Classic Principles of War

[jkm_101_fso]

Had some homework in Grad School last week regarding contemporary application of the principles of war. Wanted to float it with you fellas.

Since 9/11, which principles of war have we best adhered to? In Afghanistan? In Iraq? Which have we neglected? Which principles are outdated? Do they still apply today? Or need revamped?

Right off the bat, I can name "unity of command" as a challenge/failure in Afghanistan.

I already did the assignment, so you are not doing it for me

Thought it was a great topic.

[William F. Owen]

Had some homework in Grad School last week regarding contemporary application of the principles of war.

Which principles are you talking about? There's a couple of not very good lists of improper nouns and verbs, but they don't seem to have any useful application.

If you have some principle of your own, which you want to discuss I think that would be an extremely useful exercise.

[RTK]

I'd imagine he's referring to the Nine Principles of War (MOOSEMUSS):

Mass
Maneuver
Offensive
Objective
Simplicity
Economy of Force
Unitiy of Command
Surprise
Security

[William F. Owen]

I'd imagine he's referring to the Nine Principles of War (MOOSEMUSS):

Mass
Maneuver
Offensive
Objective
Simplicity
Economy of Force
Unitiy of Command
Surprise
Security

I was afraid that might be the case. For example, if "Economy of Force" is a principle, why isn't "Freedom of Action."

I never understood why these lists get written. They don't seem useful.

[selil]

I was afraid that might be the case. For example, if "Economy of Force" is a principle, why isn't "Freedom of Action."

Because so is "simplicity"

[John T. Fishel]

Freedom of Action is one I've seen on a few other national lists of Principles of War (if not that then something very like it). We tend to write them because we like checklists. there is nothing wrong with that as long as we don't see the list as the be all, end all. Rather, principles - seen in the less rigid way - can be useful in helping us consider whether we have taken account of the major areas of war that may present problems.

Unity of command is a principle that in most political-military conflicts the US honors in the breach. Ask yourself who is in charge of ALL USG activity (including military) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The answer is that there is no one person. In Iraq, neither Odierno nor Crocker is in charge of everything. thus the best that can be hoped for is unity of effort and that depends on the personal relationship.

Security is THE issue in both places. We've done pretty well in Iraq in the last couple of years, badly in Afghanistan.

My sense is that defining the objective was a problem in both places - again, better in Iraq recently than in Afghanistan. The objective in Iraq may well be an issue with the new Administration. It is certainly an issue in Afghanistan now and in the future. Hopefully, Petraeus is focused on that at his level but again, how will the Obama Administration see it?

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

Freedom of Action is one I've seen on a few other national lists of Principles of War (if not that then something very like it). We tend to write them because we like checklists. there is nothing wrong with that as long as we don't see the list as the be all, end all. Rather, principles - seen in the less rigid way - can be useful in helping us consider whether we have taken account of the major areas of war that may present problems.

John, I'm a huge believer in taxonomies as aids to planning and decision making, but I see no rhyme or reason to "Principles of War" in terms of lists.

"Mass" is not a principle, but "Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time." is nearly always useful. The word "Mass" does not have that meaning in it's normal usage.

My thanks to Bill Moore for pointing that out in good clear language

[jkm_101_fso]

I'd imagine he's referring to the Nine Principles of War (MOOSEMUSS):

Mass
Maneuver
Offensive
Objective
Simplicity
Economy of Force
Unitiy of Command
Surprise
Security

Exactly right. Apologize for not being more specific, Wilf.

[Bill Moore]

Just a couple of thoughts, and with the caveat that I'm looking at the principles reference irregular warfare (where they fall short), but they're still very much relevant for conventional war.

Objective: a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. If you have this, then you obtain unity of effort with the right command relationships. This is a major shortfall.

Mass: Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time. This can be interpreted to mesh with irregular warfare, especially if you extend the time factor to months and years, and change combat power to security forces.

