Body Counts and Metrics

[William F. Owen]

I started this because I hate to see another useful area of discussion die in the "Journal."
See here.
Sorry, but Body Counts work. That the it has been done it badly in the past by those cannot use the data usefully, does not mean it does not work.
We have to get over rejecting things just because they fail in the hands of people not skilled in their use.

Should it be THE measure of success? No, of course not, but most armies who defeated irregular forces used body counts. They were used in Kenya, Malaya (see my quote), Dohfar and Cyprus - and also Rhodesia!
Historically best practice body counts were based on recorded kills, verified by physical control and recovery of the body AND Weapons - usually for some form of exploitation.

The point is, you do not pursue a score as in judging success by the number you kill, but that you are sure that you are actually killing the enemy, when and as it is required. - that is why Templer used Body Counts, and British Army operations were predicated on "killing the enemy."

Do something well it works. Do it badly and it fails.

[Chris jM]

I guess your right, and that a body count could be a useful measure - but only if it is appropriate to assessing the effectiveness of any strategy, not as a strategy (or even a tactic) unto itself.

I also suspect that any reporting of eny killed will be a near impossible task. Unless your taking the ground after a conflict your unlikely to be able to accurately assess the damage you've inflicted - I think you've highlighted the issues yourself on this forum with regards to Brit actions in Helmand to this end. Additionally, even if you do dominate the battlefield post-contact, their can be massive amounts of warped feedback influencing the statistics (who was enemy, who was carrying a weapon, the need to best a sister company, etc etc).

I distrust the western militaries as a whole (yep, massive generalisation alert!) being able to employ a body count statistic as an effective tool in pursuit of strategis assessment. I fear, as I've outlined elsewhere, that many of today's coalition forces are too orientated topwards minimising their own losses and any data proving that they are killing the eny would only serve to spt/ reinforce current tactics that may inflict loss, but don't work towards a sustainable objective . It may be my own bias but I don't trust tools as easily blinding and misleading as statistics without substantial qualification. That, and I'm a former humanities student who generally distrusts the numbers people

In short Wilf, I agree that there is nothing wrong with the body count as a tool assessing one's strategy in theory, but in practise I oppose it. Knowledge of both FF and enemy forces in any conflict is bound to be imperfect, so we are better off embracing that imperfection than trying to supplant it withthe inevitable, omnipotent excel spreadsheet.

[William F. Owen]

In short Wilf, I agree that there is nothing wrong with the body count as a tool assessing one's strategy in theory, but in practise I oppose it. Knowledge of both FF and enemy forces in any conflict is bound to be imperfect, so we are better off embracing that imperfection than trying to supplant it withthe inevitable, omnipotent excel spreadsheet.

So basically your point is that poor leadership and stupidity is blocker to doing something useful???

What you miss is that has been used successfully in the past!
Be a Clausewitian I very much subscribe to the "work within the Chaos, not against it school" of warfare. You will rarely have the right information on which to base decisions.

I would also submit it is nothing to do with strategy. It is the realm of tactics. Verifiable body counts are an excellent OA tool, when combined with data sets. The Ricks/Kilcullen "don't count bodies" is simplistic, misleading and wrong.

[MikeF]

Sorry, but Body Counts work. That the it has been done it badly in the past by those cannot use the data usefully, does not mean it does not work.
We have to get over rejecting things just because they fail in the hands of people not skilled in their use.

Should it be THE measure of success? No, of course not, but most armies who defeated irregular forces used body counts.

The point is, you do not pursue a score as in judging success by the number you kill, but that you are sure that you are actually killing the enemy, when and as it is required. - that is why Templer used Body Counts, and British Army operations were predicated on "killing the enemy."

Do something well it works. Do it badly and it fails.

Breaking the enemy's will to fight is the real objective. Killing the enemy and the proper application of violence is a big part of that. Ultimately, you want to bring the enemy to the negotiating table at a weakened position. However, it's not a panacea. If the negotiations do not lead to peace, then you have failed. The war to end all wars is a good example of how the accumulation of body counts without formal arbitration instead of retribution can lead to more war.

[Bob's World]

Breaking the enemy's will to fight is the real objective. Killing the enemy and the proper application of violence is a big part of that. Ultimately, you want to bring the enemy to the negotiating table at a weakened position. However, it's not a panacea. If the negotiations do not lead to peace, then you have failed. The war to end all wars is a good example of how the accumulation of body counts without formal arbitration instead of retribution can lead to more war.

If the American Civil War would have been over an issue was that equally difused across the land it would have manifested as an insurgency if at all. In which case Grant's strategy of crushing the will of the enemy populace would have likely failed. As it was a geographic issue, and a separate nation was formed, it worked.

