is also giving indirect fires with a truly remarkable capability to deliver pinpoint fires.

If I had to pick between CAS and indirect fire from organic redlegs, I will take the indirect. Happily we do not need to make such a choice. We need to make sure that we do not allow such a choice to be framed and crammed down our collective throats.

Tom

[Eden]

I took over as the S-3 of an armor battalion just returning from a six-month tour guarding Haitian refugees at Guantanamo Bay. The battalion redeployed to Fort Hood where it then lost about 30% of its personnel who had been retained until mission completion.

Anyway, the battalion had not fired a shot in over 9 months, and had not maneuvered at all for nearly a year. The tanks had been packed in cosmoline for about six months. The following timeline reflects our journey back to competence:

Three months to get the vehicles back in shape and achieve minimal gunnery standards.

Six months to reach full gunnery qualification and minimal competence in maneuver at the company level.

Nine months to fully restore our skill set at the battalion level.

Now, I am sure that given unlimited ammunition, training resources, and relief from all the niggling peacetime duties that distract you from training, we could have done it considerably faster. But this was 1995-6, and we were the only battalion on post that had fallen so far behind in our conventional skills. It might have taken considerably longer if the whole division (at that time the 2nd Armored of blessed memory) had been in the same boat. And we had a considerable core of NCOs and officers whose conventional skills had not eroded brought into the unit to help with training and maintaining.

Yes, it may only take a few intensive weeks to put a battalion back on its conventional feet. But what about when you have 100 battalions to put back on their feet? With brigade and division commanders who have not seen a brigade or division maneuver together in the last five years or so?

We have to do the job set before us. But let's not minimize the damage it is doing to our conventional skill sets, or stop seeking ways to mitigate the damage. I personally find disturbing the argument that 'our magnificent soldiers will make it happen'. That's probably true, but more of them will be dead than might otherwise have been necessary.

[William F. Owen]

Yes, it may only take a few intensive weeks to put a battalion back on its conventional feet. But what about when you have 100 battalions to put back on their feet? With brigade and division commanders who have not seen a brigade or division maneuver together in the last five years or so?

...but this is the heart of the problem. The fact that skills will fade while out of role is a known fact and to a degree, measurable.

What training, doctrine and equipment must allow for, is the rapid reacquisition of the required skills sets, or the activity required to maintain a useful degree of currency. This is both clearly possible and viable, but there must be the institutional desire to recognise this and act on it.

British Army Artillery, Armour and Engineer units, came back to Germany from 4 month emergency tours in Northern Ireland and got on with facing the Soviet Army. It is far from easy, it is painful, but it is doable.

...and no one has a choice on this, because just like Vietnam, you may well find yourself facing an enemy armoured formation, with insurgents running around trying to kill you as well.

[davidbfpo]

I too recall the few press stories on the re-adjustment of British Army units deployed from Germany to Ulster, for short tours and then returning to their conventional heavy war-fighting role. In my reading of the journal British Army Review I've not seen any articles describing the process. Hopefully our lessons learnt have been provided via the much lauded British Defence Liaison Staff, in Washington DC and on commands. I know an Engineer Colonel who might be able to comment, so standby.

davidbfpo

[wm]

I personally find disturbing the argument that 'our magnificent soldiers will make it happen'. That's probably true, but more of them will be dead than might otherwise have been necessary.

I agree completely. That line of "three bags full" (aka, "we the unwilling, led by the unknowing, have done so much for so long with so little that now we are capable of doing anything with nothing at all") stuff smacks of the duPicq/Joffre line of reasoning that eviscerated the French Army in 1914/15 and ended up bleeding France white. I would carry it on to the British at the Somme and the Allies' "successes" through mid-1942 as further examples that most would not contest. I'll not fall on my sword WRT to America's armed forces post 1945.

[William F. Owen]

I personally find disturbing the argument that 'our magnificent soldiers will make it happen'. That's probably true, but more of them will be dead than might otherwise have been necessary.

I concur with WM

This argument is pure poison and the root of most problems. It is particularly bad in the UK, where the "our brave boys are wonderful and can do anything," has been used as an argument to overload, and over-skill them since I can remember.

The overall effect is to make them immune from any ideas about improvement that are not equipment based.

[Sabre]

I concur with WM

This argument is pure poison and the root of most problems. It is particularly bad in the UK, where the "our brave boys are wonderful and can do anything," has been used as an argument to overload, and over-skill them since I can remember.

The overall effect is to make them immune from any ideas about improvement that are not equipment based.

Agreed.
I've seen that argument used in other areas as well, not just in missions assigned, but in weapons development, organization and force structure - it's pernicious.

