Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Bob's World]

In Vietnam we only negotiated for a "decent interval" in an effort to save our own pride, while abandoning the people (the government had abandoned us long before) of South Vietnam who had trusted us the most to an inevitable conclusion as that insurgency entered phase III conventional operatoins and unified the country.

In Afghanistan we have the opportunity learn from those mistakes and attempt to negotiate a better deal for those, such as the villages in the VSO program, who have trusted us the most and who will suffer the most when we withdraw. Our loyalty should be to the people this time, and not the government.

Uzbek and Hazara elements of the Northern Allinace rightfully fear reconcilliation and are obstacles to seeking political balance. I fear they too will lose it all in their effort to keep it all.

First, however, we must re-frame the problem. Our current framing is an unsustainable disaster. Most generals just don't get it, it is too far outside their training and experience, and certainly outside the mission they have been asked to perform and the parameters of what their commands are trained, organized and equipped to do. There are some exceptions obviously, certainly Nick Carter on the UK side is one, but even still, this is not a military mission and to make it one dooms us to failure.

[carl]

Besides, if the eviction of AQ is still the main mission, no one can deliver that faster and more effectively than the Taliban.[/B][/I] That was true in 2001, and it is still true today. That is a fine point that really needs to be moved to the top of the buffer.

I don't think that is true at all. Mr. Bin Laden wasn't found in the heart of Talibanlandia. He was found in the heart of Pak Armystan. What may have been true in 2001 is not at all true today.

[carl]

Finally...A sensible and aware objection that is quite valid. Good hit.

Well, you know what they say about a monkey and a typewriter, me being the monkey.

[Dayuhan]

First, however, we must re-frame the problem. Our current framing is an unsustainable disaster.

I agree with that completely. I just don't think we are going to solve the problem by digging ourselves deeper into the hole.

We can't govern Afghanistan, and we don't want to. If Afghanistan is going to be governed by Afghans, we have to accept that they will govern their way, as their political culture determines. We cannot persuade or compel them to govern the way we think Afghanistan should be governed. Trying is a fool's errand that can only end in failure... and our failures, given our tendency not to acknowledge them, are often prolonged and very expensive.

Instead of trying to transform Afghanistan and Afghan governance, we could have simply taken up the specific, practical, and achievable goal of convincing all contending parties that the cost of attacking us or harboring those who do is too high to bear. Bit late for that now, of course...

[carl]

Ken:

I understand the importance of doctrinal definitions to the military. But to the civilian, those make no difference. Military intervention, raid, tactical or strategic or whatever, it is the our forces going into a country or place and doing military things. The doctrinal fine points are lost on most people and mostly on me too.

I agree with all that in principle but the fact is that ANY military force is or should be a tool designed to be destructive. It is not a building tool.

True of course, but selectively destructive. And historically, military forces have often been used to build things, especially infrastructure.

Reference my statement "However, as I keep trying to point out to you, we will not -- indeed, we cannot -- do it 'right.' Ergo it's best not to do it.you said Oh? What's your basis for saying we can do it right? I'm quite curious to know when we did "it right" as I sure can't think of one off hand where a large US force was committed. When you come up with one, be sure it's a post WW II example, we could do it reasonably well prior to that, since then the bureaucracy and the "fpe" have destroyed our capability to successfully perform such operations; so name me one.

Don't go stacking the deck Ken, "Well tell me one time that worked between the hours of 10 and 2 on the second Wednesday of the month?" There are a few occasions in American history when things worked at 0900 every Monday. But let's pick one from after the conclusion of WWII, South Korea. We intervened in civil war and it worked out pretty good for several generations of South Koreans.

We can also pick one where we didn't intervene where I think we could have and should have, Rwanda. We suffered no hurt at all but 800,000 Rwandans did.

That's funny. What I propose is far more work and more dangerous with more risk that an intervention.

Then why on earth should we do it?

Strategic Raids do not have to be and should not be totally by air, those are ineffective. Nor should we attempt the big punitive ala Mexico 'raid' (that was not a raid BTW, it was a Punitive Expedition, it was not intended to strike one or a few targets and rapidly depart -- it was, in fact an intervention.... Small tailored ground forces air (or sea, location dependent) lifted in, quick strike and out.

Punitive expedition or raid or not, the Pershing adventure is the same thing to a civilian. Our forces went in and mucked about for a bit to no great purpose.

