Pakistani Army commentary

[MoorthyM]

Citing Carl in part:
Yes an element of being 'fooled' existed, I suspect more of the explanation and blame rests closer to home than the murky corridors of the Pakistani Army/ISI.

David, I suspect that the history is repeating itself.

At this time Pakistan is embarking on a massive buildup of Plutonium based nukes. These compact nukes are versatile and dangerous. To my knowledge, the U.S. has no game plan on what to do about Pakistan becoming a Sunni Islamist nuke factory.

If Pakistan played a role in facilitating the conditions that led to the 9/11 attacks on America, it is now setting the stage for a nuclear 9/11.

http://www.frontpagemag.com/2010/moo...i-third-reich/

[carl]

David:

Everything about our official attitude toward Pakistan cries out "How on earth can we think that and do that!?". The Pak Army/iSI and the feudal elites haven't well hidden much of anything. What the have done is too big and brazen for that. All they really bother to do is say "We did not!" one second and "It's your fault! Can you blame us?" the next. And we go right on cooing to them as you would a favored but petulant child.

What on earth is with us? The Pak Army/ISI is the most dangerous organization in the world and will have to be brought low or tens of millions will die, if that is even possible anymore. And yet we still think we can deal with the devil's spawn.

[davidbfpo]

A WoTR review of Carlotta Gill's book 'The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001-2014:http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/fin...-and-al-qaeda/

The review author, David Isby has visited Afghanistan for thirty years.

One passage:

Unsurprisingly, Gall does not provide a comprehensive account of the strategy, organizations, or background behind Afghan or Pakistani actions (and U.S. reactions to them), which is unfortunate. She reports largely what she saw. Similarly, Gall does not attempt to provide a prescription of how U.S. policy might focus away from the “wrong” enemy without compounding the damage already done. She does not look at the larger story of U.S. relations with Pakistan, nor does she aim to identify and examine the alternatives to the perceived policy of appeasement bitterly opposed by her Afghan sources such as Amrullah Saleh, the former intelligence chief, one of the most thoughtful and effective Afghan officials (hated by the ISI, not least for his sympathy towards India). But without Pakistan providing access through its territory, both coalition military forces and Afghanistan’s economy would be at risk of being cut off. Despite Pakistan’s dysfunctional democracy, the ISI remained hands-off as an elected government served its full term for the first time in the country’s history, to be replaced by an elected successor of a different party.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Lawfare's weekly e-briefing for the identification of a review of Carlotta Gall's book by Bruce Reidel, he ends with:

What The Wrong Enemy does effectively establish beyond doubt is the ISI’s and Army’s dominance of the Afghan Taliban. As the long war in Afghanistan enters a new phase after 2014, it is critically important to understand who is calling the shots on the other side of the hill.

Link:http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/05/t...tan-2001-2014/

[blueblood]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G3DIOjTmX0M

Dr. Fair struggling not to curse is pretty amusing.

[omarali50]

I have a post up about the attack on Karachi airport and on Shia pilgrims

http://brownpundits.blogspot.com/201...nd-rocket.html

Excerpt:

What would a different strategy look like:

1. We should have switched sides completely in 2001. Calculating that Islamist terrorism will be a problem for us, a problem for India, for China, for Afghanistan, for Central Asia, for America, etc etc and we are better off having normal relations with these countries, we should have dropped the whole Jihadi option. Entirely. Completely. No good jihadists, no good taliban, no good Kashmiri militants, etc etc. In other words, we should have taken the opportunity to completely reverse a policy that was always a bad idea. We should have sided WITH America, with China, with the new Afghan regime and even with India against the Jihadist network.
2. Of course, the details of any such switch would have been a bit murky. Some lying would have been involved. But at least the people on top would have been clear about what they were trying to do. That has NOT been the case. If we had switched sides in 2001, by now the mess could have been sorted out. But 13 years were wasted while we tried to double-cross Amrika (this is not a controversial claim, many patriotic Pakistanis miss no opportunity to crow about the American failure in Afpak and to take some credit for wrecking it). We also kept alive a terrorist option against India. After Mumbai, we did not unequivocally act against the terrorists. In fact, our propaganda effort has been focused on creating doubts about the loyalties and identities of the perpetrators. This again is not a secret, or a controversial claim. It is also a mistake.

There is no way win the war against Jihadist terrorists by picking on some of them and by spreading mass confusion about their identity and aims. Terrorists dont just appear out of thin air to attack an airport. They have places of refuge, they have trainers, they have leaders, they build bombs and make plans in some physical location. These networks can be traced, their leaders killed or captured and their political supporters isolated and condemned. It is not rocket science. And it does not seem to be happening nearly to the extent which it should.

And when we do go after them, we will also have to ally WITH America, with China, and yes, even with India. Otherwise, it wont work. Good terrorists will provide cover to bad ones. Approved Islamists will help out unapproved ones. Propaganda will remain confused. and the general public will not be successfully mobilized in the effort. Law enforcement agencies will continue to hesitate to take action against particular terrorist networks and supporters because they will never know for sure who is currently approved as good and who has become bad.
It is possible that the deep state is now truly committed to defeating these groups. But if that is so, they are doing poor job of showing their priorities.

What do you think.. Has the policy now changed? Will it change soon?

[davidbfpo]

Omarali asked just:

What do you think.. Has the policy now changed? Will it change soon?

No, the policy has not changed - even after a Nawaz Sharif's government took power.

This theme has been widely discussed on another thread, for sometime now.

What will cause the Pakistani state and the national security establishment to change course?

There is a simmering insurgency in parts of the FATA, terrorist attacks of which Karachi civil airport is the latest, sectarian murders and more. Yes civilians are often those who die first, such as the Shia minority. What about those who serve in the civil and military forces, who know condoned, if not supported groups kill them often without retribution?

[MoorthyM]

I have a post up about the attack on Karachi airport and on Shia pilgrims

http://brownpundits.blogspot.com/201...nd-rocket.html

Excerpt:

There is no way win the war against Jihadist terrorists by picking on some of them and by spreading mass confusion about their identity and aims. Terrorists dont just appear out of thin air to attack an airport. They have places of refuge, they have trainers, they have leaders, they build bombs and make plans in some physical location. These networks can be traced, their leaders killed or captured and their political supporters isolated and condemned. It is not rocket science. And it does not seem to be happening nearly to the extent which it should.

And when we do go after them, we will also have to ally WITH America, with China, and yes, even with India. Otherwise, it wont work. Good terrorists will provide cover to bad ones. Approved Islamists will help out unapproved ones. Propaganda will remain confused. and the general public will not be successfully mobilized in the effort. Law enforcement agencies will continue to hesitate to take action against particular terrorist networks and supporters because they will never know for sure who is currently approved as good and who has become bad.
It is possible that the deep state is now truly committed to defeating these groups. But if that is so, they are doing poor job of showing their priorities.

What do you think.. Has the policy now changed? Will it change soon?[/I]

Omar, in my view the situation in Pakistan needs to be viewed very differently.

I have proposed that by popularizing a self-serving narrative of sharia, clerics have, by and large, created the Pakistan we see today.

Here's the link to my forthcoming paper: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c...act_id=2420652.

I think this focus on the Pakistani military (the so-called deep state) is misplaced (the basis of C. Fair's flawed book - see my review at Amazon).

The good news is this paper of mine has some meaning ideas on how to extricate Pakistan (and others) from regreesive forces and nudge it toward modernity.