How do we say the Afghan Surge is not just mil when civilians are not participating?

[Surferbeetle]

Iraq was dangerous work, the long dog paddle to safety/home was too far to seriously bank on, and so instead every day I would sally forth and do my best to learn how things worked in the public works and utilities arena in my little corner of the world. My hope was that once I built up my assessments/understanding of the physical and human terrain the leverage points would reveal themselves and either I or my successor would be able to dig in and effect positive change.

After a while I too came to understand that the regional system was in thrall to the national system…veteran regional managers, who were tough, bright, and technically competent, would not budge without the blessing from Baghdad. Once this became clear to me I would regularly wander down to Baghdad seeking guidance, resourcing for projects, and stamped approvals (what amazing power a rubber stamp can have)…Baghdad however was in administrative chaos and no one was going to stick their neck out too far, rather government decision-makers were wisely watching and waiting for an indication of how things would play out.

Then local population morale was hit hard when the decision was made to privatize SOE’s, hit hard when the military was disbanded, and hit hard again when the de-Bathification order came through. Security and hope began to wane as the heat of the summer came on and local attitudes began to harden.

So, instead of the remaining shell of a government fulfilling its assigned role, we/the coalition stepped in and provided enough in CERP to help the regional government folks more or less hold things together with spit, duct tape, and bailing wire. Prior economic sanctions had already honed these skills to an impressive edge but chaos levels were steadily rising...

IMHO force ratios were key to much of the tactical civil affairs effort, and we/the coalition worked to augment ours with local technocrats, security, etc. whenever possible. Integrated civil information management, rigorous systems analysis, assignments of defined portfolios to administrators held accountable for benchmarks/metrics are tried and true methodologies needed for both the operational and strategic civil affairs effort as well as for the effective functioning of any government. No mystery here, however the record is clear on our choice to employ/not employ these methodologies.

So what’s the answer?

Team members should be limited to those with language skills, SME skills, networking skills, diplomatic skills, tactical skills, and a no bull#### understanding that one must work with the locals in order to effect change. There are simply not enough coalition people to effect change without working with the local population. Rookies need to be trained, but experienced hands need to be in the majority.

We do indeed have the people with the requisite skills, however we have not yet chosen to adequately resource an organization within the DOS or DOD umbrella to accomplish this mission. This organization(s) could be used to positive effect in America and other locations after this particular skirmish ends. Our skirmish is just a blip in the long history of humanity’s never ending wars and since we are indeed hard wired for war why not use this experience to build something positive?

Steve ---the civil engineer, soldier, & sometime ca-bubba.

[Surferbeetle]

From this morning's Army news by Gary Sheftick Deploying brigade to test 'advise and assist' concept

The "advise and assist" brigades will assist Provincial Reconstruction Teams in their missions, will work directly with Military Transition Teams to train Iraqi Army units and with the teams that train the Iraqi Border Patrol and police. The brigades will also work closely with the State Department, U.S. Aid and other government agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations in their area.

Newell's brigade underwent 10 months of unique pre-deployment training as the first "advise and assist" BCT.

State Department officials embedded with his brigade during its rotation at the National Training Center in California's Mohave desert during January.

"We were actually fortunate to have what I call the collective brain trust of the State Department's Iraqi Stabilization Desk ... all embedded in the rotation," Newell said.

Under the new concept, provincial reconstruction teams - civil affairs servicemembers and State Department officials -- will team up with brigades going through their mission readiness exercises at NTC and other combat training centers, Newell said. The MiTT teams will also train with the brigades, he said.

After NTC, the brigade sent a core group of about 60 junior NCOs and officers to Fort Bragg for two weeks of civil affairs training. "And then that core group went into downtown El Paso, working with a number of the industries to actually do assessments and practice some of the tasks that they'd actually assist the provincial reconstruction teams in performing," Newell said.

About 20 of his Soldiers attended a city manager's course in Austin, Texas. The El Paso city manager's office also worked with the troops to help them understand essential city services

[Steve the Planner]

Steve:

In January 2009, Secretary of State-Designee Clinton made the remark that a school building is Foreign Aid (so it should be DoS/USAID).

Somewhere in the past though, she made the comment that "it takes a village to educate a child."

Having witnessed enough poorly-conceived US school projects in Iraq to sink a national budget, I'm still not convinced that even a well-trained brigade or PRT can rebuild a country one brigade or battle space at a time, any more than scattering unsustainable US school projects all over the place.

No shortage of US brains on the ground, but there always seems to be a big gap between trying to address the problems in front of you, and having an overall concept of a sustainable way forward to rebuild a country, region or village.

In early 2008, I watched a Division Commander demanding that DoS's key reconstruction leadership produce the plan for reconstructing Iraq. Lots of US programs, lots of PRTs. But no plan. Every PRT was free-standing and largely independent, and much of the effort proved unsustainable.