They got into this because I brought them in. They exist and are more competent and dangerous (and have more money) than AQ. The USSR never attacked New York either but they were a concern. Hezxbollah is also a concern, or efforts to disrupt AQ have been effective -- we have not done much to by, for or with Hezbollah.

That is because Hezbollah has not done much by, for or with us. They are Lebanese and interested in Lebanon and Israel. As of yet they are no great threat to us cause the don't want to be.

I suggest that the world has changed to an extent and you seem to have missed it.

The world has changed. Human nature has not and won't so I don't think I missed anything.

All valid concerns. We should have improved our airlift capability in the 90s to include procuring stealthy insertion and extraction transports. We did not but we can. We do know that the Armed forces of the US have been only marginally successful in most of our recent operations and we do know the way we've been operating is part of the problem and that we must change. We also need to improve our strategic reach as the large bases are an Achilles heel for us that we should have foregone twenty years ago -- but Armed Forces change slowly...

There is no getting around physics. Without big bases nearby we can't put enough force in in a raid or anything else to do much of anything. Stealthy or not, any type of transport needs either a base nearby or beaucoup tanker support. Those tankers would need bases relatively close. In any event our tankers are on the verge of falling out of the sky and the replacements are still a program, not a flightline full of airplanes.

The only other option is a strike from the sea. But of course the target has to be close to the sea. That will still require big bases. Those ships can't sortie from San Diego. They will need big bases in the region unless we recreate the naval logistics train we created in WWII, which we won't do. And even then we would still need regional bases. And also the Navy is falling apart.

Most of the "fpe" wants to change minimally and many -- not all -- of them would indeed recoil at a bird or two getting downed (the obvious counter to that is to avoid it...). I disagree on the sensitivity to casualties. That too is a "fpe" mantra but most Americans will accept casualties provided they see some successes to counter that cost.

I agree partially on the casualty part. But the complicating factor is the airplane part. Americans are very sensitive to airplanes going down and especially aircrew getting captured. That would go double if say a C-17 was forced down and the whole crew and all the soldiers in the raiding party went into the bag.

I don't know about now or the future but you seem to espouse intervention or military action for social engineering or humanitarian purposes.

Social engineering not so much. Humanitarian purposes yes; but only if practicable and only if done with vigor. It was practicable in Rwanda, it isn't in Darfur.

Strategic raids are not the be-all and end-all, they are just another tool and should and can be only part of our military posture. They are hard for some of the reasons you've stated and others -- but they are moire effective and will be better suited to the next decade or so than will long, costly interventions. The bad news is that the feckless and lazy thing is to do the interventions, it's easier on the "fpe" and they sound like those folks mean well, they like that...

The effectiveness of strategic raids is neither here nor there if we can't physically do them. We can't physically do them unless we have big bases in the region to launch or support them from. We won't be able to maintain big bases in the region unless we dominate it which sort of leads us right back to where we are now.

[Ken White]

I understand the importance of doctrinal definitions to the military. But to the civilian, those make no difference. Military intervention, raid, tactical or strategic or whatever, it is the our forces going into a country or place and doing military things. The doctrinal fine points are lost on most people and mostly on me too.

The doctrinal fine points and the names aren't important -- what is actually done in that other country is very important. Long term stay versus short stay are understandable by most. Doing no harm as opposed to doing great harm are also fairly easily understood concepts. What works and does not work seems to be a slightly more difficult concept even though there's plenty of history out there about both sides of that...

True of course, but selectively destructive. And historically, military forces have often been used to build things, especially infrastructure.

Poorly and inefficiently...

That's one of those world has changed things -- and yes, human nature, too -- pick and shovel work is not needed so much in current engineering and is not in the cards for today's armed forces; the kids hate manual labor.

... let's pick one from after the conclusion of WWII, South Korea. We intervened in civil war and it worked out pretty good for several generations of South Koreans.

Here's where that definition stuff get into things. Did we intervene or did we join and assist one nation that had been invaded by another? That was not a civil warm it was a state on state conflict...

We stayed, not to nation build, do COIN or FID support which is what you seem to espouse, but because there was not an official end to that war between the two States, both of which still exist and both of which are still de jure at war. We stayed prepared to engage in combat operations if necessary -- not anywhere near an intervention for humanitarian or development purposes. South Korea pulled themselves up, we provided very little aid to that effort.

Got another one? You can go back further if you wiah, I was just trying to make it easy on you and relevant to today's social norms (human nature may not have changed much but those norms sure have).