Body counts? Certainly gained a bad rap in Vietnam. I see this as a measure of performance though, not effectiveness. Many factors go into what it takes to break the will of an opponent, so merely counting bodies only tells you that you are killing people.

In COIN operations, where one is trying to regain the support of their populace WHO, WHERE, WHEN, WHY, and HOW one kills is probably far more important than how many. Again, I still see it as a measure of performance that will often lead to an assumption that more is better, when if fact, the opposite may be true.

[John T. Fishel]

about anything he is on to something here. Mike, there are times when you can't bring the enemy to the negotiating table - Hitler and his henchment committed suicide rather than surrender. It was the thierd or fourth echelon that came to the table and certainly did not represent the NAZI regime. I suspect that Bob's World has put the body count issue in the right context - that it can be an useful measure of performance but not of effectiveness/outcome.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

And he is in this case.

The key item from his post is this:

"Historically best practice body counts were based on recorded kills, verified by physical control and recovery of the body AND Weapons - usually for some form of exploitation. (emphasis added / kw)

I would add that those figures should not be publicized in any way or released to the media because they will either misunderstand or misuse them -- more likely both -- and that will skew the military application (as it did in Viet Nam after mid 1966).

P.S.

Don't give them to the Departmental bureaucracy or Congress either -- because they will then be 'leaked' and really misconstrued.

P.P.S

John and Bob's world are correct also in that it can be a useful measure of performance but not of effectiveness/outcome.

[Rex Brynen]

Given their undoubted utility when used right--and their tendency to promote sloppiness, be misused, fixated upon, politically manipulated, or pushed to do things they aren't meant to do/indicate--are we then saying that...

body counts are the MRAPs of metrics?

[Infanteer]

John and Bob's world are correct also in that it can be a useful measure of performance but not of effectiveness/outcome.

Probably sums it up best.

"Body Count" is just a macabre name for a BDA - something we try to do all the time as a measure of performance.

And I agree with Wilf that it is tactical. I kill 6 of the 9 guys that tried to ambush me. Good. Useful data for the AAR. Doesn't tell me anything about how I diminished the Taliban insurgency (except on that road junction )

[JMA]

I started this because I hate to see another useful area of discussion die in the "Journal."
See here.
Sorry, but Body Counts work. That the it has been done it badly in the past by those cannot use the data usefully, does not mean it does not work.
We have to get over rejecting things just because they fail in the hands of people not skilled in their use.

Should it be THE measure of success? No, of course not, but most armies who defeated irregular forces used body counts. They were used in Kenya, Malaya (see my quote), Dohfar and Cyprus - and also Rhodesia!
Historically best practice body counts were based on recorded kills, verified by physical control and recovery of the body AND Weapons - usually for some form of exploitation.

The point is, you do not pursue a score as in judging success by the number you kill, but that you are sure that you are actually killing the enemy, when and as it is required. - that is why Templer used Body Counts, and British Army operations were predicated on "killing the enemy."

Do something well it works. Do it badly and it fails.

In Rhodesia the RLI Fire Forces could not kill them fast enough, the cannon-fodder kept on coming. It was nice to know we were getting around 100 kills every six weeks (near then end) but what was the point if that made hardly a dent in their numbers.

I do however like these kind of stats. In nine years in Malaya the Brit SAS kill 108 CTs out of an estimated 800 contacted in 280 contacts giving a kill rate of 13.5%. And a rate of a contact where kills were achieved at less than 38%.

From these stats the Brits would have (I'm sure... I hope) tried to figure out how to one, achieve kills in every contact, and two, to increase the kill rate per contact. On the other hand the CTs were probably figuring out the
opposite.

Through Fire Force in Rhodesia one of the RLI Commandos (with the Air effort obviously) accounted for 1,680 kills out of an estimated 2,000 contacted in a nine month period. This was an unprecedented kill rate of 84% while the average Rhodesian security force kill rate in contacts was 18.5%

Surely the aim is to not let the enemy become battle hardened and combat experienced? The best tactics therefore must be those that achieve the highest kill rate, yes?

Now what these tactics would be in each different theater I don't know but rather than just a raw body count the kill rate is even more important in my opinion.

(Detailed stats out of Rhodesia are difficult if not impossible to get.)

[William F. Owen]

In Rhodesia the RLI Fire Forces could not kill them fast enough, the cannon-fodder kept on coming. It was nice to know we were getting around 100 kills every six weeks (near then end) but what was the point if that made hardly a dent in their numbers.

Externals and internal kills had a significant effect on the Terrs. There only option was for a Libyan/Sino backed invasion, probably some time in 1982. That was why Lancaster House got up and running. The Rhodesians in some way still represent the COIN gold standard. Kill the enemy. All else is rubbish.

