Pakistani Army commentary

[davidbfpo]

Several questions come to mind:
1. Why did Musharraf see the need to step down?
2. What do we know about the new guy besides that he's a Punjabi and a USA CGSC graduate?
3. What are the impacts for OEF in AF?
4. What are the impacts on the search for UBL/neutralizing of AQ in view of the general belief that the Northwest Tribal regions are a primary launching point for global "Islamic" terrorism?

From my "armchair" in the UK:

1. Musharraf to retain the presidency, not by popular vote, but by national and provincial legislators, had to compromise and step down from Army CoStaff. He assumes that as president he can retain power over the Army, a point many would challenge. Retaining both posts was no longer acceptable, for example Benazir Bhutto's widely reported deal with Musharraf was conditional on him standing down. How the Pakistani electorate will vote early in 2008 is unclear, will a coalition between Musharraf's supporters and Bhutto win?

2. I've not searched, but somewhere is a commentary on the Pakistani Army hierachy. The Pakistani Security Research Unit at Bradford University, UK maybe be worth checking and Indian sites - like saag.org and satp.org.

3. None, given Pakistan's stop-go cycle of military action in troublespots, determined by a variety of factors (internal politics, divisions within the Army over who is the enemy, external pressure and currently an apparent reluctance to confront in the lower ranks, let alone fire at extremists).

4. None, action in the Northern Territories is even more difficult than in North-West Province. The Pakistani state is even weaker there. If UBL is there. In NWFP stop-go remains and confronting AQ is not a top Pakistani priority. I am sceptical that Ms Bhutto as Prime Minister in 2008 would support a US air strike on his location, as reported earlier this week on Al-Jazeera.

Behind all the rhetoric realistically what can the USA / UK expect from Pakistan in the fight against terrorism?

davidbfpo

[wm]

I guess part of my concern relates to the general's last position as chief of ISI, especially with the allegations about ISI and its Taleban/AQ connections. I think this also relates to the on-off phenomenon davidbfpo mentioned. Another concern I have is the impact of his selection on Indo-Pakistani relations, particularly since US-Indian military cooperation seems to be a growth area.. I understand tKiani has had a play in that area in the past as well.

[davidbfpo]

http://www.saag.org/papers24/paper2399.html

This makes interesting reading and downplays the ISI role as he was / is a Musharraf appointee. Happy reading.

davidbfpo

[wm]

http://www.saag.org/papers24/paper2399.html

This makes interesting reading and downplays the ISI role as he was / is a Musharraf appointee. Happy reading.

davidbfpo

I concur that it is interesting reading. Besides the downplay of the ISI post you mentioned, also conspicuous by its absence is any mention of his role during the India-Pakistan crisis as described here.

[davidbfpo]

I'd say the absence of the Kargil episode, when India and Pakistani's confrontation went lethal up in the mountains, in the Indian analysts piece, indicates this episode is being hidden. It serves both nation's interests to play down the history of confrontation and preserve peace.

I recall a public briefing in London, where a Pakistani general stated the local forces, i.e. para-miltary and local garrisons, could not cope with demands to confront militants. Higher grade troops, up to 80,000, were re-deployed from the Indian border.

If Pakistan was to take military action in NWFP and elsewhere having a calm border with India is required. More likely is the need to deploy the army for the forthcoming general election.

Back to my armchair

davidbfpo