COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[marct]

Hi WM,

Always funto gte into philosophy debates with you .

I wonder, from a pragmatic point of view, whether the inquiry is really worth the effort. If we are seeking to pre-empt or disrupt the bad guys' plans, why do we need anyhting more than an understanding of what they mean, temporally, by "long term," "mid term," and "short term"? In short, I am not clear on why Rob wants to do this mapping of military doctrinal teminology.

That's actually a really good question, and I'll try to answer it. My first observation would be that unless we are planning on the annihilation of an opposing group, they will be around for a while so we will be dealing with them long after any open conflict ends. My second observation would be that while Rob couched the question in terms of military doctrine, I believe he was actually trying to get more at how cultural groups perceive a conflict space. My third observation is that how a group perceives a conflict space will, inevitably, condition how they act within that space.

I think a really good example of this comes out of the way that the new CMC technologies have been perceived by AQ - they are a major part of their battlespace as it were. Your latter point about levels is, IMO, quite justified - I would actually prefer to describe it in terms of overlapping topologies, but I'll get to that latter. Anyway, I would suggest that the AQ "strategy" is centered in a "conflict space" that is radically different from that of the Western militaries.

Now I am going to change horses here. Your post inclines me to believe that you have fallen under the spell of folks like Habermas, Derrida, and Foucault (the structuralist/post structuralist, not the physicist).

I hope you're smiling when you say that . It was to avoid that attribution that I purposefully referenced Sapir.

I am thinking you place the cart before the horse in your last paragraph. I submit that we can only know the meanings attached to the words and phrases used by our opponents to describe their "levels of war" in a complex that also includes the theoretical constructs the words and phrases convey. First, we must determine whether they even operationalize a notion of "levels of war." Just because we do, I would not want to suppose that this is a universal practice in war theorizing.

I would certainly agree with your caution here, and that is why I would prefer to conceive of it along the lines of intersecting and overlapping topologies rather than the more limited concept of "levels". But how are we going to find out how they conceive of conflict without analyzing how they a) talk about it and b) operationalize that talk?

I certainly agree that the meaning of terms is contained within a semantic matrix, but that matrix, by its very nature, also serves to condition their operations and, as such, is worth examining.

I also have some issues with your point about etymology. While it may well be the case that COG originally derives from Newtonian physics, it has long since taken on new meanings divorced from that original context. The following is an example of what I mean. In the 80's, the U.S Army offered an effective writing course. One point made in the course was using vocabulary correctly. The purist vocabulary gurus pointed out that military writers habitually misused 'viable.' Its definition, coming from biology, is "able to sustain life;" yet military writers and speakers talk about viable plans and viable options among other things. The community of speakers here, not being biologists, knew pretty much what they really meant when they used 'viable' and that most often was 'workable,' 'practicable,' or something synonymous.

Sure, word shift or semantic drift or whatever you want to call it is one of the crucial limits of any form of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Still and all, there appears to be a fair amount of support for a weak form of it.

I revert to my earlier post with the quotation from C. L. Dodgson, AKA Lewis Carroll. He was an Oxford don, holding a chair in mathematics at Christchurch, a mathematician and logician who recognized the problems with which language is fraught, especially when one tries to formailze natural language into logical argument in symbolic form. He put versions of many of those problems, humorously, into the mouths of his characters in his Alice stories.

You could also point to the dismal failures of the Vienna School in their attempts to create a scientific language.

In your last post, you seem to have taken the opposite pole to Humpty Dumpty, allowing the words to determine what and how we think, while our ovoid friend chooses to make the words bend to his conceptualization of the world.

Nope; I tend to hold with a weak form of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. At present, that takes the form of words have a limiting effect on perceptions and thought as a result of their connotations and neuronal associations. Where it becomes stronger is when we try to communicate a thought or perception.

I am proposing that there is something like a Hegelian middle ground here. We reach an understanding of other view points by successive approximations in a dialectic exchange with those who hold that point of view different from our own. The initial foot in the door (or camel's nose in the tent) is indexed to those things which we have in common because we are all human beings. An interesting exmple of this is found in the Star Wars Next Generation episode "Darmok," summarized here. For dry philosophical alternatives, I suggest a look at the literture in the philosophy of language on the problems of radical translation, radical interpretation, and the indeterminacy of translation (W.V.O Quine and Donald Davidson as prime sources).

