COIN comes home to assist policing

[Tacitus]

Interesting story I heard on NPR on the drive into work today.

D.C. Police use Radical Tactic to Combat Homicides
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...oryId=91379525

They're setting up Bagdad style checkpoints (in a "failed state" type neighborhood you might say) to check IDs of people coming in to determine if they have a legitimate use to be in the neighborhood.

Obviously, this is controversial. And residents of the neighborhood have differing opinions. The D.C. police chief seems determined, though, and thinks it is working to lower homicides.

[Surferbeetle]

From the Economist's 'The World in 2009', Crime Interrupted by Joel Budd

The approach that will come to prominence in 2009 is almost the exact opposite of zero tolerance. Rather than cracking down on petty offenders such as turnstile-jumpers and squeegee men, the authorities will focus on those who are most likely to kill or be killed. Some may be drug dealers recently released from prison. Others may be the associates of people recently wounded by gunfire. What makes the approach particularly novel is that it depends on local people. Rather than insisting on zero tolerance from the police, it tries to change what the residents of crime-infested areas will tolerate.

The new method has been quietly honed for almost a decade in Chicago, where it is known as Operation Ceasefire. It has two main tools. The more conventional one is a team of outreach workers who try to mobilise communities to oppose violence, often in partnership with local clergy. Then, at night, “violence interrupters” hit the streets to sniff out trouble. Often former gang members and graduates of the prison system, the interrupters have a hard-nosed approach to law and order. They may, for example, encourage an aggrieved man to consider beating someone instead of shooting him, or try to convince rival drug-dealers that a turf war would be bad for business, as it would attract the police.

[jmm99]

is here. Its results-data page is here - and its publications are here.

NRA members might find this article of interest - knew I read of Gary Slutkin somewhere else - probably in the Rifleman.

[Bob's World]

I believe that if you all expand your view of what COIN is, you gain a clearer understanding. To my way of thinking, EVERY police officer is waging COIN every day on the job. It is only when Civil government fails in their COIN efforts that they have to bring in the military for the type of expanded COIN operations that most think of when they think of COIN.

Viewed in this manner, the most successful COIN operation of the 60's was the passing and implementation of the Civil Rights Act by the US Government. Faced with with a rising insurgency, complete with ideology and dynamic leadership, the US could have brought in greater force to put the African American populace back into "its place," or they could change their behavior and bring a better form of governance to all Americans. Thankfully they chose the latter.

Think of this when people talk of "Appeasing" insurgents by listenting to and addressing their concerns. When a government addresses the concerns of its own citizenry it is not appeasement, it is simply doing their job. Appeasement is when a government compromises its own populace to grant concessions to the government of an other populace. Very different things altogether.

So yes, all COIN is local, and the best COIN is that which is done day in and day out to meet the needs of a populace long before it starts drifting into the behavior described by Mao as Phase I insurgency.

Just something to consider.

[120mm]

I believe that if you all expand your view of what COIN is, you gain a clearer understanding. To my way of thinking, EVERY police officer is waging COIN every day on the job. It is only when Civil government fails in their COIN efforts that they have to bring in the military for the type of expanded COIN operations that most think of when they think of COIN.

Viewed in this manner, the most successful COIN operation of the 60's was the passing and implementation of the Civil Rights Act by the US Government. Faced with with a rising insurgency, complete with ideology and dynamic leadership, the US could have brought in greater force to put the African American populace back into "its place," or they could change their behavior and bring a better form of governance to all Americans. Thankfully they chose the latter.

Think of this when people talk of "Appeasing" insurgents by listenting to and addressing their concerns. When a government addresses the concerns of its own citizenry it is not appeasement, it is simply doing their job. Appeasement is when a government compromises its own populace to grant concessions to the government of an other populace. Very different things altogether.

So yes, all COIN is local, and the best COIN is that which is done day in and day out to meet the needs of a populace long before it starts drifting into the behavior described by Mao as Phase I insurgency.

Just something to consider.

Ding, ding, ding, Winnah!

Then, at night, “violence interrupters” hit the streets to sniff out trouble. Often former gang members and graduates of the prison system, the interrupters have a hard-nosed approach to law and order. They may, for example, encourage an aggrieved man to consider beating someone instead of shooting him, or try to convince rival drug-dealers that a turf war would be bad for business, as it would attract the police.

