When to Bring the Love, When to Bring the Hate

[Ken White]

""Hearts and Minds" (which I really hate now), doesn't mean making people like you. It means enticing or forcing them to make an irrevocable choice to pick a side."

"Any COIN campaign in a given area must be preceeded with a detailed mission analysis to understand the problem. Do not ask "where is the enemy", but rather ask first "where am I?" and then, "why is he able to operate there?" Do this and your COA will fall into place."

"...This model is not an approach on how to win the hearts and minds of a populace as I believe this concept to be misguided and irrelevant. From personal experiences in combat operations, one can control the minds of a population for a discrete amount of time; however, one can never control the hearts..."

Such is the path of true righteousness. So let it be written, so let it be said...

[Rex Brynen]

It means enticing or forcing them to make an irrevocable choice to pick a side.

Perhaps I've been working in Lebanon for too long, but I've never seen such a thing as an "irrevocable choice." I have a sneaking hunch Stan and Tom would say the same about Zaire/DRC...

[Ron Humphrey]

Perhaps I've been working in Lebanon for too long, but I've never seen such a thing as an "irrevocable choice." I have a sneaking hunch Stan and Tom would say the same about Zaire/DRC...

All or nothing might be slighty closer to reality??

[Ken White]

Perhaps I've been working in Lebanon for too long, but I've never seen such a thing as an "irrevocable choice." I have a sneaking hunch Stan and Tom would say the same about Zaire/DRC...

The good news is that most people are pragmatic and are willing to make choices that are sensible and fairly durable if not irrevocable. Ron has it right; the key is to make that choice less hazardous or more hazardous -- METT-TC dependent; sometimes you need one, sometimes the other -- than alternatives; irrevocability is always negotiable. Ask any politician in any nation...

[Ian K]

Thank you all for your replies. Especially, MikeF, thank you for sharing your experiences so freely.

I realize a lot of what I've written is, compared to the rest of the community, at pretty elementary level. I picked up a copy of Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare, and starting this weekend I plan to start boning up on the basics, so hopefully in the future I'll be able to contribute in a more informed manner.

Anyways, Ken White and Wilf (William Owen) have drilled into to my head time and time again the irrelevancy of "winning" the hearts and minds. That goes back to your original post on the populace "liking" or "hating" you.

I understand that, but our objective is, as I understand it, to appeal to their rational sides and show them that cooperating with us gets them more things that they want (perhaps security, jobs, economic development, freedom, etc.) than if they continue to support the enemy. (While also making use of information warfare to erode the enemy's ideolgical position).

It means enticing or forcing them to make an irrevocable choice to pick a side.

All or nothing might be slighty closer to reality??

So in the terms of the original question, we use population control measures (as brushed upon by Cavguy) to make life inconvenient enough for troublesome populations that they will want to cooperate with us in order to have those measures rescinded (sort of carrot and stick approach)?

And is it realistic to suppose that there may be situations where the population will, presumably for ideological reasons, resist these efforts for long periods of time (years/decades) no matter how well the troops "get it"?

[Ron Humphrey]

And is it realistic to suppose that there may be situations where the population will, presumably for ideological reasons, resist these efforts for long periods of time (years/decades) no matter how well the troops "get it"?

Looks like you just uncovered one of the many reasons they say it take 10-30 years

In the long run no matter what the Counter Insurgent does or doesn't do it's the population who'll decide what right looks like for them. Sometimes you might be lucky enough to end up with it looking something like what you'd hope for, more often than not unfortunately not.

Thus the statement that Hope is not a plan, it may be an influencer in how you approach it but in the end,(as Ken is so good at saying)--- METT-TC

[Cavguy]

So in the terms of the original question, we use population control measures (as brushed upon by Cavguy) to make life inconvenient enough for troublesome populations that they will want to cooperate with us in order to have those measures rescinded (sort of carrot and stick approach)?

And is it realistic to suppose that there may be situations where the population will, presumably for ideological reasons, resist these efforts for long periods of time (years/decades) no matter how well the troops "get it"?

Answer to Q1: Not really. The point isn't to make life miserable, but to deprive the insurgents of the ability to act, and provide room for establishment of effective host nation government control. Essentially isolating the insurgents from the population. Insurgents require mobility. To borrow from Trinquier:

“We have seen how indispensable the support of the population is to the guerrilla. It is possible for [the guerrilla] to exist only where the people give him their unqualified support. It is the inhabitant who supplies the guerrilla with his food supplies … ammunition … information … warning … [and] refuge”
- Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare, Ch 9, 1964

Bottom line - deprive the insurgent of access to the population, and he can't effectively fight. The population is his support base. Deny him support, and he can't operate. NOTE: I think Trinquier erred here by using "unqualified", I think many times insurgents receive support that is qualified until the government (or another force) provdies a better alternative.

Best case you deny him that support by turning the populace against him. In the case discussed on this thread - you prevent the population from supporting him while you develop institutions capable of preventing his return. He will usually flee elsewhere when pressed in a given area, and return when conditions permit - a good example is when Mosul flared up in 2004 as soon as the pressure was on in Fallujah. So you have to plan for that or you wind up in "whack-a-mole". He is also more vulnerable when he is forced to move, and thus is easier to target if you think through your "clear/hold/build" plan effectively.

Niel

[Stan]

He will usually flee elsewhere when pressed in a given area, and return when conditions permit - a good example is when Mosul flared up in 2004 as soon as the pressure was on in Fallujah. So you have to plan for that or you wind up in "whack-a-mole". He is also more vulnerable when he is forced to move, and thus is easier to target if you think through your "clear/hold/build" plan effectively.

Niel

Niel has a solid point that has proven to work even in Sub-Sahara during political and social upheavals. By strengthening the security (per se) in one area didn't necessarily get rid of the problem, but it significantly weakened it and subsequently moved it. We were for a short period able to predict the outcome and were better prepared.