That's one of my favorite episodes ("Trek", not "Wars" ). I also agree that biological commonalities form the basis for communications (NB that "communications" is different from "thought" - a crucial point that is often not addressed in the debates in this area). While I am not enamoured of Hegel, the dialectical approach is certainly one of the bases of understanding although I believe there are others.

Marc

[wm]

MarcT-- always glad to do a little sophistical sparring.

My first observation would be that unless we are planning on the annihilation of an opposing group, they will be around for a while so we will be dealing with them long after any open conflict ends. My second observation would be that while Rob couched the question in terms of military doctrine, I believe he was actually trying to get more at how cultural groups perceive a conflict space. My third observation is that how a group perceives a conflict space will, inevitably, condition how they act within that space.

Thanks for the clarifications of intent.

I hope you're smiling when you say that . It was to avoid that attribution that I purposefully referenced Sapir.

Of course I was smiling. I hoped you'd have seen the intended humor when I categorized Foucault both as a Structuralist and as a Post-structuralist. I think that most of what we say ought not to be placed in a specific box--to abstract in this manner is to falsify and misrepresent.

I would certainly agree with your caution here, and that is why I would prefer to conceive of it along the lines of intersecting and overlapping topologies rather than the more limited concept of "levels".

This is where I want you to explain more about your concept of topologies, please.

You could also point to the dismal failures of the Vienna School in their attempts to create a scientific language.

I suspect this applies equally to almost any other "school" seeking to standardize the domain of discourse that they view as unique to their area of investigation, sort of like establishing the equivalent of what cosmological physicists do with their grand unified theories (GUTs). Wittgenstein is particularly apropos here I think--we need to show the fly the way out of the fly bottle rather than cork it up inside.

That's one of my favorite episodes ("Trek", not "Wars" ). I also agree that biological commonalities form the basis for communications (NB that "communications" is different from "thought" - a crucial point that is often not addressed in the debates in this area). While I am not enamoured of Hegel, the dialectical approach is certainly one of the bases of understanding although I believe there are others.

Thanks for catching my mistake re STNG and SW. It was well past my normal bed time. I was also looking at a miniature pod racer as I was typing that. Regarding Hegel, I tend to agree if you are speaking about the form of his presentation rather than the contents. (Maybe that just goes with writing/speaking in German. Kant, Goethe, Heidegger, and even the Brothers Grimm are as opaque as Hegel IMHO.)

[marct]

Hi WM,

This is where I want you to explain more about your concept of topologies, please.

This is rather tricky for me to do, in part since I'm in the process of reformulating it, so apologies if it's not up to snuff. I first started using the idea via Husserl, Schutz and Luckmann with some Korzybski added in. basically, in my first version it was an attempt to abstract phenomenological concepts into a form that was amenable to manipulation and analysis.

By about 1998 or so, I started to tie it in much more closely with cognitive neuropsychology, since it was beginning to look like cognitive neural networks were "fuzzy" in nature. Since then, I've been working on the concept, on and off, and keeping track of the CN literature waiting for some really hard data to show up. This, the hard data, really started appearing a last year and i seems to support the idea that neural networks use a fuzzy set typology to classify incoming sensory impressions.

This use of fuzzy vs crisp membership really does, to my mid, fit in very nicely with the phenomenological position - at least in its social theoretic form (e.g. The Structures of the Life World, V. 1 & 2 Schutz and Luckman), which brings us back to some type of cultural influence during childhood on the formation of language and concepts. Again, in the weak form of the S-W hypothesis, not the strong one.

So, back to typologies: they are, for me at least, the simplest way to "see" the various relationships (I'm a very visual thinker).

Regarding Hegel, I tend to agree if you are speaking about the form of his presentation rather than the contents. (Maybe that just goes with writing/speaking in German. Kant, Goethe, Heidegger, and even the Brothers Grimm are as opaque as Hegel IMHO.)

Sounds like linguistic determinism to me (LOLOLOL). Isn't there some famous quote about German being the only language where love poetry sounds like an argument?

Marc

[John T. Fishel]

Clausewitz defined Center of Gravity as "the hub of all power and movement on which all else depends." One of the problems caused by that definition was that many believed it meant that there could only be a single COG. It was a great debate. But you could find places in the 8 books where Clausewitz suggested that there could be more than one COG. The other issue related to COGs was the common view that they represented targets. In fact, the COGs were the source of the enemy's strength. Of course, they could be vulnerable to direct attack as were the pony herds attacked by Mackenzie but often they would only be vulnerable to indirect attack. The point is that the objective was to neutralize the source of the enemy's strength - the COG.

