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  1. #1
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    Default Ceasefire webpage ...

    is here. Its results-data page is here - and its publications are here.

    NRA members might find this article of interest - knew I read of Gary Slutkin somewhere else - probably in the Rifleman.

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    I believe that if you all expand your view of what COIN is, you gain a clearer understanding. To my way of thinking, EVERY police officer is waging COIN every day on the job. It is only when Civil government fails in their COIN efforts that they have to bring in the military for the type of expanded COIN operations that most think of when they think of COIN.

    Viewed in this manner, the most successful COIN operation of the 60's was the passing and implementation of the Civil Rights Act by the US Government. Faced with with a rising insurgency, complete with ideology and dynamic leadership, the US could have brought in greater force to put the African American populace back into "its place," or they could change their behavior and bring a better form of governance to all Americans. Thankfully they chose the latter.

    Think of this when people talk of "Appeasing" insurgents by listenting to and addressing their concerns. When a government addresses the concerns of its own citizenry it is not appeasement, it is simply doing their job. Appeasement is when a government compromises its own populace to grant concessions to the government of an other populace. Very different things altogether.

    So yes, all COIN is local, and the best COIN is that which is done day in and day out to meet the needs of a populace long before it starts drifting into the behavior described by Mao as Phase I insurgency.

    Just something to consider.

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    Council Member 120mm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    I believe that if you all expand your view of what COIN is, you gain a clearer understanding. To my way of thinking, EVERY police officer is waging COIN every day on the job. It is only when Civil government fails in their COIN efforts that they have to bring in the military for the type of expanded COIN operations that most think of when they think of COIN.

    Viewed in this manner, the most successful COIN operation of the 60's was the passing and implementation of the Civil Rights Act by the US Government. Faced with with a rising insurgency, complete with ideology and dynamic leadership, the US could have brought in greater force to put the African American populace back into "its place," or they could change their behavior and bring a better form of governance to all Americans. Thankfully they chose the latter.

    Think of this when people talk of "Appeasing" insurgents by listenting to and addressing their concerns. When a government addresses the concerns of its own citizenry it is not appeasement, it is simply doing their job. Appeasement is when a government compromises its own populace to grant concessions to the government of an other populace. Very different things altogether.

    So yes, all COIN is local, and the best COIN is that which is done day in and day out to meet the needs of a populace long before it starts drifting into the behavior described by Mao as Phase I insurgency.

    Just something to consider.
    Ding, ding, ding, Winnah!

    Then, at night, “violence interrupters” hit the streets to sniff out trouble. Often former gang members and graduates of the prison system, the interrupters have a hard-nosed approach to law and order. They may, for example, encourage an aggrieved man to consider beating someone instead of shooting him, or try to convince rival drug-dealers that a turf war would be bad for business, as it would attract the police.
    But the above quote is industrial strength stupid. How about we NOT look to Chicago for any answers on how to fight crime? Teaching criminals to commit crimes smarter is not the answer.... But Chicago is a fine example of a failed government. Basically the criminals are running the government.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    I believe that if you all expand your view of what COIN is, you gain a clearer understanding. To my way of thinking, EVERY police officer is waging COIN every day on the job. It is only when Civil government fails in their COIN efforts that they have to bring in the military for the type of expanded COIN operations that most think of when they think of COIN.
    OK, I'll just run a quick test on this.

    An insurgency is armed rebellion against the state. Yes/No?
    An insurgency is war, in that it uses violence for political gain. Yes/No?

    Is countering these activities the primary mission of a police officer. Yes/No?
    Is defending the state the primary mission of a police officer. Yes/No?

    I am not saying that some perspectives from Police Work are not incredibly valuable to Soldiers fighting against armed rebellions, but I see clear blue everything between COIN and Policing.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    OK, I'll just run a quick test on this.

    An insurgency is armed rebellion against the state. Yes/No?
    An insurgency is war, in that it uses violence for political gain. Yes/No?

