How do we say the Afghan Surge is not just mil when civilians are not participating?

[Steve the Planner]

It is pretty hard to read where the strategy is behind US reconstruction. Surge to Iraq in 2008, then to Afghanistan in 2009. Where in 2010? (Back to Iraq?)

Always seems to be an "after-the-problems-become-embarrassing" kind of effort rather than a serious understanding that post-war population stabilization and reconstruction is the critical next step to a safe landing at the end of a conflict.

As a civilian planning consultant/trouble shooter in real life, I served 2008 in Iraq as a Senior Urban Planning Adviser (DoS/Iraq), based in the North.

I saw a lot of great folks doing heroic work on the ground, but, in all seriousness, you can't rebuild a country that way.

Bruce noted that FSOs don't have the skill sets to do or direct actual reconstruction either, and that was evident in Iraq.

Once in a while, you found an FSO who learned a lot more than he should have, or was just a good leader, but for myself and most of the experts that came in under DoS, the organizational structure was very poor.

Bruce rightly said: "The problem is, FSOs only possess a slice of the skill sets needed to engage in Afghanistan. We need many more civilians, clearly, the paradox is that while the military is currently the most urgent element, it is ultimately the least important. In addition to State and USAID, we need people from Justice, USDA, Department of Commerce, experts from the legislative branch, experienced community organizers, city planners, electrical engineers, civil engineers, small town mayors, city officials, all of whom need to be spread liberally around the country. These are the people with the skill sets - not the DOS or the DOD (or its many parts)."

On this web site and others, I see a lot of naivety about the civilian side of the world. Grabbing a batch of civilians and throwing them into the fray without a clear strategy and structure doesn't get the value out of them, or bring the needed solutions.

System-level planners and experts are needed at the country level, and with a lot of regional and local movements and feedback, to set the framework and programs so other more specialized experts can do their thing at whichever level is appropriate for what they are working on. Sometimes problems like a regional drought need to be worked on many levels at a time, with a lot of different experts engaged in different ways, and at different levels of government.

In Iraq, only FSO's communicated with the mothership, and little came down to the field. Most of the experts were off on a FOB somewhere with little or no ability to do what they really do best---analyze a problem like failed regional water systems from all sides and find systemic solutions. Instead, they were just firing off non-lethal rounds of reverse osmosis plants and package generators---not much more than what the soldiers had been doing.

In Iraq, we built our informal civilian adviser networks at ADACs, lounges and hotels as we were coming or going on leave (and subsequent gmails). There was no formal communication, meeting structure or plan for civilian advisers, so we had to just make it up as we went. And do the best you could with what was available at your FOB or PRT.

There was a lot of great work done, especially at EPRTs at the grassroots level, but I suspect that much of that could have been done by CAs, etc... Civilians in a war zone need to be making a very big and unique difference in order to be worth the time, effort and sacrifice to put them there.

I was fortunate, during my tour to be heavily supported by a co-located division, so I got a lot of opportunities to get around to ministries, conferences, etc., and bring together a lot of pieces. But it was pretty ad hoc.

Too many other times, I heard about civilian advisers being cut-off and wasted by their PRT, or ineffective ones using the isolation as cover for poor performance.

In one PRT, there was an AG guy that specialized in taking Iraqi farmers on week-long trips to Jordan to study drip agriculture (luxury junkets by any measure) while the other AG guy, a nuts-and-bolts specialist in desert farm environments, was stuck on a one-man PRT in the boonies, but desperate to help Iraqis. The FSO didn't understand how to track and deploy a very scarce and valuable resource, so a guy that everyone needed in Iraq and Afghanistan went home unsatisfied and unsuccessful, while the other guy is still making regular runs to Jordan. Which one is likely to get a birth in Afghanistan?

Sending civilian experts doesn't help much unless there is a productive framework for their skills to be applied. Despite ad hoc successes here and there, the right framework did not exist in Iraq.

All the noise about civil/mil conflicts aside, I never met a good civilian expert that didn't have instant and great rapport with his military counterparts. The FSOs was always a different question. Maybe its just the grey hairs, which lots of civilian experts had, but not as many FSOs.