From my perspective, there are typically one or more COGs at each level of war. So, the pony herds were the operational level COG for particular tribes. Detroying the pony herds made it difficult to impossible for those tribes to both conduct war and maintain their nomadic way of life. But what were the strategic COGs? Did that depend on the objective? In this current war, what are the American strategic COGs? I see one as what I would call regime legitimacy based around the war policy of the Bush administration. If the enemy objective is to drive us out of Iraq and Afghanistan then neutrailizing regime legitimacy will likely achieve that. But if the objective goes beyond the two local conflicts and seeks to achieve a greater caliphate encompassing the entire globe, then the US strategic COG becomes what I call system legitimacy and goes beyond simply neutralizing the current war policies. There is, of course, nothing to prevent the enemy form attacking both COGs independently, sequentially, or simultaneously, directly and/or indirectly.

On that happy note

Cheers

JohnT

[goesh]

We have no shamans to counter our enemy’s spiritual leaders. So much thought and so many words are directed at the war of ideas and propaganda and ideology, all this mental stuff of Intel and counter Intel, innovation, creativity, adaptation but nothing of the spiritual. We essentially march to war without God yet we go to great lengths to acknowledge and respect and understand the spirituality of our opponents. We acknowledge their God but do not bring ours to the fight. In describing relationship levels per the direction of this thread, there is a vacuum that has not been filled and simply not factored in. There is a subtle spin component to COIN that minimizes the impact of spirituality as a driving force behind killing yet will seek to utilize it in an effort to complete other objectives.

Reference has been made again to the 350+ year Native American insurgency in our history and though it is gratifying to see said reference, principle lessons remain unlearned. Namely, the role of the Medicine Man/Shaman/Imam/Priest was mostly ignored back then and at best kept separate and distinguished from the roles of combat leaders and tacticians. What if I told you the only reason the Lakota and Cheyene whipped Custer was because the principal Spiritual leader of the Lakota insurgency, Sitting Bull, had a priori knowledge of the victory? He Sun Danced, sacrificed 100 pieces of flesh from his arms, went into a trance and ‘saw’ many soldiers falling into camp. These falling pony soldiers were all bleeding. The warriors didn’t need the leadership and tactical brilliance and experience of Crazy Horse and Gall to lead the charge. They were assured of victory before the first shot was fired. Lakota oral history informs us that Sitting Bull was heard to repeatedly yell “Brave hearts to the front” as the engagement unfolded. He wasn’t motivating and encouraging and bolstering courage, he was simply telling the men if you believe, go and kill your enemy. Myth and common perception suggest that every male able to fight did so, but that is not the case. Sitting Bull himself was not in combat during the Little Big Horn. He didn’t need to be though it was an option Medicine Men always had, and there were others in the insurgent camp that didn't engage too. This dynamic of ignored spirituality is not unique to our history. Guzman of the Tupac Amaru (Shining Path) was every much a Shaman as was Sitting Bull and it took a long time to catch him.

[slapout9]

goesh....You go boy!!! Tell it like is...put some MOJO in the fight. Somebody say Amen...

[Steve Blair]

We have no shamans to counter our enemy’s spiritual leaders. So much thought and so many words are directed at the war of ideas and propaganda and ideology, all this mental stuff of Intel and counter Intel, innovation, creativity, adaptation but nothing of the spiritual. We essentially march to war without God yet we go to great lengths to acknowledge and respect and understand the spirituality of our opponents. We acknowledge their God but do not bring ours to the fight. In describing relationship levels per the direction of this thread, there is a vacuum that has not been filled and simply not factored in. There is a subtle spin component to COIN that minimizes the impact of spirituality as a driving force behind killing yet will seek to utilize it in an effort to complete other objectives.

