What is presence patrolling?

[Chris jM]

The so-called 'Presence' patrol is designed to make contact with the locals in an IW environment, showing the flag as it were. However, what such patrols are really doing is demonstrating area dominance -- "we own this patch of ground" (for the moment at least) and if rarely challenged, they establish de facto dominance a majority of the time. What they should also be doing, more importantly, is gathering information (on all the METT-TC factors) and that information MUST be fed into the system, be analyzed and collated and placed into perspective. Changes to the information are critical as they indicate tends and give warning of opponent intentions. That's why the US established Company Intelligence cells in Iraq -- to collate and use that information. It is noteworthy that no one (to my knowledge) advocates presence patrols in mid intensity warfare or for major combat operations.

Two points here:

1 - if I had to 'demonstrate dominance' it could be tactically applied as a clearing patrol, you could secure an area for a period, you could disrupt an enemy force from an area, you could deny a threat group access, etc etc. Which leads me to:

2 - If your not going to do it in mid to high intensity warfare, why then do it at the lower level as a doctrinal undertaking? If my service went into a mid-level conflict environment, the presence patrolling concept would not get hung up but would stay as baggage as that is what has been taught, practiced and reinforced. The lessons would be learnt quickly but that's not the point (or perhaps it is the point - if we can learn the lessons now, when men aren't losing lives, the better off we are). Tactical task verbs (the ends) apply to all intensities of military operations, the means will change METT-TC dependent. I see 'presence patrolling' as a means elevated to an ends, and for the reasons outlined above I don't like it.

So armies in real wars conduct combat patrols to complete designated missions and reconnaissance patrols to insure they do not get surprised or to gather specific information for future action (that's why I say the 'presence' patrol should usually be and often is a reconnaissance patrol; it's also to avoid surprises and gather information for future action...).

Good point, I wish someone had explained it this way to me before.

It is also an opportunity to train and to gather information -- THAT is the purpose of the patrol and presence is simply a synergistic and beneficial effect.

I don't know if I'm arguing over or around you as I'm in agreement with 90% of what your saying. Yes, presence is synergistic and beneficial so why define your patrol by it's second-order effect? If it's a clearance patrol then clear - and if you need to be overt for reasons of 'presence' in order to do so inside the COIN environment, go ahead.

We now categorize patrols by intended function, combat or reconnaissance, that based on years of experience in major combat operations. You seem to want to categorize them by movement methodology. I'm not certain there's much benefit there. Probably not enough to rewrite most of the relevant manuals, doctrine and training materials in the west...

I like the 'overt/covert' classification but that's an armchair perspective with no supporting experience. I agree with your point made elsewhere that it may be tomatoes/tomatos - it's the same thing and you can call it what you want but doing it well is the problem.


My main point on presence patrolling remains, and I'm interested in the counter-views (what can I say, I'm a sucker for punishment ).

[Ken White]

If your not going to do it in mid to high intensity warfare, why then do it at the lower level as a doctrinal undertaking?

Because it serves an important psychological function on the local populace and on the opposition in such conflicts. That benefit disappears in higher order conflicts.

If my service went into a mid-level conflict environment, the presence patrolling concept would not get hung up but would stay as baggage as that is what has been taught, practiced and reinforced. The lessons would be learnt quickly but that's not the point (or perhaps it is the point - if we can learn the lessons now, when men aren't losing lives, the better off we are).

Very valid point, applies to the US also and it impugns senior people, not the troops. My belief is that most people will not succumb to that very human failure.

Tactical task verbs (the ends) apply to all intensities of military operations, the means will change METT-TC dependent. I see 'presence patrolling' as a means elevated to an ends, and for the reasons outlined above I don't like it.

I somewhat agree but, like Infanteer, think the terminology is mostly irrelevant (while acknowledging that there will be some that hang their hats on the issue...). A 'presence' patrol is mostly a reconnaissance that also serves, secondarily, the canine function of marking all the trees in your AO.

Yes, presence is synergistic and beneficial so why define your patrol by it's second-order effect? If it's a clearance patrol then clear - and if you need to be overt for reasons of 'presence' in order to do so inside the COIN environment, go ahead.

Because Doctrine writers make misteaks?

...it's the same thing and you can call it what you want but doing it well is the problem.

That's all that counts...

[davidbfpo]

Moderator's Note

I have moved the last four posts to the UK & Afghanistan thread, where they should be and not here - a more general debate on presence patrolling. On that thread the posts are No's. 412-415. Hopefully this thread reads OK still.

