Pakistani Army commentary

[davidbfpo]

Two contrasting articles on the Pakistani Army, one almost laudatory and the other asking questions.

Link thanks to WoTR:http://warontherocks.com/2015/10/why...ef-so-popular/

In the other corner, from a previously unknown website, with mainly American academics involved:http://muftah.org/where-things-stand.../#.VhQDZW4dzuk

[davidbfpo]

On the attachment is an exchange between Hamid Hussain and a ret'd Pakistani Army general, which illustrates how the army thinks. It is in the public domain.

[omarali50]

Sahibzada Yaqub Khan died on Jan 25th 2016 after a long and eventful life. More famous as a diplomat than as a general (he was more of an armchair general, did well with introducing academics into the army but never did anything notable in the field), he was a pillar of the Pakistani establishment. I combined obituaries/notes from Dr Hamid Hussain, Major Amin and a family friend into one blog post.

http://brownpundits.blogspot.com/201...aqub-khan.html

Excerpt:

..Of course, Sahibzada sahib's career as Bhutto's ambassador to several great powers, as Zia's foreign minister, then as the establishment's chosen foreign minister to keep Benazir in check, and then as Musharraf's envoy to justify his coup, all indicate that he was a solid and upstanding member of Pakistan's ruling elite and was comfortable with military rule, and with the foreign policy priorities of the Zia and Musharraf regimes (including the jihad in Afghanistan and its softer version in the Musharraf era). He was also highly educated and well read and had an impressive personality that a lot of people remember with awe. And of course, he got high praise from people like Nixon and Kissinger. One imagines that had he been born into the elite of a great power (instead of being born into the fading North Indian Muslim elite) he could have been an Edward Grey, though probably not a Curzon or Palmerston...

..
Yaqub’s critics point to three incidents pertaining to three different times of his life. First is when he was in Kashmir war in 1947-48. Yaqub was ordered to rescue a small picket surrounded by Indians. He was a thinking officer and kept calculating his own likely action and enemy’s possible reaction. In the meantime, Indians overran the picket. Second was when he refused to carry out military action against Bengalis when he was commander of Eastern Command. Yaqub was sacked from the army for his refusal. At that time, almost all officers regardless of their rank and social background denounced Yaqub. Later, with hindsight, some changed their mind and thought Yaqub did the right thing. Third criticism relates to his post retirement career. He served at important ambassadorial positions under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and later served as Foreign Minister of Bhutto’s executioner General Muhammad Zia ul Haq without any qualms.

[davidbfpo]

Hamid Hussain our occassional SWC contributor has a short paper, which is on the attached PDF (3 pgs).

[davidbfpo]

Shashank Joshi's article on Nawaz Sharif's choice - due in November - via the Australian Lowy Institute:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...p-general.aspx

A Pakistani satirist, who Shashank cites, has a different viewpoint:

The once all-powerful Pakistan army has now retreated to only controlling the foreign policy, the ISI, all aspects of internal and external security, beating up errant journalists, extra judicial killings, policymaking in sensitive provinces like Balochistan, wheeling-dealings with all manner of ‘non-state actors’, and the nuke button. Some would say that Pakistan Army has even been rendered toothless — the power to unilaterally nuke India and getting Pakistan annihilated in subsequent Indian retaliation is hardly a symbol of power or a compensation for the inability to freely conduct coups.

[davidbfpo]

A book review by an Indian "lurker" on this controversial author; the review starts with:

In 2007, Ayesha Siddiqa touched a raw nerve by publishing Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. Then Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf branded her a traitor, blocked the book launch, threatened to try her for treason and hounded her out of the country. Her crime was documenting the Pakistani military’s business involvement (“Milbus”) at the cost of the public economy. The 2017 edition of Military Inc. adds details from the post-Musharraf era and concludes that Milbus has become a permanent feature now. There is also widespread public and media acceptance of Milbus through the Pakistan military’s successful efforts in brushing up its image as the most trustworthy security guardian even under civilian rule. According to her, “In post 2007 Pakistan, military power is more intensely entrenched”.

(Ends with) By 2016, the Milbus in Pakistan “seemed unstoppable” since the army was perceived as the only credible national institution for guarding national security, fighting terrorism and intervening domestically to be a “counterweight to the corrupt, unaccountable and inefficient image of the political class”. This has boosted the army’s media image. This was also because “all political, religious and ethnic parties have over the years developed a dependency on the military”.

Link:https://thewire.in/123455/pakistan-m...yesha-siddiqa/

[davidbfpo]

A commentary by Hamid Hussain, a SWJ contributor. The full title being: Past is Prologue – New Ebb in Civil-Military Relations of Pakistan. It is too long for here, so is on the attachment.

One passage should alert the reader:

A look at the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) today may provide some more scary lessons. A dominant military dictated its wishes to civilians, with approval ratings of over ninety percent and admired and trusted by the general populace. Along comes a politician with only forty percent of the votes and a reasonable governance recipe. The TAF refused to adjust to this changed environment and a group of officers jumped the gun. The revenge was swift and brutal. The TAF was decapitated from the top with over forty percent of generals and admirals sacked and jailed, from the middle racks were eviscerated with the sacking of over 500 Colonels and dozens of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) booted out. The TAF is now a shadow of itself. Pakistan’s ‘Erdogan moment’ is not in near future; however nobody would have also predicted the fate of TAF just five years ago.