Reference has been made again to the 350+ year Native American insurgency in our history and though it is gratifying to see said reference, principle lessons remain unlearned. Namely, the role of the Medicine Man/Shaman/Imam/Priest was mostly ignored back then and at best kept separate and distinguished from the roles of combat leaders and tacticians. What if I told you the only reason the Lakota and Cheyene whipped Custer was because the principal Spiritual leader of the Lakota insurgency, Sitting Bull, had a priori knowledge of the victory? He Sun Danced, sacrificed 100 pieces of flesh from his arms, went into a trance and ‘saw’ many soldiers falling into camp. These falling pony soldiers were all bleeding. The warriors didn’t need the leadership and tactical brilliance and experience of Crazy Horse and Gall to lead the charge. They were assured of victory before the first shot was fired. Lakota oral history informs us that Sitting Bull was heard to repeatedly yell “Brave hearts to the front” as the engagement unfolded. He wasn’t motivating and encouraging and bolstering courage, he was simply telling the men if you believe, go and kill your enemy. Myth and common perception suggest that every male able to fight did so, but that is not the case. Sitting Bull himself was not in combat during the Little Big Horn. He didn’t need to be though it was an option Medicine Men always had, and there were others in the insurgent camp that didn't engage too. This dynamic of ignored spirituality is not unique to our history. Guzman of the Tupac Amaru (Shining Path) was every much a Shaman as was Sitting Bull and it took a long time to catch him.

For those of us who study the Indian Wars, this is nothing new. I could also mention the case of Isa Tai of the Comanche, who goaded his people into a conflict that they ultimately lost. Most good Frontier commanders were quite aware of this aspect of the fight, although how they used it varied from commander to commander.

You're quite correct that current concepts ignore this aspect of the conflict. One of the reasons (I think) that current efforts do not use God in the Western sense is that it's not always our primary motivation, and to use it in such a way plays right into IO efforts to paint all people in the West as "crusaders." I'm a firm believer in the spiritual side of conflict, but the "American Way" as spiritual center just doesn't play out well outside the US. This was a central component to most efforts in Latin America in the 1920s, though, and also played a major role in the Philippines and other involvements. But that smacks of empire-building these days.

What can take its place? That may be a good subject for another thread...

[wm]

We have no shamans to counter our enemy’s spiritual leaders. So much thought and so many words are directed at the war of ideas and propaganda and ideology, all this mental stuff of Intel and counter Intel, innovation, creativity, adaptation but nothing of the spiritual. We essentially march to war without God yet we go to great lengths to acknowledge and respect and understand the spirituality of our opponents. We acknowledge their God but do not bring ours to the fight. In describing relationship levels per the direction of this thread, there is a vacuum that has not been filled and simply not factored in. There is a subtle spin component to COIN that minimizes the impact of spirituality as a driving force behind killing yet will seek to utilize it in an effort to complete other objectives.

Reference has been made again to the 350+ year Native American insurgency in our history and though it is gratifying to see said reference, principle lessons remain unlearned. Namely, the role of the Medicine Man/Shaman/Imam/Priest was mostly ignored back then and at best kept separate and distinguished from the roles of combat leaders and tacticians. What if I told you the only reason the Lakota and Cheyene whipped Custer was because the principal Spiritual leader of the Lakota insurgency, Sitting Bull, had a priori knowledge of the victory? He Sun Danced, sacrificed 100 pieces of flesh from his arms, went into a trance and ‘saw’ many soldiers falling into camp. These falling pony soldiers were all bleeding. The warriors didn’t need the leadership and tactical brilliance and experience of Crazy Horse and Gall to lead the charge. They were assured of victory before the first shot was fired. Lakota oral history informs us that Sitting Bull was heard to repeatedly yell “Brave hearts to the front” as the engagement unfolded. He wasn’t motivating and encouraging and bolstering courage, he was simply telling the men if you believe, go and kill your enemy. Myth and common perception suggest that every male able to fight did so, but that is not the case. Sitting Bull himself was not in combat during the Little Big Horn. He didn’t need to be though it was an option Medicine Men always had, and there were others in the insurgent camp that didn't engage too. This dynamic of ignored spirituality is not unique to our history. Guzman of the Tupac Amaru (Shining Path) was every much a Shaman as was Sitting Bull and it took a long time to catch him.

A spiritual leader may not need to appeal to matters religious. I submit that Hitler was as much a shamanic spiritual leader as Sitting Bull. What I think Goesh is on to is what the French spent a lot of time describing as the moral aspect of combat. It is also what we hear described as charismatic leadership and explains why names like Chesty Puller made it on to some folks Great Generals lists on this thread.

[marct]

Hi Folks,

A spiritual leader may not need to appeal to matters religious. I submit that Hitler was as much a shamanic spiritual leader as Sitting Bull. What I think Goesh is on to is what the French spent a lot of time describing as the moral aspect of combat.