[Red Rat]

but I hope not The discussion is revolving around what are presence patrols and what they are used for. While Presence Patrols is a widely used term it is not reflected in UK doctrine and patrols are still classed as recce, fighting or standing patrols and all the tasks I have seen on this thread would be covered under any of these three headings. The fact that 'presence patrols' as a term is used so widely without being defined in doctrine (if definition is needed) probably explains the confusion!

[Pete]

Wilf often makes valid observations about the poor quality of writing in many current U.S. doctrinal publications. Without belaboring the point, the excerpt above from the U.S. Army Infantry Drill Regulations of 99 years ago is clear and to the point, contains no acronyms, and is written in the King's English. Publications that are easily understood are more useful than those that are not.

[Infanteer]

Two points here:

1 - if I had to 'demonstrate dominance' it could be tactically applied as a clearing patrol, you could secure an area for a period, you could disrupt an enemy force from an area, you could deny a threat group access, etc etc. Which leads me to
....
Tactical task verbs (the ends) apply to all intensities of military operations, the means will change METT-TC dependent. I see 'presence patrolling' as a means elevated to an ends, and for the reasons outlined above I don't like it.

To clear, to disrupt, and to deny all imply certain things that may or may not involve talking to locals (if they are present). If I send out a presence patrol and it doesn't talk to people (or isn't clearly visible), then it fails (re: no pee on the tree). I don't believe there is a mission task verb for "go talk to the locals". I'd guess another "doctrinal fit" would be contact patrols that seek to find and retain contact with an enemy force; but again, that has its own implications.

Just because it isn't in doctrine doesn't mean it isn't "real" - perhaps the doctrine guys are not up with the times. I have a feeling we are trying to squeeze 10 pounds of #### in a 5 pound bag here.

Presence patrolling is a natural condition of military superiority. I'll bet everybody back to the Romans did it. Presence patrols are likely required in conventional, "high-intensity" (I prefer "high-density") conflicts in the rear areas (think German-occupied Russia, Yugoslavia, and France).

[slapout9]

I'll bet everybody back to the Romans did it.

They certainly did. Before we had what are seen as modern police departments the Patrol function was performed by soldiers and to this day most police departments divided up their patrol sectors based upon the concept of how the Romans divided up their Military Districts, in the south many are still called patrol districts as opposed to beats or sectors or zones or precincts.

[JMA]

but I hope not The discussion is revolving around what are presence patrols and what they are used for. While Presence Patrols is a widely used term it is not reflected in UK doctrine and patrols are still classed as recce, fighting or standing patrols and all the tasks I have seen on this thread would be covered under any of these three headings. The fact that 'presence patrols' as a term is used so widely without being defined in doctrine (if definition is needed) probably explains the confusion!

There is only confusion because some here want there to appear to be confusion. In post #79 above I posted an extract from a US manual which clearly defined a presence patrol.

The definition does fit the wandering around in open areas as the aim is to show the locals that there is a military presence in the area. Thats all it achieves. Sadly the Taliban have got wise to the apparent ISAF addiction to being seen as busy little bees and maintaining a heavy patrol schedule (you know pins in the maps, long detailed SITREP of all the activity, impresses the hell out of the generals) and are using the IED tactic to great effect. But regardless ISAF keep on walking around and getting their soldiers killed. Does this presence patrolling contribute in any significant way in securing the population? Do you get get bang for the buck from it?

Some talk of displaying dominance through such patrols.

Tim Marshall of Sky TV had a recent TV report on a patrol with some Scots Bn who took 4 hours to patrol 2km. Not because they spent time talking to the locals but because the rate of advance was so slow because of the sweeping for IEDs. I can just imagine the locals and the Taliban watching and listening for the bangs and thinking how limited the movement ability of ISAF is due to the "brilliant" use of IEDs. Can't you see that by crawling along at snails pace you merely confirm that ISAF are not dominating the ground and prove to the locals how "clever" the Taliban really are and who is really in charge?

Let me share with you how much fun this "game" must be in the eyes of the Taliban.

Go back to late '70s. FRELIMO would carry ZANLA insurgents up to the border by vehicle, drop them off and wish them well. So pick a road route so used. Send in a few small teams. One creates a diversion which would lead to FRELIMO sending a few vehicles to check it out. One team lays a land mine on the approach route. When the vehicles pass the next team lay a mine to cover the return leg. Leading vehicle detonates mine. Second vehicle loads bodies and casualties and heads for home and guess what?

