Pakistani Army commentary

**davidbfpo** · 09-29-2010

No great surprise, although I expect closer-in observers may have seen the signs beforehand:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/wo..._r=2&ref=world

Opens with

The Pakistani military, angered by the inept handling of the country’s devastating floods and alarmed by a collapse of the economy, is pushing for a shake-up of the elected government, and in the longer term, even the removal of President Asif Ali Zardari and his top lieutenants.

Near the end:

The alarm about the economy was first sounded by Mr. Shaikh, a former officer of the World Bank, who told a meeting of political and military leaders last month that the government had enough money to pay only two months’ salaries. The economy was “teetering on the brink” before the floods but was now heading for the “abyss,” Mr. Shaikh was quoted as saying.

**davidbfpo** · 10-27-2010

From a Pakistani report, based on the UK Forces TV story:

Beating hundreds of soldiers from major armies of the world, Pakistan Army has won the coveted Gold Award at the prestigious Cambrian Patrol Exercise held in Wales with participation from armies of India, Australia, Canada, United States and France among others.

750 soldiers from across the world descended on the Brecon Beacons in Wales to suffer through one of the toughest exercises ever devised. The Cambrian patrol tested the soldiering skills of the teams as they crossed some of the most arduous terrain one can imagine.

During the marches, the teams had to complete challenges including observation and reconnaissance of enemy forces, cold-river crossings in full kit without access to boats, first-aid and defensive shooting under attack.

TV clip:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cVh-E...yer_embedded#!

**Wana88** · 12-24-2010

Indian Express has an excellent take on Kayani's "consolidation"

The three-year extension given to Kayani did block off avenues of promotion to several aspirants, most of them Punjabis. Nevertheless, he seems reasonably well ensconced in power and has brought in officers of his choice and proven loyalty in key slots, both at the level of Corps Commands and Principal Staff Officers (PSOs), assuaging, in the process, the discontented lot of Punjabi Generals.

Lt.Gen Khalid Shamim Wyne had been brought in as Chief of General Staff only a few months earlier after a successful stint as Corps Commander in Quetta. Logically, this could have been seen as a stepping stone to the chief’s post. He has now been accommodated as a Four-Star General in the largely ceremonial post of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), giving a go-by to the convention of rotating this post between the army, navy and air force. Wyne will retire in October 2013, just before Kayani’s term ends. Another highly rated and well-connected officer, Lt Gen Sikander Afzal Burki has been sidelined in an extended foreign peace-keeping tenure in Liberia, which would take him to retirement in March 2011.The next senior, Lt Gen Javed Zia, has been sent to the XII Corps Command in Quetta, from where he should retire in September, 2011.

Like every other army chief before him, Kayani is proving no exception to the convention of favouring officers of his parent ‘arm,’ the Baloch regiment.

A clansman, Maj Gen Naushad Ahmed Kayani (Infantry) appears to have been favoured as the new Director General, Military Intelligence.
With almost three years still to run, it may be rather premature to assess who may emerge as a potential successor to Kayani. One of the most important Kayani appointments will be that of DG, ISI, in March 2011. Whoever comes in at this slot is likely to be a trusted acolyte, on the high road to further important positions.

After Kayani retires, the following Generals will be senior most — Lt Gen Asif Yasin Malik, currently XI Corps Commander, Peshawar, whose retirement date is March 31, 2014.Much would depend on how he handles the war against terror in FATA and what the Americans think of him.After him are the April 2014 retirees — Lt.Gen Waheed Arshad (Armoured Corps) who is highly rated and presently holding the crucial Chief of General Staff slot, and the Corps Commander, Lahore, Lt Gen Rashad Mehmood. Lahore has had a jinx associated with it as no Corps Commander from there has made it as Chief so far!

http://expressbuzz.com/opinion/op-ed...ls/232158.html

**carl** · 02-03-2011

Below is a link to an Atlantic Council report about the Pakistani Army's recent experiences with counterinsurgency. It includes a very interesting audio presentation by the author.

http://www.acus.org/event/learning-d...nterinsurgency

One of the things mentioned was that in a Pakistan Army military academy, there was an easel with a picture of mullah on it, where in the past there would have been a map of India. The author suggests this is indicative of a changing focus on the part of the army. This may be a hopeful sign.