    Is countering these activities the primary mission of a police officer. Yes/No?
    Is defending the state the primary mission of a police officer. Yes/No?

    I am not saying that some perspectives from Police Work are not incredibly valuable to Soldiers fighting against armed rebellions, but I see clear blue everything between COIN and Policing.

    Seems to me that one can see COIN operations in two different lights: preemptive COIN and reactive COIN.

    Preemptive COIN stops an insurgency before it starts (sort of like preventive maintenance). What Bob's World described in his post wrt the Civil Rights Act would fall in this category I think.

    Reactive COIN is what happens after the insurgency has broken out and one seeks to return things to a preinsurrection status quo aka peacefulness (restorative maintenance--what your mechanic does after your car breaks down on the highway, if you wish). What Wilf is seeking to describe with his questions above falls into the second category. What the coalition is doing in IZ and AF is reactive COIN as well.

    A third consideration applies whether one is engaged in reactive or preemptive COIN. That is what we might call Limitation COIN. Limitation COIN strives to ensure that the actions taken to restore the status quo do not fan the fames and broaden the insurgency instead. It also must ensure that the efforts to forestall/preempt the insurrection do not produce new sources of dissatisfaction that foment more/different dissent in the populace. I suspect that this part of COIN is what Nagl had in mind when he called on us to produce soldier diplomats.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
    The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris

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    Default COIN in a Cold "X" War

    Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare (chap. 4, pp.43-47) uses "Revolutionary" for "X" - insert whatever word suits your fancy.

    The situation is one where the insurgent's acts are generally legal and non-violent - ranging up to the situation where military forces have to take an active role because of violence that police actions cannot control.

    The counterinsurgent has 4 methods in a "cold war":

    1. Direct police and legal action vs. the insurgents (primarily directed at its infra-structure).

    2. Indirect action by alleviating the underlying conditions supporting the insurgency's cause.

    3. Infiltration of the insurgency (intelligence & derailment).

    4. Co-opt the insurgency into a mainstream political movement.

    Now, moving to Bob's World's example of the Civil Rights Movement, which addresses only one side of the coin (pun intended) - Black Voting Rights, etc. One can cite use of all four methods by local, state and Federal authorities in that era; but the Kennedy-Johnson approach was to emphasize #2 (enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts) and #4 (bringing Black voters into the Democratic Party, realizing that substantial numbers of White voters would be lost).

    The other insurgency was the anti-Civil Rights movement, which had both non-violent and violent aspects. Once the decision was made to pursue enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts, application of method #2 in favor of the "antis" was not possible - although as time went on (now 5 decades), modifications were made to satisfy some of the concerns about busing, affirmative action, etc.

    The methods used against the "antis" tending to violence were largely #1 and #3 (e.g., Mississippi Burning). That again was a long process; and there were still a large number of dissatisfied Whites without a political home. That need was met by Nixon's Southern Strategy, which changed the US political map by bringing former Democrats into the Republican Party. That message (method #4) was conveyed in a number of ways - including SCOTUS nominations of two Southern judges (Haynsworth & Carswell in 1969 & 1970), which were destined to fail from the gitgo.

    The foregoing is an explanation by hindsight - the various responses developed because of the US system of governance - not because of some magical 50-year plan.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Well, yes -- and

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    ...One can cite use of all four methods by local, state and Federal authorities in that era; but the Kennedy-Johnson approach was to emphasize #2 (enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts) and #4 (bringing Black voters into the Democratic Party, realizing that substantial numbers of White voters would be lost).
    . . .
    The foregoing is an explanation by hindsight - the various responses developed because of the US system of governance - not because of some magical 50-year plan.
    there are a lot of myths about that time and effort.

    While your summation is generally correct, as one who lived in the south during most of that period, there are three things that often get discounted or ignored. First, as a result of WW II and Korea and Truman's desegregation of the Armed Forces plus a lot of returning black veterans and a lot of white guys who became aware that black was not bad, the south was in process of changing. Barriers were falling all over the place. The Kennedy developed Act that Johnson got passed just sealed the issue. Goldwater's contention that the Act was not truly necessary and could do some harmful if uintneded things was correct I believe.