ISAF have got to go back to the aim, to secure the population, and rethink the strategy and the tactics.

[JMA]

Presence patrolling is a natural condition of military superiority. I'll bet everybody back to the Romans did it. Presence patrols are likely required in conventional, "high-intensity" (I prefer "high-density") conflicts in the rear areas (think German-occupied Russia, Yugoslavia, and France).

Compared to the front line intensity the rear areas were certainly not "high-intensity" by any stretch of the imagination. A few partisans, a little sabotage... maybe.

We are not sure exactly what the Romans did are we? The ROE the Romans used would mean that the people either groveled or fled.

[Chris jM]

I appreciate the thoughts that have gone into this topic, and don't want to flog the proverbial carcass.

I'll take another stab at pointing out my views but will also suggest that it may be time to 'agree to disagree'. Infanteer, you make valid points that I don't disagree with, however I just read the situation and circumstance differently. This could very well be down to different backgrounds in different armies - so be it. At the risk of getting stuck on permanent repeat, what I intend to be my final attempt at explaining my concerns -

The discussion is revolving around what are presence patrols and what they are used for. While Presence Patrols is a widely used term it is not reflected in UK doctrine and patrols are still classed as recce, fighting or standing patrols and all the tasks I have seen on this thread would be covered under any of these three headings. The fact that 'presence patrols' as a term is used so widely without being defined in doctrine (if definition is needed) probably explains the confusion!

You have narrowed down some of my concerns. What is wrong with the term 'recce', 'fighting', 'standing' etc that we need to introduce 'presence' patrolling as a key conceptual framework to our patrol planning and execution?

To clear, to disrupt, and to deny all imply certain things that may or may not involve talking to locals (if they are present). If I send out a presence patrol and it doesn't talk to people (or isn't clearly visible), then it fails (re: no pee on the tree). I don't believe there is a mission task verb for "go talk to the locals". I'd guess another "doctrinal fit" would be contact patrols that seek to find and retain contact with an enemy force; but again, that has its own implications.

Again, in agreement. I think the continued debate here is coming from the fact that we are using the same words with different meanings. Stay with me Infanteer, what I am saying is simply:

- Patrolling to 'talk to locals' is a way we achieve a tactical task.

- Patrolling to provide an overt presence in the eyes of the locals is the way we achieve a tactical task.

- Neither of the above should be misconstrued as the tactical task in itself, though.

If we want to dominate an area, provide the local populace with the belief that 'we' are the omni-present all-powerful force of good, if we want to 'mark the tree' metaphorically, we have to break down these tasks to achievable tactical tasks that patrolling can accomplish. The whole 'domination' is a second-order effect that is a legitimate end-state for campaigning, but needs to be broken down into a number of tactical tasks to achieve that aim. Clear the main traffic routes in and out, guard the market place, deny threat groups the ability to move around the population, reinforce a local police checkpoint, secure a key govt building ---> these are all legitimate tactical tasks that can contribute to the 'dominate' concept. Each one of these may use the presence of friendly forces as a key enabler to achieve the tactical effect, but my key point is that presence patrolling is not a tactical task to be undertaken. 'Presence' may describe how we do it and imperfectly describes 'why' we do it, but in itself it is too imperfect a task and too open to poor usage that it doesn't help us.

I've spoken before about the 'presence' concept being too easily corrupted to justify poor and inefficient practices, and I'd just reinforce that idea here.

Just because it isn't in doctrine doesn't mean it isn't "real" - perhaps the doctrine guys are not up with the times. I have a feeling we are trying to squeeze 10 pounds of #### in a 5 pound bag here.

You might be right. If so, we can agree to disagree here - I think it is a small technical point but in my area of the world I genuinely think that it having detrimental effects on the preparation and employment of military forces. As such I am jumping on a pedestal for my 15 minutes of infamy!

Presence patrolling is a natural condition of military superiority.

So is aerial superiority, but you don't task a single flight to conduct an 'aerial superiority' patrol, do you? As a transient effect you have to break it down into a series of barrage/ combat air patrols, interdiction patrols, SEAD tasks, EW tasks, etc etc. No problems with the legitimacy of 'presence' in military tasks, I just don't see it a valid or useful task verb, descriptor or modus operandi to be used with a tactical patrol.