I do however like these kind of stats. In nine years in Malaya the Brit SAS kill 108 CTs out of an estimated 800 contacted in 280 contacts giving a kill rate of 13.5%. And a rate of a contact where kills were achieved at less than 38%.

From these stats the Brits would have (I'm sure... I hope) tried to figure out how to one, achieve kills in every contact, and two, to increase the kill rate per contact. On the other hand the CTs were probably figuring out the
opposite.

See the bottom of all my posts.

Surely the aim is to not let the enemy become battle hardened and combat experienced? The best tactics therefore must be those that achieve the highest kill rate, yes?

You are correct, but the US and UK Army do not want to focus on killing the enemy. Currently we are badly loosing our way.

[davidbfpo]

The latest posts by JMA & Wilf on kill ratios in ambushes and "sweeps" refer to the military search for simply being better. I am sure this issue has appeared on SWC before, although not so directly IMHO.

I am sure that some scientific research and output was present in Rhodesia and other earlier conflicts, notably WW2, on improving the kill (accuracy) ratio. There is one current thread that comes to mind: Increasing Small Arms lethality in Afg http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9942

[JMA]

The latest posts by JMA & Wilf on kill ratios in ambushes and "sweeps" refer to the military search for simply being better. I am sure this issue has appeared on SWC before, although not so directly IMHO.

I am sure that some scientific research and output was present in Rhodesia and other earlier conflicts, notably WW2, on improving the kill (accuracy) ratio. There is one current thread that comes to mind: Increasing Small Arms lethality in Afg http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9942

It maybe needs clarification that it is not an issue of seeking out the enemy and having more contacts but rather making each contact more telling in terms of the ratio of kills to the number of enemy contacted.

In Rhodesia the average kill rate among the security forces was 18.5% as compared to the fire force kill rate of 80-odd-% (this compared to the Brit SAS kill rate in Malaya of 13%)

I don't know what the kill rate in Afghanistan is but probably under 15%.

So the answer is not (IMHO) to seek out more 15% kill rate contacts with the TB but rather to figure out how to up the kill rate by a factor of at least 5.

I suggest that to achieve this the military returns to the Principles of War and instead of just paying lip service to them... applies them in a war situation!

[Rex Brynen]

It maybe needs clarification that it is not an issue of seeking out the enemy and having more contacts but rather making each contact more telling in terms of the ratio of kills to the number of enemy contacted.

In Rhodesia the average kill rate among the security forces was 18.5% as compared to the fire force kill rate of 80-odd-% (this compared to the Brit SAS kill rate in Malaya of 13%)

On the other hand Rhodesia also illustrates what critics of body-count metrics in COIN argue, namely that killing may not be a very effective measure of progress towards victory. In the end, the insurgency in Rhodesia was successful--perhaps not on the battlefield, but rather in the political and diplomatic arena where it really counted.

[Fuchs]

You are correct, but the US and UK Army do not want to focus on killing the enemy. Currently we are badly loosing our way.

Greater efforts for more kills would probably not yield much more kills anyway in the medium term. The TB would necessarily react with less exposure, using their elusiveness.

The greatest advantage of going for more kills on the defence would probably be that there would be less TB attacks (because attacks would become more risky).

Going for more kills on the offense doesn't promise a similar effect. The TB would probably improve their opsec and hide better, but their vulnerability to their foe's offensive actions couldn't be reduced by less offensive actions on their own, so there would be no motivation to change the latter.

Defensive and counter-offensive (counterattacks by convoy escorts and such) lethality should probably be improved.

A general increase in conflict intensity could not be sustained, though. The attempt to do it might turn out to be a double-edged sword.


Always keep in mind that the world is full of counter-forces.



edit: I write with ISAF in mind. ISAF's mission is to keep guarding until Afghan national forces take over. I've yet to see "victory against insurgents" in any of its mission statements or in relevant UN resolutions. I don't think that exterminating an insurgency is necessary or even advisable in such a context. Keeping the insurgency low and the ground fertile for a Kabul government takeover should be the mission. For example, I don't consider the Basra story/mission a disaster. It turned out well and the death & destruction up to that point wasn't as bad as it could have been.
Just guard a little longer and let them hurry up with their forces buildup and stabilisation of the state.

[JMA]

I said: "Surely the aim is to not let the enemy become battle hardened and combat experienced? The best tactics therefore must be those that achieve the highest kill rate, yes?"

You are correct, but the US and UK Army do not want to focus on killing the enemy. Currently we are badly loosing our way.

I nearly missed this one.

May I ask why you say this? Where is the focus then?

[William F. Owen]

I nearly missed this one.

May I ask why you say this? Where is the focus then?

Pop-centric COIN and "Influence operations," which are the basis of US/UK doctrine DO NOT focus military power on killing/destroying/defeating the enemy. Armed force is best used against armed force.