Weight of Combat Gear Is Taking Toll

[Schmedlap]

To this day I question our lack of use of filteration pumps, chlorine tablets, etc..... Are we allowing technological advances to dictact what we carry, IMO the short answer = yes. Basically it comes down to the fact that we have forgotten basic skills that have worked for centuries, because we think technology is the answer. We have become soft and forgotten how to survive on what is available.

I don't think it's a matter of "getting soft" or forgetting anything. What takes more time?
a) Locating, procuring, filtering, and chlorinating water
b) Bringing water with you
Answer: depends on the mission. I would argue that for the overwhelming majority of missions - your specific cases perhaps being the exception - the answer is (b). That's not "getting soft" or forgetting. That's doing what makes more sense.

I remember retired Soldiers complaining about us having bottled water in Iraq when I got back from my first deployment. I guess they thought that we were drinking Evian water and munching on caviar or something. I tried explaining to them that it simplified logistics and field sanitation, thus freeing up time for other stuff. Their response was, "back in my day, we drank water from our canteens and we filled our helmets with water to shave." That's nice. And that was better for what reason? I respect their nostalgia. I don't understand how it makes us more effective.

Regarding the earlier note about caching - same issue. For situations such as your anecdotal experiences, perhaps it makes sense. For most, if not all, operations in Iraq and probably many in Afghanistan, it seems like an unnecessary time killer. I don't know if you've deployed in a conventional unit since 9/11, but their responsibilities are significantly different than those of an AOB operating in the same AOR. In OIF III, my Infantry Company's tasks, just off the top of my head, included route security, fixed site security, OPs, training IA, IP, MoD (all at once - in different locations), securing new IA and IP sites as they are being built, flooding the AOR with small teams to eliminate IED emplacers in the act and maintain a state of paranoia amongst the insurgency (helping to make area more permissive for the ODAs to move about it), providing QRF and/or outer cordons for ODA missions, and providing QRF for MiTTs. Those are just off the top of my head. I could brainstorm dozens more. Those tasks are extremely time and manpower intensive - especially when you throw in the logistics and life support and the fact that we're operating from a patrol base where we provide our own security (couldn't hire Peshmerga guards like the ODAs could). Add to that mix specific missions to go out and cache supplies? Time and troops available are already tapped out. Joe is going to need to carry his ammo and water.

[ODB]

Did OEF 02' and OIF 03' with 101st. Went SF in 04.

[Ken White]

Did OEF 02' and OIF 03' with 101st. Went SF in 04.

Both do good work -- but they don't understand each other.

Almost as bad as SF and the whole Army.....

[sapperfitz82]

I did eleven day patrols in Afghanistan and saw no water any where the whole time. Other times, it would have been unsafe regardless of the cholrine tabs. Water in that AO is so polluted with heavy metals, you would not want to risk it (in most places.)

Conditioning? You're kidding right?

I won't toot their horn, but the platoon I was attached to were good, very good, at staying in shape. Yeah, we rucked twice a week, lots of weight, usually 6 miles. The did IBA and pro mask runs. The regime was tough. Regardless, they did not make more than about 1200 m a day around Babol Kehyl. I think some of you may know the area, it was the scene of OP Anaconda. The loads were not excessive, but the mortars and MGs were toting a lot of weight. We simply could not move fast enough to be of any tactical use. Sure, could drop weight and work out of a PB, we did, but the bad guys know where you are and simply avoid contact.

This scenario is specfic to illustrate a larger point. We are conceding a great deal of our mobility. I don't see the payoff. Those with enough rank to refuse the pressure to add more armor, or set theatre policy to wear all of it, have that rank to ensure the soldiers are employed within their capability for a successful mission. It aint happen.

[Ken White]

I did eleven day patrols in Afghanistan and saw no water any where the whole time. Other times, it would have been unsafe regardless of the cholrine tabs. Water in that AO is so polluted with heavy metals, you would not want to risk it (in most places.)

Sometimes you don't. Usually you don't. Most of the photos my kid in the 82d sent back from the 'Stan showed some water nearby.

Dicey water can hurt -- or not. Having drunk out of more rice paddies than I care to recall and never really having had an problems from eating or drinking locally all over the world, I'll now reveal my secret :

Old Marine Gunnery Sergeant who had been around most of Central America between the world wars, as well as on a Cruiser in the Asian Squadron and all through WW II told me "Whenever you get to a new country, eat and drink the local stuff. Your stomach will rebel at the change of diet for a day or two and then you'll be okay. That way if you have to live off local food you can do it without getting dysentery when you least need it." He seemed to know what he was talking about so I did that in about 20 or so countries over the next 40 plus years. Worked for me.