Offense: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. While offense will always play a role, it could be argued that a good defense is more constructive in irregular warfare. Protecting the population in many ways is an offensive operation against the insurgent.

Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time, at a place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Important at the tactical level, but arguments could be made that transparency is more importanat at the operational/strategic level.

Security: Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. We initially violated this principle in OIF, still don't have a handle on it in OEF-A.

We could address all of them, just wanted to throw a couple out.

[Ken White]

but do have one comment and a question for clarification. Question first:

...Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time, at a place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Important at the tactical level, but arguments could be made that transparency is more importanat at the operational/strategic level. (emphasis added /kw)

Sorry, I'm old and slow. I don't know what you mean by the highlighted comment???

Security: Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. We initially violated this principle in OIF, still don't have a handle on it in OEF-A.

Just an observation; I'm not at all sure that the enemy advantages in either theater were or are unexpected; I'd submit we were -- and more damningly, are -- too big, bureaucratic and inflexible to react to and / or pre-empt them...

There are some exceptions to that generalization, fortunately. Not enough, unfortunately.

Added item of commentary for Ol' Wilf:

Mass: Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time. This can be interpreted to mesh with irregular warfare, especially if you extend the time factor to months and years, and change combat power to security forces.

While I broadly agree with you on the concept of principles, they are useful for some to organize thoughts. There are, as you noted, several such lists of varying utility. In any event, in US practice, 'Mass' is generally construed, usefully I think, as Bill stated it in that quote. ADDED: Wilf posted his acknowledgment of Bill's comment while I was typing...

[Bob's World]

I'd imagine he's referring to the Nine Principles of War (MOOSEMUSS):

Mass
Maneuver
Offensive
Objective
Simplicity
Economy of Force
Unitiy of Command
Surprise
Security

Ok, I'm trying this "quote" function for the first time, so this might not format out right.

First, I am a HUGE believer in these principles. When working on a CONOP and going through the MDMP process, it is always worth the 5 minutes it takes to say "OK, how does this square against the principles of war." You'd be amazed how often that is the safety net that catches a flaw in the plan that is easily fixed before going final.

Second, OK this is off the top of my head, but I am pretty sure I can apply these to the PCE-strategy that you all have been sandpapering me on these past few days.

For example:
Mass: Ensure that the whole of government is engaged, or at least considered for engagement, for any action to assist the COIN activities of a Host Nation; and absolutely applied for those engagements that have been identified as decisive.

Maneuver: Ensure you have access to engage everywhere necessary, regardless of national borders, in order to fully address the situation that you have deployed American forces into theater for in the first place.

Offensive: Good COIN is proactive, not reactive. Begin aggressively working to identify and address issues of poor governance long before the situation degenerates into violence and requires military assistance to the Civil authorities.

Objective: Never forget that the Populace is the center of gravity. Fix the Government, neutralize the insurgent, but never forget it is all to support the populace.

Simplicity: Understand the problem you are trying to resolve, and then engage it and not the symptoms.

Economy of Force: Don't drop a bomb if you can use a sniper; Don't employ a Brigade Combat Team if you can employ an ODA; and Don't employ an ODA if you can employ a rifle squad; and above all, don't employ any American at all if the HN can do it themself.

Unity of Command: Host Nation is in charge. US AMB is the US lead, with the military chain answering to him.

Surprise: Work as diligently in your OPSEC to avoid it, as you do in your operational planning to achieve it.

Security: Always. Secure your force, and secure the populace. Do not destroy the village to save the village. This is the foundation that you will rebuild good governance upon.

[John T. Fishel]

as far as unity of command is concerned. Unfortunately, often the HN is not and cannot be in charge. Thus, HN in charge, becomes a goal to be achieved - preferably sooner rather than later. Equally unfortunately, the American Ambassador is not always in charge. The escape clause is the exception to the Ambassadorial appointment letter that notes that military forces do not come under the Ambassador when a major military operation is undertaken. But, then, neither do non-military elements of the USG come under the command of the military commander!