    Secondly, the 'antis' were vocal but really rather few in number and the so-called Nixon southern strategy while real was successful not because of blacks becoming strong Democratic supporters or because the Democratic party had passed the CRA but because Nixon, whom no less an authority than Noam Chomsky calls the last liberal American President signed more legislation that helped the south than did his democratic predecessors. Most of the later stuff -- school and busing issues were more a result of mishandling and bad court decisions as anything else. Not to say there weren't bitter dead enders; there were -- but poor handling exacerbated things significantly.

    Lastly, the Baby Boomers had nothing to do with all that.

    Long way of getting to the point -- I don't agree that the era and the civil rights imbroglio were a COIN effort in any sense. I do understand that one could use the actions as a corollary and have no objection to that, though I wouldn't do it.

    However, if one was there at the time, it wasn't quite the way the academics like to portray it in their somewhat revisionist history and it may have been a COIN-like preemption in Stage 0 seen through that prism but on the ground at the time, Stage 0 had not yet arrove, much less Stage 1...

    Lot of shrewd, party enhancing domestic politics though, that's for sure.

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    Default More Agree than Disagree, I'm Afraid

    Very much agreed that "there are a lot of myths about that time and effort" - time being roughly 1960-1970, and effort being Civil Rights issues and Vietnam as well. I also will babble forth before reaching my bottom line - which also agrees with "Lot of shrewd, party enhancing domestic politics though, that's for sure."

    ----------------------------------------------
    1. Integration and Armed Services

    I am in violent agreement with this:

    from Ken
    First, as a result of WW II and Korea and Truman's desegregation of the Armed Forces plus a lot of returning black veterans and a lot of white guys who became aware that black was not bad, the south was in process of changing. Barriers were falling all over the place.
    Or, as my dad said, "I don't care if the guy in my foxhole is purple with pink polka dots - so long as he shoots straight."

    -------------------------------------
    2. Goldwater

    As I was a Goldwater Preacher from 1958-1964 (when we got clobbered), you are preaching to the already converted. I was taken by Goldwater's view of the 9th and 10th Amendments; his view on Indochina (in particular) and on the Cold War (in general - "Why Not Victory ?").

    In any event, he set out his views on States' Rights and Civil Rights in chaps. 3 & 4 of The Conscience of a Conservative, available here - my 1961 copy cost 50¢ !

    A good discussion of that book & Goldwater is here.

    As you correctly point out, Goldwater was firm on the 15th Amendment (Voting Rights) and the 14th Amendment as interpreted by the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Where he drew the line was on education and public accomodations - his view of constitutional history (interpreting the 14th in light of the 9th and 10th) precluded a Federal "cram down" in those areas (see pp.34-37). On the merits of integration, Goldwater was firmly on the side of its objectives (including integration in the military) - see p.38 for his classic statement.

    So, Goldwater did precede Nixon in opening the door to Southern conservatives.

    --------------------------------------
    3. Breach of Covenant - Democrats become Republicans

    from Ken
    Secondly, the 'antis' were vocal but really rather few in number and the so-called Nixon southern strategy while real was successful not because of blacks becoming strong Democratic supporters or because the Democratic party had passed the CRA but because Nixon, whom no less an authority than Noam Chomsky calls the last liberal American President signed more legislation that helped the south than did his democratic predecessors. Most of the later stuff -- school and busing issues were more a result of mishandling and bad court decisions as anything else. Not to say there weren't bitter dead enders; there were -- but poor handling exacerbated things significantly.
    Some disagreement here. Let me be clear - I'm not saying that Southern Democrats went into the Republican Party because Blacks were coming into the Demoratic Party. Rather, the loss of Southern Democrats started in 1948 with the Dixiecrat "revolt", which was a consequence of the Hubert Humphrey "revolt" at the 1948 convention - and continued through the 50's and 60's. The crux of it was a perceived "breach of the covenant", which had governed the relations between the two wings of that party for roughly 75 years.