When I got all the later pitches about not eating or drinking locally because of this or that bug, I just ignored 'em and continued to eat and drink local food and water. Annoyed the daylights out some folks...

[Ken White]

I don't think it's a matter of "getting soft" or forgetting anything.

Wrong issue, I think -- soft isn't the question. The issue should be what works best for that AO and that mission. One does not have to practice to be miserable -- but one, if a soldier, should be prepared to do what it takes to get the job done. I'm sure you always did and always would. Most guys and gals do. Only a few will try to sluff for various reasons. Today, many are not inclined to take risks or to commit people to the boonies without eleventy gallons of water each even if that makes mission sense. Each theater, each AO, each individual mission deserves a clean sheet look. Preconcieved ideas of what's needed or best get people killed. Every situation differs.

What takes more time?
a) Locating, procuring, filtering, and chlorinating water
b) Bringing water with you
Answer: depends on the mission. I would argue that for the overwhelming majority of missions - your specific cases perhaps being the exception - the answer is (b). That's not "getting soft" or forgetting. That's doing what makes more sense.

True -- based on your experience in Iraq. What is the mission of the average rifle company in Afghanistan? How many Platoons are out there, scuffling around away from the Flag Pole. How many even smaller elements are out there. Different AO, different everything. Carrying water may be necessary, may not be.

...Their response was, "back in my day, we drank water from our canteens and we filled our helmets with water to shave." That's nice. And that was better for what reason? I respect their nostalgia. I don't understand how it makes us more effective.

It wasn't better, it was the best that could be done at the time -- the point is not that it's better, it obviously is not -- point is simply it was done when it was necessary and could be again; METT dependent. Lacking a steel helmet to shave in, why not just go a couple of weeks without shaving? Quelle Horreur...

My personal best is 94 days without a shower and fourteen days on the button without shaving or brushing my teeth. That was then, this is now -- but I have no doubt that any number of troops today can do that without falling apart. I also have no doubt that whole units can do that and still be combat effective. The body will take a lot of abuse -- it'll pay you back later but why worry...

...Add to that mix specific missions to go out and cache supplies? Time and troops available are already tapped out. Joe is going to need to carry his ammo and water.

Make no sense in Iraq or for some in Afghanistan, it all depends, as you said, on the mission. For SF and for light infantry distributed patrols in Platoon or smaller size, caches can makes sense or not -- it all depends on the mission, routes, time, intel -- all those things. Caches can also be planted by Unit A in January for Unit E to use a year later. I don't think he means it should always be done, just citing it as a technique. So is a rendezvous with a wheeled or tracked resupply effort or routing a patrol to a friendly outpost for resupply. All sorts of options.

My point and that of ODB (I think. He can speak for himself but I think I know where he's coming from...) and those old dudes is just that you do what needs to be done and preconceived notions about what is good may need to be relooked. Proper training would enable more people to do that, partly by letting them know what's possible and how to do some things if they become necessary, partly by letting them know it's not only alright to think differently, it is in fact, in combat a really good idea to do so. Such training would also teach people that they could shave with less than a Porta Cabin sink or an electric razor, that you can find and drink local water and get by on a canteen a day for a week or two with no great harm if that enhances mission accomplishment and that you don't need ten magazines and any more clothing changes than three pair of socks fo a couple of weeks or month on extended operations.

Soldiering is not as nice as life can be elsewhere, discomfort is not really necessary in many cases but where it is probably necessary to do some things like that, one should be able to order it done or to do it knowing that it's temporary and it can be done.

It's a lot easier to do -- and to order it done -- if folks know how to do it and the one ordering it knows they know how. That's where we've erred...

[Schmedlap]

My personal best is 94 days without a shower and fourteen days on the button without shaving or brushing my teeth.

We may be neck and neck there. I don't have the exact dates. I took a shower in Kuwait in March 2003. My next was in June - at a car dealership in Baghdad. That was one funky uniform.

Proper training would enable more people to do that, partly by letting them know what's possible and how to do some things if they become necessary, partly by letting them know it's not only alright to think differently, it is in fact, in combat a really good idea to do so.

On most threads, I'm with you on the lackluster training. I don't think it's an issue here. If I'm not caching supplies, purifying water, going 3 months without a shower, or eating bugs - it's not for lack of training. It's because it's been unnecessary since the summer of 2003.