We can also pick one where we didn't intervene where I think we could have and should have, Rwanda. We suffered no hurt at all but 800,000 Rwandans did.

We can disagree totally on that one. Not one iota of US interest there. We would have 'intervened' halfheartedly, done a poor job and Clinton would've pulled out rapidly making it a fiasco of greater magnitude than it was. We quite likely would have done as much or more harm as good and almost certainly would have done the USA no favors.

Then why on earth should we do it?

Because it is cheaper and far more effective than long term intervention. We can of course continue take that easier but eventually more expensive and invariably less effective route and continue to play by the opponents rules on his court but it seems sorta dumb to me. YMMV.

Punitive expedition or raid or not, the Pershing adventure is the same thing to a civilian. Our forces went in and mucked about for a bit to no great purpose.

Okay, so regardless, you want an armed force to go in and muck about to no great purpose? Have you considered a job at CNAS?

The object is to go in to attack a limited objective, quickly and harshly and leave rapidly. That is done to avoid an open ended Mexico or Afghanistan like effort. I don't think any civilian has any difficulty with that concept unless they have an ideological bent which opposes that or espouses another sort of effort and thus they wish to deliberately conflate or confuse things.

That is because Hezbollah has not done much by, for or with us. They are Lebanese and interested in Lebanon and Israel. As of yet they are no great threat to us cause the don't want to be.

That's what Clinton AND G.W. Bush thought about AQ...

The world has changed. Human nature has not and won't so I don't think I missed anything.

We can differ on that as well. Human nature may be a constant but it has been overlaid with a veneer of mores and attitudes that I have difficulty recognizing and that my father wouldn't recognize. The nature may be in there but it's buried under stultifying norms.

There is no getting around physics...The only other option is a strike from the sea...And also the Navy is falling apart.

Also on most all that. While much is now correct, there are ways...

As an aside, on the basing thing, our payments to and tolerance for the well known proclivities of the Pakistani Army and the ISI are not as much wishy washiness as it is that basing requirement. It may be a fact of physics -- but, geopolitically, it's a strait jacket and one that can and should be eliminated instead of encouraged.

Americans are very sensitive to airplanes going down and especially aircrew getting captured. That would go double if say a C-17 was forced down and the whole crew and all the soldiers in the raiding party went into the bag.

And even on that. You're closer to right on that, particularly the bit about capture -- that is one major cultural shift (more for the Armed Forces than for the American populace...). I think its easily handled but acknowledge many will not agree. Won't know until it happens -- the American people in my observation are far more tolerant of casualties, captures and military misadventures than the Politicians and the Media seem to think.

Social engineering not so much. Humanitarian purposes yes; but only if practicable and only if done with vigor. It was practicable in Rwanda, it isn't in Darfur.

After a brief partial agreement, we're back to disagreeing on Rwanda but can agree on Darfur -- probably for different reasons...

The effectiveness of strategic raids is neither here nor there if we can't physically do them. We can't physically do them unless we have big bases in the region to launch or support them from. We won't be able to maintain big bases in the region unless we dominate it which sort of leads us right back to where we are now.

We again disagree in part. What you say is true as far as is now publicly known. My belief is that need not remain true -- in fact I strongly believe it will not; we have the capability to remedy the shortfalls you identify, they've all been well known for years. We have deliberately chosen not to openly develop things in a head-in-the-sand risk averse effort to NOT do such raids and thus deny the Government that capability. The Armed Force may be able to keep that charade up a bit longer but I have a gut feeling that they won't be able to do that for long -- again, we'll have to wait and see.

[carl]

That's one of those world has changed things -- and yes, human nature, too -- pick and shovel work is not needed so much in current engineering and is not in the cards for today's armed forces; the kids hate manual labor.

Got another one? You can go back further if you wiah, I was just trying to make it easy on you and relevant to today's social norms (human nature may not have changed much but those norms sure have).

Have you considered a job at CNAS?

Human nature hasn't changed. American mores have as you indicate. My observation on human nature has more to do with the people of the world. You can do an awful lot with a pick and shovel overseas and you will have lots of guys who want to swing them.

How about the Philippines? (I know you're expecting that and have a reply pre-printed.)

CNAS won't have me. I can't get through Clauswitz and didn't read Galula's second book. I keep thinking "What did Clauswitz have to say that Slim's SGT didn't and what is in the other book that isn't in The Village?"