Do you happen to recall the "McCaffrey Wars" of the early 1990s? When GEN McCaffrey was USCINCSO he claimed authority over MILGP commanders in his AOR. It raised a firestorm. The US Ambassador to Colombia sent a blistering letter to everyone at State (and it leaked - no surprise). Ambassador Marilyn MacAffee in Guatemala canceled a military exercise that was already underway and ordered the US troops out of her country in 24 hours - it took 48! DEPSECSTATE Strobe Talbot tried to tell the Ambassadors that McCaffrey was right and they reminded him that they worked for the President not the SECSTATE (and certainly not a retread Time Magazine writer who just happened to hold the position of DEPSEC). In the end McCaffrey retired to become Pres Clinton's drug czar and Ambassador MacAffee continued to serve as an ambassador. Point is that the system while generally clear in normal times is very unclear when a major military operation is undertaken. Especially true in Iraq until the arrival of Petraeus and Crocker and still true in Afghanistan. And achieving unity of effort in iraq depended on the peronalities and will of the two men involved.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

a dipstick here. Accuracy is always applauded, tho'

Just think, he may come back...

P.S.

Of course you're correct on the HN bit and unity of command. Always fascinates me how many people -- some in extremely high places -- miss the significance of that...

[William F. Owen]

First, I am a HUGE believer in these principles. When working on a CONOP and going through the MDMP process, it is always worth the 5 minutes it takes to say "OK, how does this square against the principles of war." You'd be amazed how often that is the safety net that catches a flaw in the plan that is easily fixed before going final.

Really? I'm not for precisely the purpose you state. I find it does not catch enough, and is highly subjective. I appreciate your examples, but I don't agree with them. You don't use Mass in a way I would recognise.

The list is actually arbitrary, and different nations all seem to use differing definitions to support any particular principles inclusion.

... but, If they work for you, then Yallah! Being an adherent of Foch and Clausewitz, I don't pay much attention to them -

[Bill Moore]

I don't disagree with any of Bob's points, they are all applicable in irregular warfare. However, and this has always been my beef with those to dogmatically embrace so called principles, his definitions, or more accurately his interpretations of the principles, have nothing to do with their real definition as intended when they were written. This is a classic case of a blind love affair. Again I like what he came up, but call it what it is, a whote of government approach isn't mass, it's a WOG approach. Developing a network isn't maneuver, its developing a network. It's a size tennis shoe, yea you cram you size 10 foot into it, but it won't make it a size 10.

Mass: Ensure that the whole of government is engaged, or at least considered for engagement, for any action to assist the COIN activities of a Host Nation; and absolutely applied for those engagements that have been identified as decisive.

Maneuver: Ensure you have access to engage everywhere necessary, regardless of national borders, in order to fully address the situation that you have deployed American forces into theater for in the first place.

[Bob's World]

It seems that based on how people think they either find greater value in the detailed writings of Clausewitz, or they prefer the distilled down simplicity of Jomini. Both participated in and studied the Napoleonic wars as the foundation of their respective work. I've always respected the main points made by Clausewitz, but never understood why he chose to bury them in reams of rambling text. I may be off base on this, but I believe he is the military theorist who is most often quoted, but least often read.

I believe I think more like Jomini when it comes to breaking down a problem. Keep breaking it down until you find the simple, fundamental truths that lie at the heart of it. This works for me, but again, recognize that for many it does not. They find themselves with a concept that is too pure, and that they are unable to apply to an operational environment. Wilf is not the first theorist to take shots at Jomini's work, and won't be the last. I will say this, though, about the principles of war that he developed and that have been so central to US military doctrine for generations; I have encountered plenty of officers who could rattle them off by rote, but had little grasp of what they really meant or how to apply them effectively.

Won't say which is better, don't know that one is. Just know what is better for me. So, I read both, but find Jomini's approach easiest to work with.