Most of the skills discussed are not the lost art that they are perceived to be. When we first arrived in Baghdad in April 2003, we were chlorinating and rationing water, conducting operations without night vision, radios, or flashlights (we had no batteries), living off the city (rather than the land), and not shaving or bathing. There was no "uh oh" moment where we thought, "yikes - chlorinating water wasn't part of our last gunnery density - how do we do this?" or "Gee, I can't go patrolling at night without seeing everything in a shade of green." Everybody knew how to use tracers and knew that it was easier to see objects at night if you don't look directly at them.

Maybe the old school techniques are necessary in Afghanistan - but I'd be surprised. I'd be curious to know the competing variables, such as impact on the mission (route selection, likelihood of water being too contaminated to purify, etc), how much weight is actually going to be shed, troops and time available, likelihood of cache sites being discovered and boobytrapped/stolen or observed as they are emplaced. Mr. Tallyban knows those hills better than the Soldiers. For many discussions on this board, lack of training is an obvious culprit because we can see substandard performance that would not exist were it not for substandard training. In the case of what Soldiers carry versus what they cache, leave behind, obtain en route, etc, that's not so obvious. We don't know the competing variables.

My take on the issues on this thread are as follows...
1) If the part of the mission is to significantly minimize casualties, then that is a risk aversion imposed by the civilian masters. That's not a error on the part of the chain of command. As much as I hated the mentality of the Army pre-9/11, it was driven by the civilian leadership. Risk aversion was a specified task in Bosnia. Just because the leadership made it happen, it didn't mean that they thought it made any sense. Given that it was simply absurd, as opposed to unlawful, I don't see what choice they had. Though less drastic, the same dynamic is pushing against us in Iraq and Afghanistan. Can you imagine the hoopla that would have surrounded combat death number 5,000, had it occurred when President Bush was still in office? The media and anti-war protesters would have been dancing in the streets.
2) Earlier suggestions on this thread that leaders weigh down their Soldiers due to concern about their OERs are, for the most part, absurd and insulting. Who are these commanders who care more about their OERs than their men? I've had my share of oddballs and even some incompetent ones, but none that were just flat out evil.
3) 85 pounds in flat terrain - ok. 140 pounds in steep terrain - probably not. The former can be (and has been) solved by physical training. The latter is a physiological issue if it's continuous.
4) If your equipment gives you a significant edge, then I don't care if it's heavy, unless the loss of mobility offsets the edge that your equipment gives you. In Afghanistan, maybe that's the case. I find it hard to believe that leaders are routinely failing to adequately balance those variables.

[Ken White]

On most threads, I'm with you on the lackluster training. I don't think it's an issue here. If I'm not caching supplies, purifying water, going 3 months without a shower, or eating bugs - it's not for lack of training. It's because it's been unnecessary since the summer of 2003.

I think you just made one of mine. Point, I mean.

The fact that it's been unnecessary in your experience in a theater for five plus years is, all things considered, an anomaly -- and a dangerous anomaly. Other wars in other places may be vastly different and while I have no doubt that you and millions of other Iraq-style combat veterans can and will adapt to other forms and locales, the question is how many people will be killed unnecessarily while the Army learns anew?

Recall that the year and a half after the summer of 2003 were painful for the Army and th units that were there -- simply because they didn't know what they were supposed to do. The Army there had not been trained for the situation they were in. Conversely for the Army to take the post 2005 Iraq and turn it into the teaching model would do a great disservice to those who might confront different situations in the future.

Most of the skills discussed are not the lost art that they are perceived to be. When we first arrived in Baghdad in April 2003... Everybody knew how to use tracers and knew that it was easier to see objects at night if you don't look directly at them.

I'm sure -- welcome to the world of mobile warfare as opposed to a static COIN Op. Now take your OIF 1 experience and tack another 11 months on it while forgetting your later Iraq experience...

That experience gives you an edge over those who didn't make OIF 1 but only were there subsequently and think all war is like that. It isn't and most everyone knows that deep down -- but on the conscious level, that's the experience and that's what they'll try to emulate elsewhere. Unless initial training is thorough and firmly inculcates the basics. Right now it is not thorough it leaves most of the basics out of the mix. Those gaps are filled by 'experience' -- and if the experience confirms bad habits that may not be applicable in another war, another place...

Maybe the old school techniques are necessary in Afghanistan...We don't know the competing variables.