[Bob's World]

How we have defined this problem makes it appear like a long, dark tunnel with a very dim light at the far end, and no room to turn around even if we wanted to.

That is a self-imposed perception that fails virtually any logical test one might throw at it.

Of the two, Pakistan or Afghanistan, the stabilty of Pakistan is the more important to US interests.

To best stabilize Pakistan we need merely withdraw from our decades long intervention and occupation in Afghanistan; and cease or reframe the majority of our operations directed at AQ in both countries.

To avoid such a withdrawal from having tragic effects on the weaker segments of the Afghan populace in the Hazara and Uzbek communities who see a continuation of a Northern Alliance/GIRoA monopoly on governance as their best hope for a prosperous future; and the members of rural communities who have put faith in GIRoA and Coalition programs such as VSO; there must be some form of negotiated settlement between the various Taliban functions and GIRoA, complete with an external forcing function, left behind.

The end result may still be a Pashtu dominated Afghanistan, that is heavily influenced around the fringes by its neighbors. There is no denying that possibility. What is challengable, however, is the assumption that America and NATO would be placed at greater risk of AQ attack by that happening than they currently are.

Because of a very very tenuous "but what if" we commit ourselves to the certainty of an extremely unacceptable status quo reality. That is just not very smart. The alarmists will always be out there, but we do not have to give counsel to the fears they peddle.

[Ken White]

It points out quite well that an Army can be misused to turn victory into defeat...

Human nature hasn't changed. American mores have as you indicate. My observation on human nature has more to do with the people of the world. You can do an awful lot with a pick and shovel overseas and you will have lots of guys who want to swing them.

True on that last but I thought we were talking about the US Army and its operations / operating techniques. Americans can do pick and shovel work and will if pushed and the basic nature can reassert and give you a fully functional, thinking, independent human being -- but you've got to scrape off that veneer first and the Politicians will resist that to the death because they like that veneer and the complaisance and compliance it brings...

How about the Philippines? (I know you're expecting that and have a reply pre-printed.).

My pre-printer's broke...

Philippines? Which time?

Today? Good pick -- note that it is low key and there is no introduction of major US Forces, only low key advice and assistance. It not an intervention, it is FID assistance which is beneficial. That is quite sensible and to be encouraged as much as large troop commitments should be discouraged. Good intel, diplomacy before crisis level is reached and low key military and development assistance are fine -- it's commitment of large bodies of troops that create more problems than they can solve. There's a secondary issue with the purpose of any intervention. They can vary but just have to pass the common sense ("Will this make things truly better or worse?"). If that answer cannot easily be determined, then with a small footprint there is far less risk of making things worse. A large footprint will almost invariably create problems that will force mission alterations that can go rapidly downhill. That is true of any force; it is particularly true of the US forces which are incredibly bureaucratic and ponderous while being aggressive -- a very bad combination that militates (pun intended) against the flexibility and skills required to properly conduct most operations other than war. We can do it, we'll rarely if ever do it right or well simply because we can't.

Post WW II? No real intervention there, no troop commitment.

Post the Battle of Manila Bay in 1898 ? That was not an intervention by any definition, it was the seizure of a nation to colonize it. It involved a war with the then Colonial power and their ejection, running into a full scale war with local nationals and only later became a sort of 'intervention' of the COIN / FID sort -- not too humanitarianly oriented, though (yet another reason for my post WW II restriction earlier; human nature may not have changed but what's broadly acceptable in treatment of others and the limits of engagement capabilities therefrom descending sure have...).

The Philippine War started off not as an intervention but as a full scale, nominally declared war; the issue being viability of a free and independent Philippine state. The stupidity and aggressiveness of the US Army contributed to that war in spite of orders from DC to avoid it (shades of I-Rak...). It was conducted as a mid intensity war initially, with real atrocities on both sides and officially ending in 1902. Our use of segregation and concentration camps plus some of the rather harsh tactics enabled that 'win' and then, the 'war' thus won, things descended into a low grade insurgency which lasted over ten additional years.

I doubt conditions today will lend themselves to a US 'intervention' that effectively runs out a ruling or colonizing nation, takes on the citizens of the country involved in a 'war' that ranges between mid intensity combat and low grade insurgency for thee years and kills about 30K+ members of that nations forces plus over 200K civilians. If it then devolves into a low order insurgency for ten more years with still more deaths and atrocities, I can picture the NYT headlines...