I would certainly agree with the comment on Hitler - that really comes through in watching old clips of the Nurenburg rallies. I'm not sure Goesh is talking about the "moral" aspect, although that is probably part of it (Goesh? Expansion please?). We've had a couple of threads on the more "aplied" aspects of spirituality - in particular, and my favorite, was the Magical Realism thread, and I still stand by my suggestion of creating the US Magi Corps for just his type of fight .

Marc

[Steve Blair]

We may have gotten away from this in a mainstream sense because we've become such an industrial/mechanical society and lost touch with that side of our cultural identity/focus. As the focus has shifted away from units (as in the regimental system that's been discussed before) and moved more to weapons systems/communities I think the military has lost an appreciation for how important the moral side of the fight is (although the Marines seem more in touch with this...perhaps because of their own "combat spirituality" as it were).

Hitler was an absolutely brilliant shamanic leader and clearly understood the value of totems. He had another astute witch doctor (Goebbles) to package the product for him, and a sub-chief who took the totems to extremes (Himmler and his Nordic visions).

Mattis by all accounts is a stunning motivator combined with strong combat leadership skills and intelligence. We have others who can convey the message as well. The question still remains: what message do we convey? I'd submit that (as has often been the case in past American expeditionary efforts) we don't really know what our message is. Is it God? Freedom? Oil profits? New markets for Microsoft? Cheap real estate for Disney Middle East/Jasmine's Kingdom?

[slapout9]

It's what used to be called "The Spirit of The Bayonet" I don't know if they teach that anymore.

[wm]

MarcT,

I would certainly agree with the comment on Hitler - that really comes through in watching old clips of the Nurenburg rallies. I'm not sure Goesh is talking about the "moral" aspect, although that is probably part of it (Goesh? Expansion please?). We've had a couple of threads on the more "aplied" aspects of spirituality - in particular, and my favorite, was the Magical Realism thread, and I still stand by my suggestion of creating the US Magi Corps for just his type of fight .

Marc

The moral aspect I mean is best found in the writings of duPicq. It has little to do with ethical rectitude and everything to do with attitude, belief in oneself, and spirituality. I think Slapout has it right with his description of it as "the spirit of the bayonet." Back in the day, my drill sergeant used to call out, "What is the spirit of the bayonet?" We would respond as loudly and toughly as we could "To kill!" He would then respond, "And who are we?" To which we would reply, "The killers!" (I think VOLAR killed that mode of training and thinking though. )

[tequila]

I'll testify that the spirit is alive and well at MCRD Parris Island. My platoon didn't call it that, but our senior, a combat veteran of OIF I, gave us all many a lecture about the desire and willingness of Marines to kill the enemy --- specifically that Marines were men who could "take joy in carving the heart out of a mother####er with your right hand, and hold that man's child safe in his left." SOI was more of the same, emphasizing the former and not much on the latter.

I wouldn't worry overmuch about the warrior spirit of our infantry.

[TT]

John T. Fishel:

From my perspective, there are typically one or more COGs at each level of war. So, the pony herds were the operational level COG for particular tribes. Detroying the pony herds made it difficult to impossible for those tribes to both conduct war and maintain their nomadic way of life.

Thank you, John, for the elaboration and for the important point that there is not necessarily one COG in a particular level of war. It is helpful.

I understand the point that the destruction of the pony herds – to stay with this example – had the consequence of impacting the tribes mobility. In part my question was spurred by the impact, as you have noted, on the tribes nomadic way of life, which would in part provide a frame for their social-cultural (and even political) terrain. But I was thinking somewhere in the back of my mind of the role of horses in the social –cultural life of any one nomadic tribe (largely the plains tribes) as well between tribes. If my memory of reading I did way back in antiquity serves me right, horses were a sign of ‘wealth’ and ‘prestige’ within a tribe and between tribes.

But primarily in the back of my mind was how some tribes were split off from the Sioux, while other tribes, who were not part of the Sioux nation were co-opted. I do not know that much of the Indian wars (does the Lone Ranger count?), but this to me implied taking advantage of or influencing aspects of the social-cultural and even political contexts of each tribe and that the of social-cultural- political inter connections amongst various tribes and/or tribal groups. And you can throw in shamans and mysticism and religion into this mix as well

That there may be, and perhaps should be, more than COG covers this. Leaving aside the issue of whether the socio-cultural environment should be a COG, would I be correct in thinking that when there are multiple COGs that there ‘may’ be [or 'should be'?] different priorities attached to them (a case perhaps of minor COGs and major COGs)? I raise this understanding that in some cases several COGs may have different implications that combine to achieve one or more desired consequences.