I'm fortunate in having a son who's been an infantryman (light; a mildly different world) in both theaters and there are some very significant differences not only in terms of opponents and terrain, in rural versus urban but in the characteristics of the local populations. I think the answer is that for some units there, some older ideas are better, for others, not so much. Distance away from the flagpole and other things. METT...

I don't think caches are the be all and end all and they're only really appropriate for small and stealthy patrols (I know there are some in Afghanistan but also know there aren't nearly as many as I think there should be). Caching doesn't work for Platoons and above, the signature is too great. Hiding small ones from natives under their noses is totally possible if you know what you're doing.

That, however is off the track -- the track IMO is training people to fight competently with minimal equipment rather than having them have to learn things are possible by default when the system fails to keep up. We are masters of ad-hocery; good for us. We should also better prepare people to deal with ALL the vagaries of combat so they do not have to learn by doing but shift to low maintenance mode automatically with no hitches -- and no unnecessary casualties...

My take on the issues on this thread are as follows...
1) If the part of the mission is to significantly minimize casualties, then that is a risk aversion imposed by the civilian masters. That's not a error on the part of the chain of command...Can you imagine the hoopla that would have surrounded combat death number 5,000, had it occurred when President Bush was still in office? The media and anti-war protesters would have been dancing in the streets.

Totally true on both counts. However, I believe there is a valid question of how readily the Armed Forces military leadership bowed to the civilian masters on the issue of force protection back in the 70-90 time frame (which developed the habits that do us no favors today). I'm suggesting that the lack of push back on their part for several reasons was in fact a tactical error that has compounded things to the point where your second aspect takes over. I'm pretty sure that if the casualty count edges upward significantly next year that the noise directed at Obama will not be as strident or as well publicized but will exist. The problem is academic -- we are where we are and force protection is and will be unduly emphasized to the detriment of getting jobs done. So be it. Until there's a war involving HIC. Like Armor vests in the tropics, the leaders will learn that excessive force protection efforts cause more friendly and civilian casualties; in a COIN Op, that's justifiable and acceptable -- it is not likely to be in a mobile, HIC war.

2) Earlier suggestions on this thread that leaders weigh down their Soldiers due to concern about their OERs are, for the most part, absurd and insulting. Who are these commanders who care more about their OERs than their men? I've had my share of oddballs and even some incompetent ones, but none that were just flat out evil.

If you say someone said that, I'll take your word for it, I don't recall it but unlike you, in a longer career, I have seen some who cared more for their OERs than their troops -- very few but some. I've met a far greater number that would prefer not to fight city hall on an issue that they're pretty sure they'll lose. Fortunately, I've met an adequate number that would fight -- or would just do what they thought was right without asking.

3) 85 pounds in flat terrain - ok. 140 pounds in steep terrain - probably not. The former can be (and has been) solved by physical training. The latter is a physiological issue if it's continuous.

Agreed. I'd also say that one cannot fight well if one is carrying more than 30-40 pounds. Some Metrically inclined soul ought to do a cost benefit study on the number of casualties due to excess weight x the number of persons saved by Armor x the loss of mission capability due to excess weight and the resultant casualties from that lack of success.

4) If your equipment gives you a significant edge, then I don't care if it's heavy, unless the loss of mobility offsets the edge that your equipment gives you. In Afghanistan, maybe that's the case. I find it hard to believe that leaders are routinely failing to adequately balance those variables.

In reverse order; I do not find it hard to believe that too many but certainly not all leaders are failing to balance those variables (City hall fights one will lose...). On the issue of 'the edge' I broadly agree with your statement but I also believe that the definition of that 'edge' will vary significantly from leader to leader and that variance will all too often depend upon his or her own skills and training (or lack thereof -- and not education...) and, more importantly, his or her (or, regrettably, their Bosses...) perception of the skills and capabilities of the led.

The technological edge can be disrupted by EMP or battery resupply . Or even dumb directives from above (Among several others, I'm thinking of the change to AR 190-11 years ago that said all vehicles carrying ammunition had to have an armed SFC or higher aboard. Every tank in Germany had to offload their ammo to ASPS well in the rear...). Well trained troops have an edge all their own and they are far, far less easily disrupted.

I am firmly convinced that we are too prone to substitute technology for training because buying the technology:

- Is easier than training people thoroughly and adequately.

- Is cheaper than training people for jobs two levels above their current ranks.

- Provides more jobs in more Congressional districts.

So, again, I don't disagree with what you say, if it gives an edge, use it -- if it's 90% or better reliable -- just don't succumb to "I can't go to war without it..." and do be prepared to think it through -- and get along without it.

