Retooling the Artilleryman

[Eden]

I took over as the S-3 of an armor battalion just returning from a six-month tour guarding Haitian refugees at Guantanamo Bay. The battalion redeployed to Fort Hood where it then lost about 30% of its personnel who had been retained until mission completion.

Anyway, the battalion had not fired a shot in over 9 months, and had not maneuvered at all for nearly a year. The tanks had been packed in cosmoline for about six months. The following timeline reflects our journey back to competence:

Three months to get the vehicles back in shape and achieve minimal gunnery standards.

Six months to reach full gunnery qualification and minimal competence in maneuver at the company level.

Nine months to fully restore our skill set at the battalion level.

Now, I am sure that given unlimited ammunition, training resources, and relief from all the niggling peacetime duties that distract you from training, we could have done it considerably faster. But this was 1995-6, and we were the only battalion on post that had fallen so far behind in our conventional skills. It might have taken considerably longer if the whole division (at that time the 2nd Armored of blessed memory) had been in the same boat. And we had a considerable core of NCOs and officers whose conventional skills had not eroded brought into the unit to help with training and maintaining.

Yes, it may only take a few intensive weeks to put a battalion back on its conventional feet. But what about when you have 100 battalions to put back on their feet? With brigade and division commanders who have not seen a brigade or division maneuver together in the last five years or so?

We have to do the job set before us. But let's not minimize the damage it is doing to our conventional skill sets, or stop seeking ways to mitigate the damage. I personally find disturbing the argument that 'our magnificent soldiers will make it happen'. That's probably true, but more of them will be dead than might otherwise have been necessary.

[William F. Owen]

Yes, it may only take a few intensive weeks to put a battalion back on its conventional feet. But what about when you have 100 battalions to put back on their feet? With brigade and division commanders who have not seen a brigade or division maneuver together in the last five years or so?

...but this is the heart of the problem. The fact that skills will fade while out of role is a known fact and to a degree, measurable.

What training, doctrine and equipment must allow for, is the rapid reacquisition of the required skills sets, or the activity required to maintain a useful degree of currency. This is both clearly possible and viable, but there must be the institutional desire to recognise this and act on it.

British Army Artillery, Armour and Engineer units, came back to Germany from 4 month emergency tours in Northern Ireland and got on with facing the Soviet Army. It is far from easy, it is painful, but it is doable.

...and no one has a choice on this, because just like Vietnam, you may well find yourself facing an enemy armoured formation, with insurgents running around trying to kill you as well.

[davidbfpo]

I too recall the few press stories on the re-adjustment of British Army units deployed from Germany to Ulster, for short tours and then returning to their conventional heavy war-fighting role. In my reading of the journal British Army Review I've not seen any articles describing the process. Hopefully our lessons learnt have been provided via the much lauded British Defence Liaison Staff, in Washington DC and on commands. I know an Engineer Colonel who might be able to comment, so standby.

davidbfpo

[wm]

I personally find disturbing the argument that 'our magnificent soldiers will make it happen'. That's probably true, but more of them will be dead than might otherwise have been necessary.

I agree completely. That line of "three bags full" (aka, "we the unwilling, led by the unknowing, have done so much for so long with so little that now we are capable of doing anything with nothing at all") stuff smacks of the duPicq/Joffre line of reasoning that eviscerated the French Army in 1914/15 and ended up bleeding France white. I would carry it on to the British at the Somme and the Allies' "successes" through mid-1942 as further examples that most would not contest. I'll not fall on my sword WRT to America's armed forces post 1945.

[William F. Owen]

I personally find disturbing the argument that 'our magnificent soldiers will make it happen'. That's probably true, but more of them will be dead than might otherwise have been necessary.

I concur with WM

This argument is pure poison and the root of most problems. It is particularly bad in the UK, where the "our brave boys are wonderful and can do anything," has been used as an argument to overload, and over-skill them since I can remember.

The overall effect is to make them immune from any ideas about improvement that are not equipment based.

[Sabre]

I concur with WM

This argument is pure poison and the root of most problems. It is particularly bad in the UK, where the "our brave boys are wonderful and can do anything," has been used as an argument to overload, and over-skill them since I can remember.

The overall effect is to make them immune from any ideas about improvement that are not equipment based.

Agreed.
I've seen that argument used in other areas as well, not just in missions assigned, but in weapons development, organization and force structure - it's pernicious.

The things that the soldier has to face, the enemy, terrain, weather, supply problems, inaccurate intel (in spite of all that the US Army throws at intel), are often tough enough to overcome as it is, without having any additional difficulties piled on. As the general said "I don't want a fair fight, I want every possible advantage that I can get"...