I just wonder what could be done if there was an improvement in structure for the civilian advisers, along with a lot more effective program planning, collaboration among the experts, feedback opportunities on the effectiveness of programs, and performance tracking to get the most out of the civilians.

Like most of the civilians, my tour ended and I got on a plane home. No "thank you for your service," and no DoS exit interviews. A lot of lessons not learned...

Steve the Planner

[Bruce]

From todays NYT:

"The officials predicted that the requirement for the “civilian surge” would eventually include hundreds of people with experience in areas that include small-business management, legal affairs, veterinary medicine, public sanitation, counternarcotics efforts and air traffic control.

In addition, officials said, the number of diplomatic positions at the American Embassy in Kabul and at provincial reconstruction outposts could increase by several hundred more. Some officials supplied details of the plan on the condition of anonymity because the decisions were not final.
….

(DOD U/S Flournoy said that ) the government was still “playing a game of catch-up” after years of not setting aside money to create this civilian expertise, and she described the reliance on reservists as part of “a whole host of stopgap measures” necessary until teams of civilian experts could be created."

This fits very closely with what I said in some earlier posts. The diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, refugee coordination, governance jobs, etc, can be filled by DOS. Much of the rest will simply have to come from elsewhere. The reserves are not the best answer, but they have many of the skills. The problem is that the civilian agencies (USDA, DOC, EPA) are neither configured nor functionally capable of compelling people to deploy.

A significant chunk of the specific civilian surge will likely fall to contractors.

Regarding some previous posts:

A couple of thoughts. Steve the Planner makes some great points. As an FSO with gray hair (what little I have of it), I have a good sense of the strengths and limitations of DOS skill sets. There is a definite role for the right FSO, but it seems that, in Iraq, quantity often trumped quality.

As for no thanks for the service or outbrief. I agree. I got neither myself.

RE: "120mm" Based on 2.5 months somewhere in Afghanistan, 120 MM states:

"Gee, I've rolled around in Afghanistan in an unarmored Ford pickup for the last 2.5 months. ANA/ANP make excellent security. And that's in a role where people have a huge self-interest in killing me/us. It's just not that risky, here. But that's my mind-set vs. the typical guy in a tie."

Well, based on my year in Afghanistan, there are DOS people (Helmand, Kandahar, Kunar, Nuristan) where you simply can't drive around in an "unarmored ford." In Helmand, the DOS rep (who has been there for nearly two years) would have been dead a long time back.

Sure, up in Mazar and Kunduz, Bamiyan, Panjshir, you can ride around in the open. Herat as well. Not in the Pech river valley or on the road to Musa Qala.

As to language skills? Do we all have them? No. Right now all except one or two of the DOS people heading out this summer are finishing their 44 week high intensity language course. As for previous DOS people, I won't give her name, but, for one example, we had a Pashto speaker working near the Pak border for over a year. She had specific death threats against her. If she had ridden for "2.5 months" in an unarmored ford pickup, she would be dead as well.

"But I get the impression that State wants to grow their own from fellow Ivy Leaguers and Biff's tennis buddies and is actually frightened by people with real experience."

I've got 24 years as an FSO. I graduated from a California State College. Not many Ivy Leaguers at State. This is a sterotype from 50 years ago, maybe. I'm one of many FSOs with more than one war under my belt. And no, we don't wear ties out at PRTs. Sorry.

[Charles Martel]

This is the DoS press release that explains that the State Department is going to use military reservists because it can't fill the 250 slots it has in Afghanistan. It says it is "essential" to have a civilian increase, but reservists will be the "most effective way" to fill the slots. 21,000 Soldiers, 250 civilians, but we'll use Soldiers to fill the civilian slots because the civilians can't. Guess that qualifies as "extraordinary steps."

CM



* President Obama has made clear that a significant increase in
civilian personnel in Afghanistan is an essential component of our
strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens
in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.

* We welcome the participation of military reservists in a
civilian plan if that is the most effective way to reach our plan
levels.

* The United States is taking a "whole of government" approach to
meeting this critical need for civilian expertise. The process for
identifying and hiring civilians has already begun, and in close
coordination with our international partners and the Afghan government,
we are determining the right mix of civilian expertise required to meet
our shared strategic goal.