[Schmedlap]

I think we're largely in agreement and you raise a few more good points.

I'm thinking of the change to AR 190-11 years ago that said all vehicles carrying ammunition had to have an armed SFC or higher aboard.

I recall getting a call one night when I was acting S-3 (in garrison) because our hand grenades were dropped off at the range on the night prior to training. The problem was that the Soldiers who signed for the pallet and were assigned to "guard" the pallet did not have a weapon or ammo - a regulation that I either overlooked or was not aware of. I responded to the staff duty officer: "of course they have an armed guard. The guards are armed with hand grenades." I then quickly hung up.

Brigade mulled for 2 hours over whether it was acceptable that the guy be armed with frags. That was enough time for us to open the arms room, obtain a weapon and some ammo, and send it out to the guys guarding the frags. In hindsight, I guess it makes sense to guard a pallet of frags, but I'd spent the previous 3 out of 4 years in places other than garrison and I just wasn't well versed on regs.

[Ken White]

I think we're largely in agreement and you raise a few more good points.

On the agreement; points may be good or not -- all learned the hard way...

I responded to the staff duty officer: "of course they have an armed guard. The guards are armed with hand grenades." I then quickly hung up....I'd spent the previous 3 out of 4 years in places other than garrison and I just wasn't well versed on regs.

Good Job! Who can be well versed on Regs. Penalty of hiring civilians to write them; once you hire 'em, you can't fire 'em and they have to have SOMETHING to do -- so they rewrite Regs. Dumb.

My pet was a one page -- one sentence, actually -- change to FM 21-75 that came out of Benning in the late 80s or early 90s. Sayeth: "Patrol is a verb, the word will not be used to name an operational element."

I'm still a strong devotee of the dictum "Regulations were meant to be intelligently disregarded." Dangerous attitude in this age but that's only because DA and DoD have been at peace since 1947. Yeah, I know -- but they don't or, well, too many up there forget too often...

Not a big prob; the guys on the ground make it work in spite of things on high, they always have and by far the largest majority mean well, do well and make up for the slackness here and there.

[ODB]

To those recently returned from Afghanistan what the hell were you carrying?

Why did you carry said items?

Could go on but think we get the jist of it......

Let's get to the heart of this, lets disect the loads and maybe help some future leaders in their decision making process. More knowledge on these boards than most units, lets put it to work and see what we can come up with.

Additionally we can look at Iraq, but think the main issue lies with Afghanistan.

Again this is key IMO: Finally I'll add that we need to get out of the risk averison mode we have entered. We are the business of accepting risks, but we must not continue to avoid risks. Yes, risk mitigation is a must. How do we learn to mitigate those risks, through training.

And can anyone answer this one: Why did the Army stopped doing top down building clearing?

In regards to caches, water purification etc..... just throwing out other options, imagination is a good thing, after all I seem to remembering hearing somewhere that war is a thinking mans game.

Speed balls don't work so well when they are in a compression sack being kicked out from a UH-60 as it is screaming by trying to get the hell outta there.

[J Wolfsberger]

Not a big prob; the guys on the ground make it work in spite of things on high, they always have and by far the largest majority mean well, do well and make up for the slackness here and there.

Quote from a Soviet general (I think Voroshilov, but can't find the note):

"The difficulty in planning against the Americans is they don't read their manuals and feel no obligation to follow their doctrine."

Case in point: A friend, troop commander in the 11th circa late 1970s. NATO MapEX with Soviet observers. Friend's troop is cutoff. He orders troop on cross border raid to hit Soviet POL dump. Soviets go ballistic. "YOU PROMISED NO ATTACKS ACROSS BORDER!"

Friend gets verbal reprimand: "Bad boy! No biscuit!"

BUT...

After that, in their training exercises, the Soviets started leaving heavier protection at their log points and dumps.

I'm with you, Ken. The troops in the field will find a way to make it work.

[David I Evans]

that you can find and drink local water and get by on a canteen a day for a week or two with no great harm if that enhances mission accomplishment

Just as an aside. About 20 odd years there was a massive spike in men of about 70 years of age suffering from kidney related problems, some of them quite serious. Every single one of these men had one thing in common

Service between 1942 to 1944 in North Africa where at some point these men had been rationed to one canteen of water a day for prolonged periods.

But I agree, soldiers are going to have to get used to being wet or cold in the field again. The Project Payne brief has very funny image of a squaddie shuffling into an assault so weighed down he can't run