The things that the soldier has to face, the enemy, terrain, weather, supply problems, inaccurate intel (in spite of all that the US Army throws at intel), are often tough enough to overcome as it is, without having any additional difficulties piled on. As the general said "I don't want a fair fight, I want every possible advantage that I can get"...

[Sabre]

All good points

Let me add that you can field a hell of a lot of artillery for the price of an F22

And as for immediacy and the continuing need for arty look at earlier rotations on OEF and how soon units began taking arty with them.

Don't forget either the pricesion revolution is also giving indirect fires with a truly remarkable capability to deliver pinpoint fires.

If I had to pick between CAS and indirect fire from organic redlegs, I will take the indirect. Happily we do not need to make such a choice. We need to make sure that we do not allow such a choice to be framed and crammed down our collective throats.

Tom

Gah, CavGuy and Tom beat me to the punch.

They're right.
For a conventional war, the numbers aren't favorable for a CAS-only (no arty) force package. If we have X number of troops (say 100,000+) engaging the enemy, and they all need fire support, the USAF just doesn't have the numbers necessary to do it - not even close (especially given the spiralling cost of a modern fighter-bomber).

As I have said in other threads, artillery is dirt-cheap compared to fighter-bombers, considering not only how much an F-22 or F-35 costs, but also how much initial pilot training costs, how much annual training costs... and the support costs: it works out to be a dozen or so ground crew for each plane, maintenance and parts are expensive... There is just no comparison between arty and CAS in terms of cost vs. effectiveness (especially now with precision munitions for the artillery).

I also seem to recall a comment about how arty would be more vulnerable to ground attack by insurgents... that depends on the scenario envisioned.
Artillery units often turn out to be surprisingly hard targets for insurgents or enemy units behind the lines, especially when compared to a sprawling airbase (I'm thinking of examples from Vietnam).

[Tom Odom]

I will admit though that no artillery piece is as cool looking as this:

[Vic Bout]

...this looks pretty cool...

[Tom Odom]

Does it have a sound system?

...this looks pretty cool...

[selil]

Also, response time for Arty is damn near immediate, aircraft take time to come overhead. Arty is usually Direct Support to the unit, meaning it can be grabbed immediately. Aircraft are subject to the ATO and CAOC priority of allocation. If the battle is over a wide front, you may not get aircraft support.

Arty can provide continuous fire to suppress an enemy, for hours if needed. Aircraft have limited bombs and can't stay on station.

We're not to the point that JDAMs can replicate indirect fire support.

Very well said. Artillery and armor travel with infantry too they are not "requested" or added to an equation.

When was the last Naval bombardment? I thought the Iowa, Missouri, etc.. had all been mothballed? Off to google (the hive mind) again.

[Vic Bout]

However, in Feb 2002, when I asked 10th Mountain staffers at Bagram Air Base why there was no arty on the ground (at least anywhere out in the open that I could see or in fact, I believe, anywhere in country), the response I got was, "CENTCOM/SECDEF believes it sends the wrong message to the locals and the folks at home....we don't want to make it look like we're occupying Afghanistan." Then, not a week later Operation Anaconda kicked off. We sure could have used some 105/155 help up in the Shai Kowt...

[Entropy]

Except in bad weather. Or for some reason our Aircraft can't/won't be overhead.

Also, response time for Arty is damn near immediate, aircraft take time to come overhead. Arty is usually Direct Support to the unit, meaning it can be grabbed immediately. Aircraft are subject to the ATO and CAOC priority of allocation. If the battle is over a wide front, you may not get aircraft support.

Arty can provide continuous fire to suppress an enemy, for hours if needed. Aircraft have limited bombs and can't stay on station.

We're not to the point that JDAMs can replicate indirect fire support.

All good points, but the weather bit surprises me actually.

I tend to view Aircraft and Arty as complementary, not competitive. Each has strengths and weaknesses - both inherent and situational.

[Cavguy]

All good points, but the weather bit surprises me actually.

I tend to view Aircraft and Arty as complementary, not competitive. Each has strengths and weaknesses - both inherent and situational.

Agreed. Aboive was not meant to reduce role/effect of airpower in the slightest. I was responding to Ron's question in specific about why Arty was still needed in the age of JDAMs.

Re: Bad weather. Had a number of occasions aircraft were off station due to sandstorms in Iraq. At least they were unwilling to support when the pilot couldn't see the target. Good example was the sandstorm a few days ago when the Green Zone got barraged because A/C weren't on station. Not that we could do arty counterfire in urban though.