* We will be using all authorities, including extraordinary steps
such as term appointments and curtailments of current assignments, to
fill the positions required for this mission. We intend to fill the
civilian positions on schedule. The civilian plan is totally integrated
with the military plan and will move seamlessly behind counterinsurgency
efforts.

[120mm]

From todays NYT:

RE: "120mm" Based on 2.5 months somewhere in Afghanistan, 120 MM states:

"Gee, I've rolled around in Afghanistan in an unarmored Ford pickup for the last 2.5 months. ANA/ANP make excellent security. And that's in a role where people have a huge self-interest in killing me/us. It's just not that risky, here. But that's my mind-set vs. the typical guy in a tie."

Well, based on my year in Afghanistan, there are DOS people (Helmand, Kandahar, Kunar, Nuristan) where you simply can't drive around in an "unarmored ford." In Helmand, the DOS rep (who has been there for nearly two years) would have been dead a long time back.

Unfortunately, my location was edited out by mods, but I will tell you that there are a large number of DoS contract personnel who have been driving around in unarmored Fords in those areas for the last 5 years. Without a single one being killed. I have noticed a tendency for the DoS personnel I come in contact to make overdramatic statements like that, though.

Sure, up in Mazar and Kunduz, Bamiyan, Panjshir, you can ride around in the open. Herat as well. Not in the Pech river valley or on the road to Musa Qala.

As to language skills? Do we all have them? No. Right now all except one or two of the DOS people heading out this summer are finishing their 44 week high intensity language course. As for previous DOS people, I won't give her name, but, for one example, we had a Pashto speaker working near the Pak border for over a year. She had specific death threats against her. If she had ridden for "2.5 months" in an unarmored ford pickup, she would be dead as well.

Death threats? In Afghanistan? Wow, that is harsh. [sarcasm]

Our language assistants get them all the time. Against them and their families. And yes, they ride around with us, despite the "instant death" nature of living and working out of unarmored vehicles.

"But I get the impression that State wants to grow their own from fellow Ivy Leaguers and Biff's tennis buddies and is actually frightened by people with real experience."

I've got 24 years as an FSO. I graduated from a California State College. Not many Ivy Leaguers at State. This is a sterotype from 50 years ago, maybe. I'm one of many FSOs with more than one war under my belt. And no, we don't wear ties out at PRTs. Sorry.

The problem is, you have 24 years as an FSO. How many years do you have doing something else? The problem with State, is that their membership largely consists of people who've never done anything else. I don't think they are in a position to self-evaluate when it comes to skill-sets.

What I'm suggesting is that DoS would benefit greatly from regular infusions of people from OUTSIDE the DoS groupthink. Unfortunately, their main recruiting effort is STILL focused on 22 year old minds of mush straight out of college.

BTW, to a midwestern guy, California state colleges and any of the East Coast universities are roughly equivalent to the Ivy League stereotype. There are distinctions, but frankly, I don't care.

A couple months back, I spent a few days in the same area, and was able to figure out how that particular kalay developed. I related this info to one of your DoS guys, and he was astounded by the knowledge. Frankly, if the guy had an advisor or had himself some small town farm knowledge, he should've been able to figure it out fairly quickly. As it was, the principles on how farm villages develop is apparently not valued by DoS. But to a farm kid who has BTDT, it's pretty obvious. But then, I'm not as "expert" as you DoS guys...

[120mm]

This is the DoS press release that explains that the State Department is going to use military reservists because it can't fill the 250 slots it has in Afghanistan. It says it is "essential" to have a civilian increase, but reservists will be the "most effective way" to fill the slots. 21,000 Soldiers, 250 civilians, but we'll use Soldiers to fill the civilian slots because the civilians can't. Guess that qualifies as "extraordinary steps."

CM



* President Obama has made clear that a significant increase in
civilian personnel in Afghanistan is an essential component of our
strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens
in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.

* We welcome the participation of military reservists in a
civilian plan if that is the most effective way to reach our plan
levels.