Best

TT

[slapout9]

I posted this link awhile back but here it is again.
The Sioux Campaign of 1876: The Horse as The Center of Gravity of the Sioux Indians.




http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_vi...ISOBOX=1&REC=1

[TT]

Rob:

I'm starting to think there might be question or at least part of a question for Marc. - Maybe it gets to perceptions of time, space and scope by opponents. Maybe there be something in there about action/reaction/counter-action - is that specific to a particular culture, or is that more of a universal learning function?

I think it may be useful in trying to understand what your enemy is trying to do to you, but I'm not sure it prevents you from framing the depth of your own activities. I think it also could shed some light on applicability of other lenses/cognitive framing - like CoGs and Lines of Operation,etc. Another council member PM'd me about applicability and utility of doctrine, tenets and principals to COIN. My initial thoughts were that I believed in general they were broad enough to accommodate a great deal of conditions and that it depended on how they are interpreted by people.

Wm wrote:

I wonder, from a pragmatic point of view, whether the inquiry is really worth the effort. If we are seeking to pre-empt or disrupt the bad guys' plans, why do we need anyhting more than an understanding of what they mean, temporally, by "long term," "mid term," and "short term"? In short, I am not clear on why Rob wants to do this mapping of military doctrinal teminology.

wm, I fully take your point that if our approach is working, then whether there is a difference is of no great consequence. Though I agree with Rob that understanding how they conceive their levels of war and the how and why the levels interconnect would be critical to disrupting sucessfullly their plans.

But what I was really thinking about is – and yes, I should have elaborated! - what if our approaches are not succeeding, or are not nearly as successful as is required to be successful against them? I am thinking here, say, of a success at ‘disrupting’ the enemy at what we perceive as the operational level ends up not having the impact that we think it should, because our disruption was on what the enemy perceives as the tactical level.

Behind this lies a number of thoughts. One is that that it appears that AQI (and other insurgent groups) through the ‘propaganda of the deed’ are in effect leveraging the tactical straight into a strategic effect (ie affecting how we think about what is going on, chances of success, etc and so on). It is almost as if they are skipping a level – though their IO campaign may be seen as their operational level. Allied to this was another issue that was at the back of my mind which is that,if we accept Ken White’s point that ‘the COIN battle is the operational level’, for al Qaeda as in UBL et al Iraq very likely is a tactical level fight (I am simplifying, of course, by leaving out the complexities created by the multitude of different insurgent groups in Iraq).

AQ/UBL claim that their aim is to create, or recreate, the caliphate. To me this means that their strategic level goal has to be to control the Islamic holy land (effectively Saudi Arabia – the strategic level COG?). If this analysis is accepted – and please do correct me if I am not – this in turn might suggest that, given where he and his core followers are located, that the operational level COG would be to control (or completely destabilize?) Pakistan because of the potential benefits (probably the nukes, maybe an army?) that would contribute to their way of thinking to achieving control of Saudi (or would Pakistan be a second strategic level COG?). And pretty much everything else – Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorist attacks in N. Africa, Europe, etc - essentially are tactical level actions. (Marc’s point about perceptions of time is likely relevant here, but best that I leave that aside lest I irredeemably dig myself into a very deep hole. )

I guess in part what I am getting at here is the possibility that if the coalition succeed in Iraq, that this would only be tactical set back from UBL et al’s point view, while a loss of Iraq and whatever the consequences of that could have adverse operational and strategic level consequences for us beyond Iraq per se.


Time to go watch the Three Lions take on the Israelites….it may be a case of maneuver warfare vs methodical battle/attrition.

TT

[slapout9]

I am also posting this one called: Plans That Survive First Contact.

I was under the impression that COG's and decisive points were used all the time in WW2 but according to this paper they were NEVER used at all.
Also the term Objective had a different meaning, it was used to describe the defeat mechanism?? Wow what a concept.

Tom Odom you may find this interesting.
Rob Thornton I told you about this in a PM awhile back don't know if you ever got a chance to read it.


http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_vi...ISOBOX=1&REC=1

[Steve Blair]

I have never bought into the concept that there is only "one COG to rule them all"; rather I feel that there are many (and EBO may be a "scientific" variation on this) acting in concert. Some are more important than others, but that importance can shift over time and/or if the objectives of the parties involved change.