**Bob's World** · 02-03-2011

Historically, taking one's eye off of external threats to deal with internal discontent is the trip before the fall...

Far better for the Pak government to address the concerns of the Pashtu and Baluch populace, and for the military to stay focused on the military matters of national defense.

**carl** · 02-04-2011

Originally Posted by Bob's World

Historically, taking one's eye off of external threats to deal with internal discontent is the trip before the fall...

Far better for the Pak government to address the concerns of the Pashtu and Baluch populace, and for the military to stay focused on the military matters of national defense.

Bob's World:

The paper was interesting. The primary thesis being that after a bad start the Pakistan Army has very quickly learned to be more effective in a small war conducted within its' national borders. It has mostly learned on the fly and is incorporating what is has learned into unit training and various schools. Kind of interesting too when you think of it as indicating the organizations ability to learn like Nagl covered in his book.

I got the sense from the paper this concern with small war is especially evident at the lower levels of the army because all the casualties they've suffered in the past few years have been suffered in FATA and Swat. Fear not though, the senior generals are keeping their steely gaze fixed on the Hindu hordes to the east.

Since we are on the subject of the Pak Army and in the correct thread, I wish to ask about your following comment.

Originally Posted by Bob's World

I believe that Pakistan's position is reasonable, as is their position in regards to the Durrand line. Most military professionals doing a basic assessment of the terrain and the threat would probably come to the same conclusion. If Pakistan is reduced down to just the Indus river valley a quick push by India could foreseeably take their entire country. They would cease to exist as a nation. A fearful, nuclear armed state with its back up against the Hindu Kush and a rival nuclear state to their front is NOT a healthy situation for anyone. I think there are workable solutions, but before the US can get to sitting down and discussing workable solutions we to first be willing to recognize their reasonable perspective in regards to what their national interests are and how highly they prioritize them.

Second, to rephrase your question a bit: Is sustaining a set of conditions that supported a workable situation of deterrence between India and Pakistan one that I think is more important than disrupting that balance to grant India a clear advantage? I have to go with sustaining the status quo. Like our own Cold War with the Soviets, it was sometimes a bit dicey, but it worked. I can't imagine if some external power would have come along and ceded Canada into the Warsaw Pact, allowing the Russians to positions military forces all along our northern border, that we would have said "oh, ok."

First off, you say above most military professionals would say that Pakistan needs territory east of the Indus valley to fall back on to preclude defeat by a quick Indian push, the implication being that territory includes Afghanistan. So my question is this, what is the defeated army going to fall back on? There is nothing much in those mountains and there is nothing much in Afghanistan. What are they going to use to resupply and build up troop strength? It seems to this forever civilian that even if they used this sovereign country as their fallback, it wouldn't do them any good. There is nothing there for them to use. If they got pushed to the west of the Indus valley, it would be over regardless. I may be reading this wrong and if I am, please tell me but it seems to me that unless you have some kind of resource base to fall back on, you may as well be falling back into the ocean.

As to your second paragraph quoted above, I think I prefer you answer my question as I originally stated it. Your rephrasing changes the sense of my original question. Or you maybe could answer your rephrased question if you swapped the words "India" for "Pakistan" and vice versa. But I would prefer you answer my original question as originally stated-is the Pak Army/ISI's desire to exert control over Afghanistan one we should honor any more than India's desire that they don't?

Also you state above you believe the Pak Army/ISIs position is reasonable, yet in the past you stated that you didn't believe they had a right (or something like that, I will get lost if I go retrieve the quote, but I can if you want) to exert control over Afghanistan. Those two statements seem contradictory.