In a hypothetical scenario to illustrate my point, you and I are 2 platoon commanders in a similar area. We both get our tasks and see that 'presence' is the key task that has been given to us. As you have described above, your approach sees you hit the key population centers and mark your territory. Down the road, I'm taking the identical instructions and intent of 'presence' but applying it poorly as I'm a bit of a moron. Instead of doing the good ideas your enacting I walk in and out of a market place, have a bit of a friendly wave, then sit off to another side of the village and man a VCP. Being a key route in I think great - we are providing a presence. Some of my sections conduct independent tasks and, due to a number of factors such as poor motivation, poor training and a general lack of grey matter up top, their 'presence' task is quickly fulfilled by what amounts to a quick walk-in walk-out/ we're still here kinda stuff and then they knock all patrolling on the head mid-morning and RTB for scones and earl grey. They also poked their head into the local police checkpoint to let them know we are still alive, but that was pretty much it. Presence achieved, but the effect is poor.

Had either my hypothetical Company orders or had I been smarter and shrugged off the 'presence' patrolling construct, I think a lot more could have been achieved in this situations. A mission appreciation would have come up with a few tasks, using legitimate tactical task verbs such as clear and secure. Intel would have still be gained through an overt patrolling posture but the short-term goals would have been far clearer, easy to plan for and easier to achieve - thus focussing my patrolling and making us more effective a force. I also see tactical tasks enabling mission command and decentralized command and control far better than 'presence' does as you can let your patrols know what effect it is your after, and co-ordinate/ synchronise efforts better.

I'm not trying to be condescending here Infanteer, but rather explain my perspective. Agree/ disagreements aside, do you at least understand what I am trying to say and why?

There is only confusion because some here want there to appear to be confusion.

I wouldn't completely agree... confusion there is, but keep in mind that everyone here has _massively_ different backgrounds, experiences and perspectives on the same issue.

The definition does fit the wandering around in open areas as the aim is to show the locals that there is a military presence in the area. Thats all it achieves.

In my view (I've bored everyone with it enough above, so excuse my brevity in expanding upon it here) it also justifies/ excuses/ protects the inefficient 'wandering around' of military elements.

I've reread the definition your provided in post #79, and it continues to be valid to the discussion.

A presence patrol['s]... primary goal is to gather information about the conditions in the unit’s AO... Its secondary role is to be seen as a tangible representation of the U.S. military force, projecting an image that furthers the accomplishment of the commander’s intent.

I agree with this doctrinal definition, but still hold true to the belief that viewing ones patrol as a 'presence' one isn't following the best practice available. The concept of 'presence' is best achieved by following the more doctrinally applicable tactical tasks to the operational situation at hand.

[Ken White]

What is wrong with the term 'recce', 'fighting', 'standing' etc that we need to introduce 'presence' patrolling as a key conceptual framework to our patrol planning and execution?

The US doesn't use 'standing' patrols. I'll trade our 'presence' for your 'standing'...

I've spoken before about the 'presence' concept being too easily corrupted to justify poor and inefficient practices, and I'd just reinforce that idea here.

Yes, and I agreed but isn't that really a training, education and the well worn leadership problem?

I'm not trying to be condescending here Infanteer, but rather explain my perspective. Agree/ disagreements aside, do you at least understand what I am trying to say and why?

I hope he does, though I must confess I do not.

I wouldn't completely agree... confusion there is, but keep in mind that everyone here has _massively_ different backgrounds, experiences and perspectives on the same issue.

I agree with that and in conjunction with the preceding lack of understanding on my part, I was conducting 'presence' patrols before the US doctrine writers coined the term. Long before. Those patrols were recon or combat patrols which managed to provide 'presence.' Nothing changed with the adoption of a new term.

In my view (I've bored everyone with it enough above, so excuse my brevity in expanding upon it here) it also justifies/ excuses/ protects the inefficient 'wandering around' of military elements.

That is IMO emphatically an education, training and leadership problem, not a semantic one...

"A presence patrol['s]... primary goal is to gather information about the conditions in the unit’s AO... Its secondary role is to be seen as a tangible representation of the U.S. military force, projecting an image that furthers the accomplishment of the commander’s intent."

I agree with this doctrinal definition, but still hold true to the belief that viewing ones patrol as a 'presence' one isn't following the best practice available. The concept of 'presence' is best achieved by following the more doctrinally applicable tactical tasks to the operational situation at hand.

Emphasis added above by me. It's a recon patrol; while you're out, you're showing the flag. Armies have been doing that for thousands of years. It works. If it's misused, fire the responsible leader -- or better train him or her...