I'll acknowledge that particular War and Insurrection did not lend themselves to strategic raids as an alternative. One cannot seize another nation with strategic raids (fortunately, there isn't much call for such seizures on the horizon), however I also do not think it can be classed as an intervention of the type we are discussing. If one wishes to call it that, one can but one should then acknowledge that it took 13 years or so and caused a lot of casualties -- expensive for results achieved IMO -- and that it was a classic example of 'mission creep' that is almost inevitable with commitment of a military force into another nation where some object to that presence. As for its 'success' -- that's problematic, arguable and up to each person to assess (Would the Philippines have better progressed without US presence? We cannot know, the US was there) but there is no question that the overall cost-benefit ratio was quite bad.

CNAS won't have me. I can't get through Clauswitz and didn't read Galula's second book. I keep thinking "What did Clauswitz have to say that Slim's SGT didn't and what is in the other book that isn't in The Village?"

A bit in both cases. Those books aren't at odds, they complement each other. Every war is different.

The folks at CNAS have probably read most all those. Problem is that they seem to have cherry picked them to get the tropes they want and ignored the rest , a rather natural human tendency...

[Infanteer]

What we need is a strong Afghan ruler, in the mold of Hussein or Gaddaffi, or Stalin...

Karzai could probably be strong, but we hamstring him with our Western civility. If you look at the long line of Pasthuns who have ruled from Kabul, none have ever ruled by winning the hearts and minds of their unruly cousins in the South....

Moderator's Note: a number of the following posts appeared on the thread The UK in Afghanistan and were moved 7th August 2011 to this more appropriate, general thread on Afghanistan.

[ganulv]

Karzai could probably be strong

The bipolar issue is a bit Cromwellian, I suppose.

but we hamstring him with our Western civility.

Not necessarily untrue, but I do think there is a ton of crosstalk when words like ‘civility’ and ‘brutality’ are used in a cross-cultural context. The rulebook in the contemporary Western world is certainly different than in Central Asia and the Middle East. What is happening in Syria right now seems pretty sickening to most Western sensibilities, and I think not just because of the carnage involved but because most Westerners are of a mind not so much that carnage is always unacceptable but rather that carnage done in that particular fashion is always unacceptable. That seems fine to me so long as Westerners do not pat themselves too hard on the back about not perpetrating brutality (and I am not suggesting that you are doing that in the above post, Infanteer). As someone who has lived in a place where people went to bed at night with a justifiable fear that men dressed in black might break down their doors and drag them away to a hole in the ground before daybreak I do not care for the way night raids in Iraq and Afghanistan are consistently portrayed as benign technical affairs to the American public. Which is not to say that there is no argument to be made for such a strategy, just that Westerners should make an effort to face up to the fact that their chunk of the world is in on nasty things, too.

In Middle America the boogeyman is a Muslim wearing a bomb vest; in rural Afghanistan he is a Christian with a SCAR. If the residents of both places were able to take seriously that each others’ fears are legitimate we all might be in a better place. Don’t mean to drag the thread off topic; climbing off my soapbox now.

[JMA]

What we need is a strong Afghan ruler, in the mold of Hussein or Gaddaffi, or Stalin...

The US had one in Egypt and see what happened to him.

Seriously though the Edward Luttwak perspective is just about right... that is why the West can't win in Afghanistan.

[TDB]

The US had one in Egypt and see what happened to him.

Seriously though the Edward Luttwak perspective is just about right... that is why the West can't win in Afghanistan.

He seems to be suggesting a carrot and stick method to COIN. Well that throws up a few issues, our western liberal ideas would not permit out soldiers to carry the stick. I would search for it but lack the energy, a few years ago footage emerged of British soldiers beating Iraqi youths who had thrown stones at them and had been rioting at the same time shots were fired at said British troops. This didn't go down too well on the homefront, in an age of 254 hour rolling media and wikileaks such stick methods would get out. Of course it can be said that this wouldn't matter if the method achieved results. I'm sceptical of this, i feel that having seen how Afghan public opinion turned swiftly against an abusive Afghan government and security apparatus, then the result would be the same.

[Bob's World]

Afghanistan needs a strong ruler who is picked by Afghans for Afghans, in a system not shaped or manipulated by outsiders.