    Agreed that Nixon's overall program was not race-baiting. While Goldwater appealed to Southern conservatives, Nixon broadened that appeal to Southern populists (and to Midwestern and Western populists as well).

    Now, as to "the 'antis' were vocal but really rather few in number", that is true about the violent "antis" (for which, God be thanked); but the non-violent "antis" (e.g., George Wallace and Ross Barnett) were very vocal indeed - especially in the earlier years. Wallace, of course, later shifted gears - and appealed more to populism than anything else (he did very well in certain sections of Michigan).

    We can also agree about "bad court decisions", which have marked the course of Civil Rights from Reconstruction on. In the late 1800's and early 1900's, the SCOTUS pendulum swung too far in one direction - e.g., as pointed out by John Harlan I in his dissents (Plessy v Ferguson being his classic). In the 1950's and 1960's, it swung too far in the other direction - e.g., as pointed out by John Harlan II (grandson of I) in his dissents.

    Not for nothing that those two folks of Kentucky lineage were named after John Marshall.

    ---------------------------------------
    4. Detroit Riots - 1967

    Detroit, Newark, LA, etc. - were among the 1967 "urban disorders" in the North. I'll stick with the Detroit riots where I have some knowledge and experience.

    The Michigan Citizen ("America's Most Progressive Community Newspaper") calls it the Detroit Rebellion in its multi-part series celebrating its 40th birthday, which starts here.

    My reasons for citing this left of center reference are, firstly, it represents (even today) a flavor of the views held by that "insurgency"; and, secondly, it is based in part on the 86 page Michigan Law Review study of the riots and their aftermath - see part IV of the series, which is here:

    .... Prof. Kamisar, now a nationally recognized authority on constitutional law and criminal procedure and the Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor of Law Emeritus at the UM Law School, recalled how he encouraged students, including two members of the Michigan Law Review, to make an on-the-ground investigation.

    While learning theory in class was important, he told them, the best way to learn the law would be for them to “go to Detroit.” In doing so, he added, they would also be recording a significant historical event.

    In the immediate wake of the rebellion, the students interviewed defendants in regular jails, makeshift detention centers and courtrooms, as well as defense attorneys, prosecutors and judges. Their 86-page study, “The Administration of Justice in the Wake of the Detroit Civil Disorder of July 1967,” was published in the Michigan Law Review, vol. 66, no. 7 (1968), pp. 1544-1630.

    “The Constitution and its guarantees,” it concluded, “are applicable to all citizens at all times. Panic, disorganization, and lack of preparation should never excuse granting a defendant less than his full measure of constitutional rights.” ...
    I still believe that - although my "full measure of constitutional rights" were and are admittedly somewhat more limited than many (including Yale Kamisar) would grant.

    Truth in lending - Yale Kamisar was one of my Crim Procedure & Con Law profs - and yours truly was one of the law review editors involved in the project.

    Bottom line - the 1967 Detroit "situation" certainly looked like some form of insurgency to me.

    ----------------------------------------
    5. Galula's "Cold War" - insurgency and war.

    from Ken
    Long way of getting to the point -- I don't agree that the era and the civil rights imbroglio were a COIN effort in any sense.
    Can't get dogmatic against what you say - Calling the Detroit riots "War" or a "Rebellion" doesn't float my boat either; but they (and other incidents of domestic violence in the 60's) were far from "Peace" - as I thought of it then and now.

    If Bob's World wants to wax on about what "phase 0" should be called - and how to define it more precisely - more power to him.

    ---------------------------------------
    PS: Since I was conceived about the time meatballs were flying over Oahu, I can't claim Baby Boomer status - instead I belong to your generation as one of the tail-end runts of the litter.

    BTW: was thinking about putting red hair on the Unicorn, but that seemed excessive.

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