But the above quote is industrial strength stupid. How about we NOT look to Chicago for any answers on how to fight crime? Teaching criminals to commit crimes smarter is not the answer.... But Chicago is a fine example of a failed government. Basically the criminals are running the government.

[William F. Owen]

I believe that if you all expand your view of what COIN is, you gain a clearer understanding. To my way of thinking, EVERY police officer is waging COIN every day on the job. It is only when Civil government fails in their COIN efforts that they have to bring in the military for the type of expanded COIN operations that most think of when they think of COIN.

OK, I'll just run a quick test on this.

An insurgency is armed rebellion against the state. Yes/No?
An insurgency is war, in that it uses violence for political gain. Yes/No?

Is countering these activities the primary mission of a police officer. Yes/No?
Is defending the state the primary mission of a police officer. Yes/No?

I am not saying that some perspectives from Police Work are not incredibly valuable to Soldiers fighting against armed rebellions, but I see clear blue everything between COIN and Policing.

[wm]

OK, I'll just run a quick test on this.

An insurgency is armed rebellion against the state. Yes/No?
An insurgency is war, in that it uses violence for political gain. Yes/No?

Is countering these activities the primary mission of a police officer. Yes/No?
Is defending the state the primary mission of a police officer. Yes/No?

I am not saying that some perspectives from Police Work are not incredibly valuable to Soldiers fighting against armed rebellions, but I see clear blue everything between COIN and Policing.

Seems to me that one can see COIN operations in two different lights: preemptive COIN and reactive COIN.

Preemptive COIN stops an insurgency before it starts (sort of like preventive maintenance). What Bob's World described in his post wrt the Civil Rights Act would fall in this category I think.

Reactive COIN is what happens after the insurgency has broken out and one seeks to return things to a preinsurrection status quo aka peacefulness (restorative maintenance--what your mechanic does after your car breaks down on the highway, if you wish). What Wilf is seeking to describe with his questions above falls into the second category. What the coalition is doing in IZ and AF is reactive COIN as well.

A third consideration applies whether one is engaged in reactive or preemptive COIN. That is what we might call Limitation COIN. Limitation COIN strives to ensure that the actions taken to restore the status quo do not fan the fames and broaden the insurgency instead. It also must ensure that the efforts to forestall/preempt the insurrection do not produce new sources of dissatisfaction that foment more/different dissent in the populace. I suspect that this part of COIN is what Nagl had in mind when he called on us to produce soldier diplomats.

[jmm99]

Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare (chap. 4, pp.43-47) uses "Revolutionary" for "X" - insert whatever word suits your fancy.

The situation is one where the insurgent's acts are generally legal and non-violent - ranging up to the situation where military forces have to take an active role because of violence that police actions cannot control.

The counterinsurgent has 4 methods in a "cold war":

1. Direct police and legal action vs. the insurgents (primarily directed at its infra-structure).

2. Indirect action by alleviating the underlying conditions supporting the insurgency's cause.

3. Infiltration of the insurgency (intelligence & derailment).

4. Co-opt the insurgency into a mainstream political movement.

Now, moving to Bob's World's example of the Civil Rights Movement, which addresses only one side of the coin (pun intended) - Black Voting Rights, etc. One can cite use of all four methods by local, state and Federal authorities in that era; but the Kennedy-Johnson approach was to emphasize #2 (enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts) and #4 (bringing Black voters into the Democratic Party, realizing that substantial numbers of White voters would be lost).

The other insurgency was the anti-Civil Rights movement, which had both non-violent and violent aspects. Once the decision was made to pursue enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts, application of method #2 in favor of the "antis" was not possible - although as time went on (now 5 decades), modifications were made to satisfy some of the concerns about busing, affirmative action, etc.

The methods used against the "antis" tending to violence were largely #1 and #3 (e.g., Mississippi Burning). That again was a long process; and there were still a large number of dissatisfied Whites without a political home. That need was met by Nixon's Southern Strategy, which changed the US political map by bringing former Democrats into the Republican Party. That message (method #4) was conveyed in a number of ways - including SCOTUS nominations of two Southern judges (Haynsworth & Carswell in 1969 & 1970), which were destined to fail from the gitgo.

The foregoing is an explanation by hindsight - the various responses developed because of the US system of governance - not because of some magical 50-year plan.