Gaining and keeping population or local support is a hard one to get a grasp on. When insurgents threatened them with death, it was fairly clear. Regardless of what we did to better the locals' existence, they knew we (Belg, French and US) were unlikely to ever beat or kill them for cooperating.

Perhaps I've been working in Lebanon for too long, but I've never seen such a thing as an "irrevocable choice." I have a sneaking hunch Stan and Tom would say the same about Zaire/DRC...

Tom actually invented and perfected "Irrevocable Choice", and I figured out how to stay low

[Bob's World]

Gaining and keeping population or local support is a hard one to get a grasp on. When insurgents threatened them with death, it was fairly clear. Regardless of what we did to better the locals' existence, they knew we (Belg, French and US) were unlikely to ever beat or kill them for cooperating.

"The Population" "The Insurgent" "The Government" "The Counterinsurgent" all get thrown about fairly regular as if they were not all of the same cloth.

The Population is of course the one fabric from which all are cut, with The Government and The Counterinsurgent being one and the same, and also a subset of the populace. The insurgent is also a subset of the populace.

If someone is not of "The Populace," then I would offer they are neither an insurgent nor a counterinsurgent, but are something else altogether.

When we get careless in our language it leads to carelessness of thought, which then results in carelessness of action.

I contend that current U.S. military doctrine on COIN has fallen into this trap, casting ourselves into the role of counterinsurgent in many cases where we are not; and that this line of thinking has been heavily reinforced by our recent operations in Iraq. The US Army is to be commended for the amazing transition of both thought and deed in dealing with the situation that it was launched into the middle of in Iraq. But what we are doing there, while absolutely taking place in the middle of an Iraqi Insurgency, is not COIN. COIN is what the Iraqi government is conducting, and it is as much about improving their own governance of the populace as it is about containing any manifestations of those that challenge that governance.

If anything the role of the intervening party is the most complex of all, because it is the intervener who in fact must make what often is treated as an "irrevocable choice" about which aspect of the populace he will support in this complex dance among "The Populace."

[MikeF]

I realize a lot of what I've written is, compared to the rest of the community, at pretty elementary level. I picked up a copy of Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare, and starting this weekend I plan to start boning up on the basics, so hopefully in the future I'll be able to contribute in a more informed manner.

Ian, I meant to respond to this earlier. Don't be afraid to ask questions. I wish SWJ was available when I was in school and a young junior officer. Instead, I learned the theory by actual practice.

One of the reasons I decided to publish and continually write on this blog during my "vacation" in grad school is that I wish someone had done the same for me. If I can help young officers and NCOs become better combat leaders, then I feel like a success. I used to drill into my PLs head that they would be much better company commanders than me b/c they were learning COIN at the LT level.

Anyways, while you might be on the elementary level, Neil and I are only in middle school. Prof Ken White and many others on here have been fighting these fights way before your parents had their first date. We have much to learn from their experiences.

v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

I understand that, but our objective is, as I understand it, to appeal to their rational sides and show them that cooperating with us gets them more things that they want (perhaps security, jobs, economic development, freedom, etc.) than if they continue to support the enemy. (While also making use of information warfare to erode the enemy's ideolgical position).

Human beings may be RATIONAL, but they are very likely to be UNREASONABLE, and that is where appealing to anything other than their most base instincts. I can show you folk who will starve to death, rather than "degrade" themselves by asking for help.
Try and define co-operations in a way that they can't re-frame as "surrender."

[MikeF]

Human beings may be RATIONAL, but they are very likely to be UNREASONABLE, and that is where appealing to anything other than their most base instincts. I can show you folk who will starve to death, rather than "degrade" themselves by asking for help.
Try and define co-operations in a way that they can't re-frame as "surrender."

What I struggled most with after the Surge was the reaction of the Sunnis in Zaganiyah. Literally, my friends and neighbors (consisting of doctors, lawyers, and engineers) entered a Hobbesian state after AQI took over the village. After AQ killed or displaced half the town, the remaining civilians took over their neighbor's homes, stole their property and belongings, and even participated in beheadings.

There actions were quite unreasonable.

I continue to struggle with how people can treat each other in such a manner. As I read through the Old Testament and the works of Hobbes, Machiavelli, and John Locke, I have a much more mature understanding of what the authors refered as they describe the state of man. We can be truly ugly in our darkest moments.

v/r

Mike

[marct]

Human beings may be RATIONAL, but they are very likely to be UNREASONABLE, and that is where appealing to anything other than their most base instincts. I can show you folk who will starve to death, rather than "degrade" themselves by asking for help.
Try and define co-operations in a way that they can't re-frame as "surrender."

Rationality is really only applicable within rather limited frames of reference and is totally limited by how people perceive "reality". Wilf, your point about definition is really crucial here. In some cases, it may be best to define cooperation as a "Win" for them coming from a long and intense bargaining session.

I continue to struggle with how people can treat each other in such a manner. As I read through the Old Testament and the works of Hobbes, Machiavelli, and John Locke, I have a much more mature understanding of what the authors refered as they describe the state of man. We can be truly ugly in our darkest moments.

Always good to keep in mind, Mike. At the same time, it is probably also a good thing to remember the flip side - we can produce incredible beauty in our best moments . Anyone who thinks that we are a rational species needs their head examined .

[Cavguy]

Perhaps I've been working in Lebanon for too long, but I've never seen such a thing as an "irrevocable choice." I have a sneaking hunch Stan and Tom would say the same about Zaire/DRC...

That phrase was borrowed from Kilcullen. You are probably right, but you want the population to "get off the fence" and side with you in such a way that it becomes difficult to switch back. Anything can switch back, but we want it to be painful to do so.