* The United States is taking a "whole of government" approach to
meeting this critical need for civilian expertise. The process for
identifying and hiring civilians has already begun, and in close
coordination with our international partners and the Afghan government,
we are determining the right mix of civilian expertise required to meet
our shared strategic goal.

* We will be using all authorities, including extraordinary steps
such as term appointments and curtailments of current assignments, to
fill the positions required for this mission. We intend to fill the
civilian positions on schedule. The civilian plan is totally integrated
with the military plan and will move seamlessly behind counterinsurgency
efforts.

As I stated in another post, there are already too many "experts" in the area. What we need are practitioners. Look at the Agricultural Development Teams, such as the one deployed by the Nebraska National Guard for an example of how to do this right.

Unfortunately, what DoS will probably get is a bunch of guys with degrees and precious little practical experience. Or, they'll get guys with practical experience, but not the right mindset. But, through chance, they'll get a few guys and gals who will probably make it work in spite of the rest of the folks that go.

[Steve the Planner]

120mm hit it on the head: practitioners.

But not practitioners in foreign policy. Practitioners in the critical subject areas: agriculture, public essential services, economic development, etc...

Assuming you had a complete breakdown of public systems in Alexandria, or the need for a new agricultural system framework (crops v. opium), Who would you call? A foreign service officer would not be on the list, would it?

I disagree with the inference that FSOs are not an important and legitimate field, but they have little if no background or application in the relevant areas where reconstruction/stabilization is going on---and it shows in the outcomes.

State, for many reasons (mostly the long budget and staffing starvation of decades), simply has no depth or experience to solve the problems by an FSO-led solution. The problems and solutions lie outside---in the world of practitioners.

I particularly thought 120mm's comment about the structure and history of a community was telling. In Iraq, I found that most US parties didn't understand this, or why, for example, they couldn't get the local prov'l officials to fix the regional water treatment facilities (actually owned and operated by the central government's ministries. Practitioners understand the difference and distinction.

The lack of system awareness actually led me to assemble, from Iraqi sources, an administrative and political map for Iraq down to the provinces and sub-districts---who does what, where, and where where is.

When I left, I couldn't find a single DoS person or entity who understood why those maps were important. So they sit on a hard drive in my travel bag---used by nobody.

My concern, as DoS moves to AfPak, remains the same: Whether a proper structure, framework and program for actual practitioners can be devised. The DoS PRT model, even if it proves to have been successful, was, by no means, in a range of optimal for the resources that were provided.

The big effects that I succeeded at were always through strong military implementation/support, and not from a DoS supported effort.

As one of many civilian experts who served in Iraq, and never heard anything more from DoS, I am holding my breathe.

Steve the Planner

PS: My grad degree is from Hopkins, but it was night school, and very practitioner-based. Plus, unlike today, tuition didn't cost a house in 1979, and I had the GI bill.

[Surferbeetle]

Iraq was dangerous work, the long dog paddle to safety/home was too far to seriously bank on, and so instead every day I would sally forth and do my best to learn how things worked in the public works and utilities arena in my little corner of the world. My hope was that once I built up my assessments/understanding of the physical and human terrain the leverage points would reveal themselves and either I or my successor would be able to dig in and effect positive change.

After a while I too came to understand that the regional system was in thrall to the national system…veteran regional managers, who were tough, bright, and technically competent, would not budge without the blessing from Baghdad. Once this became clear to me I would regularly wander down to Baghdad seeking guidance, resourcing for projects, and stamped approvals (what amazing power a rubber stamp can have)…Baghdad however was in administrative chaos and no one was going to stick their neck out too far, rather government decision-makers were wisely watching and waiting for an indication of how things would play out.

Then local population morale was hit hard when the decision was made to privatize SOE’s, hit hard when the military was disbanded, and hit hard again when the de-Bathification order came through. Security and hope began to wane as the heat of the summer came on and local attitudes began to harden.

So, instead of the remaining shell of a government fulfilling its assigned role, we/the coalition stepped in and provided enough in CERP to help the regional government folks more or less hold things together with spit, duct tape, and bailing wire. Prior economic sanctions had already honed these skills to an impressive edge but chaos levels were steadily rising...