[Pete]

Why try to put a limit on the number of purposes for which a patrol might be conducted? According to the Manual for Noncommissioned Officers and Privates of the Army of the United States, 1917,

The designation of a patrol indicates the nature of the duty for which it is detailed, as, for example, visiting, reconnoitring, exploring, flanking, combat, harassing, pursuing, etc.

The main thing to be avoided is complicating doctrine by coming up with different procedures for each type.

[Chris jM]

I hope he does, though I must confess I do not.

Evidently the failings in articulation and argument are my own, then.

I feel that my objections are becoming increasingly theoretical and abstract, and thus of minimal utility to anyone, myself included. What I can agree with is that, in the words of Ken White, this is "emphatically an education, training and leadership problem, not a semantic one" and I am, undeniably, focussed solely on semantics here.

Stepping back from my disagreements in classification and typification tidies things up. All my concerns would be answered and solved if the 'education, training and leadership' flaws that give form to poor patrolling - 'standing' or otherwise - thus probably hinting to me that my argument is getting too far into abstracted weeds.

This would also, as Pete put it, avoid 'complicating doctrine' or anything else unnecessarily, which I am certainly not advocating but unfortunately seem to be doing.

[William F. Owen]

I've reread the definition your provided in post #79, and it continues to be valid to the discussion.

From the JMA Quote's.

9-136. A presence patrol is used in stability or civil support operations.

OK? How is this relevant to current OPs? I submit, it is not. A'Stan is certainly neither.

Tim Marshall of Sky TV had a recent TV report on a patrol with some Scots Bn who took 4 hours to patrol 2km. Not because they spent time talking to the locals but because the rate of advance was so slow because of the sweeping for IEDs.

If you do not understand why a Patrol may be tasked with recovering, and/or clearing IEDs, or conducting a similar activity in support of other patrols, and/or activity, then I'll leave it to Red Rat's seemingly inexhaustible patience to walk the OPSEC line and explain it to you.

[Chris jM]

From the JMA Quote's.

[9-136. A presence patrol is used in stability or civil support operations.]

OK? How is this relevant to current OPs? I submit, it is not. A'Stan is certainly neither.

Because, like it or not, perfectly or imperfectly, the military is filling an important capability gap in the Afghani security situation.

There is no expeditionary constabulary or indigenous forces to do the lower-end policing to a satisfactory standard in opposition to the Taliban and, in that void, the strategy and policy from governments is that the military is to pick up the task.

This may be our own doing through poor planning, mission creep or a combination of all the above with the addition of poor policy. However, I think you are amiss to say that it is irrelevant to current operations. Undesirable, perhaps, but not irrelevant. The military has been tasked and we have to deliver.

If presence patrols are irrelevant, how come we are doing so many of them?

Further, you also state that A-stan is neither a stability nor a civil support operation. I would say that it is both of those, as well as being many other things else. Again I'm not going to that this is right or proper, but it is the reality we have to deal with.

[William F. Owen]

If presence patrols are irrelevant, how come we are doing so many of them?

Are we? Patrolling does mean being present. There is both benefit and risk associated with that (security v activity). That is the art part. Making that judgement. The term "presence patrols" teeters on the moronic, and it seems to appear in one obscure US manual.

Further, you also state that A-stan is neither a stability nor a civil support operation. I would say that it is both of those, as well as being many other things else. Again I'm not going to that this is right or proper, but it is the reality we have to deal with.

It may be those things at some time in some places.
If you find yourself writing down Apache Close Air Support Frequency and have a JFAC tagging along, then I submit the words "stability" and "civil support" do not need to be used.
If you find yourself standing outside a shop in Antrim, while an RUC officers buys more cigarettes, then things will be slightly different again. Context, context and context.
To quote my wife, "You don't ride your donkey on the highway."

[JMA]

Because, like it or not, perfectly or imperfectly, the military is filling an important capability gap in the Afghani security situation.

There is no expeditionary constabulary or indigenous forces to do the lower-end policing to a satisfactory standard in opposition to the Taliban and, in that void, the strategy and policy from governments is that the military is to pick up the task.

This may be our own doing through poor planning, mission creep or a combination of all the above with the addition of poor policy. However, I think you are amiss to say that it is irrelevant to current operations. Undesirable, perhaps, but not irrelevant. The military has been tasked and we have to deliver.

If presence patrols are irrelevant, how come we are doing so many of them?

Further, you also state that A-stan is neither a stability nor a civil support operation. I would say that it is both of those, as well as being many other things else. Again I'm not going to that this is right or proper, but it is the reality we have to deal with.

Nail on the head again Chris.

