Thoughts on the Afghan National Army

[Colin Robinson]

I'm writing a section for my PhD thesis on the effectiveness and accountability of the Afghan National Army. Basically I have to say whether they're combat capable, and whether they're accountable, to a full Security Sector Reform - OECD Handbook level. The section is below - comments much appreciated:

"The ANA is combat capable, but not usually without heavy coalition support. Virtually all ANA formations operate as adjuncts to coalition forces. (REF: Jeff Hayes, Reforming the ANA, FPRI E-Notes) An exceptional officer commands the one brigade [3-201] that runs its own area of responsibility."

"There has been little effort to build democratic civilian control over the Afghan army. Instead influential figures [ie Bismillah Khan] manage their personal patronage networks. This discourages Western style management and accountability. The army has not attempted to depose the government. Instead, army officers at senior levels do not appear to be concentrating on the war. (REF: Engels leaked report NBC 30 Dec 09) Instead many appear to be concentrating on their personal survival and profit."

"The Afghan experience of army reconstruction is therefore a partial success: somewhat effective, but not accountable in OECD SSR terms."

Hope this sounds like a good representation of the true picture.

[davidbfpo]

Please note there is a consolidated thread on the ANA: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5384

I assume Colin has plundered that; added so others can cross-refer.

Colin - thanks for the update on your research.