IMHO force ratios were key to much of the tactical civil affairs effort, and we/the coalition worked to augment ours with local technocrats, security, etc. whenever possible. Integrated civil information management, rigorous systems analysis, assignments of defined portfolios to administrators held accountable for benchmarks/metrics are tried and true methodologies needed for both the operational and strategic civil affairs effort as well as for the effective functioning of any government. No mystery here, however the record is clear on our choice to employ/not employ these methodologies.

So what’s the answer?

Team members should be limited to those with language skills, SME skills, networking skills, diplomatic skills, tactical skills, and a no bull#### understanding that one must work with the locals in order to effect change. There are simply not enough coalition people to effect change without working with the local population. Rookies need to be trained, but experienced hands need to be in the majority.

We do indeed have the people with the requisite skills, however we have not yet chosen to adequately resource an organization within the DOS or DOD umbrella to accomplish this mission. This organization(s) could be used to positive effect in America and other locations after this particular skirmish ends. Our skirmish is just a blip in the long history of humanity’s never ending wars and since we are indeed hard wired for war why not use this experience to build something positive?

Steve ---the civil engineer, soldier, & sometime ca-bubba.

[Surferbeetle]

From this morning's Army news by Gary Sheftick Deploying brigade to test 'advise and assist' concept

The "advise and assist" brigades will assist Provincial Reconstruction Teams in their missions, will work directly with Military Transition Teams to train Iraqi Army units and with the teams that train the Iraqi Border Patrol and police. The brigades will also work closely with the State Department, U.S. Aid and other government agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations in their area.

Newell's brigade underwent 10 months of unique pre-deployment training as the first "advise and assist" BCT.

State Department officials embedded with his brigade during its rotation at the National Training Center in California's Mohave desert during January.

"We were actually fortunate to have what I call the collective brain trust of the State Department's Iraqi Stabilization Desk ... all embedded in the rotation," Newell said.

Under the new concept, provincial reconstruction teams - civil affairs servicemembers and State Department officials -- will team up with brigades going through their mission readiness exercises at NTC and other combat training centers, Newell said. The MiTT teams will also train with the brigades, he said.

After NTC, the brigade sent a core group of about 60 junior NCOs and officers to Fort Bragg for two weeks of civil affairs training. "And then that core group went into downtown El Paso, working with a number of the industries to actually do assessments and practice some of the tasks that they'd actually assist the provincial reconstruction teams in performing," Newell said.

About 20 of his Soldiers attended a city manager's course in Austin, Texas. The El Paso city manager's office also worked with the troops to help them understand essential city services

[Steve the Planner]

Steve:

In January 2009, Secretary of State-Designee Clinton made the remark that a school building is Foreign Aid (so it should be DoS/USAID).

Somewhere in the past though, she made the comment that "it takes a village to educate a child."

Having witnessed enough poorly-conceived US school projects in Iraq to sink a national budget, I'm still not convinced that even a well-trained brigade or PRT can rebuild a country one brigade or battle space at a time, any more than scattering unsustainable US school projects all over the place.

No shortage of US brains on the ground, but there always seems to be a big gap between trying to address the problems in front of you, and having an overall concept of a sustainable way forward to rebuild a country, region or village.

In early 2008, I watched a Division Commander demanding that DoS's key reconstruction leadership produce the plan for reconstructing Iraq. Lots of US programs, lots of PRTs. But no plan. Every PRT was free-standing and largely independent, and much of the effort proved unsustainable.

As I pushed for inter-regional redevelopment and national/provincial coordination, the DoS pushback was that they were structured one province at a time, and anything else "scared people." whatever that meant.

But nothing viable was going to come back to economic life in the North until the bridges got rebuilt and routes secured so that inter-regional trade could resume. The brigades and PRTs had no visibility to the regional systems, and many of their objectives were entirely too local and too short-term.

I was just glad to be affiliated with a division commander who pushed and pushed for coordinated regional strategies against a "bigger picture" understanding of the connections across his region, and to the national economy and government.

While I (and the Iraqis) was fortunate in having that, there was no formal process to assure that it happens again. Or to assure that you or I might stumble onto the keys to start the engine. But there should be.