I suggest that the question be asked as to why this virtual peacekeeping activity - presence patrols has assumed such importance is that the ISAF forces are fresh out of ideas.

The (US) doctrine is clear and for as long as the term presence patrols are used this fruitless activity can be measured against the laid down definition.

This is pertinent: (see more in post #79 above)
"9-138. The commander always plans for the possibility that a presence patrol may make enemy contact, even though that is not his intent. Rarely should a commander use a presence patrol where enemy contact is likely. Presence patrols work best for some types of stability operations such as peace operations, humanitarian and civic assistance, non-combatant evacuations, or shows of force. Before sending out a presence patrol, the commander should carefully consider what message he wants to convey, and then clearly describe his intent to the patrol leader."

I anticipate that this tread will become drowned in the semantics of what a presence patrol is or isn't. I suggest therefore that in order to avoid that one discusses the suitability of the current patrolling tactics as applied (certainly in Helmand).

One needs to go back to the aim (the selection and maintenance of the aim used to be the first principle of war, and if it isn't it is not hard to see where things started to go wrong) and that appears to have been to secure the population.

Essential background reading to see where things went wrong in Helmand to the point where now some monster called presence patrols has become the order of the day.

Understanding the Helmand campaign:
British military operations in Afghanistan
Anthony King

The problem began with the 'penny packeting' of troops into first platoon houses and then into FOBs then the doctrine kicked in where commanders believed they needed to aggressively dominate the AO.

Now put the following ingredients together in a mix and what you get is a presence patrol.

* Have troops will/must patrol - get the troops out of base.
* Terrain too open for the soldier's skills set to operate in a covert/clandestine manner.
* Should be securing the population - so visit every village once a week and secure it for an hour.
* Want to be seen to be dominant - when the Taliban see us coming they move out of the way (or take a few long range pot shots at us).
* Have no intel - must get some so we will talk to the population (if they will talk to us).
* Have no credible Afghan military or police presence to share the work load.
* Have 6 months to make an impact - make a name for oneself, earn a medal, kill some gooks.

Quite a witches brew you will admit.

The basic soldier cannot be blamed for the tactical incompetence that manifests itself in sending out these presence patrols or indeed what passes for patrolling activity.

It seems the quote from a Royal Marine back in 2008 about ‘failed to clear,
fail to hold and failed to build’ (See Anthony King pg 8) still holds good for operations today.

Call it what you will a presence patrol or any other name and you will never work in its current form in areas where their is a high risk of making contact with the Taliban (or rather the Taliban making contact with you).

[William F. Owen]

JMA
Please tell "us" how it's done. Please detail specific solutions. Specifically,

a.) You say FOBs are a mistake. What's the alternatives?
b.) You say patrol "tactics" are wrong. Specifically, what is wrong and what are the solutions?
c.) Add as much operational context as possible, based on your knowledge of the theatre.

[JMA]

If you do not understand why a Patrol may be tasked with recovering, and/or clearing IEDs, or conducting a similar activity in support of other patrols, and/or activity, then I'll leave it to Red Rat's seemingly inexhaustible patience to walk the OPSEC line and explain it to you.

I was being very specific about Tim Marshall's TV reporting out of Helmand. This was a wandering around type of patrol and nothing to do with clearing IEDs.

See for yourself here

Very clearly this was a patrol from one base to the next and back again.
(Sounds a bit like the Grand Old Duke of York, yes? - For our US friends the background to this can be found here.)

What makes this whole situation so much more sad is the following quote from Tim Marshall:

One NCO (non-commissioned officer) told me his fears were not when he was patrolling, but the night before, when he was planning the route and thinking: "Are these the right decisions to keep the guys safe?

So its safety first? Or are we out there to show the Taliban and the locals whose the boss?

Quote again:

For the 1 Scots men, halfway through their six-month tour of duty, it was routine. They do it day in, day out, seven days a week, and they take it one day at a time.

The system is broken... fix it... or get the troops out.

[William F. Owen]

I was being very specific about Tim Marshall's TV reporting out of Helmand. This was a wandering around type of patrol and nothing to do with clearing IEDs.

The reason for the patrol was never given. To those of us with even a miniscule understanding of the subject, there are many sound reasons for mounting such a patrol. Base plate check? A walk through to position the patrol in support of another action? Do not know. We were never told.

That you do not understand what you are seeing, does not support your theory about "wandering around type of patrols", and if you look carefully, you will see them sweeping for IEDs.

Still curious as to your insights as to how you would do everything better.