As I pushed for inter-regional redevelopment and national/provincial coordination, the DoS pushback was that they were structured one province at a time, and anything else "scared people." whatever that meant.

But nothing viable was going to come back to economic life in the North until the bridges got rebuilt and routes secured so that inter-regional trade could resume. The brigades and PRTs had no visibility to the regional systems, and many of their objectives were entirely too local and too short-term.

I was just glad to be affiliated with a division commander who pushed and pushed for coordinated regional strategies against a "bigger picture" understanding of the connections across his region, and to the national economy and government.

While I (and the Iraqis) was fortunate in having that, there was no formal process to assure that it happens again. Or to assure that you or I might stumble onto the keys to start the engine. But there should be.

Last week, I attended a planning conference in Minneapolis where Economic Geographer John Adams reminded the audience of the importance of re-starting the economic engine to re-start a city/region. He used Lewis Mumford's quote: "The magnet comes before the container," and explained how each city/regional center must find its own economic purpose and exploit that.

When I got to Iraq in December 2007, I saw a lot of scatter-shot, one size fits all reconstruction solutions, that sometimes got lucky, but nothing that laid a comprehensible strategy for reconstruction.

Like you, the answers were on the ground somewhere in country, and we had to "find" the pieces, and push for solutions, including the absolute need for Iraqi engagement and buy-in. No offense to our brilliant programs, but once you figured out what the Iraqis did before, and expected to be doing again after we left, it was pretty easy to find Iraqi solutions. The hard part, too often, was getting the Americans out of the way.

How do we improve the reconstruction process so that the answers are in all the right places before deployment so the folks on the ground can really make things work?

Somehow, I don't think that bringing the Brigades and PRTs closer is going to yield fast and effective solutions unless they are operating within a strategy that is going to succeed.

How does that get created? Do you have a plan for reconstructing Afghanistan? There never was one in Iraq.

Steve

PS: I'm envious of the surf buggy.

[120mm]

I really don't know if the "advise and assist" Brigade concept will work out, but I guarantee that if it's possible, Pete Newell will get it done.

A fine gentleman, and I recall fondly drinking way too much German beer with him about a year ago and speaking about this very subject.

[Surferbeetle]

How does that get created? Do you have a plan for reconstructing Afghanistan? There never was one in Iraq.

Steve,

My engineering-centric thoughts are no substitute for what a team consisting of skilled planners, city managers (local and coalition), senior FSOs, senior USAID experts, and a COIN-centric Commander could put together for a specific province...several of these teams could then be linked together in order to cover all of Afghanistan giving us the benefit of unity of command.

Building upon the concepts used to develop the Afghani ANA and ANP, perhaps Afghani non-kinetic first responder teams could also be raised, trained, and staffed in order to augment existing government services and work as a third stabilizing 'leg'.

For your consideration, here are some SWJ conversations in which I have combined the benefits (?) of beer, a keyboard, and my comfortable armchair (located far from the sound of any battle) in order to share an opinion or two on agriculture, water, electricity, one-stop shopping for many government services, training & mentoring forces, metrics, security, and public private partnerships

Best,

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

Problem is how do you coordinate a shortage of actually qualified experts.

Like you said elsewhere, the need for ag guys (or girls) is huge, especially if we want to restructure the whole system (from opium), but there will only be a handful at best. So, how do we spread them out.

Obviously, there will be a lot of newly gazetted "ag specialists" coming, but god knows how many of them will really be that, and how many would have the depth to support and guide a real ag change.

So, you try to figure out some kind of an expert flying team that allows the real experts to set and manage the framework at a higher level, and works downward to support field implementers.

In Iraq, being just a dumbass planner rather than an ag guy, I was content with just mapping out all the stuff---what was grown where, what economic and system infrastructure was needed, and what stuff was available. Couldn't restart poultry without grain and hatchlings, etc... So we started mapping chicken stuff, and caught a lot of ribbing from IAD staff for fragos about our chicken hunt. Then moved on to dates, tomatoes, cows, etc....

We heard that you couldn't get hatchlings in Iraq, but, one day we were convoying down Route 1 from Bayji, and off in the distance was an old factory building with a picture of chicks on the front. We pulled in and, sure enough, the place was full of hatchling being warmed and rotated---25,000 at a time. So you never know what you don't know until you go out and look.

But, once the map was completed, it allowed our limited number of ag folks to contribute info on what as needed in each sector (value chains, etc..), and begin to target ag support stuff.

What we were looking for, as mappers and grunts, was to find the info that could engage the experts to tell folks in the field what they could do, and how to do it. If the shortage is ag guys, we do what we can to expand their capabilities and impacts.

The Afghan surge will be driven by scarcity of experts, so ways to expand their impact and replicate their talents will be crucial.

Steve