To go back to the pony herd COG...there was another factor at play as well (more of a social COG). Within most tribes (although in this case I'm using the Comanche and Kiowa) there was a "blood for blood" social element at work. In other words, if warriors were killed during a raid, their male kinsmen had a social duty to avenge that loss. This social drive was one of the factors behind the 1874 Red River War. Astute commanders (like Mackenzie) grasped the fact that by striking a logistic COG (or two...the pony herd and the physical wealth represented by the village) he could achieve the goal of his campaign without triggering the vengeance factor. When he attacked the combined Comanche/Kiowa encampment at Palo Duro Canyon there were only 3-4 reported Indian casualties (Mackenzie also only counted bodies left behind...he didn't do estimates), but he captured and destroyed the village and the 1,200 or so ponies in the combined herd.

This same approach didn't work with tribes like the Apache, who didn't depend on horses in the same way, but commanders found other ways to attack their COGs. Grierson, for example, hit on water as a main COG and scattered patrols at each dependable water hole along an Apache escape route. This proved successful in that it forced them to battle and the Apache were not capable of replacing losses in any real way (something they had in common with most tribes).

Again, in each case there were a number of COGs in play (supply, mobility, reinforcements, social considerations) and each was targeted based on the commander's assessment. Mackenzie seems to have grasped quickly the social aspect of most tribes, as he usually targeted things other than the warriors of a tribe he tried to bring to battle. Sheridan hit on mobility as a COG early on when he started pushing winter campaigns in 1867-68. The Army could move (with difficulty) in the winter; the tribes could not. Miles carried this to its logical conclusion in 1876-77 against the Sioux using infantry (which had more mobility during winter than cavalry due to its lack of horses and correspondingly lighter logistical tail).

With the social COG aspect, some commanders understood that there were factional lines between the tribes and within the tribes themselves. Most tribes contained what came to be called "peace" and "war" factions, and astute commanders tried to isolate the latter from the former. But most also failed to understand the weak nature of tribal leadership, so they missed a vital COG (or at least a factor that would greatly hinder what diplomacy they tried).

Lots going on in this thread, but I've always felt that multiple COGs were the norm and that they could be found in many areas (including those not traditionally looked for...like social networks). Maybe that's my Indian Wars specialization coming through, but you also saw it in Vietnam. We just never picked up on it there....

[Ken White]

I have never bought into the concept that there is only "one COG to rule them all"; rather I feel that there are many (and EBO may be a "scientific" variation on this) acting in concert. Some are more important than others, but that importance can shift over time and/or if the objectives of the parties involved change.
. . .
. . .
. . .

... Maybe that's my Indian Wars specialization coming through, but you also saw it in Vietnam. We just never picked up on it there....

I totally agree with your premise but disagree with the final sentence. In Viet Nam, WE picked up on it early on and at Division / Brigade level generally practiced it (Commander dependent). Some of the Field Forces also did from time to time (again Commander dependent). The problem was that ComMACV/USARV largely did not allow it to be implemented on a command wide basis because of a different command philosophy on what the war entailed -- until a New Commander who picked up on it and practiced it took charge on 10 Jun 68.

In COIN efforts, the nation and the effort become the Operational level of war. If COIN is not understood, then the operational effort will be misdirected at the wrong COG -- or even non-existing but falsely presumed COG. There will almost always be multiple COG and they will constantly shift (COIN or conventional -- or IO...). That's why bureaucracies don't do well at war fighting while intuitive commanders with fairly well trained troops win...

We were a bureaucracy in WW II yet we still did pretty well because we were generally willing to put the right folks in charge and leave them alone. Most of our errors (Schmidt?) were due to a failure to identify what was important and put form over function. COG existed and even if we didn't use the term or the process, the good guys identified what was stupid (Gavin's comment on Schmidt, Urquhart's on bridges, Halsey's on Peleliu) and what needed to be done -- after they learned by a few mistakes; just as did Miles and Crook.

As did Abrams in Viet Nam after the Harkins / Westmoreland land war in Europe Operational effort had proven disastrous for seven years. Abrams and Co. focused on mostly the correct COGs and methodically went after them.

[Steve Blair]

With VN, I use the statement in direct reference to MACV under Westy and his staff. I know it was picked up on at lower levels (with varying degrees of success), but at the end of the day it was a higher headquarters push that was needed. Abrams got it...his predecessors didn't.