Last week, I attended a planning conference in Minneapolis where Economic Geographer John Adams reminded the audience of the importance of re-starting the economic engine to re-start a city/region. He used Lewis Mumford's quote: "The magnet comes before the container," and explained how each city/regional center must find its own economic purpose and exploit that.

When I got to Iraq in December 2007, I saw a lot of scatter-shot, one size fits all reconstruction solutions, that sometimes got lucky, but nothing that laid a comprehensible strategy for reconstruction.

Like you, the answers were on the ground somewhere in country, and we had to "find" the pieces, and push for solutions, including the absolute need for Iraqi engagement and buy-in. No offense to our brilliant programs, but once you figured out what the Iraqis did before, and expected to be doing again after we left, it was pretty easy to find Iraqi solutions. The hard part, too often, was getting the Americans out of the way.

How do we improve the reconstruction process so that the answers are in all the right places before deployment so the folks on the ground can really make things work?

Somehow, I don't think that bringing the Brigades and PRTs closer is going to yield fast and effective solutions unless they are operating within a strategy that is going to succeed.

How does that get created? Do you have a plan for reconstructing Afghanistan? There never was one in Iraq.

Steve

PS: I'm envious of the surf buggy.

[120mm]

I really don't know if the "advise and assist" Brigade concept will work out, but I guarantee that if it's possible, Pete Newell will get it done.

A fine gentleman, and I recall fondly drinking way too much German beer with him about a year ago and speaking about this very subject.

[Surferbeetle]

How does that get created? Do you have a plan for reconstructing Afghanistan? There never was one in Iraq.

Steve,

My engineering-centric thoughts are no substitute for what a team consisting of skilled planners, city managers (local and coalition), senior FSOs, senior USAID experts, and a COIN-centric Commander could put together for a specific province...several of these teams could then be linked together in order to cover all of Afghanistan giving us the benefit of unity of command.

Building upon the concepts used to develop the Afghani ANA and ANP, perhaps Afghani non-kinetic first responder teams could also be raised, trained, and staffed in order to augment existing government services and work as a third stabilizing 'leg'.

For your consideration, here are some SWJ conversations in which I have combined the benefits (?) of beer, a keyboard, and my comfortable armchair (located far from the sound of any battle) in order to share an opinion or two on agriculture, water, electricity, one-stop shopping for many government services, training & mentoring forces, metrics, security, and public private partnerships

Best,

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

Problem is how do you coordinate a shortage of actually qualified experts.

Like you said elsewhere, the need for ag guys (or girls) is huge, especially if we want to restructure the whole system (from opium), but there will only be a handful at best. So, how do we spread them out.

Obviously, there will be a lot of newly gazetted "ag specialists" coming, but god knows how many of them will really be that, and how many would have the depth to support and guide a real ag change.

So, you try to figure out some kind of an expert flying team that allows the real experts to set and manage the framework at a higher level, and works downward to support field implementers.

In Iraq, being just a dumbass planner rather than an ag guy, I was content with just mapping out all the stuff---what was grown where, what economic and system infrastructure was needed, and what stuff was available. Couldn't restart poultry without grain and hatchlings, etc... So we started mapping chicken stuff, and caught a lot of ribbing from IAD staff for fragos about our chicken hunt. Then moved on to dates, tomatoes, cows, etc....

We heard that you couldn't get hatchlings in Iraq, but, one day we were convoying down Route 1 from Bayji, and off in the distance was an old factory building with a picture of chicks on the front. We pulled in and, sure enough, the place was full of hatchling being warmed and rotated---25,000 at a time. So you never know what you don't know until you go out and look.

But, once the map was completed, it allowed our limited number of ag folks to contribute info on what as needed in each sector (value chains, etc..), and begin to target ag support stuff.

What we were looking for, as mappers and grunts, was to find the info that could engage the experts to tell folks in the field what they could do, and how to do it. If the shortage is ag guys, we do what we can to expand their capabilities and impacts.

The Afghan surge will be driven by scarcity of experts, so ways to expand their impact and replicate their talents will be crucial.

Steve