They actually had that in Mullah Omar, but we didn't like the fact that he refused to violate Pashtunwali and give us AQ as we demanded. I suspect he had no idea how serious we were, and I am sure we had no appreciation for how important Pashtunwali is either. A tragic failure to communicate.

Stability demands reconciliation, but reconciliation currently demands swearing an oath of loyalty to the current constitution and is denied entirely by those deemed to be "beyond the pale". I cannot help but think of a similar offer made to Josey Wales and his fellow guerrillas in that Clint Eastwood classic.

The best thing the west could do to get a strong leader in Afghanistan is leave. If what we have created there is sustainable it will endure. If it is not it will evolve or be replaced. Then we must have the humility and honor to work with whomever emerges and whatever form of government these people opt to create for themselves. If they saw value in what we have been selling these past 10 years, they will retain those aspects they liked all on their own. It won't look like what Western politicians and diplomats would want, but then, it isn't their call.

[JMA]

Afghanistan needs a strong ruler who is picked by Afghans for Afghans, in a system not shaped or manipulated by outsiders.

Bob, just how was Mullah Omar 'picked' by Afghans?

[JMA]

He seems to be suggesting a carrot and stick method to COIN. Well that throws up a few issues, our western liberal ideas would not permit out soldiers to carry the stick. I would search for it but lack the energy, a few years ago footage emerged of British soldiers beating Iraqi youths who had thrown stones at them and had been rioting at the same time shots were fired at said British troops. This didn't go down too well on the homefront, in an age of 254 hour rolling media and wikileaks such stick methods would get out. Of course it can be said that this wouldn't matter if the method achieved results. I'm sceptical of this, i feel that having seen how Afghan public opinion turned swiftly against an abusive Afghan government and security apparatus, then the result would be the same.

The moral of this story is that you can't win an insurgency by throwing money at the population while the insurgents execute anyone and everyone who 'cooperates' with you.

The 'war' was won in 2001 and that's when the US should have exited with the warning that if you let AQ back and start the poppy nonsense again we will be back with more of the same. But some smart guys had another plan...

[Bob's World]

Bob, just how was Mullah Omar 'picked' by Afghans?

That was an internal transition when the Taliban ran off the government that the Soviets had put in place. Sure, Pakistan supported that play, nothing is ever simple, but I don't think Pakistan was nearly as prescriptive as the various European/Western interlopers have been.

Just because sometimes a populace has to use bullets rather than ballots to elevate a government of their own over one imposed upon them, does not mean it is not a popular decision. Afther all, it is a much more significant commitment to self-determination to join a revolution than it is to drive down to the local fire station and cast a vote.

[Bill Moore]

I don't think Pakistan was nearly as prescriptive as the various European/Western interlopers have been.

I think the above comment is debatable. The radicalization of the Taliban happened in Pakistan under the guidance of the ISI, and the Taliban still answered to the ISI when they took over Afghanistan. The Taliban didn't wage a successful insurgency, they waged conventional warfare against the Soviet installed/supported (though not supported much) government in Kabul. While the Soviet installed government was largely ineffective and the people of Afghanistan initially welcomed the Taliban victory (not sure what percentage welcomed their victory), they soon realized they just replaced one devil for another. The Taliban was not installed by the Afghan people, they were not legitimate political rulers, they were simply winners, and they won due to the support they received from Pakistan (and maybe the U.S.).

[Fuchs]

I didn't check any books, but I think you two miss a big part in your timeline.

The Taliban did not oust the socialist government (which happened in '92 iirc), but the "Mujaheddin" warlords (Hekmatyar etc) who proceeded to have so much infighting that their conflict left more ruins in Kabul than the whole 79-92 conflict phase.

[Bob's World]

Well, I for one find the whole "radicalization" position to be just one more excuse governments make to shift responsibility for their own problems onto some convenient foil. Nothing radicalizes a populace to action more than the actions and policies of the government in question. Period.

As to percentages, when does any leader have a mandate? American Presidents of late are lucky to have 50% of the populace behind them.

To be clear, I am not advocating that Omar was democratically elected; I am making the point that he rose to power in a process of self-determination that evicted a govenrment that lacked local legitimacy because it was formed and protected by the Soviets.

I suspect that sadly, unless someone has a major strategic wake-up call regarding our current approach to Afghanistan, that 10 years from now there will similarly be a process of violent self-determination to remove the GIRoA gang that was elevated to power and protected by the US and the Coalition. Nature has a way of seeking balance when it is disrupted once that disruption is removed.